Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Beliefs Loar
 
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Schiffer I 19
Belief/Loar: is understood as a function that depicts propositions on internal physical states. - These internal physical states have functional roles that are specified by these propositions.
I 286f
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: his realization of a theory of beliefs/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states), whose functional roles are defined by the theory. - Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role rather than many roles. - Schiffer: this will not work, therefore the Quine-Field argument is done in. Quine-Field Argument/Schiffer: (I 157) Belief/Beliefs/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine, beliefs are never true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But:
QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981


Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Ethics Brentano
 
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Franz Brentano
Chisholm II = Peter Koller Ethik bei Chisholm in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm II 276
Ethics/Brentano/Moore/Koller: Brentano and Moore converge in amazing ways. Ethics/Brentano/Moore: The ultimate goal of right action: "the best thing you can do":
---
II 279
The greatest possible sum of the good which can be attained. (stock) VsMoore/VsBrentano: that does not only assume that we already know what the good is, but also that we can recognize the best among the achievable good.
So that there is something that is intrinsic and recognizable good.
Brentano/Moore: assert for this reason that there is a direct, immediate knowledge of what is good in itself. Immediate evidence.

Good/Ethics/Value/Brentano/Moore: the good is what you should desire and should be taken for good.
Brentano: what it is worth to love it with a love that is properly characterized for its own sake.
---
II 280
E.g. (Brentano): pleasure, clear insight, knowledge, joy (if it is not joy in the bad), correctness of our judgment and of our emotions, (of our love, hate, and will). Brentano: Principle of summation (of the good:
1. Something good is better than something bad
2. the existence of good is better than its non-existence
3. a greater good is better than a smaller one.
---
II 280
Ethics/Value/Good/Moore: Question: What things in isolation are to be considered for good on their own? This also requires the determination of levels of value. ---
II 281
Method of isolation. This is why pleasure, taken alone, is of no great value for Moore. Only together with the experience of beautiful things it has a valuable force. This leads to the
Principle of Organic Units: Many things take on quite different properties, depending on the context. (MooreVsBrentano). ((s) "syncategorematic" values.)
MooreVsBrentano: since the inner value is characterized by connecting several simple properties, it can not simply match the sum of its parts.
For example, when no one is aware of a beautiful object, it has no value.
---
II 282
Method of Isolation/Moore: that are now applied again to recognize the value of such organic units. Thesis all things that have real value are complex organic entities.
E.g. the joys of human intercourse, enjoying beautiful things.
E.g. Bad: Enjoying ugly things, cruelty, hating the good, etc.
Exception: Pain: is already an evil without any connection to others.
Mixed virtues/Moore: as whole things clearly good, but contain something bad: e.g. courage, compassion, (hating the bad) knowledge of bad or ugly things.
---
II 283
Acting/ethics/Brentano/Moore: that is sufficient as a basis to answer the question: what action is right? Of several possibilities for action is only the one right that either produces more or at least not less good things in the world. It is indifferent whether this good is beneficial to the agent himself, or to others.
An action is therefore correct, if it has correct consequences.
Criterion/Ethics/Moore/Brentano: the purpose of doing as much good as possible in the world is then the criterion for correct action.
Judgement: Problem: in regard to this our knowledge is always incomplete.
---
II 284
Moore/Brentano: therefore ethics cannot provide general rules. We have "rules of medium generality". These then apply in the majority of cases. Ethics/values/ontology/intrinsic properties/Moore/Brentano/Koller: ontological question: what are the objects of the intrinsic value concepts, on which things can the concepts of the intrinsic good and bad be applied at all? What is the logical structure of these concepts, can the method of isolation always be applied?
---
II 287
KollerVsBrentano/KollerVsMoore: the questions about the epistemological justification of intrinsic valuations and the question of their suitability for a sustainable foundation of ethics are precisely the questions that make the approach of Brentano and Moore appear doubtful.

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Hetero-Phenomenology Radner
 
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Daisie Radner
Heterophänomenologie: wie wir etwas über die Vögel und die Bienen lernen in
Tie I D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005

Perler I 408
Hetero-phanomenology/HP/DennettVsBrentano/VsHusserl: hetero-phenomenology works from the perspective of the 3rd person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: Thesis: hetero-phanomenology can also be operated from the first person perspective.
---
I 409
Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: hetero-phenomenology deals with: 1. How things appear to a subject
2. How is the experience of the subject ("how is it for the subject ...")?
Frank Jackson: treats both as equivalent:
E.g Fred: for him there are two red hues, where all the others only perceive one. How is it for Fred to see Red1 and Red2?
Radner: the question varies between (1) and (2).
In the first sense, Jackson: "How is the new color?"
In the second sense, Jackson: "if we could adapt our physiology to that of Fred, we would finally know."
E.g. M. Tye: instead of saying,
A) The color blind Jones does not know how the different colors look, we can just as well say,
B) He does not know what it is like to have the experiences characteristic of seeing the colors.
Both hang together, but problems are not always the established and reversed equally well in the sense of 1. as of 2.
---
I 410
For example, color researcher Mary/Jackson/Radner: the problem is not how red may look for Mary (probably as for us), but how her experience will be. Will it be a surprise? ---
I 411
Environment/Inner world/Radner: both can be approached from the viewpoint of the 1st and the 3rd person. ---
I 412
This distinction does not correspond to that between car and hetero-phenomenology. Hetero-Phenomenology: 1., 3. Person/environment/inner world: all combinations of questions are possible.
Environment/hetero-phanomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How do things appear to the subject?"
1. Person: E.g. "How would things appear to me if I had a sense device like that of the subject?"
Inner world/hetero-phenomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How are the experiences of the subject?"
1. Person: E.g.: "How would my experiences be if I were in the circumstances of the subject and had certain characteristics in common with it?".
---
I 413
Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: E.g. he would like to know how a warning call sounds for another subject, e.g. for birds of prey like hawks or owls, which have a smaller head than us. ---
I 414
How would it be if I had no auricles and the ears were only two inches apart? Problem: I may be able to imagine other ears on my brain, but not how it would be for me with a cat brain.


Tie I
D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg)
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Intentionality Brentano
 
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Franz Brentano
Pauen V 22
Intentionality/Brentano/Pauen: this is not about ordinary language "intention"; but the necessary being "about" something. ---
V 23
Intentionality is inappropriate as an indication of the mental, since not all states of consciousness are intentional by character - E.g. pain. ---
Field II 69
Intentionality/Believe/Brentano/Lewis/Field: (Lewis late 1970s): compares the problem with the following about numbers. E.g. "Many apparent physical properties seem to combine physical and non-physical things - called numbers". For example, what kind of physical relation can a 7-gram heavy stone have to the number 7?". (Similar to Churchland 1979, Dennett 1982, Stalnaker 1984).
FieldVs: the comparison does not contribute much.
Nominalism: is here a solution: literally there are no numbers, and then also no relations (Field 1980). This allows the use of numbers as a useful fiction.
FieldVs: so viewed, there is no pressure to solve Brentano's problem.
---
Field II 71
Intentionality/Believe/Brentano/Horwich/FieldVsHorwich: (Horwich (1998) shows how one can still miss the problem: thesis: according to him "means" and "believes" stand for real relations between people and propositions. Horwich: but there is no reason to suppose that a physical access receives this relational status:
Definition fallacy of the constitution/Horwich/Field: the (false) assumption that what constitutes relational facts would itself be relational.
---
Field II 72
Intentionality/Brentano's Problem/Field: his problem is reformulated in our context: how could the having of truth conditions (in representations) be explained naturalistic? ---
II 259
Reference/indeterminacy/FieldVsBrentano: if reference is indeterminate, we can only accept one naturalistic response, not one of Brentano's of an irreducible mental connection. ---
Prior I 123
Intentionality/Brentano: is a unique logical category. Similar to a relation, without being a real relation.

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014


Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Intentionality Hintikka
 
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I XVII
Intentionality/Hintikka. Thesis: Intentionality has a multi-world character. Definition intentional/Hintikka: a concept is intentional iff. its semantic explanation involves several possible scenarios and their relation to each other. This places intentionality close to intensity. Thesis: Intentionality is a gradual matter. There are types and dimensions of intentionality that are not all equally interesting. Just as possible worlds can differ.
Chisholm: Chisholm has proved intentionality in the logical behavior of certain concepts.
---
I 183
Definition Intentional/Intentionality/Hintikka: Thesis: it is a sign of intentionality when possible worlds are used to explain the semantics of the concept. Intentionality/Hintikka: we can also call it intensionality:
One has to look at a background of alternatives (unrealized possibilities) when one considers the consciousness of a subject.
Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka: for the two, "directedness at an object" was essential for intentionality. An intentional term "points behind itself". HintikkaVsHusserl/HintikkaVsBrentano.
William Kneale: ditto. KnealeVsHusserl/KnealeVsBrentano.
---
I 188
Intentionality/Hintikka: intentionality is a gradual matter. This is obvious if it is true that we always have to look at unrealized possibilities when it comes to intentionality. "Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the more one can go beyond the actual world.
Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: the degree of intentionality is measured by the distance to the actual world.
---
I 196
Intentionality/Hintikka: that the failure of (c) (preservation of identity, VsSeparation) is a criterion for them, can be seen in their behavior in changing concepts: necessity (logical, physical, and analytical) satisfy condition c). ("What is, is necessary what it is and no other thing") Conversely, certain other concepts are obviously more intentional than necessity, and they violate c).
---
I 197
E.g. "Not everything what is, is so that it is known what it is, nor that it is no other thing".

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Language Brentano
 
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Franz Brentano
Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986

II 264
Language/Brentano/Hedwig: their analysis includes "multiple knowledge". Clarity of language is an expression of the clarity of knowledge. VsBrentano: unclear how the reistic language of the philosopher could become the language of the world of life.
---
II 265
Brentano, however, is concerned with the reverse process.

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014

Ontology Brentano
 
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Franz Brentano
Chisholm II = Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm II 267
Ontology/Brentano/Hedwig: B. is sober: it is only "things" that are presented and recognized as "being". (No universals?). Hedwig: precisely for this reason, it is surprising that Brentano calls fiction "useful" and "convenient" and "practical".
---
II 268
Brentano concedes to the Copernican, who speaks Ptolemy, a rethinking. The gap in Brentano is closed by thinking. VsBrentano: the strength of this epistemology is also its weakness: sensory perception falls under the rule of a epistemological option.
Brentano: (already early): Mind and inner perception are to be evaluated completely analogously. (Vs Thomas Aquinas).
VsBrentano: Question: To what extent can the genetic origin of an idea motivated by an emotion be brought in itself epistemologically and made evident by this idea?
Brentano cannot do this, even if he refers back to the evidence of secondary consciousness. That is, that the psychic appears to be preceded by a field of affects which remains dark and cannot be recognized in itself,
---
II 269
but only in its effect on the act of cognition. ---
II 271
Ontology/Brentano: Being is synonymous with thing.

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Propositional Attitudes Davidson
 
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I 20
A suggestion boils down to interpret the remainder of the sentence after "believes" as a complex adverb. DavidsonVs: no human being has any idea how the meanings of the individual words could be derived from them. But we obviously understand the sentences because we understand the contained words.
---
I 22
If the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, new, very long words would have to be learned, which often occur only once. Since, however, each statement can appear as a content sentence, its number is infinite and therefore cannot be learned. ---
I 104
Fodor: inner "solipsist" states that determine what is meant. DavidsonVsFodor: But such conditions do not exist at all, which is obvious: the very general characteristics for porcupines, e.g. "Has four paws, and spines," etc. are as dependent on the natural history of the acquisition of these words as the words "porcupine" and "short-beaked echidna". ---
II 127
Propositional attitudes are individuated through public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects (with privileged access, for example). - (> Externalism). ---
Avr I 102f
Rationality/Davidson: is what we need to understand propositional attitudes, not for physics - ((s) = reason). ---
Dav I 22
Propositional attitude/content/meaning/Davidson: if the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, we would always have to learn new, very long words, which often occur only once. ---
I 23
Propositional attitude/belief/reference/content/Davidson: according to that there is no alternative to the concept of belief sentences as relational sentences. Thus, one must consider the content sentence "The diamond Kohinoor is one of the crown jewels" together with "that" as a singular term. ---
I 39
Propositional attitudes/object/content/belief/desire/Brentano: no internal object different from the outer object - ((s) Davidson, actually, also Vs "inner objects" - but: DavidsonVsBrentano: Problem with objects that do not exist - Solution/Davidson/(s): Learning history secures word meaning without reference - Brentano Thesis: Intentionality irreducible to brain states. ---
97
Propositional attitudes/Davidson: are not subjective - access to other minds is guaranteed by the mechanism of language comprehension. - One must be able to come from the observed behavior to the attitudes, because language and thought are interpretable.
---
II 127
Propositional attitudes/Davidson: are individuated via public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects - (externalism) - no representation - predicate "x believes that p": relation between speaker and an utterance of the interpreter.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brentano, Fr. Davidson Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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I 39
DummettVsBrentano: for him, the problem of thoughts remains (or pseudo-thoughts) about objects that do not exist. But this problem can be easily solved: we must drop the idea that there are internal objects or mental ideas in the required sense. This does not mean that only external objects remain by which we can identify the different states of consciousness.
We have resources, even if these states of consciousness, as the saying goes, are directed to non-existent objects. Because we are able to determine them without presupposing that there are any objects at all that are "present to consciousness".
Strand: DavidsonVs inner objects (DavidsonVsBrentano)

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Brentano, Fr. Dummett Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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Davidson I 39
According to Dummett Brentano has refused to concede that a mental act has an inner object different from the outer object, namely a mental picture through which the external object is presented to the consciousness. DummettVsBrentano: for him there is therefore still the problem of the thoughts (or seeming thoughts) about objects that do not exist.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Brentano, Fr. Field Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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Field II 30
Materialism/Mental Objects/Properties/Field: Materialism must also deny irreducible mental properties (E.g. beliefs, desires). 1) Problem: the experience properties, E.g. the property of feeling pain.
2) Problem: Intentionality: how can materialism explain it.
Mental Properties/Field: seem to be relational: between a person and something.
Materialism: must show that they are not irreducibly mental.
Can materialism VsBrentano show that beliefs and desires can be explained adequately?
Field: It can!.
II 259
Reference/Uncertainty/FieldVsBrentano: if reference is indeterminate, we can only accept a naturalistic answer, not a Brentanoian one of an irreducible mental connection. Naturalism/Field: but must admit that reference is indeterminate, (because he cannot assume any mental facts here).
Solution/Field: Naturalism, however, can assume naturalistic facts that partially define the reference. E.g. Facts about our use that show that a word does not stand for something else.
Problem: with that it is never ensured that the found reference is the only one. (This is already due ton the normal uncertainty, not the radical one).
Def Partial Reference/Field/(s): the same as "vague reference". That is, a word refers to an object, but perhaps also on others. (see above).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Brentano, Fr. Putnam Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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Horwich I 435
"Cling-Together" Argument/Justification/Putnam: (Thesis: the question of what is a good explanation or not, what is a good interpretation or not, and what is justified and what is not, are in the same boat). (Cling Together, Swing Together Argument/(s): that interpretation, justification and explanation are in the same boat). E.g. Suppose we took the concepts "competence", or "best explanation" or "justification" as undefined basic concepts. Since these are not physicalist concepts, our realism would be no longer of the kind that Harman wants to defend.
Why then not say that Brentano's right and there are irreducible semantic properties?
PutnamVsBrentano: if there is nothing wrong about it, then the question why one is not an ethical non-cognitivist becomes a serious question.
Harman/Putnam: would still say, however, that it makes a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago,
---
I 436
or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts that decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if mR has to break with Harman (and with Mackie), then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged.
Interpretation/Explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come as deeply from human needs as ethical values.
Putnam: then a critic of me might say (even if he remains mR): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument).
Putnam: and this is where I wanted him! That was my main concern in "Vernunft Wahrheit und Geschichte". (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are often not in the same boat" (companions in guilt" argument, cling together, swing together argument: in case of partial relativism total relativism threatens to ensue. PutnamVsHarman)
Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism and not total relativism at the same time.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Brentano, Fr. Quine Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Schiffer I 157
Beliefs/Belief Propositions/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief propositions are never true, even though he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (Quine, W + O in 1960, p. 221).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Brentano, Fr. Wittgenstein Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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Stegmüller IV 54
Mental states/WittgensteinVsBrentano: (also Locke, Hume): no such thing as "understanding" but something like a toothache, depression, great excitement (emotional state); understanding is at a different level. ---
IV 59
N.B.: E.g. assuming even if my meaning (to mean) of the addition would always be connected with a particular headache, I could not decide if it would not be Quaddition because only previous given cases.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Brentano, Fr. Verschiedene Vs Brentano, Fr. Metzinger II 397
GüzeldereVs "higher order consciousness" / GüzeldereVsBrentano: danger of infinite regress.





Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Brentano, Fr. Martin Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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Arm II 8
Intentionalität/Martin/Pfeifer/Burnheim/VsBrentano: nicht zentrales Merkmal d. Mentalen, sondern von Dispositionen! Place: zentral: "Gerichtetheit": von Dispositionen auf Ereignisse, die nicht existieren: die Manifestationen! (Brentano pro).

Mart I
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Brentano, Fr. Güzeldere Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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Metz II 397
Bewusstsein/Brentano: "Die Vorstellung des Tones und die Vorstellung von der Vorstellung des Tones bilden nicht mehr als ein einziges psychisches Phänomen". "In demselben psychischen Phänomen, in dem der Ton vorgestellt ist, erfassen wir zugleich das psychische Phänomen selbst." Erstmals Auftauchen eines "Höherstufigen Bewusstseins" in der Philosophie!
GüzeldereVs"Höherstufiges Bewusstsein"/GüzeldereVsBrentano: Gefahr des infiniten Regresses.
Brentano, Fr. Hintikka Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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I 183
Intentionality/Brentano/Husserl/Hintikka:: for both of them "orientation to an object" was essential for intentionality. An intentional concept "points behind". HintikkaVsHusserl/HintikkaVsBrentano. William Kneale: ditto. KnealeVsHusserl/KnealeVsBrentano.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Brentano, Fr. Chisholm Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
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II 212
Psychology/Analytic philosophy/Marek: question: is the concept of the mental uniform? One can speak of things that are mental: e.g. properties, qualities, phenomena, states, events. And you can say of concepts and theories that they are not mental.
II 214
Question: Are there purely logical features that are characteristic of the mental? Brentano: yes, intentionality Other authors VsBrentano: the search for characteristics is in vain, since the mental is not further defined.
E.g. as you cannot give specific characteristics for the concept of phenomenal color. You can only specify subspecies (for color as for the mental).
I 217
Everyday language to quickly left behind.
II 253
Science/Language/Brentano/Hedwig: Thesis: we may think with Copernicus, however, we speak with Ptolemy. E.g. rising of the sun.
II 254
VsBrentano: this thesis could put him on the spot himself: it might turn out that in a daily statement, if it were thought in terms of his philosophy, something else would be thought than said. (> concept change, > translation, > meaning, > language/thinking).
II 256
Brentano justifies the modern-thinking Copernican who speaks in the Ptolemaic language.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Chisholm, R.M. Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
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Chisholm II 166
SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-criticism: mess of facts and complexes.
There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus.
Simons I 1
Extensional Mereology/Simons: is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM.
Individuals calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals).
VsCEM: 1. Claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory.
Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives.
Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc.
Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the
Extensional mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory).
Problem:
1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times.
I 2
2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to:

Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism: Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has.
Vs: problem: to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts essential).
Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies.
Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): after the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves.
1.
Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high.
2.
common solution: replacement of the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts.
SimonsVs: hence the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument.

CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. Also in:
Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies.
Part/Simons: is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses.

Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants.
I 3
continuants/Simons: may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if it is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place.
I 175
Temporal part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsalle/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: also continuants can have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. continuants/Simons: thesis: do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus.
I 187
SimonsVsChisholm: if he is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions.
I 188
strict connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum.
Chisholm: himself asks this question for the example a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks.
I 189
Chisholm Thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example.
Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology.
I 192
Def succession/Chisholm:
1.
x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’
(ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’
(iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a.
Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest.
w: be in it the common part e.g. in altering a table
SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table!
ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table.
Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table!
I 193
SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! Example Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously).
Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm).
I 194
Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a all the time is an A, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case.
And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A!
SimonsVsChisholm: so his definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle!
Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive.
Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution.(>Wiggins 1980, 30ff).
mereological constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity.
E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely.
Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stand for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year.
SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis:
I 195
To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: this is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins).
SimonsVsChisholm: seine These hat zur Folge dass die meisten Menschen meist ihre meisten Begriffe falsch gebrauchen, wenn das dann nicht überhaupt immer der Fall ist.
I 208
Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from the Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship".
Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism.
A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use!
interrupted existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap.
- - -
I 274
SimonsVsChisholm: according to his principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Sententialism Schiffer Vs Sententialism
 
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Stephen Schiffer
I 120
Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes.
I 120
And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98).
2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring".
Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!.
E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!.
I 123
DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f).
2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts.
I 137
Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist.
Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory.
I 157
Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221).
Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs:
If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And:
Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited.
Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true.
Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad.
I 158
We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychological theory.
(2) The justification for methodological physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine).
(3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible.
SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Essentialism Chisholm, R.
 
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II 166
SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: These Chisholm hat von Brentano einen mereologischen Essentialismus geerbt, mit dem ich nicht übereinstimme. Ich werde aber diese Ideen benutzen, um eine leicht abweichende Interpretation von Wittgensteins Tractatus zu geben. Wittgenstein selbst war nicht so klar in bezug auf Tatsachen wie es scheint. Selbstkritik: Durcheinander von Tatsachen und Komplexen.
Zwischen dem späteren Wittgenstein und Brentano liegen Welten, aber es gibt Berührungen zwischen Brentano und dem Tractatus.
Simons I 2
Chisholm/Mereologischer Essentialismus/Simons: Chisholm vertritt den mereologischen Essentialismus: These kein Objekt kann andere Teile haben, als es aktual hat. Vs: Problem: zu erklären, wieso normale Gegenstände nicht modal starr (alle Teile wesentlich) sind. Lösung/Chisholm: These (erscheinende) Dinge (appearances) ((s) alltägliche Dinge) sind logische Konstruktionen aus Objekten, für die der mereologische Essentialismus gilt. Lösung/Chisholm: These die tatsächlichen sind mereologisch konstant und die Erscheinungen wieder logische Konstruktionen aus unveränderlichen Objekten. SimonsVsChisholm: der Preis ist zu hoch.
Simons I 275
mereologischer Essentialismus/Zwischenposition/Chisholm/Simons: es gibt noch eine weitere, die Chisholm ablehnt: daß einige Teile wesentlich sind und andere nicht. Das ist meine Position. ChisholmVsSimons: alle Teile sind notwendig.
Simons: These einige Teile sind wesentlich (nicht notwendig!).

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Hetero-Phenomen. Dennett, D.
 
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Perler / Wild I 408
Hetero phenomenology / h.ph. / DennettVsBrentano / VsHusserl: from the perspective of the third person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: you can also operate h.ph. from the first person perspective.
Intentionality Millikan, R.
 
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Graeser I 125/126
Intentionalität/MillikanVsBrentano: These Verrichtungen aller Art sind auf eine bestimmte Normalität hin angelegt. Das ist natürlich häretisch gegenüber Brentano, der den Begriff seinerzeit für irreduzibel Mentales geprägt hatte. (Um die unüberbrückbare Kluft zum Physischen zu markieren).
Millikan: statt dessen: Intentionalität kommt nicht in einem Stück! Alles hat die Funktion, dieses oder jenes hervorzubringen.

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002