Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Brentano, Franz
Books on Amazon
Objects of Thought Prior I 121
Objects of thought/Brentano/Meinong/Findlay: Brentano: is a modern echo of Reid:
I 121/122
Brentano: Scholasticism called the intentional existence of an object a "direction (pointing) to an object" (this does not have to be something real) or "an immanent objectivity".
Mental state/Brentano: everyone has in himself something that serves as an object, even if not all do this in the same way.
Brentano's modern echo is Findlay.
Intentional objects/thought objects/Findlay: (like Meinong): we can think of objects that do not exist.
We can even make many true claims about them.
Meinong: e.g. that the golden mountain does not exist is true but it is undoubtedly that it is both a mountain and a golden one.
(s) VsMeinong: E.g. just as an impossible thing is both: 1. impossible, 2. a thing. Findlay/Meinong: existence or non-existence does not make any difference in reference to "being what".
Non-existence/Meinong: "incomplete objects" that lie before us, whenever we think of them, in the general way "something that is so and so" (Similar to Reid:> triangle).
Prior I 123
Intentionality/Brentano: unique logical category. Similar to a relation, without being a real relation.

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29