Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Senseless/meaningless: Meaningless in philosophy and logic are statements which cannot be negated. False assertions on the other hand are never senseless. Otherwise, their truth value could not be established. See also Sense, Truth, Negation, Meaning, Sentence meaning, Truth value, Misinformation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
R. Millikan on Sensible/senseless - Dictionary of Arguments
I 223 Senseless/senseless sentences/negation/Image/Millikan: here there is the same problem (as with > facts/Millikan): E.g. "Gold is not square". The sentence is not true because gold has a form other than square. Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no meaning either! Nevertheless, e.g "gold is not square" seems to say something true. Problem: again, if "not" has a function other than in representative sentences, we must still explain this function. 2. Problem: (more important): the mapping rules between simple sentences of the form "x is not " and its real value. Real value/Negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? E.g. The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact like John's exactly-being-180-tall? I 224 Millikan: the latter is correct. >Sense/Millikan._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
||
> Counter arguments against Millikan
> Counter arguments in relation to Sensible/senseless
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19