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|Substance||Holz I 90
Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the first and necessary being seems merely to correspond to the substance of Spinoza. In reality, it is only the concept of the totality of the inner-world facts.
The notion of the being experienced includes the concept of a true totality.
If, therefore, something is, then also is the one being of all beings and not nothing.
Holz I 112
Substance/Causality/Leibniz: Substance does not require causal action because its state is "by itself" (according to its own nature) in correspondence with the states of other substances.
Their autonomy is based on the fact that, in absolute world immobility, they represent nothing more than the particular perspectively realized isomorphism of the individual and the whole.
The individual is what it is only by the fact that the whole of the world is the necessary and sufficient condition of its individual being. That's why there is no need for windows.
It is not initiated from the outside, because that would be something outside the world then.
The individual is always a manifestation of the whole (>Mach's principle).
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992