Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Boer, Steven E.
Books on Amazon
Content I XIII
Definition Thought/Boer: can be common to different states of mind.
Proposition/Boer: I do not call it thought content, because this expression brings too much ballast with it.
Intensional transitive verbs: have three conditions, each of which is sufficient for itself:
(i) failure of the principle of the substitutability of identity
(ii) quantification permits a specific "narrow range"
(iii) there is no existential (ontological) commitment.
Direct objects/direct object/propositional settings/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis.

Fulfillment conditions/EB/proopositional attitudes/individuation/Boer: N.B.: The fulfillment conditions do not appear to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude.

On the other hand:
Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude.
Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs.

Propositional attitudes/Individuation/Lewis: (1969): the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain fulfillment conditions.

Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: in order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience.

Definition mental reference/Terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference.
Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only a partial aspect of a speech act (utterance).
Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication.
Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent.
Problem: non-existent objects.
Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain.
Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only the item/s to which a subject by the power of having ψ refers to. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves.
Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ).
That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content).
Content/thought content/Boer: is the that-sentence.
Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

> Counter arguments against Boer

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX file
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29