Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Possibilia, philosophy: possibilia are accepted, possible objects that do not exist (in our world) actually. It is controversial whether one should discuss them at all, since their properties are not so clearly defined that they can always be distinguished from one another, for example, to count them. See also possibilism, actualism, modal realism.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

J. Bigelow on Possibilia - Dictionary of Arguments

I 101
Possibilia/Bigelow/Pargetter: things that are not located anywhere but could have been. They are not universals at first! In the end, however, we will argue that they are universals after all.
>Universals
.
I 113
Possibilia/counterfactual conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: counterfactual conditionals often require that we consider possibilia even if we know that they are not actual.
>Counterfactual conditional, >Actuality, >Actualism, >Actual world, >Possibilism, >Possible worlds.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990


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> Counter arguments in relation to Possibilia

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18
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