Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Boer, Steven E.
Books on Amazon
Propositional Attitudes I XIV
Propositional attitudes/individuation/Lewis: (1969): the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain conditions of fulfillment.
> Intensional Objects
Propositional attitudes/belief/Boer: the whole is plausible, but not substantial enough to answer philosophical questions.
E.g. why are beliefs not complete under logical equivalence, and even if it is under entailment?
What does it mean that two people have the same belief? (And not just a similar one).
For example, how can rational people believe things that are not true? (Error, deception).
For example, if water is necessarily H20, why does this not automatically provide the scientific knowledge?
Solution: for such questions we need a substantial theory and ontology of beliefs qua propositional attitudes. That's what this book is all about.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

> Counter arguments against Boer

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24