Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Millikan, Ruth
Books on Amazon
Ontology I 13
Ontology/Millikan: we are interested in the general structure the world must have in order for subject-predicate sentences, negation, etc. to be mapped on it.
Realism/Millikan: correctly understood, realism does not demand that the world has to be "properly divided".
I 109
Ontology/Millikan: there is not one "single correct description" (articulation) of the facts.
Solution: Thesis: Structures, sets of possible transformations instead of things with properties. Similar to the group theory of mathematics, with which many problems of a similar kind have been solved.
Substance/Properties/Millikan: Thesis: "Substance" and "properties" are categories that are cut off relative to each other and relative to the operation of the negation. They do not mutually exclude one another.
Properties/Millikan: properties are varied elements of facts, receptive to negation.
Substances/Millikan: substances are also variable, but relative to other transformations.
I 255
Ontology/Category/Millikan: to grasp that a thing falls into an ontological category does not mean to have an inner representation, but a richer concept.
Classification/Millikan: the classification function is to change a concept, not to represent the world.
Category/Millikan: On the other hand, many of our words expressing categories also map the world.
For example, knowing that a thing is a mineral makes it possible to ask specific questions.
Knowing that a thing falls under a category is not a representation, e.g. "Gold is a chemical element" is not an inner representation.
I 258
Identity/Ontology/Millikan: if I am right, the ontology of identity is such that we can discover objective sameness in the world, i.e. to know when we identify something correctly.
Thus we can leave the paradoxes of verificationism, phenomenalism and idealism behind us. ((s) paradoxes that arise from the assumption of only momentary existence or only mental existence or only momentary perception).
Realism/Millikan: Thus we arrive at a fully developed realism (not classical realism, see Realism/Millikan.).

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29