Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Taylor, Charles
Books on Amazon
Facts EMD II 263
Facts/F/tradition/Taylor: description of sentences = existing situations - logical complexes - constituents: the entities that are relevant for the truth of any sentence - Problem: relevance when a totality of F is given - Definition exist/Taylor : an element exists if its description is true.
II 264
Theory of Tradition/Tradition: logical truths: all have the same descriptum - VsTradition: coextension: not the same F: E.g. having a heart, having kidneys - but synonymy: "aardvark/groundhog": same fact - tradition needs the principle of material adequacy: that is, the entities (constituents) must be relevant for the truth of the sentences that they describe.
II 269
Vs: vague formulation dependent> Strawson.
II 277
Negative facts/Taylor: conflict between principle of material equivalence and condition 3: intuitively, the same elements are relevant for the truth of the sentence S as for its negation. But S and ~ S have opposite truth conditions. That is, the sentences must have different descriptions - solution: take the negation sign itself as an element - above the elements which are themselves relevant for the truth of S - then neg F as category sui generis - negation: must have common constituents with the corresponding positive F.
II 277/8
Definition Fact/F/Taylor: new: every F x in S associates with the set of "F-states (x)" of total states, so that x exists iff the actual total state is an element of the set of F-states (x).
II 279
Then facts are equivalence classes on S (= sentence or set of F) under the relation ~, but whereby the descriptum of a sentence is now seen as an equivalence class to which belongs its descriptum in the former sense, and the new fact as existing, if their elements in the former sense exist - facts are then elements of S.
EMD II 280f
Facts/application/Taylor: we no longer need that for truth conditions - and not anymore for a Tarskian truth theory - (the semantic apparatus is strong enough) - facts: were used to explain connection between analytic/synthetic sentences - analytic sentences do not describe any F - new: method: to paraphrase sentences of natural language - e.g. Fischer's victory over Spasskij caused Breshnievs anger: victory (f,s) anger (b) - then expand syntax: by double-digit sentence operator "tries victory (f,s) anger (b)" - (+) - problem: fulfillment and truth for the extended language - "causes" is not truth-functional: solution: perhaps two-digit predicate of the meta-language "caus": should only be valid between existing facts - (and such that are equivalent to these - a sequence of elements satisfies caus(A,B) under the interpretation I iff caus(ascribe (A,s), ascribe(B,s)).
Graeser I 57
Fact/F/TaylorVsDavidson/VsDummett: some phenomena, which are talked about, only gain form through the use of language - N.B.: inasmuch they cannot well serve as data of a theory, which make meaning understanding dependent on the knowing of truths .

Tayl I
Ch. Taylor
The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. M√ľnchen 2002

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-27