Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Universals: Universals are expressions for what objects can have in common, such as a particular color. Examples of universals are redness, roundness, value. The ontological status of universals as something independent of thought - that is, their existence - is controversial. What is undisputed is that we form terms to generalize and use them successfully. See also General terms, Generality, Generalization, Ontology, Existence, Conceptual realism, Realism, Ideas, Methexis, Sortals, Conceptualism, Nominalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
P. Forrest on Universals - Dictionary of Arguments
Bigelow I 89 Structural universals/Peter Forrest/Bigelow/Pargetter: (similar to our higher level relations): Forrest: thesis: there is a quasi-mereological n-part operation that takes n quasi-parts and assembles them into a quasi-whole: Operation ‹a1,…an› = an+1. Bigelow/Pargetter: that is equivalent to the fact that we have a (n+1)-digit relation: R(a1,…an, an+1). BigelowVsForrest: our differences lie in the fact that we do not accept the quasi-mereology. >Mereology, >Parts, >Whole, >Mereological Sum, >J. Bigelow. Entailments/VsBigelow: one could object that we have explained the entailments between 1st level properties by appeal to higher level properties. >Entailment. In doing so, we have practically assumed that there are also entailments between them (this is circular). I 90 Bsp Necessary (being methane R (being carbon) Entailment: then because of this relation the entailment is valid, between the methane-being of something and the fact that this thing has a part which is carbon: (I) Necessarily, for any F and G, if (F) R (G), then every instance of F has a part that is an instance of G. The principle (I) involves necessity. This must be grounded in the essence of universals to avoid modal basic concepts. But is not the appeal to essences itself modal (and modal magic)? >Essence, >Modality, >Necessity, >Modal Logic. BigelowVsVs: yes and no. We all need a little magic sometimes. But this is white magic. You just argue sometimes about what is white and what is black._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Forrest, P. Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
||
> Counter arguments against Forrest
> Counter arguments in relation to Universals
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16