|Quine, Two Dogmas of Empricism:|
1st Dogma distinction analytic/synthetic - 2nd Dogma reductionism. The belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to a logical construction of terms which refer to immediate experience. - Quine, W.V.O. (1951), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review 60, 20–43. Reprinted in his 1953 From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press. See also analytic/synthetic, reduction, reductionism, conceptual schemes, holism. Later D. Davidson discussed a 3rd dogma (separation scheme/content).
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|Two Dogmas||I 321
Knowledge/Context/Holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: does not all knowledge depend on "collateral information" as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we then test individual concepts independently of the rest?
Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan: Thesis: Our statements on the external world do not stand alone before the tribunal of experience, but only as a corpus.
It follows that no single belief is immune to correction.
Test/Review/MillikanVsHolism/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs stand never before the tribunal of experience.
It is therefore unlikely that such a belief will ever be supported or disproved by other beliefs.
Confirmation: only confirmation: by my ability to recognize the objects that occur in my settings.
From the fact that beliefs are related does not follow that the concepts must also be related.
Identity/Identification/Millikan: The epistemology of identity is primarily precedent to that of judgments.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987