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|Substance||Holz I 31
Substance/Spinoza: is with him unique according to its nature, infinite, and indivisible.
Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thought prerequisite of the substantial unity of the world and the experience prerequisite of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance, in which "all that one had taken for true, has perished."
This, however, reveals the actual presupposition of thinking, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger.
Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity".
If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought.
Holz I 62
Identity Principle/objective cognition/Leibniz: The objective unity of the world can also be shown independently of my perception, it is evident in the way of givenness of every consciousness content in itself. (Everything appears as what it appears).
Adequacy does not matter here.
"Tantum est quantum est, tale est quale est". Pre-predictive being a priori.
Problem: then the phenomena are still mere moments of the one and only substance, as in Spinoza.
Substance/Spinoza: no being is to be justified against the universe in its own being. Rather, the reduction of identical sentences would lead to an "ens absolute infinitum" in Spinoza, from which "it follows that there is only one substance and that it is infinite."
However, this reduction can only come to a beginning with a waiver of the substantial existence of the many individuals.
VsSpinoza: if one accepts the existence of the individual, the problem is insoluble for Spinoza.
He solves the problem, or it does not come into his field of view, because he conceives the essence of the human only as formed from certain modifications of the attributes of God.
With this, the Cartesian doubt is covered up. The ego cogitans becomes the mere appearance, the annexation of the self-assured unity of God.
Thus Spinoza returns to medieval realism.
Thus the rationality of the factual cannot be justified. ((s) > "What is real, is also reasonable").
Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992