Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Goals: Goals are desired outcomes that we strive to achieve. See also Imagination, Purposes, Actions, Behavior, Will, Intentionality, Intentions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Ruth Millikan on Goals - Dictionary of Arguments
Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in: Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (eds.) Der Geist der Tiere, Frankfurt 2005 II 201 Animal/Purpose/Millikan: the anthropomorphism equips animals with plans or human-like purposes, i.e. with cognitions. To do this, one needs a theory, about what is purpose, cognition and human cognition. I distinguish between 1. Biological, 2. "intentional" purpose direction: this has to do with recognizing purposes and having plans. Thesis: there can be no investigation of the behavior that is not implicitly based on a speculation about what the biological purpose direction is. The intentional purpose direcetion is more problematic. It is a form of biological purpose. >Intentionality, >Animals. II 202 Purpose/biological/Millikan: E.g. Heartbeat, e.g. a frog ejecting its tongue. Biological function is the historical survival value. >Functional explanation. Behavior/Millikan: why can behavior not be investigated without referring to biological purpose? II 203 There can be an infinite number of possible descriptions ((s) Cf. >"Is language infinite?") that can be given for a behavior. The mouse runs towards its hole, but also to the north, towards London, or towards the broom. Here, it is clear that only the former description is relevant. II 204 That mice run away from cats is the key. Because it is a recurring phenomenon. That they are running towards a broom is not a recurring phenomenon. II 205 Not any output of an animal is relevant behavior. E.g. "knee twitching" has no survival value. E.g but sneezing probably has one. II 207 For example, if my blinking makes you smile, namely as a biological purpose, I will not recognize this purpose; I will not blink because I think of that purpose. >Purposes._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |