Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Evidence: proof of the existence and the behavior of objects or of the truth of statements. Evidence can be direct or indirect. See also theories, facts._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Arne Naess on Evidence - Dictionary of Arguments
I 397 Increase in evidence/evidence/naess: increase in evidence leads to more reasons to claim something, but not repetition of "it is so". No approximation of knowledge: E.g., I reach for a dummy - search for knowledge is not comparable to this. - Increase of evidence may be measurable, but not of knowledge. >Knowledge, >Justification. If understanding, remembering and seeing implies truth, then increase of evidence cannot lead to this knowledge or memory. - A distance to the truth is not determinable as in the case of grasping next to it. >Understanding, >Recognition, >Cognition, >Theory of knowledge. I 399 No approach to knowledge: Either the statement is false or it is true, then we already possess knowledge. >Truth, >Statements, >Truth values._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Naess I Arne Naess Can Knowledge Be Reached? Inquiry 1961, S. 219-227 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28