|Picture Theory: When discussing the picture theory it comes to the question, to what extent a sentence is image of a fact, a situation or a section of the world. How should the sentence parts correspond to parts of the world? Is there such a correspondence at all? - See also Relations, Map Example, Tractatus, Wittgenstein, Russell, Picture.|
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|Picture Theory||I 102
Mapping Relation/Language/Millikan: we begin by coordinating at least some words with objects.
Correspondingly, true sentences correspond with facts in the world.
Problem: wrong sentences do not correspond to any fact. Question: How can words which correspond individually to objects very well be composed that at the end the whole sentence does not correspond?
E.g. "Theaitetos flies": "Theaitetos" corresponds to "Theaitetos", "flies" corresponds to "fly".
Wrong solution: to say that the problem would be in the relation between Theaitetos and the flying. For the relation corresponds already with something, this can be instantiated (e.g. between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiated. Everything corresponds with something - but not the entire sentence "Theaitetos flies".
Solution/Frege: he combined singular terms with "values" which were the objects in the world.
Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted it in the same way as names, as complex signs, which at the end described the true or the wrong. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant!")
Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan: (Millikan: better than Frege): Complex aRb, whereby in the case of wrong sentences the correspondence with the world is missing.
Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another sense of "corresponds"! That is, words should correspond to things differently than sentences with the world.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987