Books on Amazon
Circle/Peacock/McDowell: why does Peacocke believe that there must be bridges between the conceptual and what is external in the experience?
He believes that he must avoid a circle with this.
In order to explain the possession of a concept of observation, we must not, according to Peacocke, regard the content as conceptual.
For example, colors: not only the notion of "red" is presupposed, but, worse, the "concept of possession of the concept "red"" is presupposed.
Circle/McDowellVsPeacocke: this only shifts the problem.
Why should we actually assume that we are always in a position to explain what it means to have a concept?
For example, the neurophysiological conditions would not refer to what someone thinks when he thinks that something is red. (That's exactly what Peacocke wants).
Circle/McDowell: the explanation for observation concepts must always be outside the scope of the concepts. (Also Wittgenstein). But not "lateral perspective".
Circle/Experience/Reason/Side perspective/McDowell: because of the impossibility to take the "side perspective" (to set oneself up outside of everything), the circle is not to be avoided, but it is not bad in the case of observation concepts.
The problem of motivated thought tends to undermine the motivated thought.
The necessary "side perspective" (external point) undermines the intelligibility of "for the reason that".
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001