Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lorenzen, Paul
 
Books on Amazon
Truth P. Lorenzen Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium (1959) in Karel Berka/L. Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin, 1983

Berka I 270
Truth/Dialogical Logic/Lorenzen: with the infinite inductive definitions, one can transform, e.g. the semantic concept of truth into a dialogically definite concept.
There are two sets, the
set T of the true formulas and the
set F of the wrong formulas.
---
I 271
If the formulas with the logical particles are constructed from decision-definite prime formulas, then T (true) and F (false) are defined infinitely inductively as follows:

A e T u B e T > A u B e T

A e F > A u B e F

B e F > A u B e F

(correcpondingly for v)

A e F > i A e T

A e T > i A e F

(n)A(n) e T > (x)A(x) e T

A(n) e F > (x)A(x) e F

(correspondingly for (Ex)).
Foundation/Lorenzen: for this definition one does not need ordinal numbers as step numbers, because the definition scheme is "sound". That is, one gets after a finite number of steps to a prime formula.

Lorn I
P. Lorenzen
Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983


> Counter arguments against Lorenzen
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29