## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Fodor: Signal language of the brain for internal processing - PutnamVs. Mentalese explains nothing, shifts the problem. SearleVs. Regress of homunculi. - Rorty's solution is a hierarchy of dumber homunculi. | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Boer, Steven E. Books on Amazon |
Mentalese | I 16 Thought language/Mentalese/Boer: if it exist, the singular terms would take over the presentation and the formulas of expressing. We summarize this in (D5): (D5) R is a concept-dependent relation = for each object x and y that x has the relation R to y, entails for a representation z and one --- I 17 Behavior-determining relation Q: A) a has Q to z and B) either (i) z forms y on x (that is, z is or contains something that represents y for x) or (ii) z expresses y (that is, z is a representation with a fulfillment condition which it has from y) and C) for any representation r which maps y or expresses it whether x has q to r depends on whether r has one or more intrinsic properties of a certain domain (i.e. there is a set F of intrinsic features of x' representations such that, for each representation r which maps y for x, x has Q to r iff r exemplifies a feature from F). E.g. wanting to marry someone. Requires, among other things, certain visual impressions, a behavioral-determining relation, but not certain other visual or auditory impressions. Then we say that the relation exists under a certain specification. This is in perfect agreement with (T2). Problem: from (P2) seems to follow that e.g. Oedipus: (14) The mother of Oedipus exemplifies the property of being a thing that Oedipus wants to marry. --- I 18 From (P3) we conclude (15) (15) Oedipus wants to marry the mother of Oedipus. Solution: Differentiation of A) Strong/notional reading: reports how Oedipus understands the desired condition B) Weaker/relational reading: shows only which objects are involved, without taking into account what Oedipus thinks of them. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29