Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Montague, R.
Books on Amazon
Propositions Cresswell I 67
Proposition/Cresswell: there are certainly semantics that accept propositions as basic entities and attribute them as values to sentences (Montague, 1974, 227, and Cresswell, 1966).
I 68
(Also Thomason, 1980).
Sentence functor/Montague/Thomason: in such theories the
meaning of the sentence functor is: a function of propositions on propositions,
of predicates: functions of individuals on propositions, etc.
Thus, the generation property is obtained for all sentences.
Situational Semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: it is not certain whether Barwise and Perry can accept this - at least not, if the meaning of each sentence operator (and when expanding each modifier) must be represented by a function. For they must have infinite domains, and the two do not want infinite entities in the semantics (> Cresswell 1985b 210f, 215f).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28