Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Boer, Steven E.
Books on Amazon
Representation I 16
Representation/conceptual dependency/non-actualism/referential quantification/Boer: the referential quantification does not work so easy here.
Representation/Solution/Boer: there is a completely intelligible property which can have a real relation: the representation:

(CD) R is a concept-dependent relation = it is possible that for some objects x and y and properties F and G, x R to y, qua has the thing that is F, but x has R not to y qua the thing, which is G.

(CD)) says that the speech of x relation to y qua F-thing ((s) x is the same F as y): namely, x's representation of y.
Conceptual relation: could then be mediated by representations in the sense that to be in relation R to y, x be behavioristic to the intrinsic properties of a (verbal or non-verbal) representation which in its turn is associated with y in the correct manner
Thought object: here it can be a kind of "presentation". (E.g. souvenir image, causally based on y, a private name or label).

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

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> Counter arguments in relation to Representation

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28