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|Parmenides||Bubner I 66
Parmenides/Hegel/Bubner: Hegel attributes to Parmenides an almost Spinozistic pantheism. Everything be one and the differences void. Hegel: this is due to the denial of the negative, which he has made in the separation of spheres into truth and opinions of man. Then all the negatives belong to the erroneous opinions.
These erroneous opinions are constantly shifting back and forth between being and nothing.
ParmenidesVs: "Which form the negative can also take, it is not."
Hegel: this putting the negative aside leaves only a single truth, namely that being is.
Being/Parmenides/Hegel: "Thinking produces itself, what is produced is the thought, so thinking is identical with its being, for there is nothing but being, this great affirmation".
This is, however, an abstraction from any determinateness which is attributed to the kingdom of Doxa (erroneous opinions).
It makes no sense to speak of yet another being than that which is produced by thought.
Thinking/being/Hegel/Bubner: the strange thing in the production thesis, into which Hegel dissolves the unity of being and thinking (in Parmenides), is questioned in other translations. In this case one can reverse the primary identity of being with itself as a reason for the existence of thought-content, while Hegel traced back the being to the spawning thinking itself.
Being/Parmenides/Hegel: Beginning of Logic: Second Parmenides Exegesis:
Definition being/Parmenides/Hegel: Being is the indefinite immediacy. Bubner: this is not simply a matter of heaven, but the absence of any quality (determinateness) is generated by radical abstraction from all that is defined, which means a denial of all mediation.
Thus the immediate is the absolute emptiness in the beginning. This coincides with nothingness. Since there is nothing to permanently refer to, in order to characterize being in its peculiarity, the limit to nothingness has always been blurred.
However, a reflection on the origin would show that the indeterminacy has arisen only by moving away all determinateness.
In reality, therefore, the beginning is not at all the indifference of being and nothing, but in the "movement of the immediate disappearance of the one in the other.
End/beginning/Parmenides/Hegel: the static developmental beginning would be the end. It is therefore necessary to go beyond the position of the absolute, and such a process itself constitutes a "second new beginning."
Finite/infinite/idealism/Hegel/Bubner: the transition from the infinite to the finite (in the early idealistic construction) must then be accomplished in such a way that the infinite does not become finite.
There must be no boundary between the two, because then the infinite is no longer itself, but limited.
This boils down to the principle that there is nowhere in heaven and on earth something that does not contain both being and nothing in itself. "
Finite/infinite/boundary/Hegel/Bubner: it has always been passed over. Thus the fixing of one position against another, which made the transition necessary, is already faulty.
Abstraction always comes too late, the process of passing over is always going on. This is the triumph of the "profound Heraclitus" over eleatism.
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992