VsCorrespondence theory: this also ">

Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Given, philosophy: something in the outside world, which should correspond to what we perceive through the senses. It is problematic how to distinguish the constitution of external objects from what is determined by the construction of our sense organs. The presupposition of a given, also assumes that both this and the side of the perceiving subject are fixed in a certain way. This is doubted by many authors.See also reality, myth of the given, perception, world, world/thinking, thing in itself, perspective, nature, naturalism, epistemology.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

R. Millikan on Given - Dictionary of Arguments

I 6
Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology.
VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory.
>Foundation
, >Correpsondence theory.
I 7
Not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth".
In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes.
Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product of nature, as the knowing person himself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world.
>Knowledge/Millikan, >Naturalism.

_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Millikan
> Counter arguments in relation to Given

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration