|Boer, Steven E.
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Non-existence/search/propositional attitudes/Boer: E.g. someone who is looking for the fountain of youth or e.g. someone who worships Zeus, is looking for something and worships something. One cannot say that he is not looking for anything
This leads to (D3):
(D3) R is an existence-independent relation = It is possible for an existing thing to have the relation ^R to something that is not an existing thing.
Boer: the application of (D3) now depends on how we interpret "some" and "existing".
Existence/Classical logic: to be value of a bound variable. Problem: then you can have no relation to an existing thing that is not an existing thing ((s). That is, classical logic leads to a contradiction on a more elementary level).
Relation/classical logic: must deny that there are such relations at all.
Solution: then you have to regard "looking for the fountain of youth" as a simple form without complexity, i.e. no relational verb with a singular term.
Existence-independence/conceptual dependency/non-actuality/"there is"/"exists"/Boer: distinction between "exists" and "there exists":
VsNon-Actualism/Boer: this is fixed on shady entities like potential fat men. (Unrealized Possibilities).
BoerVsVs: these are overreactions.
Solution/Boer: a metaphysical basis for the distinction exist/be without ontological overpopulation.
Non-actual/non-existent: here there are two possibilities then:
A) an essential property of N is not exemplified (e.g., fictional figures, "merely possible individuals" e.g. Superman)> Possibilism, also Plantinga pro as an actualist)
(B) N has no essential properties. For example, it is assumed that fictional characters are essentially fictional, that is, they could not be real. Then there might be at best an imitation of Superman. The fictional Superman is then a thing without individual essence.
If you accept this, you can still maintain the thesis that all things are necessarily self-identical.
Existence-independence/referential quantification/non-actualism: causal relations cannot be existence-independent. On the other hand, relations to non-existent objects must be existence-independent. E.g. search, worship, etc. can be relations to non-existent objects.
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986