Books on Amazon
|Recognition||Holz I 39/40
Recognition/Definition/Leibniz: the return of the object of knowledge to definitions is an essential and indispensable last moment of recognition.
Recognition/Leibniz: it is not sufficient, however, to merely deduce the unprovability of the identity principle from the nature of the argument.
This would suffice, however, to nominally state the reason for any deduction method, whereby the deduction would have to be carried out methodically as a reduction to identical sentences.
But a material knowledge of truth would only be guaranteed if the principle itself were to be regarded as not only nominal, but also material-ontological.
Otherwise it is only a heuristic principle. However, it is immediately intelligble if it is accepted that it is necessary that the opposite of which is impossible.
Recognition/Leibniz: the principle of principles is a good use of ideas and experiences.
Good usage is nothing but the combination of the definitions by identical axioms.
The principle is, however, arbitrary and conventional. Perhaps a differently structured logic would be conceivable.
Recognition/Thinking/LeibnizVesDescartes: he needs a true God (who is not a deceiver), so that self-assurance does not remain trapped in the empty "pure thought of itself".
Leibniz: instead: justification by factual truths, i.e. it is about the ontological status of the world.
Holz I 82
Empiricism/Leibniz/Holz: here, the reduction forbids us to speak of the necessity of the factual, while facing an infinite number of empirical, identical propositions.
Even the unity of the world is only a heuristic assumption or an idea of reason.
(> Continuous determination, Kant).
Consistent determination/Kant/Holz: "Everything existing is consistently determined": i.e. in order to recognize a thing completely, one has to recognize everything possible, and thereby determine it, whether it is affirmative or negative.
The consistent determination is therefore a concept which we can never represent in concreto of its totality. It is merely an idea of reason, which prescribes to the mind the rule of its complete use.
Kant's subject-centric solution reduces the world to phenomenality.
Being in itself is inaccessible.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992