Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Knowledge: Knowledge is the awareness or understanding of something. It can be acquired through experience, or education. Knowledge can be factual, procedural, or conceptual. See also Propositional knowledge, Knowledge how._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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T. Horgan on Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments
Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/HorganVsJackson/Horgan/Chalmers: (Horgan 1984)(1) E.g. The knowledge about Clark Kent and the knowledge about Superman differ intensionally. >Intensions, >Content, >Conceptual Content, >Inferential Content , >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought, >Existence, >Non-existence, >Description levels. Knowledge/ChurchlandVsJackson: likewise, the knowledge about temperature differs from knowledge about medium kinetic energy. (Churchland 1985)(2). Solution/Chalmers: a posteriori the intensions coincide. 1. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-52. 2. Patricia Smith Churchland. (1985). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief. Philosophical Review 94 (3):418._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Horgan I T. Horgan Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009 Horgan II T. Horgan The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content 2010 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |