Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Intuitionism: A) intuitionism in mathematics assumes that the objects to be inspected, e.g. numbers are only constructed in the process of the investigation and are therefore not ready objects, which are discovered. This has an effect on the double negation and the sentence of the excluded middle. B) Intuitionism of ethics assumes that moral principles are fixed and are immediately (or intuitively) knowable. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
F. Waismann on Intuitionism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 69 Intuitionism/Waismann: Intuitionism allows only proofs that can be constructed in a finite number of steps (that are constructive). All others are meaningless. >Proofs, >Provability. Formalism/Waismann: also allows non-constructive evidence. This dispute is, however, idle, if it is true that the word existence has no clear meaning from the outset. It is only obtained by the proof. And then a corresponding different one. >Formalism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
||
> Counter arguments against Waismann
> Counter arguments in relation to Intuitionism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18