Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Hintikka, J.
Books on Amazon
World Lines I XVI
World line/cross-world identity/Hintikka: 1. We must allow some objects not only to exist in certain worlds, but also that their existence is unthinkable there. That is, world lines can cease to exist - even worse: it may be that they are not defined in certain worlds.
Problem: This is not permitted in the usual knowledge logic (belief logic).
2. World lines can be drawn in two ways:
A) object-centered
B) agent-centered.
Analogy: this can be related to Russell's distinction between knowledge through acquaintance and by description.
I 20
World line/Hintikka: world lines should connect the counterparts of an individual in different worlds. If we have a network of world lines (in relation to a subject of knowledge), then we have truth conditions for quantified sentences in an epistemic logic of the 1st level.
I 22
World line/epistemic logic/knowledge logic/acquaintance/description/knowledge/Hintikka: there must be two types of world lines:
A) public: knowledge through description (psychological: semantic memory).
B) private: knowledge through acquaintance. E.g. visual perception (including memory). Only related to a subject. (Psychological: episodic memory).
These world lines are then bound to a scenario.
Quantification: Problem: we need two pairs of quantifiers then.
Spelling: (∀x)/(∃x) for the public, descriptive - (Ax)/(Ex) for the private world lines established by acquaintance. Then
(2.5) (Ex) {b} K (d = x)
I.e. in a visual perception situation, b can find a niche for d under his visual objects.
More generally: b is known with d, b knows d.
I 59
World line/Hintikka: we use world line instead of Frege's "way of being given".
I 105
World lines/possible worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there are two sets of world lines for a set of worlds, which also connect each individual to an individual in another world, but the two sets differ in which individual is connected to which one.
Perception/observation language/observation concepts/Hintikka: for perception verbs we need such a possibility ((s) Because it can be that one mistakes an object for another.)
I 148
World lines/identification/cross-world identity/Hintikka: Thesis: the world lines must be drawn before the conditions are applied at all. The drawing of the world lines is never a part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise it would be circular).
Truth-conditions/atomic/atomic set/Hintikka: for my theory the interplay of truth values of atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows, e.g. how the truth values of sentences of the form
"knows + a-W-word" sentences depend on the truth values of sentences of the form (18) - (19).
(18) (∃x) K (b = x)
(19) (Ex) K (b = x)
HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is that these conditions are always indexed (indexical), i.e. that they are context-dependent. That is, that it is only in a certain situation whether an individual is the same.
Or whether it is analog to one that would criticize traditional truth tables because some of the sentences that they serve to put them together are, for their part, blurred.
Epistemic logic/Hintikka: the epistemic logic, however, is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25