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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bacon | Gadamer | I 354 Bacon, Francis/Gadamer: On the whole, one will have to follow the usual Bacon criticism and admit that Bacon's methodological proposals disappoint. >F. Bacon. They are all too vague and general, and have produced little when applied to I 355 natural science, as we can see today. >Method/Bacon, >Experiments/Bacon, >Interpretation/Bacon. Dialectics/GadamerVsBacon: It is true that this opponent of empty dialectical quibbles has himself remained deeply bound to the metaphysical tradition and its dialectical forms of argumentation, which he is fighting against. His goal of defeating nature by obeying it, the new attitude of attacking and conquering nature, all that has made him a champion of modern science, is only one programmatic side of his work, to which he has hardly contributed anything lasting. Prejudice/Bacon: His real achievement lies rather in the fact that he comprehensively examines the prejudices that occupy the human mind and lead it away from the true knowledge of things, thus achieving a methodical self-purification of the mind that is more a disciplina than a methodology, Bacon's famous doctrine of "prejudices" has the purpose of making a methodical use of reason possible in the first place(1). >Prejudices/Bacon. 1. F. Bacon, Nov. Org. 38ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Induction | Bacon | Gadamer I 354 Induction/Francis Bacon/Gadamer: It is the special achievement of Bacon (...) that he is not content with the immanent logical task of developing the theory of experience as the theory of a true induction, but that he has discussed the whole moral difficulty and anthropological questionability of such an experiential achievement. His method of induction seeks to rise above the random and accidental manner in which everyday experience is produced, and even more so above its dialectical use. In this context, he has, in a way heralding the new age of methodological research, upset the theory of induction, which is still represented in humanistic scholasticism, because of its enumeratio simplex. Induction: The concept of induction makes use of the fact that generalization is based on random observation and, as long as no counter-instance is encountered, claims validity. As is well known, Bacon contrasts anticipatio, this hasty generalization of daily experience, with interpretatio naturae, the knowledgeable interpretation of the true being of nature(1). Interpretation: Through methodically organized experiments, it should allow the gradual ascent to the true, durable generalities, the simple forms of nature. This true method is characterized by the fact that the mind is not left to itself there(2). He's not allowed to fly the way he wants. Rather, the requirement is to ascend gradatim (step by step) from the particular to the general in order to acquire an orderly experience and to avoid all haste(3). Experiment: The method that Bacon himself demands, is an experimental one(4). However, it should be borne in mind that the experiment in Bacon does not always mean the technical event of the natural scientist who artificially induces processes under isolating conditions and makes them measurable. Rather, experiment is also, and above all, the artistic guidance of our mind, which is prevented from allowing itself to be led by hasty generalisations, and who consciously varies the observations he makes on nature, consciously confronting the most remote, apparently most divergent cases, and thus gradually and continuously learns to arrive at the axioms by way of a process of exclusion(5). (See >Thought Experiments). GadamerVsBacon: >Francis Bacon/Gadamer. 1. F. Bacon, Nov. Org. I, 26ff. 2. A.a.O. 1, 20f; 104. 3. A.a.O. l, 19ff. 4. A. a. O. vgl. insbesondere die „distributio operis«. 5. A.a.O. 1,22, 08 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Induction | Mayr | I 78 Induction/Francis Bacon/Mayr: large rehabilitation (and actually the first introduction) of induction. For two centuries decisive. >F. Bacon. Justus von LiebigVsBacon: Liebig 1863(1) first rejection of Bacon. "Induction alone cannot produce new theories". Biology: for them, practically none of the universal laws of physics apply. This is why it was largely excluded from science philosophy. >Laws of nature, >Physics. I 80 MayrVsPopper: it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to falsify a useless theory convincingly. The categorical statement that in a single falsification the whole theory falls does not apply to evolutionary biology. >Falsification, >K. Popper, >Theories. I 219 Def Induction/Biology/Mayr: Influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues. By proteins. It is important for almost all organisms. 1. J. v. Liebig (1863). The natural laws of husbandry. Boston: D. Appleton and company. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Interpretation | Bacon | Gadamer I 354 Interpretation/Bacon/Gadamer: Through methodically organized experiments, it should allow the gradual ascent to the true, durable generalities, the simple forms of nature. This true method is characterized by the fact that the mind is not left to itself there(1); it must not fly as it wishes. Rather, the requirement is to ascend gradatim (step by step) from the particular to the general in order to acquire an orderly experience that avoids all haste.(2) >Induction/Bacon, >Francis Bacon/Gadamer. 2. F. Bacon, Nov. Org.. 1, 20f; 104. 3. A.a.O. l, 19ff. Feyerabend I 97 Natural interpretation/Bacon/Feyerabend: Bacon wanted to remove natural interpretations (which were prejudices for him) like the shells of an onion. He thought the interpretations were simply added to the perception. I 98 Natural interpretation/observation language/FeyerabendVsBacon: without them we would be completely disorientated. We also cannot separate their netting. >Observation language. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Interpretation | Feyerabend | I 94 Natural Interpretation/Feyerabend: Natural Interpretation encompasses mental operations that are so closely linked to the senses that separation is difficult. Natural interpretations are learned! Natural Interpretation/Intellectual History/Feyerabend: depends, either a-priori presuppositions (Kant) or advantages (Bacon). 97 Natural Interpretation/Bacon/Feyerabend: Bacon wanted to remove natural interpretations (which were prejudices for him) like the peels of an onion. He believed the interpretations were simply added to perception. I 98 Natural Interpretation/Observation Language/FeyerabendVsBacon: without natural interpretation we would be completely disoriented. We cannot take apart its mesh. >Observation language. I 105 Natural Interpretation/Feyerabend: the new natural interpretations form a new and abstract observation language. They are introduced and hidden so that the completed change is not noticed (method of anamnesis). They contain the notion of the relativity of all motion and the law of inertia of circular motion. I 123 Natural Interpretation/Earth Movement/Feyerabend: this kind of interpretation is "natural" in a completely new and revolutionary sense: it does not require neither an external nor an internal drive to maintain it! The first kind of movement is necessary to explain the up and down of the stars, The second kind is used when one wishes to regard the movement as something relative, as depending on the choice of a coordinate system. >Observation, >Reference systems. I 367 Interpretation/Feyerabend: interpretation is a continuity of formal relations (logic) does not mean continuity of interpretations. E.g. Duhem: the notorious "derivation" of Newton's law of gravitation from Kepler's laws. >Natural laws. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Method | Bacon | Gadamer I 354 Method/Bacon/Gadamer: [The Interepretation] (...) is intended to allow, through methodically organized experiments, the gradual ascent to the true, lasting generalities, the simple forms of nature. This true method is characterized by the fact that the mind is not left to itself there(1); it must not fly as it wishes. Rather, the requirement is to ascend gradatim (step by step) from the particular to the general in order to acquire an orderly experience that avoids all haste(2). >Induction/Bacon. Gadamer I 355 GadamerVsBacon: His goal of defeating nature by obeying, the new attitude of attacking and conquering nature, everything that made him a champion of modern science, is only the one programmatic side of his work, to which he hardly contributed anything lasting. Kuhn I 41 Baconian Method/Kuhn: is to make measurements without ties to any theory - KuhnVsBacon: that it is practically never realized. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Positivism | Comte | Wright I 152 Positivism/Comte/Wright, G. H.: Comte's positivism is above all science theory (Cf. Comte 1830(1)). Comte's ultimate goal was to be an advocate of the "positive" scientific spirit in the study of social phenomena. Coupled with this was a strong belief in the usefulness of scientific knowledge for social reforms. (1830, lecon I, 8). Wright, G. H.: it is perhaps not uninteresting that Comte can be compared to Francis Bacon as a herald of a technological view of knowledge. Both contributed significantly to the creation of a certain "scientistic climate of opinion", but almost nothing at all was contributed to the actual scientific progress. (G. H. von WrightVsBacon, G. H. von WrightVsComte.) >Technology, >Science, >Empiricism, >Sociology, >Explanation. 1. Comte, A.: Cours de philosophie positive, Avertissement de l' Auteur, 1830. |
Comte I A. Comte Cours de Philosophie Positive (Ed.1830) New York 2012 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Positivism | Wright | I 152 Positivism/Wright, G. H.:can be characterized in different ways: a) associated with a phenomenalist or sensualist epistemology; and b) modern positivism: associated with a verification theory of meaning. c) associated with a "scientist" and "technological" conception of knowledge and its uses. >Phenomenalism, >Sensualism, >Verificationism, >Meaning, >Scientism, >Technology. Mill: has more of a positivist in the first sense of the word than Comte. >J. St. Mill. Comte: his positivism is above all science theory (cf. Comte, A. 1830)(1). Comte's ultimate goal was to be an advocate of the "positive" scientific spirit in the study of social phenomena. This was coupled with a strong belief in the usefulness of scientific knowledge for social reforms. (Comte 1830, lecon I, 8). >A. Comte. Wright, G. H.: it is perhaps not uninteresting that Comte, as a herald of a technological understanding of knowledge, can be compared to Francis Bacon. Both of them contributed significantly to the creation of a certain "scientistic climate of opinion", but almost nothing at all was contributed to the actual scientific progress. G. H. von WrightVsBacon, G. H. von WrightVsComte. >F. Bacon. I 21 Positivism/VsPositivism/Wright, G. H.: the anti-positivist methodology of the nineteenth century can be associated with an older Aristotelian tradition, a tradition that had been replaced three centuries earlier by a new spirit in science theory, above all by Galileo. >G. Galilei, cf. >P. Feyerabend. 1. Comte, A., Cours de philosophie positive, Avertissement de l’Auteur, 1830. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Prejudice | Bacon | Gadamer I 355 Prejudices/Bacon/Gadamer: This is precisely where [Bacon] is interesting for us, because here, albeit critically and with the intention of exclusion, moments in the life of experience come up which are not teleologically related to the goal of science. For example, when Bacon, among the idola tribus, speaks of the tendency of the human mind to always remember only the positive and to forget the instantiae negativae. The belief in the oracle, for example, feeds on this human forgetfulness, which retains the true prophecies and ignores the untrue ones. Language/Bacon: Likewise, the relationship of the human mind to the conventions of language is in Bacon's eyes a form of disorientation of knowledge through empty conventional forms. It belongs under the Idola fori. GadamerVsBacon: (...) already these two examples can show that the teleological aspect, which dominates the question in Bacon, is not the only possible one. Whether the primacy of the positive in memory is valid in every consideration, whether life's tendency to forget the negative is to be treated critically in every consideration, is still to be asked. Hope/GadamerVsBacon: Since Aeschylus' Prometheus the essence of hope is such a clear distinction of human experience that, in view of its anthropological significance, the principle of letting the teleological standard of cognitive achievement apply alone must be regarded as one-sided. Language/GadamerVsBacon: Something similar will suggest itself to us in relation to the meaning of the language that guides all experience in advance. As certainly as verbalistic illusory problems can arise from the dominance of linguistic conventions, language is at the same time a positive condition and management of the experience itself. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bacon, F. | Black Vs Bacon, F. | III 89 Science/Neutrality/Black: classic trend: "not interest-driven". III 90 Idyllic picture: the results are only shared with a small illustrious circle of insiders. That is outdated. Instead: Science/Bacon:> Rule over nature. Scientists: USA 1978: 1.223 million practicing, social scientists:. 190.000. BlackVsBacon: the military-industrial complex casts a shadow over its ideal to use science for the benefit of mankind. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Bacon, F. | Feyerabend Vs Bacon, F. | I 97 Natural Interpretation/Bacon/Feyerabend: wanted to remove natural interpretations (which were prejudices for him) like the layers of an onion. He believed that the interpretations were simply added to the perception. I 98 Natural Interpretation/Observation Language/FeyerabendVsBacon: without it we would be completely disoriented. We cannot take its braid it apart. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Various Authors | Hacking Vs Various Authors | I 98 Argument of Cosmic Coincidence: a good theory explains phenomena as contiguous which have not previously been thought of as related. Conversely, we arrive at the same raw entities with very different thought processes. I 227 Reichenbach: "Argument of the same cause" - also Salmon: E.g. Brownian movement, Avogadro number: you always come to the same number in different ways. HackingVs: petitio principii. Language/Bennett: developed, E.g. because one native wanted to warn another that a coconut was about to fall from a tree. HackingVsBennett: racist! In general, conjectures about the origin of language have a tendency to be unimaginative and patronizing. I 249 Bacon: "An experiment which is not preceded by theory is related to the natural sciences like the sound of a child’s rattle to music". HackingVsBacon: an experiment can be made out of mere curiosity and be equally fruitful!. I 299 Theory/Observation/Hanson: Noticing and observing are skills and abilities. E.g. positron. HackingVsHanson: you cannot train an assistant to make accurate observations without teaching him big theory. (still practiced in England today). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Experiment | Pro | Hacking I 249 AristotleVsExperiments - instead: deduction from principles - Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626) per experiment (> 17th century) - HackingVsBacon: e. also out of sheer curiosity. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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