Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Berkeley Kant
 
Books on Amazon
Adorno XIII 57
Berkeley/KantVsBerkeley/Adorno: Kant (…) nennt Berkeley, den wir einen Spiritualisten nennen würden, einen Idealisten und spricht dabei von träumerischem Idealismus, weil es ein Idealismus sei, der die Realität der Außenwelt einfach bestreitet, während sein eigener transzendentaler Idealismus als Versuch zur Rettung der Objektivität ja gerade empirischer Realismus sein will.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Experience James
 
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Suhr I 93
Experience/James: experience is a "double-barreled word": like "life" and "history". ---
Diaz-Bone I 55
Experience/Sensation/JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "Associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions which produce ideas by acting on the organism. James: This "determinism" probably explains the sensations of details, but not the experiences of utterances of will, feelings, rationality, memories.
---
I 59
Pure Experience/James: Experience is the Reality! (> Berkeley: being is perceived, being of things is their being known.) JamesVsBerkeley: esse est percipere.


Dew I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 2016

James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
God Berkeley
 
Books on Amazon
Stegmüller IV 380
Berkeley / Stegmüller: in favour of theism - introduces a theistic concept of God a -
IV 381
VsBerkeley / Berkeley / Stegmüller: 1 Vs: it could be several ghosts. not merely a God - 2 Vs: the order is exaggerated.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Ideas Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 74
"Idea of idea," Berkeley / Rorty: makes it possible to make the concept of an extended substance superfluous. - BerkeleyVsDescartes
II 129
Berkeley / Rorty: Thesis: "nothing but another idea can be like an idea" - RortyVsBerkeley: He should have said - only one sentence may be relevant to the truth of another seentence - ((s)> coherence theory)

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Ideas Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
I 51
Ideas/Berkeley: the idea of A cannot be the idea of B - SellarsVsBerkeley: he would not be able to admit the idea of something crimson - ((s) red and crimson are not mutually exclusive).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Imagination Berkeley
 
Books on Amazon
I 230f
Imagination / abstract / Berkeley: the idea of a triangle must be neither acute nor stump nor rectangular etc. - then it’s not a triangle - so there are no abstract ideas - VsBerkeley: merges the problem with the abstraction: how is it possible that a one can have a relation to a class or species? (General / Special) - there can be no similarity between giving something that is an idea and something that is no idea - a perception cannot reflect something that is external to perception.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Immanence Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 33
Def immanence principle/ Berkeley / Rutte: "real external thing": absurd, because otherwise there would have to be thoughts that are thought by nobody - VsBerkeley: confusion between "not intended" and independent thought - objects that are independent from thinking therefore do not have to exist - Berkeley: There is no specific experience for verifications - we can make the same predictions when denying the outside world.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Mental States Berkeley
 
Books on Amazon
I 222
Mind / Berkeley: different from imagination - but always based on ideas - it is the active substrate of the passive idea - HumeVsBerkeley: a mind can generate no idea in another spirit - I do not recognize the mind by sense impressions, but by want.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Perception Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
I, 136ff
Perception/ChisholmVsTradition: Appearance rather than feeling - adverbial speech: "feels reddish" - cannot be comparative - hallucination: here it depends on the mode of experience - appearance: divisible> sense data language is permissible - perception: it is epistemically evident to me that the object is there - transcendent evidence: judgment about the object is related to me - perceptible properties: secondary qualities - 1. primary qualities: indirect attribution of a property, 2. non-propositional: the subject takes possession of the property true, self-presenting - does not imply the object . ---
I 150
Perception/Knowledge/Theory of Knowledge/Chisholm: Epistemic Principle 9 de re: x is such that it is evident to x that it is F (less pure) - not applicable if thing does not exist - not to reveal existence non-reflectively, not self-presenting. ---
I 152
Negative perception: seems to demand incompatibility, but it does not have to - Russell: negative perception: empirical propositions, directly known, not developed - Chisholm: e.g. hear nothing: psychological state - negative perception/Whitehead: creates consciousness in first place. - Chisholm pro: Awareness of one's own intentional attitudes. ---
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 24
Perception/Rutte: more than experience: taking an external through the senses - experience: could also be purely immanent. ---
II 24
Aporia of perception/Hartmann: how is correspondence possible if the one is consciousness-immanent and the other consciousness-transcendent? - Causing of experiences has very different properties than having experiences. ---
II ~ 25
Perception problem: not whether we perceive things as they are, but whether we can infer from our experiences a causer. - Rutte: experience-like core of the immediate given (SellarsVs) - perception/Rutte: effect of the object evokes a legal order of experience which causally determines the experiences and provokes expectations. ---
II 27
Perception/Helmholtz: not as an image of properties but their "indications". These are interpreted on the basis of hypotheses - the mode of appearance of a thing is structurally reflected in a certain regular order of our sensory experiences. Hypothetical realism: Schlick, Kraft, Popper, Konrad Lorenz et al. ---
II 34
Perception/Rutte: success/failure already presupposes realism. - linguistic analytical philosophy: criteria for deception - Berkeley: does not exist. VsBerkeley: then there is not even a conceptual distinction of hallucination, but this is presupposed by Berkeley himself. ---
II 36
Realism/Truth/Rutte: whoever wants to know whether there are outside things can perhaps guess the truth about it - there is no truth-oriented way to find it out because no successes or failures can be demonstrated that might speak for or against the assumptions.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Perception Pinker
 
Books on Amazon
I 148
Berkeley: e.g. cherry: is just a mixture of sensations. If you take that away, you take away the cherry. PinkerVsBerkeley: we can have exactly the same knowledge of two objects and yet know that they are two - before swapping we number them.
---
I 176
Sensory perception/thoughts/Pinker: have an emotional coloring. They need a governing body, an "I".

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Rationalism Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 36f
RationalismVsBerkeley: we believe in the outside world from the beginning, no decision situation; similar to Hume, but very modest position - methodology / Sciences: Strategy: better than maintaining a change -> belief in the uniformity of the world.
II 39
Rationalism / Rutte: reason always appealed to already existing belief-majorities - reason: strategy: attitude maintained when change is not attractive, is also true for indecision - it is more attractive to maintain realism - solipsism: less attractive
II 76
KantVsRationalism: mere consistency shall impose existence - (s) existence: freedom from contradiction, but not vice versa guaranteed -> Field: consistency = logical possibility.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Reality Berkeley
 
Books on Amazon
I 217f
Matter / material world / outer world / reality / reality / Berkeley: there is no material substance - but probably an outer reality! - I 232 involuntary perception is a moment of reality.
Danto I 202
LockeVsBerkeley: there are objects to be compared.
I 202
Berkeley - Schopenhauer: only two kinds of things: consciousness and its contents.
  I 206
World / reality / Berkeley / Danto: there is nothing but ideas - but we do not sit in a cage that shields us from the world. - BerkeleyVsPlaton: there is no cage because there is no distinction between inside and outside. Science / Berkeley: does not refer to a reality behind the experience, but the experience itself.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Sensations Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty I 135
Quine: there are no feelings. (As the sun is not "rising".) ---
Quine V 15ff
Sensation/Quine: structured wholes (figures) - not flashes of light - VsBerkeley: Depth: is not accessible - perceived shape, not stimuli (> consciousness) - (this is within reception) - stimuli instead of sensory data ----
V 17
Gestalt TheoryVsSense data - QuineVsGestalt Theory: meaning related with receptors, not with consciousness.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Similarity Berkeley
 
Books on Amazon
Putnam V 96
Similarity / PutnamVsBerkeley: the question of whether A and B are similar to each other is meaningless: everything is similar to each other in any respect - self-reflection on similarity is circular, because attention on a thing presupposes s. - s.: not self-interpreting
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Skepticism Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
III 179
TraditionVsSkepticisms: if one asserts something that goes beyond the experience, then one is constructing something totally unverifiable anyway - so if the reality consists of nothing but our experience, the skepticism comes to nothing - tradition. The scepticism only allows the abyss between appearance and reality - SearleVsTradition: it is not true that the experience is what is perceived - I also do not conclude from the perception to the object - SearleVsBerkeley: my experience gives me access to something that is not an experience itself: the table.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

World Berkeley
 
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Stegmüller IV 384/385
Berkeley/Stegmüller: Doppeldeutigkeit: a) unsere Weltauffassung trifft nicht zu. - b) Gott selbst perzipiert eine vierdimensionale Welt - (der modernen Physik). - 1. MackieVsBerkeley: zur physischen Welt gehört auch die Anatomie der Wahrnehmung. - 2. wenn es Willensfreiheit gibt, müßten wir auch Veränderungen in Gottes Ideen bewirken können. - 3. nach Berkeley müßten Gottes Ideen widerspruchsfrei sein, aber nicht vollständig. - D.h. nicht durchgängig bestimmt. - Sie haben den Status intentionaler Objekte. - Bsp ich kann einen Gegenstand denken, ohne seinen genauen Platz zu kennen. - Analog müßten Gottes Ideen auch unbestimmt sein. - 4. viele Details ergeben sich ganz natürlich. - nach Berkeley werden sie künstlich komplizierter.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Berkeley Vs Aristotle
 
Books on Amazon
I 230
General/BerkeleyVsAristotle/BerkeleyVsPlato/BerkeleyVsLocke: the idea of a triangle as an abstract notion may neither be acute nor perpendicular nor obtuse (>SellarsVsLocke: disjunction, Berkeley: rejection). Berkeley: but then it is not a triangle, so there are no abstract notions. I 231 VsBerkeley: how is science at all possible? Solution/Berkeley: referential character of the signs.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Berkeley, G. Danto Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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Arthur Danto
I 209
VsBerkeley: Violates the common sense. Everything seems to have the nature of a dream. Another problem: Berkeley actually is aware of the existence of objects at times, since they appear to anyone. What happens to things when I turn off the light in the kitchen and go away? Surely there is still a lot of cockroaches, but it is questionable whether their world is mine.

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Berkeley, G. Frege Vs Berkeley, G.
 
Books on Amazon
IV 47
FregeVsBerkeley: if everything is imagination, there is no bearer. If there is no bearer, there are no imaginations either. But there can be no experience without someone who experiences it. But then there is something that is not my imagination, and yet the object of my contemplation. Could it be that this "I" as a bearer of my consciousness is just one part of this consciousness, while another part may be a "moon image"? I.e. that something else is taking place while I judge that I’m looking at the moon? Then this first part would have a consciousness and a part of this consciousness would be I in turn, so regress. Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the bearer of my imagination. So that what I say something about is not necessarily my imagination. VsFrege: It could be argued, E.g. when I think that I feel no pain at this moment, doesn’t something in my imagination correspond to the word "I"? Frege: That may be. IV 48 I/Frege: the word "I" may be connected to a certain image in my consciousness. But then it is an image among other images, and I am its bearer just as I am the bearer of other ideas. I have an image of me, but I’m not this image! There must be a sharp distinction between the content of my consciousness (my imagination) and the object of my thinking (objective thoughts). Now the path is clear to recognize other people as an independent bearers of their imagination. Even imaginations may be the common object of thought by people who do not have these images. Imagination may become object.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Berkeley, G. Hume Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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Danto 2 I 213
Hume and Berkeley: if I do not assume an external object x, what better reasons do I actually have for assuming the existence of a self, or of a mind?
I 214
HumeVsBerkeley: Berkeley therefore had his hands full to assert that there is no idea of ​​the self since minds for themselves are no ideas, were not perceptible for themselves. That is why he had to allow something as abstruse as the object x which he had actually discarded. Hume: So he should either drop the idea of ​​the minds or allow the object existence. Hume: when I enter 'myself', I always stumble on perceptions of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself without any perception. 'Bundle of different perceptions, constantly on the move'. Hume: for him there is no object, of which the manifestations were manifestations, and no subject to which they would manifest themselves.
Berkeley I 221
HumeVsBerkeley: another mind cannot cause an idea in a mind anymore than a substance. VsHume: the objection fails to recognize that Berkeley sees a conceptual contradiction in the concept of 'material thing', which cannot be transmitted in the same way to the mental substances. (A not perceived thing would be a contradiction, like a not perceived perception).
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Berkeley, G. James Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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I 59
pure experience / James: Experience is the reality! (> Berkeley: being is being perceived, being of things is their being known.) - JamesVsBerkeley: esse est percipere!
Berkeley, G. Kant Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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Putnam I 167
Kant/Putnam: Was basically the first to propose the separation of "internal" and "external" conception of truth.
I 167/168
KantVsBerkeley: Totally unacceptable - "a scandal". Putnam: Kant derives from this the abolition of "similarity theory".
BerkeleyVsLocke: Discarded both the primary and secondary qualities and only admitted what Locke would have called "simple" qualities of sensation.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Berkeley, G. Locke Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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Danto I 202
Berkeley - Schopenhauer: there are only two kinds of things: consciousness and its contents LockeVsBerkeley: there are objects to be compared.

Loc II
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Berkeley, G. Phenomenalism Vs Berkeley, G.
 
Books on Amazon
Danto2 I 216
DantoVsBerkeley: still the question remains, why do I need God, if I turn off the light in the kitchen. One answer is phenomenalism. Phenomenalism: the reference to objects is always the last reference to the sensory experience. The whole theory is a kind of translation program.
Berkeley, G. Pinker Vs Berkeley, G.
 
Books on Amazon
I 148
Associationism/Association/Berkeley: "Take away the sensations of softness, wetness, red, and sourness and you take away the cherry. Since it is not a being different from the sensations I say it is a mixture of sensations." VsBerkeley: that never worked. E.g. we can have exactly the same knowledge of two objects, and still know that they are two! If two identical chairs are reversed, the state is changed, even if we know no property that distinguishes the chairs. We just number them.
- - -
I 161
Category/Blurred Categories/Pinker: E.g. all subjects unanimously came to the statement that 13 was a better example of an odd number than 23! E.g. a mother is a better example for a woman than a comedienne, a moment later they claim that a number can only be either even or odd, a human can only be man or woman, no gray areas. I 162 E.g. guess If we learned that chimpanzees eat onions, we would (wrongly) think it likely that gorillas also eat them. Pinker: but in fact we do not work in a way that would make us assume that. (also VsBerkeley). Therefore, humans are more complex than the connectoplasma.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Berkeley, G. Prior Vs Berkeley, G.
 
Books on Amazon
I 91
PriorVsBerkeley: E.g. I cannot consistently think that I have never thought about a particular thing ("this crocodile" or that the grass is green) and will never think of it. That was Berkeley's error, inferring from the perception of the impossibility of the Second on a completely unsecured impossibility of the First, because I cannot think that there are (unspecified, not particularized) things that I cannot think.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Berkeley, G. Putnam Vs Berkeley, G.
 
Books on Amazon
V 94
Correspondence Theory: it could be saved by being limiting it to sensations and mental images. PutnamVsBerkeley: error: The fact is that everything resembles everything else in infinitely many ways.
---
V 95
The question, are A and B similar to each other? is completely meaningless, it is not specific enough. ---
V 96
Similarity: The number of similarities is limited only by our mental abilities and our time. If there are too many similarities, there are also too many causalities. So similarity cannot be based on causal chains. Recourse/Similarity/Putnam: arises if we are to decide privately on similarity ourselves. If we were to turn our attention to something, we already presume the similarity.
Error/Delusion: it sure can be deceiving, but the term "horse" does not refer to situations in which something happens, but to certain animals.
Causal chains: which is reasonable? If I can decide that, I previously have the reference.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Berkeley, G. Quine Vs Berkeley, G.
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Quine II 213
QuineVsBerkeley: there is more substantial similarity between the knowledges of two people than between person and thing (language, observation terms have inclination to consensus). - - -
V 15
Sensation/Quine: primarily structured entities (figures) not light flashes, etc. Space/Depth Dimension/QuineVsBerkeley: not reconstructed from inference, because the two-dimensional data for them are not conscious.
Perception/Quine: this is about shape, not about stimulus (they are covered by reception).
Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that objects exist at all and that science is true?
V 16
Quine: the introduction of the physical senses would have appeared to them as circle.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Berkeley, G. Russell Vs Berkeley, G.
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Newen I 50
RussellVsBerkeley: his thesis must be wrong, because it has to accept God's existence and his perception to our own existence. ---
I 51
Russell: one direction of the biconditional is wrong: why should something exist because it is perceived? ---
Russell IV 84
Universals/quality/Russell: Suppose, we assume that someone would deny that there are even any universals. Then we would have to determine that we cannot prove that there are qualities, while we might well prove that there must be relations. ---
IV 85
E.g. "blackness": if we deny that there is an "abstract idea", at which all black things participate, then we still need something like similarity. And this similarity is again something universal: a relationship, relation. One cannot say that there is another similarity for each pair. Because then we would have to admit that these similarities look similar.
---
IV 86
RussellVsBerkeley, RussellVsHume: have overlooked counter objection against the denial of the "abstract ideas" because they, too, only thought of qualities as universals, and did not notice the relations (e.g. similarity).

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Berkeley, G. Verschiedene Vs Berkeley, G. I 218
Realität/Wirklichkeit/Existenz/Ontologie/Samuel JohnsonVsBerkeley: seine Lösung scheint ebenfalls paradox zu sein. Insbesondere verstößt sie gegen die alltägliche Erfahrung. ((s) nicht Wahrnehmung, denn die könnte ja genauso sein. Erfahrung).
I 219
Bsp Johnson: stieß einen Stein mit dem Fuß an. VsJohnson: zeigte damit höchstens, daß er Berkeleys These mißverstanden hatte. Berkeley hatte von Anfang an solche Einwände vor Augen.
Berkeley: auch nach seiner immateriellen Hypothese Bsp "steht das Pferd im Stall", "ist die Wand weiß" usw.




Berkeley, G. Mackie Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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IV 384/385
Berkeley/Stegmüller: interpretation a): of his philosophy: not all details of our conception of the world are accurate in detail, only God gives us the ideas that accidentally allow for such interpretations. interpretation b): God himself perceives a four-dimensional world with a microstructure as it is brought to light by modern physics.
That sounds more plausible, but bears four difficulties:
We can trace and explain the sensory physiology, e.g. of the eye.
Such explanations pose a problem for Berkeley's theory. How does it tackle it?
1. MackieVsBerkeley: part of the physical world are also anatomy and physiology of sensory perception itself. According to theism all that would be completely meaningless.
The difficulty for Berkeley's theory, however, is greater when a causal relationship is being denied!
IV 386
2. MackieVsBerkeley: Free will: if it existed, we would have to be able to bring about changes in God's ideas just by acts of volition! 3. MackieVsBerkeley: (more profound): according to Berkeley divine ideas would have to be consistent, but they need not be complete, that is, not necessarily determined continuously! They have the status of intentional objects, and their logic would also apply here: Ex.: I can think of a book on the shelf without thinking of the exact spot where it is located. Similarly, God also would have to have indeterminate ideas!
In contrast, our sensual data altogether appears to reflect a completely determined world.
VsVs: Berkeley could defend himself: it would be a peculiarity of God ....
4. MackieVsBerkeley: many details are completely natural, if one assumes a material, objective world; Berkeley artificially complicates them.
IV 387
For the purposes of theoretical and modern physics a materialist theory is preferable.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Berkeley, G. Peacocke Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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I 51
Meaning Space/Sensory Space/Perception Space/Peacocke: is undeniable, and it is neither just artificial nor derivative. It is obviously not populated by experience itself.
Rather, there is a correlated space for each intrinsically spatial sense which is characterized by it.
I 52
E.g. if we are touched at the neck, it is something else than if we see something in front of us. E.g. but it is the same sense of "closer" when we hear or see someone approaching. (Representational) and it refers to the same space. ((s) This is about a sense of the word, not perceptual sense).
PeacockeVsBerkeley: wrongly inferred from the (correct) premise that vision and touch have no common ideas (ideas, notions) to the wrong conclusion: that a sense of dimension should have priority with respect to the philosophical explanation here.
Asterisked Predicates/"Elliptical*"/"Red*"/Field of Vision/Asterisk/Peacocke: asterisked predicates are truly spatial in a way! They relate to size and shape in the visual field.
There is no ambiguity here, because different spaces are affected.
"Elliptical" makes sense for us in different arbitrary spaces. (Not only physical).
If it was just about a single space, there would be problems: see above: Problems with the translation theory or additional representational content to explain "elliptical" only by public, physical space.
Sensory Data/Peacocke: the sense data theory has characteristic spatial concepts such as square or elongated sensory data, etc.
The insight consists in that these spatial predicates
I 53
cannot be defined at the level of representational content. The space in which these additional spatial predicates are located, is the sensation space (non-representational).
This distinction prevents us from committing the error of asking: "Are sensory data surfaces of physical objects?" "Can we perceive sensory data ?".

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Berkeley, G. Solipsism Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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Berkeley I 219
VsBerkeley: ein Argument gegen eine Reduktion der Dinge auf ihr Wahrgenommenwerden wäre, daß sie dann keine permanente Existenz mehr hätten. BerkeleyVsVs: man könnte erwidern, daß zwar ein bestimmter Mensch nicht immer alle Dinge wahrnimmt, aber doch an jeden Gegenstand wenigstens ein Mensch denke.
Vs: doch in einer Zeit, in der man noch unbewohnte Länder und Meere entdeckte, muß dieses Argument Berkeley schwergefallen sein.
I 220
Statt dessen wird die Seinskontinuität abhängig von Gott. Die Frage, warum Berkeley überhaupt eine Kontinuität fordert, ist damit aber noch nicht beantwortet! VsBerkeley: sein Dingbegriff sei künstlich und spitzfindig.
BerkeleyVsVs: er stehe selbst auf der Seite der einfachen Leute, den seine Philosophie führe wieder auf die einfachen Ursprünge zurück.
VsBerkeley: dabei übersieht er, daß das philosophisch Primäre weder in der Philosophie noch im Alltag das Einfache zu sein pflegt.
Traum/Realität/VsBerkeley: Frage: wie kann man zwischen Wirklichkeit und Phantasie unterscheiden?
Man könnte versuchen die Differenz dadurch festzustellen, daß man die willkürlichen von den unwillkürlichen Vorstellungen trennt.
Berkeley VsVs: da aber keine Vorstellung eine andere verursachen kann, müssen auch die gegen unseren Willen
I 221
entstehenden Vorstellungen von einem Vorstellenden, d.h. einem Geist, hervorgerufen werden. Da diese Vorstellungen stärker, lebhafter intensiver und dauerhafter sind als unsere Phantasiegebilde, müssen wie von einem Geist hervorgerufen werden, der stärker ist als der menschliche Geist. So wird die Stärke und Dauerhaftigkeit zu einem Kriterium von Wirklichkeit.
VsBerkeley: 1. Problem der Anwendung des Kriteriums: seine Unbestimmtheit. Es ist bloß relativ. Wie soll man bei einer Rivalität der Merkmale entscheiden?
Bsp besonders intensive, aber unregelmäßige Vorstellungen im Vergleich zu sehr schwachen, aber regelmäßigen Vorstellungen?
SolipsismusVsBerkeley: 2. wenn schon der Geist als Vermögen angesehen wird, Vorstellungen zu produzieren, ist es dann möglich, daß ein Geist in einem anderen Geist Vorstellungen hervorruft, und welches sind die Bedingungen dieser Möglichkeit?
I 222
DiderotVsBerkeley: "Brief über die Blinden", lettre sur les aveugles": "Idealisten werden diejenigen Philosophen genannt, die nur ihre eigene Existenz und die Existenz der Empfindungen in ihnen anerkennen. Ein extravagantes System, das seine Entstehung nur einem Blinden verdanken kann.
Und dieses System ist zur Schande des menschlichen Geistes und der Philosophie am schwierigsten zu widerlegen, obwohl es am absurdesten ist.
VsDiderot: hier wird nicht der Idealist Berkeley geschildert, sondern ein Solipsist.
Berkeley, G. Chisholm Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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II 33
Def Immanence/Rutte: E.g. Berkeley: the concept of real external thing is absurd, because this would mean wanting to grasp the idea of ​​an imaginary thing not thought of by anyone. (Contradiction). VsBerkeley: confusion between "not thought of" with "thought independent".
Reality/Verification/Berkeley: experiences and their courses are reviewing instances for the assumption of external things. There are no specific experiences for such reviews.
We can make the same predictions when denying the outside world.
We cannot appeal to any other instance than our order of experience.
II 34
In order to show that things are causes we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the external things without our experiences. But this is impossible. The same experience might exist if there were no external things.
BerkeleyVsRealism: that makes realism obsolete!
VsBerkeley: the same is also true of spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (The fact that it is as superfluous as realism).
II 35
Analytical philosophy/ Philosophy of language/Rutte: the language-analytical counterpart to realism is the assumption that we have learned on the basis of criteria to distinguish perception from illusion: without criteria we could not learn it. BerkeleyVs: such criteria do not exist!
VsBerkeley: then we cannot even make the distinction by concepts between a perception of external things and a total hallucination!
Berkeley himself already presupposes this conceptual distinction! ((s) Why?).
(Rutte: elsewhere Berkeley already sees the concept of external things as absurd, but not here).
Berkeley: needs no criteria, since we will never learn this distinction anyway.
VsBerkeley: nevertheless this distinction can be thought in a meaningful way. The concepts "experience" and "subject-independent" are available to everyone. They can be made explicit without referring to a specific perceptual situation.
III 36
RationalismVsBerkeley/Rutte: the representatives of reason can point out that de facto such a decision situation does not exist: we believe in the outside world from the start. Hume: has referred to a similar natural belief with view to the even more fundamental question of the uniformity of the world.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Berkeley, G. Stegmüller Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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Stegmüller IV 376
Wahrnehmung/Berkeley: die Elemente der Ideen (die realen Dinge) sind vom Willen des Wahrnehmenden abhängig! Sie verlaufen im Einklang mit gewissen Regeln (die wir heute Naturgesetze nennen würden). Nicht so die Täuschungen. Das beweist, dass der göttliche Geist mächtiger ist als der unsere.
Realität/Berkeley: diejenigen Ideen, die das ausmachen was wir die Wirklichkeit nennen, brauchen nicht ständig wieder hervorgebracht zu werden. Wenn wir sie nicht wahrnehmen, so bleiben sie doch dadurch existent, dass Gottes Geist sie ständig perzipiert.
VsBerkeley: unklar: falls eine Idee nur in und durch das Perzipiertwerden existiert, dann scheint es sich bei ihr um einen Bewusstseinsgegenstand zu handeln. Dann aber ist es unmögliche, dass mehr als ein Geist genau dieselbe Idee wahrnehmen könnte!
VsVs: Bsp der Baum, den ich sehe, der nur meine eigenen Idee ist, hört auf zu existieren, wenn ich aufhöre, ihn zu sehen.
IV 377
Die Ideen sind zwar kausal abhängig von den wahrnehmenden Geistern, sie werden jedoch nicht durch das Perzipiertwerden konstituiert! Ideen: wären dann mehr als geistige Inhalte oder Bezugsgegenstände: die wirklichen Dinge wären unmittelbar von Gott hervorgebrachte Ideen. Der Baum wäre dann von mir unabhängig.
Terminologie: "Immaterieller Realismus". Realismus deshalb, weil es für den Wahrnehmenden eine ganze Welt anderer Geister und Ideen gibt.
Theismus/Stegmüller: auch der gewöhnliche Theismus behauptet, die physische Welt hänge "von Gott ab". doch diese Beziehung bleibt hier dunkel. Demgegenüber ist Berkeleys System eine klare und verständliche Deutung: die Welt besteht einfach aus Ideen, die im göttlichen Geist existieren.
IV 382
Materialismus/Idealismus/Berkeley/Stegmüller: die Entscheidung für eine Alternative hängt von der Stellungnahme zu Berkeleys sieben Argumenten (IV 379 380) ab.
VsBerkeley:
zu (i): welche Art von Ähnlichkeit fordert denn der Materialist? zu (ii): Locke setzt nur voraus, dass es für das Sehen, Hören, Berühren usw. akzeptable Erklärungen gibt, in denen als Ausgangspunkt nur Gegenstände mit räumlichen Eigenschaften verwendet werden, deren sonstige Eigenschaften aber keine Ähnlichkeiten mit unseren Ideen von sekundären Qualitäten zu haben brauchen. Die Frage, ob dies bei primären Qualitäten ähnlich ist, kann man offen lassen.
IV 383
zu (iii): selbst wenn Bewegung, Größe usw. relativ sind, können sie doch objektiver Art sein! Relativität impliziert nicht Geistabhängigkeit! zu (v): es könnte sein, dass es könnte sein, dass eine Theorie über eine geistunabhängige Realität dadurch bestätigt wird, dass sie eine bessere Erklärung für unsere Sinnesdaten liefert als jede andere Theorie.
Außerdem ist dieses Argument für Berkeley wertlos: es wendet sich nicht speziell gegen den Materialismus im Unterschied zu seinem immateriellen Realismus.
Das Grundproblem jeder Repräsentationstheorie: der "Schleier der Wahrnehmung" besteht auch für ihn!
zu (vi): dies ist in der Tat ein Problem für den Materialismus, aber dass eine solche Schwierigkeit wie das Leib Seele Problem auftritt, beweist nicht die Unhaltbarkeit aller Varianten dieser Theorie.
zu (vii): Dinge oder Qualitäten, die unseren Ideen ähnlich sind, brauchen nicht ebenfalls passiv zu sein!
Fazit:: StegmüllerVsBerkeley: kein Argument von BerkeleyVsMaterialism ist schlüssig!

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Realism Berkeley Vs Realism
 
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Chisholm II 33
Realität/Überprüfung/Berkeley: die Erlebnisse und ihre Verläufe geben Überprüfungsinstanzen für die Annahme von Außendingen ab. Es gibt keine spezifischen Erlebnisse für solche Überprüfungen. Wir können dieselben Prognosen machen, wenn die die Außenwelt leugnen.
Wir können uns auf keine andere Instanz als unsere Erlebnisordnung berufen.
II 34
Um zu zeigen, daß die Dinge Verursacher sind, müßten wir zeigen können, daß wir eine Erfahrung von den Außendingen ohne unsere Erlebnisse haben könnten. Das ist aber unmöglich. Dieselbe Erlebnisordnung könnte bestehen, wenn es gar keine Außendinge gäbe.
BerkeleyVsRealismus: damit ist der Realismus überflüssig!
VsBerkeley: dasselbe gilt nun aber auch von Spiritualismus, was Berkeley nicht zu sehen scheint! (Daß er überflüssig ist wie der Realismus).
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Skepticism Frege Vs Skepticism
 
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Davidson II 124
FregeVsSkepticism: the skeptic has no cure, because he cannot even assume for his next statement that his words still have the same meanings as before.
Dummett I 58
Skepticism: never sure whether sense corresponds to a relation -Frege: just a severe deficiency of our language, which must be eliminated.
IV 45
FregeVsSkepticism: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! - If everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imagination! - Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination.
IV 50
Imagination/Psychology/Skepticism/Frege: not everything is imagination, otherwise psychology would contain all the sciences. (s) VsFrege: That does not make it impossible for everything to be imagination at the end of the day. (reductio ad absurdum is not enough.)) -
IV 51
Perception/Frege: sensory perception necessarily requires sensation, and this is part of the inner world.
Frege IV 46
FregeVsSkepticism: interestingly, in his consideration the opposites turn into each other. (>"Dialectic"). E.g. a sensory physiologist as a naturalist is initially far from considering the things he is convinced to see and touch as his imagination.
IV 46
Stimulus/Frege: skepticism can easily refer to him: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! We are experiencing only one end of the process that protrudes into our consciousness! Perhaps other causes are at work? So everything dissolves into imagination, also the light beams. The empirical sensory physiologist thus undermines his own conditions. Everything requires a carrier, I have considered myself as the carrier of my imagination, but am I not myself an imagination?.
IV 47
Where is then the carrier of these imaginations? If everything is imagination: there is no carrier. Also, no imaginations are somehow distinguished. Now I experience the change into the opposite: FregeVsBerkeley: if everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imaginations! ((s) that introduces a new concept, which does not exist in Berkeley: that of the carrier). But there can be no experience without someone who experiences it. But then there is something that is not my imagination, and yet object of my contemplation. Could it be that this "I" as a carrier of my consciousness is only one part of this consciousness, while another part is perhaps a "moon image"? I.e. something else is taking place when I judge that I am looking at the moon? Then this first part would have a consciousness and a part of this consciousness would be I, etc. so regress. Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So that what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination. VsFrege: It could be argued E.g. that if I think that I don’t feel any pain at this moment, doesn’t something in my imagination correspond to the word "I"? Frege: That may be.
IV 48
I/Frege: the word "I" may be connected to a certain image in my consciousness. But then it is an image among other images, and I am its carrier as I am the carrier of other images. I have an image of me, but I’m not this image! There must be a sharp distinction between the content of my consciousness (my imagination) and the object of my thinking (objective thoughts). Now the path towards recognizing other people as an independent carriers of imagination is clear. Images may also be the common object of thought by people who do not have this image. Imagination may become object.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Various Authors Berkeley Vs Various Authors
 
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Ber I 224
absolut/Zeit/Raum/Wissenschaft/BerkeleyVsNewton: es gibt keine absolute Zeit, keinen absoluten Raum, keine absolute Bewegung, keine absolute Kraft.
I 225
Theologische Wurzel: eine Vorstellung ist nicht Ursache einer anderen Vorstellung eine Kraft nicht Ursache einer anderen Kraft. Ursache aller natürlichen Dinge ist nur Gott. Realität/Zeit/BerkeleyVsNewton: Gott gibt uns eine Abfolge von Vorstellungen. Daher gibt es keine absolute Zeit. Die Zeit ist die Reihe dieser Vorstellungen.
Eimerexperiment/BerkeleyVsNewton: versucht zu zeigen, daß es keine absoluten Raum gibt, aber seine Widerlegung ist fehlerhaft. Dennoch gibt es keinen absoluten Raum.
Wissenschaft/VsBerkeley: wie ist überhaupt eine Naturwissenschaft möglich, wenn alle Wahrnehmungen nicht durcheinander, sondern unmittelbar durch Gott verursacht werden?
Lösung/Berkeley: so wie er an der Realität der Dinge festhält, hält er auch an der Regelmäßigkeit de Naturerscheinungen fest, die aber als Folge der Güte und Weisheit des Schöpfers von ihm auch durchbrochen werden könnte.

Ber I 212
BerkeleyVsScholastik: ihr "pro und kontra" (Sic et Non) hatte sich modisch eingebürgert. Spiegele nur Ungewißheit wider. Seit Descartes: Versuche, dem Meinungsstreit dadurch zu entgehen, daß man sich auf unbezweifelbare Erkenntnis zurückzieht, um einen Neuaufbau zu beginnen.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997