Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Millikan, Ruth
Books on Amazon
Intensions I 5
Belief/wishes/intension/Millikan: can be explained without reference to language.
I 111
Intension/Millikan: intension is something quite different from Fregean sense. It is not a rule, but an application criterion, relative to the speaker's state. We must take into account the speaker and his mechanisms. Its dispositions and its justification for the use of an icon.
I 112
Intension: has therefore to do with causation and justification of utterances.
Sense/Fregean Sense/Millikan: sense has nothing to do with the particular speaker and his situation, one does not have to know how he comes to map something, just how something is mapped.
Meaning/Intension/Millikan: Difference: e.g. Pegasus: has an intension, but as an empty name it can have no (Fregean) sense.
Adjective: correspondingly: "bewitched" has no sense, but intension.
I 143
Intension/Concept/Language/Quine/Millikan: our concepts cannot be based on intensions, and these in turn on other intensions etc.
Intrusive information/Quine: then we would be dealing with "intrusive information".
Quine: everything would always have to be tested at once.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29