Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| de re - Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments | |||
| de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Item | More concepts for author | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brandom, Robert | de re | Brandom, Robert | |
| Chisholm, Roderick | de re | Chisholm, Roderick | |
| Cresswell, Maxwell J. | de re | Cresswell, Maxwell J. | |
| Davidson, Donald | de re | Davidson, Donald | |
| Dretske, Fred | de re | Dretske, Fred | |
| Hintikka, Jaakko | de re | Hintikka, Jaakko | |
| Lewis, David K. | de re | Lewis, David K. | |
| Logic Texts | de re | Logic Texts | |
| Perry, John | de re | Perry, John R. | |
| Prior, Arthur N. | de re | Prior, Arthur | |
| Quine, W.V.O. | de re | Quine, Willard Van Orman | |
| Rorty, Richard | de re | Rorty, Richard | |
| Schiffer, Stephen | de re | Schiffer, Stephen | |
| Searle, John R. | de re | Searle, John R. | |
| Wiggins, David | de re | Wiggins, David | |
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