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Certainty/skepticism/pain/knowledge/Cavell: it is not about the ability to recognize something is weaker than the ability to know something.
On the contrary, if I acknowledge my delay, for example, it follows that I know about it, but not vice versa.
For example, if another person may have pain without recognizing it, then it follows that he knows about his pain? From this comes the (imagined?) fact that he now has certainty about his pain.
Consequence: either we accept the analysis made by the anti-skeptic about the various statements of the skeptic or we keep to the facts that they take into account and conclude that the analysis offered cannot be correct that it did not follow the argument.
Skepticism/Cavell: the direct attempt to defeat it makes us believe we have arguments where we really have none.
We are fighting in a too strong embrace with the skeptic. Thus, the anti-skeptic assumes the most important condition in the argument of the skeptics: according to which the problem of knowledge about the foreign psychological is the problem of certainty.
At the same time, he neglects the central insight of the skeptic, trying to prove their non-existence by himself (that certainty is not enough).
This leads the anti-skeptic to fix on the perspective of the first person and to neglect the third person.
But one could say: the recognition of pain in the first person is not a recognition of certainty, but the recognition of pain! Showing the object.
Certainty/knowledge/first person/third person/pain/cook: the idea that I cannot know about the feelings of the other because I cannot have them, treats the difference as one of the circumstances.
E.g. as I am not able to see the crocuses of my neighbor.
WittgensteinVs: the difference is not in the circumstances but in the language game.
Why is "incapable of having the feelings of another" no circumstance? Probably because you cannot imagine how it could be otherwise.
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002