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Verification/Knowledge/Epistemology/Realism/Naturalism/Millikan: our problem of the recognition of identities is different from the ordinary recognition problem of the realists.
With us, it is not about the existence of an inner test for the correct image of the world. We just need to show that there can be tests that...
...determine whether concepts, when applied under normal conditions, can produce mapped sentences.
Correspondence/Coherence/Tradition/Millikan: for the tradition it must be coherence, if correspondence is not the right one.
Test/Millikan: E.g. the heart can only be tested together with kidneys.
Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/image/Millikan: we are only trying to understand how there can be a test that has historically been applied to human concepts in this world, and whose results are correlated with the world for reasons, which we can specify.
Problem: we are more handicapped here than the realism.
It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all.
Holism/MillikanVsHolism: epistemic holism is wrong.
Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if applied only to a small set of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts.
Concept/Law/Theory/Test/Review/Millikan: if a term occurs in a law it is necessary,...
...to test it together with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain conclusion rules.
Concept/Millikan: since concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested.
Test: does not mean that the occurrence of sense data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine).
Theory/Review/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together?
Tradition: says that not only some, but most of our concepts are not of things we observe directly but from other things.
Test/Logical Form/Millikan: if there is a thing A, that is identified by observing effects on B and C, is then the validity of the concepts of B and C together with the theory that traces back the observed effects on the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A?
From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts governing B and C is tested when the concept governing A is tested and vice versa.
This is not the case if A is a definite description, for example, the "first president of the USA", and it does not follow if the explicit intension of A represents something causally dependent. For example, "the mercury in the thermometer rose to the mark 70" as an intension for "the temperature was 70 degrees".
Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities - the ability to recognize something as self-identical.
Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: e.g. my ability to make a good cake is quite independent of my ability to smash eggs, even if I have to smash eggs to make the cake.
Test/Review/Theory/Millikan: That a test works can often be known regardless of knowing how it works.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987