Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Boer, Steven E.
 
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Intensional Objects I XIV
Direct objects/direct object/propositional attitudes/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis.

Fulfillment conditions/EB/propositional attitudes/Individuation/Boer: N.B.: The conditions of fulfillment do not seem to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude.

On the other hand:
Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude.
Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs.

Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: In order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience.
Definition reference/terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference.
Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only partial aspect of a speech act (utterance).
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I XV
Mental reference: should then be only a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication.
Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent.
Problem: non-existent objects.

Thought object/Tradition/Boer: Thought objects are often understood in the tradition as the thought content of a propositional attitude with all involved objects:
BoerVs: confusion of thinking-that with thinking-about.
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I XV
Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain.

Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only that/these item/s to which a subject refers to by the power of ψ. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves!
Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ).
That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content).
Content/Thought content/Boer: is the that-Satz.
Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986


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> Counter arguments in relation to Intensional Objects



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-27