Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Montague, R.
Books on Amazon
Objects (Material Things) Lewis IV 28
Object/Lewis: what I call a thing in the world, they call it
Carnap/Kripke/Montague: a couple. ((s) Then the thing can be held fixed, permuting the worlds. LewisVs))
They would call the same thing in different worlds, what
I/(Lewis): call class of reciprocal counterparts.
But caution: there is more than verbal difference: I can cover a universality that they cannot cover (Canrapt, Kanger, Hintikka, Kripke, Montague)
Counterpart relation: is generally not an equivalence relation.
That is, it does not apply between the pairs with the same first term ((s) no thing is in several worlds). No matter how you try to identify them.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29