Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Fodor: Signal language of the brain for internal processing - PutnamVs. Mentalese explains nothing, shifts the problem. SearleVs. Regress of homunculi. - Rorty's solution is a hierarchy of dumber homunculi.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Boer, Steven E.
 
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Mentalese I 16
Thought language/Mentalese/Boer: if it exist, the singular terms would take over the presentation and the formulas of expressing. We summarize this in (D5):

(D5) R is a concept-dependent relation = for each object x and y that x has the relation R to y, entails for a representation z and one
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I 17
Behavior-determining relation Q:
A) a has Q to z and
B) either (i) z forms y on x (that is, z is or contains something that represents y for x) or
(ii) z expresses y (that is, z is a representation with a fulfillment condition which it has from y) and
C) for any representation r which maps y or expresses it whether x has q to r depends on whether r has one or more intrinsic properties of a certain domain (i.e. there is a set F of intrinsic features of x' representations such that, for each representation r which maps y for x, x has Q to r iff r exemplifies a feature from F).
E.g. wanting to marry someone. Requires, among other things, certain visual impressions, a behavioral-determining relation, but not certain other visual or auditory impressions. Then we say that the relation exists under a certain specification.
This is in perfect agreement with (T2).
Problem: from (P2) seems to follow that e.g. Oedipus:

(14) The mother of Oedipus exemplifies the property of being a thing that Oedipus wants to marry.
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I 18
From (P3) we conclude (15)

(15) Oedipus wants to marry the mother of Oedipus.

Solution: Differentiation of
A) Strong/notional reading: reports how Oedipus understands the desired condition
B) Weaker/relational reading: shows only which objects are involved, without taking into account what Oedipus thinks of them.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986


> Counter arguments against Boer
> Counter arguments in relation to Mentalese



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29