Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
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Property Dualism Chalmers I 130
Property Dualism/SearleVsProperty Dualism/SearleVsChalmers: Searle (1992) has a similar view as I do, but denies that this is a property dualism. Rather, the ontological status of consciousness is the same as that of physical properties, such as being liquid. This is not a mere terminological difference to my dualism. In Searle, basal physical facts do not cause the higher level ones, they constitute them. Constitution is a much closer relationship than causation. (FN 2/chapter 5).

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24