|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.|
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|Truth||Holz I 44
Truth of reason/Truth of facts/Leibniz:
Truth of reason: certain simple and original ideas, such as those of identity, are immediately seen as modes or forms of our sense-perception as categories of the givenness of beings.
They are not mediated by perception, but are the determinateness of perception itself.
Holz I 54
Definition Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth appears as a statement relation, in which the identity of different things is determined against each other.
Definition Experience/Leibniz/Holz: experience is the return of something different to their connection in such a relation.
Discovery of the truth of different things, namely subject and predicate in synthetic sentences of experience. Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth is not really in the identity of the subject A = A, but in the return of the predication to the identity of a certain predicate with a certain subject in which it is contained, thereby distinguishing the subject from other subjects.
The truth of a proposition states that it can be traced back to an identical proposition (axiom).
Truth/Leibniz: truth appears only mediated, in the medium of its opposite, of appearance (> Hegel).
Truth of facts/truth of reason/Leibniz: I gain the certainty of the facts, the vérités de fait only by means of their representation on the level of reason - the vérités de raison.
This can show me the material truth but only as the not wrong. (s)
Double negation: weaker.
In the reversal of the method of proof in truths of facts, the variety of experience and the unity of reason stand opposite to each other like a mirror image.
Truth of facts/Leibniz: the truth of facts must exist, if anything should be said at all about the infinite manifoldness, and knowledge should thus be gained.
Truth of reasons/Leibniz: truth of reasons is necessary, their opposite is impossible.
Truth of facts/Leibniz: truth of facts is contingent, their opposite is possible.
Holz: the difference between the two must not be misunderstood, otherwise Russell would be right:
Russell: It is nonsense to say of a true proposition that it is not true in the sense of another, apotictically true proposition. ((s), for example, that a truth of reason contradicts a truth of facts).
Holz: the difference lies in the argument.
For the proof of truth of facts, we must examine the preceding chain of connections and because of the infinite divisibility of the bodies an infinite number of sentences. This can only do the infinite mind of God.
Truth of reason/Leibniz: is the generic term for truths of reasons and truths of facts!
The truth attribute of both lies in the fact that in the subject concept all its possible predicates are contained. "Praedicatum inest subiecto".
Inclusion of the predicate in the subject: A is contained in Ax or Ax = A + B + ... X.
This inclusion of the predicate is the foundation of truth. This is, according to structure, a reason of reason.
Definition truth/Leibniz/Holz: is then the constitution of that state in which identity comes to a being or a fact when it enters into a distinction between subject/predicate/definiendum/definiens.
This state is where the fact appears as the concept of the fact.
Truth is a reflexion relationship.
Holz I 68
"Overarching general"/Leibniz/Holz: the truth of reason is the genre which comprises two (and only two) species, namely the truth of reason itself and its opposite, the truths of facts.
For the formal logician, this remains a systematic contradiction: Leibniz makes a distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Nevertheless, he comprehends both of them analytically!
Holz: in fact, the relationship is not a formal logical one, but a dialectical one.
> Josef König: "The Overarching General" as the basic logical figure of Leibniz's metaphysics, is necessary for the inexpressable multiplicity of the world, which can nevertheless be subjected to an order of reason.
Holz I 73
Complete concept/Leibniz: the complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole.
Only perceptible to an infinite mind.
Overarching general: for the infinite mind, the distinction between truths of reason and truths of facts is again invalid. For him, everything is a truth of reason, or, one can say as well, everything is a truth of facts for him!
For the finite mind, however, the truth of reason is the opposite of the truth of facts.
Overarching general: the one involves its opposite.
Truth/Cognition/Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: This again has the astounding consequence that Leibniz can only speak sensibly of two kinds of truth (truths of facts/truths of reason) when he comprehends the idea of the infinite mind (for which the two coincide) only as a metaphysical auxiliary construction.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992