Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Certainty: In philosophy this is about whether we can know that we know something. The term was coined by L. Wittgenstein in the discussion of G. E. Moore. See also Moore's Hands, Skepticism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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St. Cavell on Certainty - Dictionary of Arguments
I (a) 62 Certainty/skepticism/pain/knowledge/Cavell: it is not about the ability to recognize something is weaker than the ability to know something. On the contrary, if I acknowledge my delay, for example, it follows that I know about it, but not vice versa. >Knowledge, >stronger/weaker. I (a) 63 For example, if another person may have pain without recognizing it, then it follows that he knows about his pain? From this comes the (imagined?) fact that he now has certainty about his pain. Consequence: either we accept the analysis made by the anti-skeptic about the various statements of the skeptic or we keep to the facts that they take into account and conclude that the analysis offered cannot be correct that it did not follow the argument. >Skepticism. Skepticism/Cavell: the direct attempt to defeat it makes us believe we have arguments where we really have none. We are fighting in a too strong embrace with the skeptic. Thus, the anti-skeptic assumes the most important condition in the argument of the skeptics: according to which the problem of knowledge about the foreign psychological is the problem of certainty. >Other Minds. I (a) 64 At the same time, he neglects the central insight of the skeptic, trying to prove their non-existence by himself (that certainty is not enough). This leads the anti-skeptic to fix on the perspective of the first person and to neglect the third person. But one could say: the recognition of pain in the first person is not a recognition of certainty, but the recognition of pain! Showing the object. >First Person, >Pain. I (a) 65 Certainty/knowledge/first person/third person/pain/cook: the idea that I cannot know about the feelings of the other because I cannot have them, treats the difference as one of the circumstances. >Emotion/Cavell, >Circumstances. E.g. as I am not able to see the crocuses of my neighbor. WittgensteinVs: the difference is not in the circumstances but in the language game. >Language game. I (a) 66 Why is "incapable of having the feelings of another" no circumstance? Probably because you cannot imagine how it could be otherwise._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18