Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Boer, Steven E.
Books on Amazon
Intentionality I 4
Definition semantic intentionality/Boer: weaker: can be defined by fulfillment conditions with quasi-semantic characteristics.
Fulfillment conditions/EB: are determined asymmetrically by thought contents (GI).
N.B.: therefore, all cognitive intentional states are semantically intentional, but not vice versa. E.g. to have a thought content is to have certain terms, but not vice versa.
I 4
Animal/Thinking/Terms/Boer/(s): Thesis: we could concede animals certain terms, but not the full handling with them. And indeed, rather, in attributed whole sentences, not alone.
I 4
Perception/Semantics/Cognition/Peacocke/Boer: Thesis: some perceptual states are semantic but not cognitively intentional.
Boer: that is controversial. ((s) Whether perception can also be non-conceptual).
I 6
Definition weak metaphysical intentionality/Boer: the fact that a relation is participation-independent, or a condition that is such that its existence entails a participation-independent relation to something.
Intentionality/Boer: some authors have something stronger in mind:
I 7
Existence-independence/conceptual dependency/intentionality/Smith/McIntyre/Boer: (Smith, McIntyre, 1982):
BoerVs: Problem: this is much more remote from actualism.
> Dependency
I 10
Definition metaphysical strongly intentional/Boer: is a relation R iff it is both existence-independent in the sense of (D3sub) and is concept dependent in the sense of (D4sub).
Sufficient condition for this:

(4) (ER) {that a subject is a in s entails (Σw) aRw & M [Σx) (Σy) x exists and xRy, but y does not exist and M (Σx) (Σy) (Σz) (y = z & xRy & ~ xRz)]}.

(D4sub) R is a concept dependent relation = it is possible that (Σx) (Σy (Σz) (y = z & x has R to y &~(x has R to z)).

For example, Oedipus wants to marry Iokaste, but not his mother.

E.g. to believe that... exists (But ... does not exist)
I 11
Boer: Thesis: this can be a real relation. (In substitutional quantification/sQ).
I 20
Definition strong metaphysical intentionality/Boer: is a relation between terms by virtue of their simultaneous existence-independence in the sense of (D3NA) and conceptual dependency. In the sense of (D5).
Definition strongly metaphysical intentional state/Boer: exists when in this state being is involved, since one stands in at least one strongly metaphysical intentional relation to a being.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

> Counter arguments against Boer
> Counter arguments in relation to Intentionality

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-25