Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Similarity: Similarity is the conformity of one or more - but not all - properties of two or more objects. See also Identity, Equality, Properties, Predicates, Predication, Identification, Descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Paul Churchland on Similarity - Dictionary of Arguments
Fodor IV 188 Condition/Equality/Similarity/Quality/Paul Churchland: basic cncepts: State space, similarity space, similarity metric. E.g. "Anglophone hyperspace with logical relations on hypersurfaces." Should replace Chomsky's image. ((s) Hypersurface/Churchland/(s): something on that you can go up/down, right/left, and front/back, and that within a language. Is needed to describe objects and their relationships.) --- IV 189 Fodor/Lepore: that assumes that state spaces also reflect grammar. Churchland: It also has in mind that a kind of representations reflect "contents" of neurological states. Fodor: Thereby he's up to his neck in his intentionality. --- Fodor IV 193 Similarity/Equality/Semantics/Paul Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: surprisingly begins with sensations, not with intentionality (such as with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had an adequate access to sensations, this could be generalized to a general mental representation. Churchland: the qualitative character of our sensations is generally considered to be inaccessible as neurobiological reduction. But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here, reveals a considerable amount of explicit information. E.g. color dice with frequencies. --- IV 194 Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes here that this is an access to the sensations (via frequencies!), not only to the discriminatory ability of the nervous system. Churchland: so the inexpressible can be expressed. The "unspeakable pink" can be grasped by frequency. So maybe the everyday language can also be replaced. --- IV 195 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust concept of equality in general?_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |