Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Malcolm, Norman
 
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Identity Cavell I 45
Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sensory impressions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application.
Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would also be the same.
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Cavell I 55
Identity/numeric/qualitative/Malcolm: in sensations, we must invent a criterion! E.g. Siamese twins with one hand: here you have to decide if there is one pain or two.

Malc I
N. Malcom
Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-27