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|World||Holz I 25
World/Leibniz/Holz: for Leibniz the world is divided in three areas:
2. Processuality of history
3. "res cogitans".
World/world model/Explanation/Philosophy/Leibniz: Leibniz was the first to recognize that a theory of the world is not a theory of qualitative statements about substances, but must be designed as a relation system in which unity is determined by multiplicity.
World/Leibniz: the construction of a world model is thus directed to unity as a relation term, in which unity and multiplicity are understood as a real relation.
Holz I 47/48
World/Leibniz: Problem: how the concept of the totality of all beings and all facts can be constructed from it.
Since, like the number of sense-perceptions, the number of the corresponding identical propositions (and axioms) is also infinite.
Holz I 75
World/Leibniz: from the universal context, which is necessary for the determination of each individual (complete concept), it follows that, if one changes, the whole changes.
Final Justification/metaphysics/Leibniz: outside of the world, there is some dominating one, not as much as the soul in me, more like my ego in my body (?) - although of much higher reason.
The sufficient reason of existence cannot only be found in no individual, but also not in the whole aggregate and the set of things. It is different from the chain of connections.
This is in the sense of the logical process, a subject to which all possible predicates belong to (as far as they are composable).
This subject must be external to the world because the world is its predicate!
But this external to the world is also the world itself, because it is its only predicate! (But this "entelechy" must not be regarded as an existence, which is added to the world as a separate being, but as an organizing principle).
Apparent paradox: the only essential being must at the same time be thought of as the world as a whole and as external to the world.
Dissolution: the double movement of reasoning thought: ascending and descending.
1. Ascending: here the reason is external to the world because the world cannot think of a quantitatively determined end.
2. Descending: here the whole world appears as the unfolding of the One, in which it is included.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992