Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 53 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity/Syntheticity Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 64
Analytical/Chisholm: early: ..a preposition is analytical for which there is a conjunctive property such that it and the S property include one another (inclusion) and the P property is one of its sub-properties - late: different property relations: implicy and involve - (Involve: that which contains one also contains the other)
II 66f
Analytical/Language/Meaning Postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: Problem: different intensional structure: Ex squares have the conjunctive property of being rectangular and equilateral, or conjunctive property of being rectangular and have mutually perpendicular diagonals - same extension, different meaning, hence different properties - II 67 Carnap: the property expressions are L equivalent because of the rules of language (meaning postulates) - ChisholmVsCarnap: for him it is not about the intensional structure, but about the structure of properties themselves

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Analyticity/Syntheticity Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 120
Lasting sentences: meaning of the stimulus is more sparse -accordingly: synonymy of stimuli is less plumable > VsAnalyticity. ---
I 339
Material implication "p impl q" not equal to "p > q" (mention/use) - "implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms. ---
V 114
QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences e.g. - "A dog is an animal" oneself later. - Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. - Analyticity is as social as language. - Random first examples should not have any special status - Definition analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. - That’s bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. - Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs. ---
VI 79
Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. ---
VII 21
Analytical/QuineVsKant: limits them to subject-predicate form - reformulated: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts" - VsEssentialism: creature arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational - This is relative. ---
VII 23
Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried: problem: based on unclear synonymy. Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent - not with bachelor/unmarried.
---
VII 28 ~
Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning - A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be a unempirical dogma. ---
VII 37
Verification theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning - then "analytically" borderline case: method does not matter - synonymous: method of refutation and confirmation are the same. ---
VII 37
Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement. ---
VII 161 ~
Analyticity/Quine: approximate truth because of meaning - that says nothing about existence.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Coherence Theory Ayer
 
Books on Amazon
I 21
AyerVscoherence theory: there could be different systems of coherent statements.
I 293
Coherence / Carnap / Ayer: Carnap tried to rescue the coherence theory: pragmatism: what serves our goals? - AyerVsCarnap: that ultimately only one of the competing culturally distinct systems is acceptable, already exceeds the coherence theory itself.
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
Colour Carnap
 
Books on Amazon
VI 126
Colors/Carnap: arise as abstraction classes of color identity.
VI 102
Abstraction class: class of elements related to an arbitrary element - (s)> one-classes
VI 152
Similarity Circles/Carnap: at first, you take all classes of elementary experiences (EE) that are partially similar to each other - (due to reflexivity) - then the two-, three-, etc. classes of partially similar EE - then one removes from this list all the classes that are contained in a different one as subclass
VI 181
GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (color theory): we are to remain in the field of sensory perception itself and notice the laws in the area of perception that exist between them - CarnapVsGoethe: the laws of physics do not apply there, but different, more complicated ones do.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Empiricism Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Graeser I 146
QuineVsCarnap: (holism): since theory is only debatable as a whole, theoretical terms escape the reduction to sensual terms -" but: Empiricism: Quine is not a strict opponent -" How else is knowledge of the world possible? ---
Quine VII 40~
Empiricism/Quine: has excessively rich ontology - science is double dependent on language and experience, but thesis: this duality cannot be traced back to individual statements. ---
XII 90/1
Empiricism/Quine pro: 1) everything that speaks for scientific theories comes from experience - 2) every word meaning is ultimately based on experience. ---
XII 94
Gave up: 1) trying to explain everything from sensory data - 2) the rational reconstruction. ---
Stalnaker I 3
QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: is no basis for the distinction between language rules (rules) and our judgments about the world - no theory - neutral basis.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Explanation Goodman
 
Books on Amazon
IV 165
Explanation: A basic term is not defined, but explicated by means of its different varieties.
II 67
reduction sentences / Carnap: If we want to construct a language of science, we must take some descriptive (ie not logical) expressions as basic expressions. Other expressions can then be introduced by means of reduction sentences.
II 68
GoodmanVsCarnap / reduction sentences: pretty absurd, the whole thing, in my opinion, philosophy has the task of explicating the science (and the everyday language), not to describe it. The explication (> Quine) must refer to the pre-systematic use of the terms under consideration, but does not have to adhere to the ordering. It is all about economy and unification.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Expressions Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 230
QuineVs grammatical word classes, homonymy (one word functions as another): Problems with the concepts of word and lexical identity. ---
I 230
Ambiguity: the name Paul is not ambiguous, not a general term but a singular term with proliferation - ambiguity action/habit: ice skaters, delivery (action, object). ---
I 407f
Term: not without articles, pronouns, plural, predication, identity ("considering" is not a term) - Term should be accepted because of usefulness (VsNominalism). ---
XII 90
Presentation/proof/expression/QuineVsCarnap: the fact that a sentence can be expressed using logic, set-theoretic and observation terms do not mean that it can be proved with set-theoretic and logical means only (s) means of expression are not means of evidence.)- (> inside/outside circle).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Exterior/interior Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
XII 90
Display/proof/expression/QuineVsCarnap: that a sentence can be expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms, does not mean that it could prove itself with set-theoretical and logical means alone. - ((s) Means of expression are not admissible evidence (inside/outside circle)).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Exterior/interior Stroud
 
Books on Amazon
I 206
General/Special/skepticism/verificationism/generalization/interior/exterior/Stroud: Descartes with him the special is representative and can therefore be generalized. - VerificationismVsGeneralization: it considers it suspicious: not apply statements of the system to the system itself. - StroudVsCarnap: the problem interior/exterior is not the same as that of the general and special. - StroudVsCarnap: the sentence that Descartes does not know whether he is sitting by the fire is not meaningless, only in connection to the skeptical presumption that it is not verifiable. - Problem: the verificationism could come easily in the situation to have to assume that then all of our everyday language would be useless. ---
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - so that the interior/exterior-problem is avoided. ---
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori "knowledge".

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Fido-Fido-Principle Logic Texts
 
Books on Amazon
RyleVsCarnap: (Rezension von Carnaps Bedeutung und Notwendigkeit): Fehler:"Fido"-Fido-Prinzip ("Fido"-Fido-Prinzip).: weil der Name »Fido« seine Bedeutung daher erhält, dass er sich auf ein einzelnes Individuum bezieht sind wir versucht anzunehmen, dass andere Wörter auf dieselbe Weise funktionieren.
Russell tappte in seiner Darstellung von Universalien in diese Falle: nach seiner Auffassung bestehen atomare Aussagen aus einer Anzahl von Individuen und einem Universale.
Bsp »Fido ist ein Hund«. Worauf bezieht sich »Hund«? Nach der »Fido«-Fido-Theorie muss es seine Bedeutung daher erhalten, dass es einem einzelnen Ding zugeordnet ist, der Hundheit oder dem Universale, Hund. III 32f

Aussage/Russells Aussagen waren von ihm so konzipiert worden, dass sie die Bedeutung von Sätzen ausmachen. Folglich, sagte er, müssen Sie diese generischen Entitäten, Universalien enthalten.
Das ist ein nicht gerechtfertigter Schritt. III 32f

"Fido"-Fido-Prinzip: RyleVs: Referenz gleich Bedeutung.

"Fido"-Fido-Prinzip: falsche Gleichsetzung von Ref und Bed: Russell: glaubte fälschlich, Fido sei der Hundheit zugeordnet, Prädikate, Verben Adjektive bezögen sich auf Universalien III 32~
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001
Generality Stroud
 
Books on Amazon
I 206
General/Special/skepticism/verificationism/generalization/interior/exterior/Stroud: Descartes with him the special is representative and can therefore be generalized. - VerificationismVsGeneralization: it considers it suspicious: not apply statements of the system to the system itself. - StroudVsCarnap: the problem interior/exterior is not the same as that of the general and special. - StroudVsCarnap: the sentence that Descartes does not know whether he is sitting by the fire is not meaningless, only in connection to the skeptical presumption that it is not verifiable. - Problem: the verificationism could came easily in the situation to have to assume that all of our everyday language would be useless. ---
I 264
Public/knowledge/Stroud: there are indeed general statements about knowledge: e.g. that someone knows something about Sicily of the 4th century.. - E.g. that no one knows the causes of cancer. - VsMoore: that he does not achieve a general statement about knowledge, but is not due to a lack of generality.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Grue Carnap
 
Books on Amazon
IV 31
> Grue / CarnapVsGoodman: "red", etc. are purely qualitative predicates, - ’grue’, etc. are positional predicates - GoodmanvsCarnap: the distinction qualitative / positional is relative to a perspective on a respective base language. - This could also include grot / reen as basic predicates, then "red" and "green" would have to be interpreted in relation to a time - IV 32 then the attributions "qualitative" / "positional" was reversed - there is no perceptible color change: who understands "green" in the sense of "gred" understands understands "color" in the sense of "blolor": things of equal blolor are those which are gred etc.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Internal/external Stalnaker
 
Books on Amazon
I 44
External questions/Carnap: questions about whether a frame is to be accepted. - QuineVsCarnap: all questions are asked within a linguistic context, therefore, internal and external issues are not easy to separate.
I 45
Nevertheless, there are still external matters also in Word + Object. - E.g. thesis: Speech of physical phenomena themselves is regarded as a physical phenomenon. - Stalnaker: that goes without establishing ourselves outside the world. - The the causal theory of reference has its place, too.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Language Rules Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 68/69
Language rules / Carnap: a) what "square" is true of, is a square, b) what "rectangle" is true of, is a rectangle c) What are "square" is true of, is a rectangle - meaning postulates allow the step c) - Mention/use/Carnap: the expressions are not mentioned in the maning postulate, but only used - "(x) (Fx> Gx)" is a m.post. of S" is a statement about "F" and "G" in S - ChisholmVsCarnap: Tarski: on the left is a necessary condition for the truth of the expression on the right-hand side - that does not refer to language rules, but to non-linguistic entites - no sentence is true only due to the use.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Logic Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 138
Frege/logic/Hintikka: his logic is considered as the theory of complex sentences - Wittgenstein in contrast: easiest parts of the world - eliminate logical constants - They do not represent. ---
I 205
Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no other author than Wittgenstein has ever had the thought, in the logic it had ultimately no more explanation than what is given to us in experience through the simple objects - all phenomenology is just logic. - HusserlVs - Husserl: possibilities are motivated by background beliefs. ---
II 160
Logic/WittgensteinVsFrege: 1. It is rather arbitrary, what we call a sentence - therefore logic means something else in my opinion than in Frege's. 2. VsFrege: All words are equally important - Frege: thesis: "Word", "sentence", "world" are more important.
---
II 238
Logic/arbitrary/Wittgenstein: the rules of logic are insofar arbitrary that they can be eliminated for greater expressiveness - E.g. sentence of the excluded third (SaD) is invalid - at least "contradiction" is used in different meanings - as well as double negation -. Some authors: "the application is different." WittgensteinVs: one cannot talk independently of a sign from its use. - ((S) Then it is another sign - against see below.
---
II 328
The sentence of the excluded third is universal. ---
II 327
Logic/Wittgenstein: it is not a science, but a calculus - in it you can make inventions, but no discoveries. ---
II 333
Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: one cannot construct a logic for all cases - because one cannot abstract both applications from the application. ---
VI 85
Logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Schulte: not we express with the signs what we want - but in the logic the nature of the nature-necessary sign states itself - (6,124). ---
VI 89
Logic/border/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic is not given a limit through the use of the language, of course - it is, so to speak, the common framework of "my" and "your" language. ---
VI 118
Logic/Wittgenstein: say/show: logic says nothing, it shows something about necessity - grammatical sentences (about the language) thus fall out of the language game -> training: no speakable rules but blind following. TrainingVsExplanation, instead: Description - (> tell/show). ---
IV 101
Logic/Tractatus: (6.1264) each sentence of logic is a, in characters expressed, modus ponens - (And this cannot be expressed by one sentence). - (> Show/tell).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Logical Possibility Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 86
Logical possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. - FieldVsKripke: yes it is, this is due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be read "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". ---
I 87
E.g. Carnap: "He is a bachelor and married": is logically wrong - (> meaning postulates) - FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not belong to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. - consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) - should not only be true, but logical. - ((s) Even without meaning postulates. Meaning postulate/(s): this is about the extent of the logic.) ---
I 118
Logical possible/FieldVsKripke: "It is possible that there is an electron": is true in all models, therefore logically true. (> Logical possibility is itself logically true).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Logical Truth Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
X 87
Logical truth/Quine: always in relation to a particular language, because grammatical structure (is not transcendent) -" because the same language (i.e. set of sentences) can be generated by different formation rules or encyclopedia -" dependency on language and its grammar. ---
X 88
Identity/logical truth/structure/Quine: Identity puts structural conception of the logical truth (as structural property of schemes) in question, because they become wrong if one inserts a different predicate instead of = -" (in logical truth each predicate must be replaceable by another). ---
X 90
Identity/logical truth/structure/definition/Quine: if = is not simply interpreted as a predicate in the lexicon of the object language, but only as an abbreviation for compound sentences like (3), then the laws of identity are nothing but abbreviations of logical truths of the quantifier logic-" then the structural conception of the logical truth is saved. ---
X 109
Logical truth/attitudes/propositional attitude/Quine: if we had schemes with them, we could not decide which of them are valid -" laws for attitudes should not be logical laws, because propositional attitudes are too content rich. ---
X 109
Logical Truth/modality/modal logic/Quine: the modalities leave more room here than the attitudes: we can get schemes here that are valid: E.g. ~(~ p necc. p) - Also, we receive from any valid scheme another one by prefixing of necessary E.g. necc. (p or ~p) from p or ~p. ---
X 127
Logical truth/Carnap: Thesis: purely linguistical, because true in every replacement from the lexicon. ---
X 127ff
Logic/language/reality/QuineVsCarnap: logical truth is not purely linguistic, because evidence is as important as the translation - e.g. expression of "it is raining" when it rains -" but no logical consequences from circumstances, because true sentences follow from any sentence - all evident things are inseparable from the translation -" semantic ascent seems to speak for the language of logic -" Vs: the truth predicate shows the separation from the language -" Quine: the logic is based on the world and not on the language. ---
I 133
Yet: pro Carnap: we learn the logic by learning the language -" but that’s not different from everyday knowledge.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Meaning Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
I 16
Meaning/Putnam: not in the head: Proof: linguistic division of labor shows that I am not the only one who has the criteria - ((s) at least I am willing to learn from others) - PutnamVsTarski : understanding of the reference must be added - this must be independent of recognition - (realistic position). ---
I 49
Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivismus: the theory does not determine the meaning - otherwise the term gravity would change if a 10th Planet was discovered - positivists also require, that the theory is dependent of all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. ---
141 ~ I
Meaning/Putnam: results from the deletion of quotes. ---
I 258
Term transformation/change of meaning/significance/Putnam: e.g. if aliens had replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper through giant light bulbs, we would say : "that is not really a star" but not "this is not really the Big Dipper".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Meaning Postulates Chisholm
 
Books on Amazon
I 69ff
analytically / meaning postulates / ChisholmVsCarnap: it is not secure, that the fixing of ""square" means square" is not merely ad hoc and arbitrary

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Meaning Postulates Cresswell
 
Books on Amazon
I 30
KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsMeaning postulates/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsMeaning postulates. ---
II 163
Meaning Postulates/Definition/Entailment/inconsistency/Cresswell: Meaning postulates are needed to define terms such as entailment and inconsistency.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Meaning Postulates Katz
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell I 30
Lager: KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsBedeutungspostulate/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsBedeutungspostulate.

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Metaphysical Possibility Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 86
Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth - FieldVsKripke: that is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be seen as "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". ---
I 87
E.g. Carnap: "He is a bachelor and married": is logically wrong - (> meaning postulates) - FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not belong to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) - should not only be true, but logically true. - ((s) Even without meaning postulates - (meaning postulate/(s): this is about the scope of logic.)

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Naturalized Epistemology Stroud
 
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I 209
Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence - there is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. - brains in a vat - Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world. ---
I 211
QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory - solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. - QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge. ---
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. ---
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. ---
I 250
Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? - But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) - Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain - then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another - ((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) - underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things - Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events. ---
I 251
Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy at events - StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness - the proof has to be one, too. ---
I 253
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects).

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Positivism Popper
 
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I 116f
Positivism/Popper: understands the problem of demarcation naturalistic, as fixed border - positivist radicalism: the laws of nature are not traceable to elementary experience sets. ---
I 117
Wittgenstein: after his criterion of meaning the laws of nature are meaningless, that means no legitimate sentences. PopperVsCarnap: failure to dismiss metaphysics through reviews. Instead, Popper: it has a heuristic value. (E.g. Speculative atomism).
---
I 127
Log records/Popper: no preferred position. They appear in science only as psychological statements. PopperVsPositivismus: positivism does not wish that there should still be meaningful problems except the problems of "positive" empirical science. He wants to see the so-called philosophical problems as pseudo-problems. That will be always feasible. There is nothing easier to uncover a problem as a pseudo-problem. One only needs to take the concept of "meaning" narrow enough.
---
II 473
PopperVsLogical positivism: Science as a process emphasized more than the characterization of formal traits at theories that are regarded as scientific products.

Po I
K. Popper
Objektive Erkenntnis Hamburg 1993

Positivism Putnam
 
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I 41
PutnamVsPopper/PutnamVsMach: VsPositivismus: is idealistic, does not correspond to reality. ---
I 44
PutnamVsPositivismus: according to him truth is not trans-theoretical - it is only a trans-theoretical concept, "leads to successful prediction" - Putnam: instead: Realism: must adhere to logic of truth transfers. ---
II 45
From the fact that two theories lead to successful predictions, it does not follow, that their conjunction leads to that - reason: the predicate, which plays the role of truth ("leads to prediction") does not have the characteristics of truth. ---
I 49
Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the significance - otherwise the concept of gravity would change if a 10th Planet would be discovered - also the positivists demand that the theory is also dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the scheme of theory and prediction would collapse. ---
I 215
Truth/Positivism: which degree of confirmation one accepts, is ultimately conventional, a question of purpose - Putnam: that is relativism - it has no answer to the enemy that says, "in my system the P is not rational".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Possibility Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 86
Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. - FieldVsKripke: yes it is, this is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be read "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". ---
I 87
E.g. Carnap: "He is bachelor and married": is logically wrong. (> Meaning postulates) - FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not count to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. - Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) - should not only be true, but logically true. - ((s) also without meaning postulates.) ((s) Meaning postulate/(s): here it is about the extent of the logic.) ---
I 203
Geometric Possibility/Field: instead of logical possibility: there are different geometries. - Precondition: there are empirical axioms which differentiate the possibility from impossibility. - However, the existence quantifier must be within the range of the modal operator. ---
I 218
Problem of Quantities/mathematical entities/me/Field: For example, it is possible that the distance between x and y is twice as long as the one between x and w, even if the actual distance is more than twice as long. - Problem: extensional adequacy does not guarantee that the defined expression is true in every non-actual situation - that is, that we must either presuppose the substantivalism or the heavy duty Platonism. - That is what we do in practice.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Predicates Goodman
 
Books on Amazon
I 127
Predicate/denotation/Goodman: names and certain images denote singular, Predicates and certain other images denote in general (for example, images in a bird book.)
---
II I preface (Putnam)
Goodman/Putnam: not all predicates are equally projectable. ---
II IV Preface
No predicate is disjunctive by itself or non-disjunctive. VsCarnap ---
II IV
Nevertheless, according to Carnap both "length" and "length squared" are qualitative. This selection of predicates that should be fundamental or not fundamental is too arbitrary.
---
II V
More radical solution: proposed by Wesley Salmon: to allow for inductive logic only ostensively defined basic predicates. To distinguish normal from pathological predicates. PutnamVs: unmotivated and too strict:   E.g. we call a bacillus S-shaped when it looks like that under a microscope. Then the concept is not based on observation, but it is totally projectable.
---
II IV
Grue/Goodman: If we take the familiar color predicates, "grue" is a disjunctive predicate. If we take, however, the unusual predicates grue and bleen as basic expressions then grue can be defined as green and observed before the point of time t or as bleen and not observed before t. ---
II 61
Misleading is, to regard the issue of disposition as the one of explanation of hidden properties. I do not want to say that there is some object like the property combustible or the property "burning". It is, after all, predicates that produce relations. ---
II 64
A predicate such as "flexible" can be regarded as an extension or continuation of a predicate like "biggt". The problem is to define these continuations only with manifest predicates. When are two objects much of the same kind? The fact that they both belong to any class, is not enough. because: any pair of objects belongs to any class. And that both should belong exactly to the same class would be a demanded too great, because two objects never belong to exactly the same classes.
---
II 74
Continuation/predicates: statement: "Time-space is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-space" on p + t - variant: Real time-space p1 + t1, head rotation, other color: the predicate "U-blue possible" only continues the predicate "blue" on a wider range of real objects. ---
II 77
One can move fictitious mountains to London in true statements, simply by applying on London a certain continuation of the predicate "mountainous". ---
II 78
Statements about what is possible do not need to exceed the boundaries of the real world. We often confuse a description of the real world with the real world itself. ---
II 79
The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and are usually further. The problem of the continuation of "burning" to "combustible" is akin to the problem of induction. ---
II 121
"Green" and "grue" seem to be completely symmetrical to each other (in terms of continuation), but "green" is much better anchored.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Proofs Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
XII 90
View/proof/expression/QuineVsCarnap: that a sentence can be expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms, does not mean that it could be proved alone with set-theoretical and logical means - (s) means of expressions are not evidence - (> inside/outside; > circle ).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Properties Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Rorty VI 151
Major property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself." ---
Quine I 43
Features: independent existence is pointless. ---
I 218
Mass Terminus/Quine: is archaic(> Cassirer) -> Properties a) commonality b) Scattered clumps? ---
I 217
Features: usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains. ---
I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back abstract objects - faithfully distinguished of concrete objects by use of "-ness". ---
I 322
Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun. ---
I 344/45
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal logic) - only more or less important properties. ---
I 344
Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions). ---
I 361
Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46). ---
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
---
I 412
Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables. ---
I 464
QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties. ---
II 129f
Properties: hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things. properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator.
Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence).
Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences.
Properties not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function.
Properties as last classes every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn).
Properties/identity: (here) interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion.
Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list.
Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed.
---
II 144 f
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief de re (essential property). Modal logic/Quine: entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context.
Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re.
---
X 95
Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Propositions Tugendhat
 
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III 215
Proposition/Carnap: judgment, its meaning should also contain the "real state" - then extended to sentences - Tugendhat: thus, the domain of semantics is exceeded, because the truth of the proposition in contrast to the truth of the sentence is not a semantic determination (not relative to a system of signs) but an "absolute" determination - TugendhatVsCarnap "real" state meaningless if pragmatics is excluded.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Protocol Sentences Hempel
 
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I 99 ~
protocol sentence / Hempel : compared to them even singular assertions have the character of hypotheses - I 100 it follows : CarnapVsTractatus : truth / falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements ( because they are indeed hypotheses) - the ( significance criterion is too narrow ) -> also p.s. are no longer unassailable - I 102 Schlick : not completely without basic sentences , otherwise > relativism - I 104 SchlickVsCarnap / VsNeurath : the thesis that a statement is true if it is proven by p.s. sufficiently leads to absurd results , if the idea is absolutely true p.s. is declined - there are obviously many different systems of p.s. - by Carnap and Neurath each of these different , incompatible systems were true - I 105 Carnap : to bring forth true p.s. we learn through conditioning: meters properly read , etc. - I 106 in the new form of Carnap s theory p.s. are even more radically stripped their base character: they lose their irrefutability - Popper : statements of all Forms may occur as p.s. - I 107 at the end they are superfluous
C.G. Hempel
I Hempel Zur Wahrheitstheorie des logischen Positivismus aus Wahrheitsheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996

II Hempel Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

II (b) Hempel Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung (1951) aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982
Proxy Geach
 
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I 199f
Variable/Description/Proxy/GeachVsCarnap: in his rules for descriptions E.g. "" ____ (ix) (.. x ..) ____ "etc. the strokes do not act, as Carnap believes as vacancies (proxy) but as variables - Carnap thinks, if he renames them, he could prevent his problems with variables.
I 224
"stand for"/Geach: no difference whether I say, a predicate "stands for" a proposition or was its name - ((s) as a proxy name?).

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Quantifiers Geach
 
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I 199, 200
Quantifier / GeachVsCarnap: all quantifiers contain variables

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Quine Fodor
 
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IV 37
Holism/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine represents a meaning holism (MH) - but supposedly also a confirmation holism (CH) - which equals the Quine-Duhem thesis - (>Two Dogmas: phrases not individually before the Tribunal).
IV 39f
PragmatismVsRealism - QuineVsReductionism: verification conditions not analytically included in statements - CH/FL: does not have to be a pragmatist, can also be a realist - compatible with Quine-Duhem thesis (sentences not individually verifiable) - Confirmation not a linguistic matter, but the way the world is (Quine pro realism). - Quine: a priori equivalent to the semantic. - Quine pro verificationism: sentence meaning: method of verification. - QDT: highly consistent with realism - QDT: a) any statement can be maintained if appropriate auxiliary hypotheses are provided - b) the requirement that evidence must be a posteriori - QDT/Fodor/Lepore: can also be read: as a) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of confirmation - b) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of meaning.
IV 2189
Network/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: the only fixed nodes are the observational concepts.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Radical Interpretation Carnap
 
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VII 146
Radical Interpretation/RI/Translation/Field Linguist/Carnap: Key point: first it is discovered that certain objects are designated by a given word (extension), then the intension is discovered (what natives understand by it) - Extension before intension - order. 1) positive E.: attribute 2) negative E. (deny) 3) indefinite cases. - It is still possible to attribute different intensions to the thus extensionally fixed predicates! Because there can be different properties, for which the extension of the predicate has been determined. ((s) Ex (s) if all considered dogs are brown, it is not clear whether the color or the animals were singled out - Furthermore, "gloeb" could refer to four-footedness thus covering the entire extension. ChisholmVsCarnap: this does not take into account while any mistakes of the speaker or uncertainty.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Rational Reconstruction Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
XII 91
Definition rational reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalist statements of observation, of logical and set-theoretic terms. - QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions, and each would seem equally satisfactory, if it was only shown that the physicalist statements are true - rational reconstruction was to show that all other scientific concepts are superfluous. - Vs: Problem: assignment of sense qualities to space-time points does not work. - Carnap later: only reduction sentences instead of context definition. ---
XII 94
Vs: the rational reconstruction would have to provide whole theories instead of translated sentences or translated terms.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Reductionism Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty IV 51
Synonymy / Davidson: If we fail to establish a synonymy between micro / macro structure (between sets of neurophysiological and psychological language), it says nothing about "Irreduciblility" (reduciblility). The failure of synonymy is irrelevant for the truth of physicalism.
Davidson II 130
2 dogma / Quine / Davidson: - ((S) VsCarnap?) - reductionism, the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to a logical construction of terms which refers to immediate experience ((s) instead network with purely logical truths in the center.)

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Reductionism Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
(according to Rorty):
QuineVsReductionism

Quine VII 40
Reductionism/QuineVsCarnap: his space time quadrupel set preuppose a sedentary world - the quadruples still increase the set of the general properties - refined form of reductionism: any incident either increases the probability (likelihood) of a statement or deminishes it. ---
Schiffer I 2
QuineVsReductionism: the semantic cannot be reduced to more fundamental facts because of the indeterminacy of translation - so he saw the whole semantics skeptical.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Rylean Ancestors Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
I 81ff
Definition Rylean ancestors/Sellars: E.g. Primitive language, vocabulary for public properties of public objects, conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification and especially the subjunctive conditional. Moreover, vagueness and openness. - Intersubjectivity/SellarsVs: thesis that an intersubjective language must be a Rylean language. - Carnap: the resources for an intersubjective language can be known from the formal logic. - SellarsVsCarnap - Sellars pro Ryle: thoughts are a short form for hypothetical and mixed categorical-hypothetical statements about behavior. ---
I 93
Definition Rylean Language/Sellars: behaviorist language that is limited to the non-theoretical vocabulary of a behaviorist psychology - (s) so nothing unobservable). ---
I 105f
Rylean Language/Rylean ancestors/Sellars: actual declaration, new language - more than just code: conceptual framework of public objects in space and time. - Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them. (Individual things have no antecedent objects of thought).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Semantic Ascent Stroud
 
Books on Amazon
I 213
Semantic Ascent / Quine: mention instead use - transition from substantive to formal speech. - It is still about reality and not just about language. - E.g. "Wombat" is true of some organisms. - VsCarnap: these are not "external" questions.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Skepticism Carnap
 
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Stroud I 170
CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Carnap: Thesis: we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if an appropriate sensation is possible for us - if we can determine the truth of the corresponding sentences. - Then we have to determine a sphere within which this is possible.
Stroud I 173
Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: E.g. the sentence: "No one will ever know if __." Here the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because unverifiable - Meaningless: neither true nor false - then the question "Are there external things?" would be pointless, because neither true nor false. - Useful, however: internal questions: questions of existence within an area of ​​knowledge. - Within an area of ​​knowledge: the same sentence can be produced - i.e. the syntax is not decisive. - Sense: something that is true cannot contradict something that is meaningless. - CarnapVsSkepticsm: meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable.
I 179
Descartes: has the same explanation for the truth of skepticism as Carnap for its futility: the lack of verifiability of empirical existence statements.
Stroud I 187
CarnapVsSkepticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic frame (reference system) - Knowledge/Carnap: Two components: 1) Experience - 2) Linguistic frame (reference system), within which we understand the experience.
I 188
The only theoretical question is that about the rules of the system. - Mother Tongue/Carnap: we do not choose it - therefore, it reflects no thesis about the existence of the outside world. - Decision: if we continue to use it. - Problem: because it is a decision there are no objective facts that make it.
Stroud I 191
Skepticism/Reference System/StroudVsCarnap: introduces a "we" and experience as something that happens to us - The fact that we exist and have experience cannot just be regarded as an "internal" truth of the thing language.
Stroud I 193ff
StroudVsCarnap: either leads to idealism or to metaphysical realism or to skepticism all three of which he rejects - because of the futility of external questions.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Statements Hare
 
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II R. M. Hare Philosophische Entdeckungen in Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

Grewendorf II 133
Statements/tradition/Hare: Hare divides statements into empirical and analytical ones. In addition to that there seems to be nothing else. Problem: one can easily assume on the basis of a confusion that the proposition, which states that the other proposition is analytically true or false, is itself analytic.
But it is at least not obviously true that
E.g. the statement "propositions of the form 'p and not p'are analytically false" should be analytically true. Is it not a statement of how the words "and not" are used?
And is it not analytically true that they are used in this way and not otherwise?
Problem: there is a conflict here between the temptations to call the statement analytically, as well as empirically, as well as neither of both options.
Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein calls the discussion "nonsensical." > Silence.
CarnapVsWittgenstein: his behavior is contradictory: instead of being silent, he writes a whole book.
---
II 134
HareVsCarnap: does not take Wittgenstein's doubts seriously enough.


Meg II
G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle
Linguistik und Philosophie Frankfurt 1995
Stimuli Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 66/67
Stimulus: Gavagai: stimulus, not rabbits! - (>F) - Verification by society. ---
I 67
Stimulus meaning: preliminary isolation of individual sentences for verification. VsCarnap: Advantage: unicorn/Goblin: distinction without preliminary decision on admissibility. ---
I 81
Stimulus meaning: objective reality that the linguist needs - translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. ---
I 120f
Consistent sentences: stimulus meaning more sparse - accordingly: stimulus synonymy less plumable >VsAnalyticity. ---
I 126
Stimulus synonymy improved by socialization (agreement) - same goes for stimulus analyticity: But now: 2 + 2 = 4 on the same level as "There are black dogs" (acceptability). ---
I 402
Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy individual thing-universal - it does not matter whether it exists. Equator, North Pole - linking with stimuli weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. ---
II 57
QuineVsSensory qualities - people speak and do not think about their stimuli - it is about stimulus and response. ---
V 48f
Stimulus/Response/Quine: this (polar) contradiction is mitigated by the notion of perception similarity (>pleasure/displeasure). ---
V 49
Truth similarity: includes auditory similarity of words - truth similarity - analysis ignores the different origins. - stimulus reaction analysis does not.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Syntax Carnap
 
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Tugendhat III 207 ~
Syntax / Carnap: all philosophical problems are part of the syntax. - III 209 TugendhatVsCarnap: then sentences cannot be about anything. - They must be phys. facts themselves - III 211 Science / Tugendhat: Basic Concept: observability. - This is inaccessible for the logical syntax. -> The result was behaviorism, to make the evidence accessible to science that is not accessible to the syntax.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Systems Feyerabend
 
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Feyerabend I 242
Carnap/Feyerabend: the physicist assumes that the world only contains contradictory theoretical systems.
FeyerabendVsCarnap: Now the only way to decide whether a particular property is necessary for science is a functional post-festum investigation. This leads back straight to the story that provides the data for such an investigation. There is no way to judge a particular proposed system.

Fe I
P. Feyerabend
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Fe II
P. Feyerabend
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Theoretical Terms Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
I 48
Theoretical Terms/th.t./PutnamVsPositivism: the theoretical terms do not have different meanings in different theories - the semantic concepts are trans-theoritical - VsCarnap: the purely syntactical positivism cannot express that a formal language is successful when they correspond to a reasonable degree of probability to situations.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Theories Putnam
 
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Horwich I 389
Theory/Putnam: earlier theories are limiting cases of later theories. - This is convergence. - That explains also why theoretical terms retain their reference. ---
Horwich I 392
Ideal Theory/Putnam: if we can see the fulfillment-relation as unintended, it is useless to say that even the ideal theory "in reality" could be wrong. ---
Putnam I 49
Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the meaning. - Otherwise, the term gravity would change if a 10th planet was discovered. - In addition, the positivists demand that the theory is dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. ---
I 63
Theory/Putnam: two theories do not have to have equivalent terms, but only the same reference. ---
I 97
Truth/logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives are not determined by their formal logic. -> Holism -> Quine: the distinction between the whole theory and meanings of each statement is useless.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Two Dogmas Esfeld
 
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I 50 ~
Two Dogmas / QuineVsCarnap: experience can not confirm individual statements. - Science depends on both language and experience. but not traceble in individual sentences (> System) - also logical truths can be invalidated! - without separationanalyt. / synth: confirmation spreads over the whole system.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Understanding Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 394
Understanding/Truth Conditions/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. - Putnam: a theory of understanding cannot be the whole meaning theory. ---
I 400
But this only works with a verificationistic approach of understanding. - Not with a truth conditional approach. - Therefore, the use is already explained. ---
Putnam V 38ff
Understanding/Putnam: the phenomena do not constitute understanding, but rather the ability to apply sentences - understanding is not an event. - ((s) Otherwise it would be lost in the next moment). - Putnam: Understanding is a skill. - Imagination does not help to use sentences correctly. - No amount of mental images is constitutive or necessary for understanding. ---
V 175
Truth/understanding/Tarski/Putnam: Problem: we do not understand what it means to understand "snow is white". - We do not know what standards the other creates for truth. ---
I 31
Understanding/PutnamVsCarnap: is not merely knowledge. - Also, the right relationship with excellent situations is necessary. - (> Causal theory).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Variables Geach
 
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I 198f
Variable/description/deputy/GeachVsCarnap: in its rules for descriptions, e.g. ""___ ___ (ix)(...x...)___ ___" etc. the strokes do not function, as Carnap believes as vacancies (substitutes) but as variables! - Carnap thinks, however, if he renames them, he avoids his problems with variables. ---
I 199, 200
Variables/Constants/GeachVsCarnap: Carnap does not distinguish between them, as he himself says: E.g. Carnap: "If "Q" is a constant pr (determined or indeterminate), then the sentences (Prague)" (city),"Q(a)" are all equally derivable from "Q(x)". - Geach: "determined or undetermined", shows that the alleged "constant pr" is used as a variable. - Solution: "For all "Q" if ..." - but then we have a variable ""Q"" that contains quotes as part of itself. ---
I 201
Free Variables/Strawson: E.g. (A) In "x is a human", "x" is a free variable. - Here, "x" does not occur as a free variable - because "x" is "x is a human" occurs as a free variable, the theorem (A) is true. - If (A) contained a free variable, it would not be a statement, but a propositional function. ---
I 203
Bound Variables/Use/Mention/Geach: in e.g. "x is a human being", "x" is needed, therefore it is a bound variable! (Bound by the quotes) - at the same time the expression is the name of a description, even if it does not denote anything. (> Denote/designate). - Names do not denote anything.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Verification Carnap
 
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Stroud I 196
Probation/Carnap: correspondence between sentence and reality. Verifiability must be mitigated to probation ability.
Stroud I 198
Skepticism/Verification Principle/V.P./StroudVsCarnap: does not introduce any distinction that we did not have before. - Whether the verification principle itself is necessary depends on how it is introduced. - But even then it will decide between meaningful and meaningless the way we have been doing so far. - Incorrect Introduction/(s): with the idea to provide something that we already knew before.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Verification Danto
 
Books on Amazon:
Arthur Danto
I 80
DantoVsCarnap: Heidegger s "Das Nichts nichtet" is not unverifiable. We all know it as existential fear.

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Verification (Confirmation) Carnap
 
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Nozick II 49
Confirmation / Carnap: is an intrinsic characteristic of the pair E, H, - some VsCarnap: the confirmation here also depends on what other predicates there are in the language.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982


No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 51 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity Quine Vs Analyticity
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Danto I 239
QuineVsAnalyticity: we do not anticipate at which time we have to change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no clue.
Lanz in Metz I 272
The lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and science are on one and the same continuum.
McDowell I 158
QuineVsFirst Dogma: (distinction analytic/synthetic) against the notion that the truth of a synthetic sentence depended on two things: the meaning and the world. ((s) you cannot have meaning before you have the world).  Quine, however, preserves duality: Apparently, the truth depends both on the language and on extra-linguistic facts.
 McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we simply cannot distinguish them sentence by sentence.
- - -
Quine IV 407
QuineVsAnalyticity: reflects a failed notion of scientific theories and their reference to experience. There is no strict separation analytic/synthetic. "Roots of Reference": if you consistently proceed empirically, you gain an epistemologically harmless notion of analyticity.
Analytic/Kant: does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context!
II 407/408
Analytic/Quine: Kant should rather have said that a statement is analytic if it is true because of meanings and regardless of of facts. This explicitly draws a connection between analyticity and meaning. QuineVsAnalyticity: considerable difficulties exist with sentences like: Ex "No bachelor is married", "cats are animals." Obviously, these are not logical truths, their negation would be no formal objection.
(IV 410)
Ex Quine: "I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic or not. This is not because of the ambiguity of "green" and "extended", but because of the ambiguity of "analytical". Artificial languages: semantic rules for determining analyticity are only interesting if we already understand analyticity.
False notion: the idea that with the truth of a statement it is generally possible to distinguish between a linguistic and a fact component.
The whole difficulty is perhaps only a symptom of a false notion of the relationship between language and the world.
- - -
V 113
Logic/Frege/Carnap: the laws of logic apply because of language. I.e. its sentences are analytic. QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of meaning has not been given empirical meaning. Thus neither this linguistic theory of logic.
Solution/Quine: through our observation of language learning: we learn truth functions by finding connections between dispositions.
Alternation/Language Learning: the law that an alternation is implied by each of its components is learned with the word "or" itself. Something similar applies to the other laws. (>Minimum/Maximum/Chisholm). (>logical particles >logical constants).
Analyticity/Analytical/Language Learning/Quine: Ex we learn "bachelor" by learning that our parents agreed under precisely the circumstances under which they agreed to "unmarried man".
QuineVsAnalyticity: Important Argument: there are even disagreements about logical truths: Ex between classical logicians and intuitionists. Maybe we think that some truths are analytic and others are not?
Law of the Excluded Middle/SaD/Language Learning/Quine: the law of the excluded middle rejected by intuitionism is not linked in such a way with learning "or"! It is rather due to the blind spot of alternation.
Important Argument: perhaps the law of the excluded middle (Quine "law") which is true only in our point of view should only be seen as synthetic.
V 116
Analytic/Analyticity/Quine: the analytic propositions are a subclass of stimulus analytic propositions agreeing to which is a disposition of any speaker of a language community. QuineVsCarnap: but even now we do not have such strict contrast to the synthetic propositions.
Solution/Quine: Thesis: sentences that have been learned by many first are closer to analyticity than sentences that have only been learned by a few. The analytic propositions are those which are learned by all like that. These extreme cases, however, do not differ significantly from the neighboring ones. One cannot always specify which ones they are.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Carnap, R. Ayer Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 292
AyerVs coherence theory: there are many competing systems, whose acceptance depends on culture of scientists. VsCarnap: he hoped that only one of these systems would be accepted. But this means already to exceed the limits of the coherence theory.
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
Carnap, R. Carnap Vs Carnap, R.
 
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VI VII
Extensionality thesis/Carnap: (1928): all statements are extensional. Self-criticism CarnapVsCarnap: (1961) is not correct in this form. New: weaker form: not every extensional statement is translatable into a logically equivalent statement in an extensional language. Extensional method/Carnap: is basically just to use an extensional language for the whole constitutional system. Self-criticism: (1961) that is not clear: the impression could arise that for the validity of the re-construction of the concept A through a term B it was already sufficient for that B to have the same scope as A. Vs: in reality, the stronger condition must be satisfied that scope equality is not just a coincidence, but a necessity! (Because of logical rules or laws of nature).

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Carnap, R. Danto Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Arthur Danto
Danto I 80f
CarnapVsHeidegger: denied that a sentence like "Das Nichts nichtet" was verifiable. DantoVsCarnap: we all know a feeling of anxiety . Why should it be less empirical than seeing a table.

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Carnap, R. Davidson Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 96
DavidsonVsCarnap: In philosophy, one has made ​​the mistake to assume that any justification of empirical knowledge must go back to sensory experience. If so, the theory of knowledge has no need for purely private subjective objects of consciousness.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Carnap, R. Feyerabend Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 242
Carnap: the physicist assumes that the world contains only consistent theoretical systems. FeyerabendVsCarnap: the only way to decide if a particular property for science is necessary is to examine a functional postfestum. This leads straight back to the story, which provides the data for such an investigation. Then we have no way to assess a particular proposed system.
I 362
Carnap: guiding principle: new and abstract languages ​​can not be introduced directly, but must be linked to an existing observation language first. (FeyerabendVs).

Fe I
P. Feyerabend
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Fe II
P. Feyerabend
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Carnap, R. Field Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 118
FieldVsCarnap: although my approach is similar to that of Carnap in Meaning and Necessity, 1) it does not refer to meaning at all. I.e. no "meaning relations between predicates" ((s)> meaning postulates).
2) my treatment of free variables does not require the introduction of "individual concepts" and is consistently anti-essentialist. (FieldVsEssentialism): no formula of the form "MB" is true in a model with view to an attribution function if it is not also true in the model in relation to any other attribution function. Nino Cocchiarella/Carnap/Field: Cocchiarella: ("On the Primary and Secondary semantics of logical necessity"): an approach similar to Carnap: FieldVsCocchiarella/FieldVsRamseyFieldVsCarnap: leads to Ramsey’s bizarre conclusion that E.g. "it is possible that there are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 objects" is logically false if the world happens to contain fewer objects (empirical).
FieldVsCarnap: 3) his idea that modal concepts are derived from semantic concepts should be modified, Field: Just the other way around! (QuineVsField).
II 186
Referential Indeterminacy/Reference/Theory Change/Reference Change/Semantic Change/Field: we now have all the components for the indeterminacy of reference: Only (HR) and (HP) remain, but are mutually exclusive. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass.
(HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass.
In fact there is no fact on the basis of which you could opt for one of two. Vs: it could be argued that we only lack additional information. FieldVsVs: but then it should be possible already to say what kind of information that is supposed to be. And we have already found that there can be no fact here. "Mass"/Newton/Denotation/Reference/Field: the issue is not that we do not know what Newton’s "mass" denotes, but that Newton’s word was referentially indeterminate. (Because we do not know which of the two, HP or HR should be excluded.) II 187 The truth and falsity of (4R) and (5P) cannot be explained on the basis of what Newton referred to. FieldVsReferential Semantics/FieldVsCarnap: this is excluded by this indeterminacy of reference.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Carnap, R. Fodor Vs Carnap, R.
 
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II 111
Formal Language/Ideal Language/Carnap: Suppose we had three artificial languages L1, L2, and L3, each of which is considered as a possible idealization of the natural language L. The sentence S in the language L should be
analytic in L1,
synthetic in L2, and none of both in L3.
How do we know whether S in reality is analytic, synthetic, or none? We ask of a theory that it answers this question.
FodorVsCarnap: the theory would have to explicate the concepts of analytic in L, synthetic in L, etc. But none of the languages developed by Carnap and his successors does that. Therefore, they are not idealizations of natural languages.
II 112
As long as, beyond that, these idealizations use terms that are not interpreted for natural languages, they claim wrongly to explain something. Then we have no way to detect deviations.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Carnap, R. Goodman Vs Carnap, R.
 
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II 67
GoodmanVsCarnap/Reduction Sentences: the whole thing is pretty absurd. In my opinion, philosophy has the task to explicate, not to describe science (and the everyday language). The explication shall refer to pre-systematic use of the expressions of consideration, but does not need to comply with the order. It s all about economy and standardization. - - -
Schurz I 219
Grue/Bleen/Goodman/Schurz: logical form: (B: observes G*: grue) G*: ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)). Sa: Emerald. Sample: {a:1 ‹ i ‹ n} Then the assertions Sai u Bat0 u Gai and Sai u Bat0 u G*ai are equivalent b< definition. If we apply the inductive generalization conclusion both for "green" and for "grue", our sample results in the two universal hypotheses H: = "All emeralds are green" and H*: = "All emeralds are grue". Problem: H and H* imply for all emeralds not observed before t0 conflicting forecasts (green vs red). Schurz: the following relationship exists to subjective inductive exchangeability assumptions: for regular probability functions the exchangeability assumption cannot be valid at the same time for the predicate (Gx) and its pathological counterpart (G*). Question: according to which criteria should we decide which predicates we consider as exchangeable or inductively projectable? Many criteria were proposed and proved to be unsuitable. Carnap: (1947.146 1976, 211): Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "Positional" Predicate/Carnap, that is a predicate that refers to the time t0 in its definition. E.g. grue.
Def Qualitative Predicate/Carnap: has no definitional reference to individual constants.
GoodmanVsCarnap: (Goodman 1955/75, 105): Problem of language dependence (sic: dependence): through reciprocal re-definition it is possible to move from our own language (with "green" and "red") to a language which is equivalent in its expressiveness and in which "grue" and "bleen"(G * x * x R,) act as basic concepts (basic predicates):
Re-Definition/Language Dependence/Logical Form:
Language L (Gx, Rx primitive) language L* (G*x, R*x primitive)
Definitions in L Definitions in L*
G*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 › Rx)) Gx: ‹› ((Bxt0 › G*x) u (~Bxt0 › R*x))
R*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 › Rx) u (~Bxt0 › Gx)) Rx: ‹› ((Bxt0 > R*x) u (~Bxt0 › G*x)). Solution/Schurz: it is possible to distinguish between qualitative and positional predicates in terms of ostensive learnability independent of the language! I 220 GoodmanVsInduction/Schurz: this does not answer why induction should be based on qualitative and not on positional predicates. Induction consists in extending pattern that were so far observed as consistent into the future. To be able to formulate useful induction rules we need to know what remained constant!
And that depends on the qualitative features. Positional features are pseudo-features.
Important argument: the fact that individuals are "constantly" "grue" means that they change their color from green to red at t0 .
In this case, we have carried out "anti-induction" and not induction. That is the reason why we (with Carnap) have basic predicates for qualitative and not positional features for induction rules.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Carnap, R. Husserl Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Chisholm II 148
Erwähnung/Gebrauch/Husserl/Mulligan/Smith: (HusserlVsCarnap): die Erwähnung (abnormaler Gebrauch) von b in Anführungszeichen ist parasitär zum ursprünglichen Gebrauch. Man muß wissen, was ’ b’ ist, um ’ "b" ’ gebrauchen zu können. Der unmodifizierte und der modifizierte Gebrauch müssen also etwas Gemeinsames haben. Erwähnung/Husserl: ist eine nominale Funktion.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Carnap, R. Kant Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Stroud I 173
Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that he could not be wrong, because it is necessary in order to clarify any other meaningful questions empirically. CarnapVsKant: According to the verification principle this is but a "pseudo-theory", which cannot explain or guarantee anything. Meaning/Sense/CarnapVsKant: In order to make sense, we need to know the truth value of the propositions which contain the corresponding expressions. weaker: We must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something then his falsehood.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Carnap, R. Lewis Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Field II 196
Theoretical Terms/TT/Ramsey sentence/Carnap/Lewis/Field: (Carnap 1956, Kap.26, Lewis 1979b,1972). Theoretical Term/Introduction/Content/Ramsey sentence/Carnap: if a new TT was introduced by a theory Θ(T), then the content of the theory is equal to the content of the Ramsey sentence (Ex)Θ(x).
Only realization: In a special case in which (E!x)Θ(x) is, we can say that T denotes the only object that fulfills Θ(x) erfüllt. (special character).
multiple realization: Problem: what does the theoretical term denote here? (>Functionalism, Turing machine).
It seems to need to denote something, if this were not possible we cannot explain why Θ(T) is true (and this must be according Carnap's thesis that it "has the content" of(Ex)Θ(x).)
Solution/Carnap: if Θ (x) is realized multiple times, then T denotes one random object which fulfills Θ(x).
LewisVsCarnap: This is not plausible because it is not explained how it is possible for a user of T to take a particular object instead of another one.
Field II 197
Content/TT/Ramsey sentence/Lewis/Field: Lewis felt obliged (probably reluctantly) to not take the content of the Ramsey sentence Ex Θ (x), but the modified sentence of Ramsey: (E! x) Θ (x) ((s) which only presumes one object). I.e. the theory is wrong if Θ(x) is realized multiple times, so that T can be seen as without denotations. Then there is no ambiguity.
LewisVs: (1970b): This is costly: Then if somebody states Θ (T), then it is absolutely implausible that he thereby has asserted that nothing than T Θ (x) can be fulfilled.
LewisVs: (1972): even worse: it has been applied here on functionalism, which is after all based on multiple realization.
Multiple Realization/Functionalism/Field: Many authors actually want to accept mR in one and the same organism at the same time.
Partial Denotation/Lösung/Field: Lewis could simply say that (as Carnap says) the content of Θ (T) is simply the Ramsey sentence (Ex) Θ (x), and if Θ (x) is realized multiple ways, then T partially denotes each of the "Realisierer".
Lewis IV 88
Theoretical Terms/TT/Definition/Description/Lewis: After having defined the TT through descriptions, we can eliminated the latter with their help. This is how we obtain O sentences. Def erweitertes Postulat/Lewis: das Postulat von T, das wir durch Ersetzung der TT durch Kennzeichnungen erhalten (O Satz).
Es besagt, dass die Theorie T realisiert ist durch das n Tupel der ersten, zweiten...Komponente der einzigen Realisierung von T.
Das erweiterte Postulat ist definitorisch äquivalent mit dem Postulat.
Es besagt, dass die Theorie einmalig realisiert ist.
Es ist logisch äquivalent mit einem kürzeren O Satz, der das gleiche in kürzerer Form besagt.
Das nennen wir den "Satz der einzigen Realisierung von T":
IV 89
Ey1...yn (x) x1...xn (T[x1,,,xn] ↔ . y1 = x1 & ..& yn = xn LewisVsCarnap: dann ist das Postulat wahr dann und nur dann, wenn die Theorie einmalig realisiert ist.
Problem:
das erweiterte Postulat ist ein O Satz der stärker ist als der Ramsey Satz, der bloß sagt, dass es wenigstens eine Realisierung gibt.
Dennoch, wenn die Definitions Sätze Teil von T sind, dann ist das erweitere Postulat ein Theorem von T.
Dann ergeben uns die Definitionen Theoreme, die nicht ohne sie hätten abgeleitet werden können.
D.h. da die Definitionen selbst, anders als der Carnap Satz, nicht logisch vom Postulat impliziert sind.
Deshalb, wenn wir behaupten wollen, dass die Definitionssätze von T korrekte Definitionen sind, müssen wir die Idee aufgeben, dass die Theoreme alle und nur die logischen Konsequenzen des Postulats von T sind. Und das geben wir gerne auf.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Carnap, R. Putnam Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Goodman II Putnam Foreword
Carnap / Putnam:according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Put I 48).
Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself,
PutnamVsCarnap: Ex "logical sky" Ex "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer".

- - -
Lewis IV 85
Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts.
IV 85/86
Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there.
They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas".
- - -
Putnam V 244
Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private.
PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable.
- - -
V 250
Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap). - - -
Putnam I 42
Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful.
There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them).
Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions:
1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions.
I 43
2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language". - - -
Putnam I 46
Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence.
PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"!
(I 46 +: Hilbert's Epsilon, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term).
- - -
Putnam I 48
Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem.
I 49
Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say!

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Carnap, R. Quine Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Carnap VII 151
Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! (?)
However, if in the case of the lexicon (?) we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.
VII 154
Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of ​​the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate.
QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects.
VII 155
CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations.
Lanz I 271
QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories!
I 272
There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. ---
Newen I 123
Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically.
I 124
Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap).
Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli.
Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities:
1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval
2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection.
This only applies for occasion sentences.
I125
Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers.
QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words.
- - -
Quine I 73
QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way.
I 74
Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference:
Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet.
Quine: theory has primarily to do with records,
Carnap: to do with terms.
- - -
I 466
For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general?
I 467
This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas?
However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers.

Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts.
It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form.
QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".)
Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania."
- - -
IV 404
Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself).
IV 416
QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? - - -
V 28
Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities.
V 29
Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning.
QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences.
V 30
Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.)
Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms.
QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role).
- - -
VII 40
But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience.
QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values ​​are revised in the same sense.
- - -
X 127
Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter.
Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect:
1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything.
2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation.
Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory.
QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world.
Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate.
X 133
We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge!
- - -
XI 99
QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences.
XI 129
Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values ​​of the variable.
Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values ​​of variables.
To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination).
XI 130
Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence.
XI 138
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference.
XI 142
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers.
XI 150
Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things.
XI 151
CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice.
- - -
XII 69
QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope.
Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity.
Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G."
- - -
XII 89
Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory.
XII 90
QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).)
Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic.
XII 91
Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction.
Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts.
QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement.
XII 92
QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities.
But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts.
CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions.
XII 94
Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession.
2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools.
QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation?
Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization.
Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed.
Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism:
XII 95
Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences.
Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts!
Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories.
pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations).

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Carnap, R. Searle Vs Carnap, R.
 
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John R. Searle
V 124/125
Axiom of identity/SearleVsCarnap: Paradoxes based on a misunderstanding of the function of the reference: (Carnap: interchangeability salva veritate). Searle: in this form it is not tautological but wrong. The problems are trivial. (Here not further treated).
Def Principle of identification/Searle: ("Third Axiom") Referral identifies an object apart from all others, at all times.
Condition: the listener must be communicated a description (identification) by the utterance of the regarding phrase.
V 126
Either by predicates, that only come to this object, or ostensive. This is equivalent to Frege's dictum that every indicating expression must have a meaning.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Carnap, R. Sellars Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Carnap VI 79
Self Psychological/Carnap: does not require the mediation of physical objects, but happens abruptly. (SellarsVsCarnap: only through the acquisition of language).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Carnap, R. Tarski Vs Carnap, R.
 
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I 176
TarskiVsCarnap: die Neigung, semantische Begriffe (wie Wahrheit und Bezeichnung) aus der Diskussion auszuklammern, macht die Diskussion bruchstückhaft und unangemessen. Semantik/Tarski: sie sollte nicht den Sinn aller wissenschaftlichen Terme klären müssen. Diese Aufgabe bleibt den Wissenschaften vorbehalten, in denen die Terme gebraucht werden, und sie wird von ihnen bewältigt. Aufgabe der Semantik ist es, den Sinn des Terms »wahr« zu klären. Und diese Aufgabe wird von ihr erfüllt.

Tarsk I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983
Carnap, R. Tugendhat Vs Carnap, R.
 
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III 213
Metasprache/Tugendhat: bei der Übersetzung in die Metasprache wird vorausgesetzt, dass wir die metasprachlichen Zeichen "verstehen". Sonst wären wir über die Syntax ja nicht hinausgekommen. Was wir dann verstehen, der Sinn der metasprachlichen Zeichen, kann nicht wiederum durch eine "Übersetzung" angegeben werden, sonst bliebe man ad infinitum in der Syntax. (Regress). Wir brauchen die Regeln des Gebrauchs, also Pragmatik. (TugendhatVsCarnap).
"Absolute" Wahrheit/Tugendhat: hier bleibt die Verifikation weiterhin ausgeklammert und daher der Wahrheitsbegriff selbst leer.
TugendhatVsCarnap: was heißt "wirklicher Zustand" wenn die Pragmatik ausgeklammert sein soll?

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Carnap, R. Wittgenstein Vs Carnap, R.
 
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I 134
WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would the logical semantics reject in the lump, because it cannot be articulated according to the conception of language as a universal medium. - - -
I 194 ff
WittgensteinVsCarnap/Wittgenstein/Bio/Hintikka: accuses Carnap, he had used his idea of physicalist base language without permission and without reasonable notice. Neurath has demanded, as the first in the Vienna Circle, one should no longer speak of "experience content" and the "comparison between sentence and reality", but only of sentences. (> Coherence theory).
- - -
II 333
Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: the attempt to construct a logic that should be prepared for any situation, is an absurdity of great importance, such as Carnap's construction of a relation system, but which leaves it open whether something fits to what gives it content. - - -
VI 94
WittgensteinVsCarnap/Schulte: one cannot assume a priori that elementary propositions should consist of binary relations.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Carnap, R. Verschiedene Vs Carnap, R. Skirbekk I 16
Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence.
Carnap VI 177
Zuschreibung/Qualität/Sinnesqualität/Carnap: es gibt keine scharfe Grenze zwischen zuschreibbaren und nichtzuschreibbaren Sinnesqualitäten. Organempfindungen lassen sich kaum oder gar nicht bestimmten Weltlinien (also Sehdingen) zuschreiben. Bsp "melancholischer Wald": Diese Zuschreibung ist berechtigt!
VI 178
Weil er eine Empfindung mit entsprechender Qualität erregt. Wie der Zucker die der Süße. (extern) VsCarnap: "pathetischer Fehlschluß".
VI 181
GoetheVsPositivismus/GoetheVsEmpirismus/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Farbenlehre): man soll im Gebiet der Sinneswahrnehmungen selbst bleiben und die zwischen ihnen bestehenden Gesetzmäßigkeiten im Gebiet der Wahrnehmungen selbst feststellen. CarnapVsGoethe: wir müßten also die Gesetze dort (n der Wahrnehmung) auffinden. Aber physikalische Gesetze gelten dort freilich nicht, wohl aber gewisse andere, wenn die Konstitution der physikalischen Welt überhaupt möglich sein soll.
Aber diese Gesetze sind von viel verwickelterer Gestalt.
VI 71
Kennzeichen/Merkmal/Definition/Konstitution/Carnap: Problem: Bsp Fremdpsychisches: das Verhalten ist ja nicht dasselbe wie das Fremdpsychische selbst! Realismus: das zornige Verhalten ist nicht selbst der Zorn.
Lösung/Carnap: man kann aber alle wissenschaftlichen (nicht metaphysischen) Aussagen über F unter Beibehaltung des logischen Wertes (Wahrheitswertes) umformen in Aussagen über K. Dann sind F und K logisch identisch.
(s) Aber eben nicht umgekehrt: der Begriff des Verhaltens ist nicht der Begriff des Zorns.
VI 72
Eine Bedeutung für K, die nicht mit F übereinstimmte, könnte wissenschaftlich gar nicht angegeben werden! (viele Autoren VsCarnap). Carnap: das hängt zusammen mit der Leibnizschen Identität.
VI 78/79
Fremdpsychisches/Carnap: jeder psychische Vorgang, wenn er als fremdpsychischer auftritt, ist prinzipiell erkennbar (am Verhalten) oder erfragbar). Also kann jede Aussage umgeformt werden in eine Aussage über die entsprechenden Merkmale. Daraus folgt, daß alle psychischen Gegenstände auf physische Gegenstände (Ausdrucksbewegungen, Verhalten) zurückführbar sind.
(BergsonVsCarnap).




Carnap, R. Church Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Alonzo Church
EMD II 146
Carnap: (Meaning and Necessity): Bsp "Jones glaubt, daß S":
II 147
behauptet eine Relation zwischen Jones und dem Satz S. ChurchVsCarnap: es muß zusätzlich eine implizite Referenz auf die Satzbedeutung von S geben.
Loar: und wie könnte man das, ohne prop Einst zu einer Relation zwischen Jones, S und eine intensionalen Entität zu machen: (R(Jones ,S, p)) ? (Das muss sich gar nicht auf S als zu einer bestimmten Sprache gehörig beziehen, sondern kann in seinem Kontext unzweideutig sein).
Vs: aber dann wird die Referenz zweifelhaft, denn die Form der Wörter ist irrelevant in Bezug auf das, was als behauptet geglaubt wird, wenn man erst mal die Proposition weiß.
Frege/Loar: seine Theorie ist viel besser: "dass S" bezeichnet die Entität, die tatsächlich die Bedeutung von S ist, aber ohne auf S selbst als eine bestimmte Bedeutung habend zu referieren.

Chur I
A. Church
The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Carnap, R. Stalnaker Vs Carnap, R.
 
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I 43
Def Liberal Platonism/LP/terminology/Stalnaker: I developed the liberal platonism (LP) earlier to explain the difference between reference to numbers and normal things. But it is not a defense of the MR: thesis: one starts with facts of mathematical discourse e.g. existence of a practice that contains among others assertions, inference, arguments. If we then have Tarskian semantics (and require a domain of goods we are talking about) then this explains the facts about the discourse. Thesis: when we say that our practice is legitimate it is not a sufficient reason to say that we really make assertions and the semantics really tells us what the statements say? ((S) content, >assertion). ((s) short: LP: thesis: practice is sufficiently without immaterial realm).
I 44
Problem: then the LP says carelessly, that the existence of numbers is constituted by the fact that there is a legitimate practice. FieldVsStalnaker: that is a kind of linguistic idealism.
Field pro Carnap: (Carnap: "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology", 1950): as an external issue what numbers are it violates Carnap's principle.
Platonism/Field: two theses:
1. numbers, functions and sets exist
2. they are mind-independent.
Stalnaker: if I had formulated more cautiously, I would have set up a real platonism.
Empiricist sense criterion/Carnap/Stalnaker: would say as we all: if the language did not exist, the statements would not be meaningful. Stalnaker: but that is still compatible with the fact that it still could be true.
Internal issues: within a frame
External issues: purely practical questions of whether to accept the frame.
QuineVsCarnap/Stalnaker: thesis: all questions are asked in any linguistic context, and questions such as "Is it reasonable to accept a frame of numbers?" and "Are there numbers?" are not easy to separate.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Carnap, R. Brendel Vs Carnap, R.
 
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I 275
logischer EmpirismusVsSkeptizismus/Empirismus/Skeptizismus/Schlick/Carnap/Brendel: VerifikationismusVsSkeptizismus: (Wiener Kreis): verifikationistische BT: nicht verifizierbare Aussagen sind sinnlos.
Skeptizismus: die Frage nach seiner Wahrheit oder Falschheit zählt auch zu den sinnlosen fragen bzw. „Scheinproblemen“.
I 276
Verifizierbarkeit/BrendelVsWiener Kreis/BrendelVsSchlick/BrendelVsCarnap/Brendel: dieser Begriff war damals schon ständig schwankend.
I 277
Problem: welches sollte die empiristische Basis für Aussagen der verschiedenen Gebiete bilden? VsEmpirismus: Problem: Theoretische Termini.
BrendelVsEmpirismus: dennoch ist die therapeutische Diagnose richtig, weil nicht alles sinnlos ist, das dem empiristischen Sinnkriterium nicht genügt.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Carnap, R. Neurath Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Carnap I 16
Probation/Carnap: correspondence between sentence and reality, NeurathVsCarnap: coherence instead of correspondence. Carnap: the thesis of verifiability must be attenuated to the thesis of probation ability.
- - -
Rescher I 364
NeurathVsCarnap: there is no way to make finally secured clean log sentences the starting point of scholarship. 1) All actual statements can be refuted in principle.
2) The benchmark for judging statements is the comparison with the system at our disposal.
NeurathVsCorrespondence Theory: against all talk of truth as correspondence with reality.

Neur I
O. Neurath
Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983
Carnap, R. Stroud Vs Carnap, R.
 
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I 182
Extern/intern/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine scheint Carnap so zu interpretieren. Dass der Unterscheidung die zwischen "Kategorien-Fragen" und "Teilmengen-Fragen" entspricht. Extern/QuineVsCarnap: das ist nichts anderes als zwei Weisen der Formalisierung der Sprache. Wenn wir nur eine Art gebundene Variable für alle Dinge haben, wird es eine externe Frage sein: "gibt es so und so?" wenn die Variable über den ganzen Bereich geht. (Kategorien-Frage).
Intern: wenn es für jede Art Ding eine Variable gibt, wird es eine Teilmengen-Frage sein. Dann bezieht sich die Frage nicht auf alle Dinge, die es geben kann.
I 183
Philosophie/QuineVsCarnap: unterscheidet sich von den Wissenschaften nur in der Breite ihrer Kategorien. (W+O, S 275). Extern/intern/QuineVsCarnap: Kategorien-Fragen unterscheiden sich von internen Fragen nur in ihrer Allgemeinheit von Teilmengen-Fragen. Wir können zur Allgemeinheit kommen, indem wir eine Art Variable über alle Dinge gehen lassen.
I 191
StroudVsCarnap: das führt ein "wir" ein, und etwas, das uns zustößt, das "Erfahrung" genannt wird. Dass wir existieren und Erfahrungen haben, kann nicht einfach als eine "interne" Wahrheit der Dingsprache angesehen werden.
Man kann die Sinngebung der Erfahrung dann auch nicht als gemeinsames Ziel aller "echten Alternativen" ansehen, weil dann vorausgesetzt wird, dass es äußere Dinge gibt.
Problem: die Frage des gemeinsamen Ziels aller echten Alternativen kann auch nicht als externe Frage aller Bezugssysteme angesehen werden, weil sie dann sinnlos wird.
Wenn sie aber "intern" wäre, was wäre dann der Unterschied, wenn man von einem Bezugssystem in ein anderes wechselt, das dieses Ziel gar nicht enthält?
Das beantwortet Carnap nicht.
I 192
Das macht es schwer, seinen positiven Ansatz zu erfassen. CarnapVsSkepticism: missversteht die Relation zwischen linguistischem Rahmen der Ausdrucksweise über äußere Gegenstände und den Wahrheiten, die innerhalb dieses Bezugssystems ausgedrückt werden.
StroudVsCarnap: aber was ist genau sein eigener nicht-skeptischer Zugang zu dieser Relation?
1. zu welchem System gehört Carnaps These, dass Existenzbehauptungen in der Dingsprache weder wahr noch falsch sind?
2. was drückt die These dann überhaupt aus?
Wissen/intern/Carnap: Bsp der Geometer in Afrika kommt wirklich zu Wissen über den Berg.
StroudVsCarnap: aber was bedeutet es zusätzlich dazu, dass dies keine Wahrheit ist, die unabhängig von einem Bezugssystem gilt?
Angenommen, wir hätten aus irgendeinem Grund nicht die Dingsprache und könnten eine andere Sprache frei wählen. Folgt daraus, dass Bsp der Satz über den Berg in Afrika nicht mehr wahr wäre?
Sicher würden wir in einer völlig anderen Sprache ohne Ding-Ausdrücke etwas ganz anderes ausdrücken. Aber wäre der Satz, den wir jetzt bilden können, in dieser anderen Sprache nicht mehr wahr?
I 193
Und könnte er niemals wahr sein, wenn wir zufällig die Dingsprache niemals angenommen hätten. Existenz/Sprache/Skeptizismus/StroudVsCarnap: das kann nicht richtig sein und es führt zu einem extremen Idealismus, den Carnap gerade ablehnt. Es ist deswegen absurd, weil wir schon genug über Berge wissen, um zu sehen, dass sie nicht durch eine gewählte Sprache beeinflusst werden.
Sprache/Gegenstand/Stroud: die Dinge waren schon lange da, bevor Sprache in der Welt entstand. Und das ist wiederum etwas, was wir "intern" in der Dingsprache wissen.
StroudVsCarnap: dann ist seine These, verstanden als der Sprache "intern", falsch. Sie widerspricht dem, was wir schon als Wissen über uns und die äußeren Dinge annehmen.
Empirisch genommen, führt sie zum Idealismus, der den gewussten Tatsachen widerspricht.
CarnapVsVs: würde sagen, dass man seine These natürlich nicht "empirisch" und nicht der Dingsprache "intern" auffassen darf.
StroudVsCarnap: aber innerhalb irgendeines Bezugssystems muss sie intern sein, sonst ist sie sinnlos.
Problem: das ist aber eine Aussage über die Relation zwischen einem gewählten Rahmen und den internen Aussagen innerhalb dieses Rahmens. Und wenn das impliziert, dass diese internen Aussagen weder wahr noch falsch gewesen wären, wenn ein anderes Bezugssystem gewählt worden wäre, ist das immer noch Idealismus, ob empirischer oder nichtempirischer Idealismus.
Truth Value/tr.v./Konvention/StroudVsCarnap: die WW der internen Sätzen wären abhängig von der Wahl der Sprache (des Bezugssystems).
I 194
StroudVsCarnap: es ist wichtig zu sehen, dass wenn das nicht folgen würde, Carnaps These nicht vom traditionellen Skeptizismus unterschieden wäre! Es wäre dann Raum für die Möglichkeit, dass Aussagen über Dinge wahr blieben, selbst wenn wir die Dingsprache aufgeben und Wahrheit wiederum sprachunabhängig wäre. Problem: das würde wieder dazu führen, dass unsere Wahl eines linguistischen Rahmens nur deshalb notwendig wäre, um etwas zu formulieren oder zu erkennen, das unabhängig von diesem Rahmen sowieso wahr wäre ((s) > metaphysischer Realismus).
theoretisch: das wäre nach Carnap dann eine "theoretische" Frage über die Akzeptabilität der Dingsprache als Ganzes. Aber in Bezug auf eine Objektivität, die wir dann voraussetzen.
CarnapVsTradition: es ist gerade die Unverständlichkeit solcher theoretischer Fragen, die wichtig bei Carnap ist. Denn
Problem: dann könnte es sein, dass selbst wenn wir unsere besten Prozeduren (> Beste Erklärung) sorgfältig anwenden, die Dinge immer noch anders sein könnten als wir denken, sie wären". Das entspricht dem Skeptizismus.
"Konditionale Korrektheit"/Skeptizismus/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap akzeptiert, was ich die "konditionale Korrektheit" des Skeptizismus genannt haben: wenn der Skeptiker eine bedeutungsvolle Frage stellen könnte, würde er sich durchsetzen.
StroudVsCarnap: wenn er nun nicht leugnen würde, dass die „internen“ Sätze wahr oder falsch bleiben, beim Wechsel des Bezugssystems, würde sein Ansatz genauso tolerant gegenüber dem Skeptizismus wie die Tradition. ((s) Sowohl das Leugnen als auch das Nichtleugnen würde also zum Problem.)
Kant/Stroud: auch er akzeptiert die "konditionale Korrektheit" des Skeptizismus. Wenn Descartes Beschreibung der Erfahrung und ihrer Relation zu den äußeren Dingen richtig wäre, könnten wir nie etwas über diese Dinge wissen.
Carnap/Stroud: seine Thesis ist eine Version der „Kopernikanischen Wende“ von Kant. Und er erlangt sie aus denselben Gründen wie Kant: ohne sie hätten wir keine Erklärung, wie ist’s möglich, dass wir überhaupt etwas wissen.
Bezugssystem/Rahmen/StroudVsCarnap: es öffnet sich eine Lücke zwischen dem Rahmen und dem, was unabhängig von ihm wahr ist. ((s) Wenn eine Wahl zwischen verschiedenen Rahmen möglich sein soll).
StroudVsCarnap: in dieser Hinsicht ist Carnaps Ansatz ganz Kantianisch.
I 196
Und er erbt auch die ganze Obskurität und den Idealismus von Kant. Es gibt überall Parallelen: für beide kann es eine Art Distanzierung von unserem Glauben geben. Wir können eine philosophische Untersuchung des Alltagslebens durchführen, (was die Bedingungen des Wissens betrifft).
I 197
Bezugssystem/Rahmen/StroudVsCarnap: zu welchem Rahmen gehört Carnaps These, dass keine Sätze über äußere Gegenstände wahr oder falsch unabhängig von der Wahl eines Bezugssystems (Sprache) sind? Und ist diese These - analytisch oder nicht – selbst „intern“ in irgendeinem Rahmen? Und ob sie es ist oder nicht, ist sie nicht bloß ein Ausdruck des Kantianischen Transzendentalen Idealismus? Skeptizismus/StroudVsCarnap: der Grundfehler ist, überhaupt eine konkurrierende Theorie zur Tradition zu entwickeln.
I 198
Ein rein negativer Ansatz oder deflationärer Gebrauch des Verifikationsprinzips würde den Skeptizismus einfach als sinnlos eliminieren. Wenn das ginge, brauchte man den Skeptizismus gar nicht mehr zu unterminieren. Aber: Verifikationsprinzip/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: der Status des Verifikationsprinzips selbst, bzw. seine Akzeptabilität. Wir können es nur dann gebrauchen um Descartes zu widerlegen, wenn wir einen guten Grund haben, es als notwendig anzunehmen. Aber das hängt davon ab, wie es eingeführt wird.
Es sollte dazu dienen, die Auswüchse sinnloser philosophischer Spekulation zu verhindern.
StroudVsCarnap: 1. Dann können wir nur noch zuschauen und sehen, wie weit das Prinzip zu einer Unterscheidung taugt, die wir vorher schon getroffen haben! Der einzige Test wären Sätze, die wir schon vorher als sinnlos erkannt hätten!
2. Aber selbst angenommen, das Prinzip wäre als extensional und deskriptiv adäquat erwiesen, d.h. es würde so zwischen sinnvoll und sinnlos unterscheiden, wie wir das tun,
I 199
es würde uns nicht ermöglichen, etwas als sinnlos auszuscheiden, das wir nicht auf anderem Wege schon als sinnlos erkannt hätten. Verification principle/StroudVsCarnap: wurde falsch eingeführt ((s) mit dem Hintergedanken, ein Resultat zu liefern, das vorher schon in Gänze bekannt war). Frühe Skizzen Carnaps zeigen, dass zunächst auch fälschlicherweise allgemeine Naturgesetze ausgeschlossen worden wären.
Verification principle/VP//StroudVsCarnap: eine richtige Einführung würde ein starkes destruktives Instrument liefern, das schon Kant suchte: sie müsste erklären, warum das VP korrekt ist. Das wäre wahrscheinlich identisch mit einer Erklärung, wie Wissen von äußeren Dingen möglich ist.
Verification principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: die frühen Vertreter hatten im Sinn, dass
1. Ein Satz nur dann bedeutungsvoll ist, wenn er einen "tatsächlichen Inhalt" ausdrückt,
2. Dass Verstehen eines Satzes bedeutet zu wissen, was der Fall wäre, wenn der Satz wahr wäre.
Verificationism/Stroud: an diesem Ansatz ist zunächst nichts besonders originelles. Was ihm den verifikationistischen Dreh gibt ist die Idee, dass wir nichts auch nur verstehen können, das nicht als wahr oder falsch gewusst werden kann oder
schwächer: zumindest als rationaler zu glauben als sein Gegenteil.
StroudVsCarnap: das schlug fehl, sogar als Versuch, die empirisch überprüfbaren Sätze herauszugreifen.
I 205
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: selbst wenn der verificationism wahr ist, brauchen wir immer noch eine Erklärung, wie und warum die traditionelle philosophische ((s) nicht-empirische) Untersuchung scheitert. ((s) soll hier dem Skeptizismus entsprechen). (>Warum-Frage).
I 207
StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: es ist plausibler, das Verifikationsprinzip ((s) > empiristisches Sinnkriterium) zurückzuweisen, als zu behaupten, dass Descartes niemals etwas sinnvolles gesagt hätte. StroudVsVerification principle: es wird solange unplausibel bleiben, wie nicht verstanden ist, warum die traditionelle Unterscheidung innen/außen nicht korrekt sein soll.
- - -
I 214
formalen Redeweise: ""Wombat" trifft zu (ist wahr-von) einigen Lebewesen in Tasmanien". QuineVsCarnap: missversteht den semantischen Aufstieg, wenn er von externen Fragen spricht. Damit wird aber nicht Carnaps pragmatischer Ansatz zurückgewiesen, der sich auf Einfachheit und Fruchtbarkeit von Theorien bezieht.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Carnap, R. Hempel. Vs Carnap, R.
 
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II 139
Isolated Statements/Hempel: we could establish a criterion for the elimination of isolated statements: Def (4.1) a theoretical system is cognitively significant iff. it is partially interpreted up to at least the degree that none of its primitive statements is an isolated statement.
Vs: but that can wrongly exclude well-supported statements.
E.g. a system contains the primitive statement (S1)
(S1) (x)(P1x > (Qx P2x)
wherein P1 and P2 are observation predicates while "Q" is supposed to be a theoretical construction (see above).
Now S1 is not a truth or falsity of formal logic. And if further S1 is excluded from the set of primitive statements of T, then the system T’, which is thus obtained, has exactly the same systematic i.e. the same explanatory power as T.
The method may be too strict.
S1 is an E.g. for what Carnap calls analytical statements! (Of course, it is not a truth of formal logic).
Reason: all their consequences are truths of formal logic.
II 140
HempelVsCarnap: E.g. Suppose our system T contained the additional statement (S2) (x) (P3x> (Qx P4x))
wherein P3 and P4 are additional observation predicates. From the standpoint that "any bilateral reduction statement is analytical" (Carnap), S2 would then be as analytical as S1.
Still, the two statements taken together contain non-analytical consequences that are expressible solely in terms of observation predicates:
(O) (x)(~(P1x u P2x u P3x u ~P4x) u ~(P1x u ~P2x u P3x u P4x)).
We would hardly want to alow the consequence that the conjunction of two analytical statements may be synthetic.
Analyticity/HempelVsCarnap: if the concept can be applied to statements of interpreted deductive systems at all, then it must be relativized with respect to the present theoretical context. It must also be put into perspective with view to the rules of the language at hand.
II 141
Isolated Statement/Hempel: if we apply the other strategy and discard S1 as isolated statements, we arrive at an analogous conclusion. Whether a statement is isolated or not depends on the linguistic frame and theoretical context.
Carnap, R. Chisholm Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Carnap VIII 164
Pragmatics/ChisholmVsCarnap: his representation was over-simplified. Carnap: ditto. I have ignored possible effects of uncertainty and actual errors of the speaker. (> Radical Interpretation, RI). Chisholm: the analysis can be simplified by the concept of belief. Carnap pro. Belief/Pragmatics/Carnap: requires a conceptual framework of theoretical pragmatics. The basic concepts of pragmatics are best not behavioristically defined, but introduced as theoretical constructions in the theoretical language connected with the observation language on the basis of postulates and correspondence rules.
Def Belief/Church: relationship between a person and a fact.
Def Belief/Carnap: relationship between a person and a statement. The concept of Church is not pragmatic: (state which does not necessarily include language). VIII 165 It is neither implied that the person is aware of the belief, nor that they could verbalize it. Carnap: for the statement, verbalization is of course the condition. This corresponds to the believing-to-be-true. The pragmatic concept of intension serves the purpose of linking Churchian belief and believing of a statement.
Chisholm II 68/69
Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: there is "no clear sense" in which such a sentence is related to words and their use! SauerVsChisholm: the objection is not severe: Solution: if ’(x) (Fx > Gx)’ is a meaning postulate in S, then one should not depart from this sentence itself, but from " ’(x)(Fx > GX)’ is a meaning postulate in S". That is a statement about "F" and "G" in S.
II 71
Analytical/Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: do not secure that the definition of "square" means square is not merely ad hoc and arbitrary.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Carnap, R. Hare Vs Carnap, R.
 
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II 133
Statements/Tradition/Hare: splits statements into empirical and analytical ones. There seems to be nothing beyond that. Problem: Because of confusion, you can easily come to the assumption that the proposition that states this and the other proposition is analytically true or false, is itself analytical. But it is at least not obviously true that.
E.g. The statement: "propositions of the form ’p and not p’ are analytically false" should be analytically true. Because is it not a statement about how the words "and not" are used?
And is it not analytically true that they are used like this and not otherwise?
Problem: there is a conflict here between the temptations to call the statement analytical as well as empirical as well as none of both.
Wittgenstein: considers the debate "absurd". >Silence.
CarnapVsWittgenstein: his behavior is contradictory: instead of remaining silent, he wrote a whole book.
II 134
HareVsCarnap: does not take Wittgenstein’s doubts seriously enough.
Carnap, R. Soames Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Horwich I 478
Mengenlehre/T-Def/Tarski/Soames: ["Schnee ist weiß" ist T] und "Schnee ist weiß" sind notwendig äquivalent in elementarer ML. ((s) >Redundanztheorie). T-Predicate/Tarski/Soames: Tarski würde kein Prädikat als W Prädikat anerkennen, wenn [ a ist T] nicht material äquivalent wäre
I 480
zu jeder metasprachlichen Paraphrase des objektsprachlichen Satzes der von a benannt wird. Auf dieser Basis kann man Tarski so interpretieren, dass er implizit annimmt, dass Instanzen von (19) notwendig sind oder a priori. (Soames pro).
(19) Wenn "T" ein T-predicate für L ist und "S" in L bedeutet dass p, dann ist "S" T iff p.
Soames: aber das ist etwas ganz anderes als zu behaupten, dass "T" in (20) durch ein T-predicate für L ersetzt wird, dass dann die resultierenden Instanzen des Schemas notwendig und a priori wären:
(20) Wenn "S" in L bedeutet dass p, dann ist "S" T iff p.
Soames: dies ist es aber, was erforderlich ist um (17) und (18) zu behaupten!
PutnamVsTarski/Soames: hat den Kontrast (17/17 Tarski) gebraucht.
DummettVsTarski/Soames: hat den Kontrast (18/18 Tarski) gebraucht.
Putnam/Dummett/Soames: beide zeigen, dass Tarski’s T-Def nichts mit Verstehen oder semantischer Interpretation zu tun hat.
Davidson/Soames: versteht man am besten so, dass er nicht versucht, Bedeutung in Begriffen von Wahrheit zu analysieren, sondern den Begriff der Bedeutung zugunsten des der Wahrheit zu eliminieren. Dann würde der Verteidiger des Davidson von „Truth and Meaning“ folgendes statt (i) haben:
(i) Wenn x weiß, dass das, was durch die relevante Instanz von „S“ ausgedrückt wird, wahr in L ist iff p, für jeden Satz von L, dann ist x ein kompetenter Sprecher von L.
Soames/Problem: wenn nun "wahr in L" verstanden wird als Abkürzung für das Definiens das von Tarski geliefert wird, dann ist (i) so absurd wie (18Tarski).
SoamesVsCarnap: genau diese Art von Absurdität liegt im folgenden, (was Tarskis Definiens erlauben würde, der zentrale Begriff in einer Bedeutungstheorie (BT) zu sein):
(T) S ist T iff p.
Carnap/Soames: das kommt bei Carnap in Meaning and Necessity S. 5/6 und Abschnitt 7 seiner Introduction to Semantics vor).
meaning theory/M.th./Soames: darf nicht an weitere semantische Begriffe appellieren.
T-predicate/Soames: der Begriff der Wahrheit spielt keine vorgebliche (ostensible) Rolle in unserem ursprünglichen Problem. Die Verfeinerung des Problems führt zu der Sichtweise, dass eine adäquate m.th. ein Prädikat charakterisieren müsste, das gewisse Bedingungen erfüllt.
Soames: es war eine Entdeckung, dass es genau auf die wahren Sätze zutrifft. ((s) Das alle wahren Sätze gemeinsam haben).

Soam I
S. Soames
Understanding Truth Oxford 1999

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Carnap, R. Meixner Vs Carnap, R.
 
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I 159
Def "individuelle Begriffe"/Carnap/Meixner: hat damit die Eigenschaften im Sinn, die die Einzigungen von Eigenschaften sind. MeixnerVsCarnap: die von ihm gemeinten Entitäten sind weder individuell noch Begriffe. Sie sind ungesättigte Entitäten,
I 160
also keine Individuen.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Carnap, R. Newen Vs Carnap, R.
 
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New I 115
Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network):
Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places.
Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations.
I 116
If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account.
Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism.
Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations.
VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations.
I 117
VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example
1) statements about our own consciousness
2) statements about the world of physical objects
3) about the consciousness of others
4) about intellectual and cultural objects.
Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment.
I 118
The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory.
Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories.
Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects.
Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color.
I 119
Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red.
Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction.
VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution:
I 120
(From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E
T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E

Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc.
Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C.
Problem: Carnap neglected
GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle.
NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial.
I 121
Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world.
NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen.
- - -
NS I 30
CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems:
1) problem of empty names.
a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence
b) how can various empty names be distinguished?
2) Problem:
 Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true.
- - -
NS I 101
Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory.
NS I 102
Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege.
VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic.
Solution: Searle: bundle theory.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Carnap, R. Schurz Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Gerhard Schurz
Schurz I 171
analytisch/synthetisch/QuineVsCarnap/Schurz: Quines Einsicht in die lokale Ununterscheidbarkeit brachte eine tiefgreifende Umwälzung. Carnap akzeptierte sie erst spät. Allerdings hatte er erkannt, dass mehrere Reduktionssätze zusammen empirischen Gehalt erzeugen. (s.o.).
Reduktion/Schurz: doch mit dem Begriff "reduction sentence"“ blieb er eben seinem reduktionistischen Programm treu.
Zuordnungsgesetz/Terminologie/Schurz: nennt Carnap (1956) "Correspondence Rules" (C)
I 172
Gesamttheorie/Carnap:. „T and C“. ("Theory and Assignment Laws"). Zuordnungsgesetz/SchurzVsCarnap: das kann nicht sein, weil assignment laws Konsequenzen aus einer Theorie T sind, die aus dem Zusammenwirken aller Theoreme folgen. ((s) zirkulär).
Analytizität/Carnap: resümiert in (1963, 964) dass es ihm nicht gelang, einen entsprechenden Begriff zu formulieren.
Lösung/Carnap: Zerlegung der Theorie in Ramsey-Satz und Carnap-Satz:
Ramsey Satz/Carnap: synthetisch
Carnap Satz/Carnap: analytisch.
Analytisch/synthetisch/Ernest Nagel:(1961) der analytische Gehalt der Mechanik ist nicht lokalisierbar!

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Carnap, R. Stegmüller Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Stegmüller IV 342
StegmüllerVsPositivism: wegen der in den Aussagen enthaltenen Naturgesetze sind Aussagen von Naturwissenschaftlern nicht verifizierbar!
IV 343
Auch Planungen müssen sich auf Annahmen stützen, die im Moment der Planung nicht verifizierbar sind. Criteria/sense criterion/Theologie/VsCarnap/Stegmüller: statt eines fragwürdigen Sinnkriteriums müssen wir die Begriffsbestimmungen Gottes betrachten und fragen, ob unser intuitives Vorverständnis dafür genügt.
Theologen erheben Geltungsansprüche unabhängig von Sinnkriterien.
Bsp Eine unkörperliche Person lässt sich zumindest denken!
Bsp Ebenso, dass etwas aus nichts geschaffen wurde stellt keine gedanklichen Schwierigkeiten dar!
IV 344
Bsp ein Problem bildet nur der Begriff des notwendig Seienden.

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Carnap, R. Wessel Vs Carnap, R.
 
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I 20
Begründung/Logik/Wessel: alle Begründungsversuche sind hier letztlich zirkulär! Pro Carnap: natürlich hat jeder Logiker und jeder Mathematiker das Recht, beliebige Kalküle erst aufzubauen, wobei er die Regeln korrekt anzugeben hat.
VsCarnap: das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass die möglichen oder vorhandenen Kalküle gleichberechtigt sind! Das wäre ein "Gleichgütligkeitsprinzip".
- - -
I 345
faktische Modalität/Carnap/Wessel: Carnap schlägt vor: Def faktisch notwendig/Carnap: ist eine Aussage (d.h. "kausal wahr") genau dann, wenn sie logisch aus der Klasse alller Grundgesetze folgt.
Def Grundgesetz/Carnap: Behauptungen, die die logische Form von Gesetzesaussagen haben und wahr sind.
Grundgesetze/ReichenbachVsCarnap: dito, aber die Wahrheit muss auch feststellbar sein.
notwendig/Wessel: ist ein zukünftiges Ereignis sA, wenn aus dem gegenwärtigen Wissen A logisch folgt.
notwendig/Carnap: kein Einzelereignis ist logisch notwendig, wenn es also von allem isoliert betrachtet wird.
I 346
Modalität/WesselVsCarnap: zu enge Auffassung.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Descartes, R. Carnap Vs Descartes, R.
 
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VI 226
Ego/Carnap: class of elementary experiences. No bundle, because classes do not consist of their elements! CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the ego is not a primordial fact of the given. From "cogito" does not follow "sum". Carnap: the ego does not belong to expression of the fundamental experience. But the "this experience". Thinking/RussellVsDescartes: "it thinks". (> Lichtenberg). ("Mind", p.18).
- - -
Stroud I 196
KantVsDescartes/CarnapVsDescartes. Rahmen/Bezugssystem/Carnap/Stroud: für Carnap gibt es keinen Standpunkt, von dem aus man einen Rahmen als adäquat oder inadäquat beurteilen kann. Das wäre eine "externe" Frage.
Kant/Stroud: die Parallele dazu ist bei Kant der transzendentale Idealismus: wenn die Dinge unabhängig von uns wären, wäre Skeptizismus unvermeidlich.
Problem: der transzendentale Idealismus ist schlecht mit dem Verifikationsprinzip zu kreuzen. Ist Carnaps eigene positive Theorie hier besser dran? Das ist eine Frage nach ihrem Status. Sie verfolgt dasselbe Ziel wie Kant: die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Erkenntnis zu erklären, aber ohne die Grenzen der Verständlichkeit zu überschreiten.
Allgemeines/Besonderes/innen/außen/Verallgemeinerung/Stroud: dazu wäre es notwendig, dass erklärt wird, wie die allgemeine skeptische Konklusion sinnlos sein kann, selbst wenn die besonderen alltäglichen empirischen Behauptungen sinnvoll sind. Das kann nicht einfach daran liegen, dass das eine allgemein und das andere partikular ist.
Descartes/Stroud: das Partikulare ist in seinem Argument repräsentativ, und kann daher verallgemeinert werden. Die Unsicherheit im Einzelfall ist repräsentativ für all unser Wissen. Das ist die Stärke des Arguments.
VerificationismVsGeneralization: gerade diese Verallgemeinerung hält er für verdächtig.
CarnapVsSkepticism/CarnapVsDescartes: Aussagen, die innerhalb eines Bezugsystems sinnvoll sind, können nicht sinnvoll auf das Bezugssystem selbst angewendet werden.
Stroud: aber das ist das Problem innen/außen und gar keine Frage von Allgemeinheit oder Besonderem.
StroudVsCarnap: er muss also zeigen, dass die Bewegung von innen nach außen unmöglich ist, und nicht die Verallgemeinerung. Dazu brauchte er aber eine Erklärung, warum die traditionelle Sicht der Relation zwischen „internen“ und „externen“ Fragen falsch ist, wenn er den Skeptizismus vermeiden will. ((s) Warum-Frage).
Besonderes/VerifikationismusVsDescartes: Thesis: der einzelne Satz von Descartes ist schon von Anfang an sinnlos. (Weil unverifizierbar). (StroudVsVs).
I 207
StroudVsVerificationism: er muss nun zeigen, wieso dieses Verdikt nicht auf alle einzelnen (besonderen) Sätze des Alltagslebens zutrifft. Der Verifikationismus müsste sonst annehmen, dass unsere ganze Sprache (Alltagssprache) sinnlos ist! (Weil sie nach skeptischen Kriterien nicht verifizierbar ist). Bsp "Ich weiß nicht, ob Erklärung vom Sitzen im Durchzug verursacht wird" oder Bsp "Der Flugzeug-Spotter weiß nicht, ob das Flugzeug ein F ist" wären als sinnlos verdammt! Wenn der Verifikationismus bestimmte Sätze nur dann als sinnlos verdammt, wenn sie z.B. von Descartes oder einem anderen Skeptiker geäußert werden, müsste er zeigen, dass es eine abweichenden Gebrauch bei solchen Gelegenheiten gibt. Sonst könnte er gar nicht angeben, was VsDescartes an seiner Äußerung falsch gelaufen sein soll. ((s) Äußerung hier = Handlung, nicht Satz, der ja sinnlos, weder wahr noch falsch sein soll).

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Heidegger, M. Carnap Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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I 89
CarnapVsHeidegger: denied, that a sentence like "Das Nichts nichtet" ((s) "Nothingness destroys") be verifiable. DantoVsCarnap: we all know a feeling of anxiety. Why should it be less empirical than seeing a table.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Hempel, C. Nagel, E. Vs Hempel, C.
 
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Schurz I 93
Law of Nature/LoN/Schurz: strict spatio-temporally unlimited universal sentences are candidates for LoN. If they were true, they would express real LoN. They are called lawlike. I 94 Lawlike/Schurz: spatio-temporally unlimited E.g. All objects attract each other ((s) only true if protons, electrons, etc., are not objects.) E.g. All living things must die spatio-temporally limited: E.g. mammals in polar regions have - compared with their counterparts in warmer areas - a more rounded shape (Germann's law). Scientific/Schurz: depends on the size of the area in this case. Universal Sentence/Schurz: to avoid differences of degree they were called fundamental and derived universal sentences Def Fundamental Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: does not contain any individual constants and no spatio-temporal limitations. Def Derived Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: can be derived from background knowledge from other universal sentences together with singular starting conditions. I 95 Ernest NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsHempel: according to this, no accidental universal sentence can be a derived law: E.g. "All screws on Smith's car are rusty". Solution/Nagel: only fundamental universal sentences can be laws. Hempel: admitted this, thus the lawlikeness remains gradual! Lawlike/Statistics/Schurz: even here there is lawlikeness: E.g. 50% of all cesium-137 atoms have decayed after 30 years. E.g. 80% of all lung cancer patients used to be heavy smokers.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Kant, I. Carnap Vs Kant, I.
 
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Newen I 112
CarnapVsKant: keine synthetischen Urteile a priori möglich. - - -
- - -
Stroud I 171
Def Pseudo-Frage/CarnapVsMetaphysik/CarnapVsKant//Stroud: sind Fragen, die deshalb nicht beantwortet werden können, weil es keine mögliche Sinneserfahrung gibt, die über die Wahrheit oder Falschheit der Sätze entscheidet, in der bestimmte Ausdrücke vorkommen. ((s) z.B. metaphysische oder transzendentale Ausdrücke). Carnap: Bsp zwei Geographen wollen ergründen, ob ein bestimmter Berg in Afrika real oder bloß eine Legende ist.
I 172
a) Wenn sie einen Berg dort finden, der mehr oder weniger dem entspricht, was man angenommen hat, können sie sagen, dass er real ist, dass er existiert. Realität/Carnap: damit wenden sie einen empirischen, nicht-metaphysischen Begriff von Realität an. (Carnap , Chicago 1958, 207).
b) Angenommen, die beiden wären nicht nur Wissenschaftler, sondern auch Philosophen: einer der beiden nennt sich 2Realist", der andere "Idealist":
"Realist"/Carnap: wird sagen, der Berg habe nicht nur die Eigenschaften (Charakteristika) die man an ihm entdeckt habe, sondern er sei auch real, d.h. unabhängig von unserer Wahrnehmung.
"Idealist"/Carnap: leugnet, dass der Berg von unserer Wahrnehmung unabhängig ist. D.h. er sei nicht real im Sinne des Realisten.
Wissenschaften/Empirie/Carnap: hier kann diese Divergenz zwischen den beiden gar nicht aufkommen. (333f)
D.h. aber nicht, dass beide Thesen falsch wären.
I 173
transzendentaler Idealismus/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: würde sagen, dass er nicht falsch sein könnte, weil er notwendig ist, um alle anderen sinnvollen Fragen empirisch zu klären. CarnapVsKant: nach dem Verifikations-Prinzip ist das aber eine "Pseudo-Theorie", die gar nichts erklären oder garantieren kann.
Sinn/sinnvoll/CarnapVsKant: damit etwas sinnvoll ist, müssen wir den Wahrheitswert (WW) der Sätze kennen können, die die entsprechenden Ausdrücke enthalten.
schwächer: wir müssen einen Grund angeben können, warum es besser ist, die Wahrheit von etwas zu glauben, als seine Falschheit.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Lorenzen, P. Wessel Vs Lorenzen, P.
 
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I 345/346
Gesetze/Wessel: haben immer die logische Form einer formalen Implikation (obwohl nicht alle wahren formalen Implikationen Gesetze darstellen) ((x)(P(x) > Q(x). Als Folgerungen allein daraus erhalten wir niemals Formeln der Form Q(a), wo a eine Individuenkonstante ist.
Modality/Lorenzen/Wessel: angenommen wird, eine bestimmte Menschengruppe hat ein bestimmtes System von Aussagen W als wahr akzeptiert. Von diesen Menschen werden dann auch alle Aussagen als wahr anerkannt, die logisch aus diesen Aussagen folgen.
Lorenzen betrachtet das nur für Zukunftsaussagen als sinnvoll.
Wissen/Lorenzen/Wessel: für Lorenzen ergibt sich daraus, dass alles, was wir wissen, bezüglich dieses Wissens notwendig ist.
Tradition: Bsp wenn wir wissen, dass in einer Erbsenschote fünf Erbsen sind und dass sie Eiweiß enthält. So ist nur das zweite notwendiges Wissen. Nach Lorenzen sind beide Aussagen notwendiges Wissen. (WesselVs).
Modality/WesselVsCarnap: zu enge Auffassung.
Modality/WesselVsLorenzen: zu weite Auffassung. Dass alles Wissen notwendig sein soll, ist eine "fatalistische Konsequenz".
I 347
Modality/Wessel: ist keine Art von Wahrheitswert, wie oft fälschlich angenommen wird! Carnap: identifiziert Wahrheit und logische Notwendigkeit,
Lukasiewicz: hat einen dritten Wahrheitwert "möglich"
Lorenzen: benutzt "möglich" und "möglicherweise wahr" synonym. WesselVsLorenzen.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Neurath, O. Schlick Vs Neurath, O.
 
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Hempel I 104
Protocol statement/SchlickVsCarnap/VsNeurath: their thesis that a statement is true if it is proven adequately by a protocol statement, is leading to absurd results, unless the idea of absolutely true protocol statements is rejected. There are obviously many different systems of protocol statements. After Carnap and Neurath each of these different, incompatible systems were true. For each tale a system of protocol statements could be set up. Carnap, Neurath: There is actually no formal or logical difference between the systems, however, an empirical! The historical fact that there is an excellent system that the humanity and the scientists of our culture actually accept.
I 105
In fact, the majority of scientists sooner or later come to an agreement. Protocol statements/Carnap: how do we learn to produce "true" protocol statements? Obviously by conditioning. For example, by learning to read gauges properly or by stating reliably: "this document comes from the 17th century."
I 106
In the new form of Carnap's theory protocol statements are even more radically stripped of their base character: they lose their originally awarded irrefutability. Popper: Statements of all forms may occur as protocol statements.
I 107
At the end of the term will be superfluous. Fact/statement/Hempel: transition from substantive to formal speech.
Coherence theory/Carnap/Neurath: do not settle for a pure coherence theory, but for a limited.
- - -
Rescher I 348
SchlickVsNeurath: there may not be mere conherence in the scientific knowledge: there can be no knowledge of any truth, if there is nothing of which we are absolutely certain.

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985
Ordinary Language Dummett Vs Ordinary Language
 
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Dummett III 185
Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl.
III 196
Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either!
However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense.
III 196/197
Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin).
Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained.
III 198
DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances.
According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct.
III 199
DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Peirce, Ch.S. Quine Vs Peirce, Ch.S.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 54
Method/Quine: The question of what exists is the question of proof. The final arbitration in this matter is the scientific method, as amorphous it may be. However it is defined in detail, the scientific method produces theories, whose connection with any surface stimulation is solely in the scientific method, without independent testing instance, by which they are supported. In this sense, it is the final arbitrator of truth. Peirce was trying to define the truth straight as a scientific method. Namely an ideal theory, which one approaches as a limit if one does not disist to apply the (supposedly canonical) rules of method to the constantly renewing experience.
Definition Truth/Pierce: Ideal Theory
QuineVsPeirce: there is a lot wrong with this analogy: Appointment of Organon for infinite process, limit, erroneous use of the analogy with numbers, because the concept of the limit is dependent on the term "closer than". And this is defined for numbers, but not for theories.
---
I 55
Vs: but we have, after all, no reason to believe that the surface stimulation of people, even if one considers it in the eternity, allows a certain systematization, which is scientifically seen better or easier, than possible alternatives. Although the scientific method is the way to the truth, it does not even enable a definition of truth.
Likewise, any so-called pragmatic truth-definition is doomed (QuineVsPragmatism) to fail.
---
I 444
Definition ordered pair: provides the possibility to treat two objects as one. One can thus adjust relation classes by perceiving them as classes of ordered pairs. Footnote: we are interested in "relations-in-extension" here. They stand in a relationship to relations-in-intension like classes to properties (difference class/property.). E.g. The father-relation becomes the class of exactly those ordered pairs whose respective members - for example (Abraham, Isaac), are a man and one of his children. Peirce: Definition ordered pair: (terribly cumbersome with mental charts, etc.)
QuineVsPeirce: simply a defective noun that is not used to be at home, where we are used to embed completely grown-up general terms. Mathematical
---
I 445
Definition: (1) If (x, y) = (z, w), so x = z and y = w.
If relations are classes of ordered pairs, then pairs on the same level as other objects as members of classes must be available. The ordered pair plays the role of an object, which performs the task of two.
---
X 23
Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a sentence would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning." QuineVsPeirce: also this equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information.
Basic Rules: is here the whole of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions.
Introspection: some epistemologists would catalog these alternatives by introspection of sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve stimulation (at the nerve endings).
Problem: you can not assign senses proof to unique individuals sentences. (Underdetermination of empiricism).
---
XII 94
Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1. abandoned to deduce the truth about the nature of the sensory experience. Thus, it has made a substantial concession.
2. it has abandoned the rational reconstruction, that is, the attempt to translate these truths into observation terms and logical mathematical tools.
QuineVsPeirce: Suppose, we think that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence of observation language all differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation?
Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could then be trapped in an infinite long axiomatization.
N.B.: thus, the empiricist gives up the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements can be expressed via the reality.
Quine: the problem is a not too high complexity for a finite axiomatization, but the holism:
---
XII 95
Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference of opinions") only relates to theories as a whole, not individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" should be one in which the texts, in which logical mathematical observation terms will be translated into, are whole theories and not just terms or short sentences.

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Carnap Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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II 173
Analytic/Synthetic: CarnapVsQuine: trying to overcome the difficulties in order to maintain the distinction. Restriction: the distinction should apply only to the so-called constructed languages. Here there are clear rules as to when a composition is allowed.
VII 147
Pragmatics/Carnap: additional problem: whether the objects exist. Quine: doubts that in the case of absence an explication of the words is possible, since he requires clear behavioral criteria. So these words become meaningless. CarnapVsQuine: it is theoretically possible to show the fruitfulness of semantic concepts through the evolution of language systems without pragmatic basis (language use, behaviourist). (operational procedures).
VII 151
Intensionalist thesis of pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the language habits. Extensionalist thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste; the linguist is free, because it cannot be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise, either. Quine: the completed lexicon is e.g. pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the foot. But we can draw an advantage from that. On the other hand, if we postpone a definition of synonymy in the case of the lexicon, no problem appears as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.
VII 152
Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist must provide not only the real cases, but also the possible ones.
VII 153
CarnapVsQuine: The extensionalist thesis is inappropriate: E.g. entry in the lexicon: (3) Einhorn, unicorn Kobold, goblin On the other hand the wrong registration: (4) Einhorn, goblin Kobold, unicorn Carnap: The two German words here have the same extension, namely the zero class (Carnap pro). If the extensionalist thesis is correct, then there is no essential, empirically verifiable difference between (3) and (4).
VII 154
QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man in the street was unwilling to say anything about nonexistent objects.
VII 155
CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man in the street is very well able to understand issues related to assumed counterfactual situations.
Quine XI 150
Ding/Gegenstand/Carnap/Lauener: Dinge anzunehmen bedeutet nur die Wahl einer gewissen Sprache. Es heißt nicht, an diese Dinge zu glauben.
XI 151
CarnapVsQuine: sein Existenz Kriterium (Wert einer gebunden Variablen zu sein) hat insofern keine tiefere Bedeutung, als darin nur eine Sprachwahl zum Ausdruck kommt. QuineVsCarnap: Sprache und Theorie können nicht so getrennt werden. Wissenschaft ist die Fortsetzung unserer täglichen Praxis.
Stroud I 221
Traum/Quine/Stroud: Quine schließt an keiner Stelle die Möglichkeit aus, dass wir die ganze Zeit träumen. (>Descartes). Skeptizismus/Empirie/Carnap: kann nicht empirisch beantwortet werden.
Wissen/Carnap: allerdings kann es empirische Untersuchungen geben, die zeigen, wie wir zu Wissen gelangen.
Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: soll das leisten.
CarnapVsQuine: Pointe: eben weil sie eine empirische Untersuchung ist, kann sie die traditionelle Frage des Philosophen nicht beantworten.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Quine, W.V.O. Goodman Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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IV 21
Quine: individuation is determined by a bunch of mutually interrelated grammatical particles and constructions. Plurals, pronouns, numerals, the "is" (of identity) and its derived "same" and "other". GoodmanVsQuine: he failed to declare that the interpretation of these particles can not be made without consideration of the places they individuate. The interpretation changes when they are used in different systems.
IV 22
E.g. sunset. Whether we see the same thing as yesterday, depends on whether we are employed with the identification of suns or sunsets. (> description).
Quine V 30
Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to a finally mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I am, unlike the two, satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary of which some of the physical basic predicates were initially learned by using the dispo way of speaking. (Heuristic role).

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Ramsey, F. P. Fraassen Vs Ramsey, F. P.
 
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I 54
FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: all this was a mistake: the empirical meaning (set of observation consequences) of a theory cannot be isolated in this syntactic way. If that were possible, T/E would say the same as T about what is observable and how the observed behaves, and nothing else. Unobservable/Fraassen: Will naturally differ from the observable in that it systematically lacks the characteristics of the observed. Unobservability/Fraassen: unless we ban the negation, we can express in a language of observation that something is unobservable. And to a certain degree even how these unobserved entities are. E.g. unobservable/Copenhagen Interpretation/Observation Language: says that there are things that sometimes have a particular position, and sometimes don’t. Important argument/Fraassen: I have just expressed this conclusion, without using a single TT.
I 55
PhilosophyVsSyntaktical Approach: philosophers thought it to be rather too wide: many theories T are such that T/E is tautological. Such theories probably derive their empirical meaning from the observation consequences along with other theories or empirical hypotheses.
I 56
Syntactical/FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: the syntactically defined relations are simply the wrong ones! The biggest mistake of the syntactical approach was to focus on irrelevant technical questions: FraassenVsRamsey/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig: things like the Ramsey sentence, Carnap Conditional, Craig’s Theorem, "reduction sentence", "empirical language", theoretical terms (TT) "axiomatization in limited vocabulary" were all self-inflicted problems! They are philosophically not important!. FraassenVsRamsey Sentence.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Russell, B. Ryle Vs Russell, B.
 
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Logik III 33 (>RyleVsCarnap)
Russell fell into the trap in his account of universals: according to his opinion, atomic statements consists of a number of individuals and a universal.
E.g. "Fido is a dog." What does "dog" refer to? According to the "Fido"-Fido-theory of the Fido, it must get its meaning through the fact that it is assigned to a single thing, to "being-a-dog" or the universal, dog.
Statement/Russell's statements were designed by him to make the meaning of sentences. Consequently, he said, they must contain these generic entities, universals.
This is an unjustified step.
---
III 296
"Fido"-Fido principle: RyleVs: reference equals meaning. ---
Logik III 34
> VariousVsRussell, statements, facts Russell: believed that predicate expressions, verbs, and adjectives related to universals, "is president" refers to presidency, "runs" to what is common to all things that are going. But many philosophers deny that the concept of the object reference can be applied to such parts of speech.
Meaning: Russell and others simply identify meaning and object reference (reference).

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Skepticism Carnap Vs Skepticism
 
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Stroud I 170
CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Thesis: the significance of our expressions is limited to their empirical use. This means that the use of the expressions themselves is limited by whether there is a possible sensation which is relevant for determining the truth or falsity of the sentence in which these expressions occur. Def Principle of Verification/Understanding/Meaning/Carnap/Stroud: Thesis: then we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if appropriate sensations are possible for us.
Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: sentence: "Nobody will ever know if__." Here, the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because it is unverifiable. Def Meaningless: neither true nor false.
I 174
CarnapVsSkepticism: the question "Are there external things?" would thus be pointless. It would not be a question that you could not answer (sic), because there is no meaningful question and no meaningful response here. Important argument: but that does not mean that there are no entirely meaningful questions about the existence of external things: these are the internal questions ((s) within an area of ​​knowledge).
I 176
Truth/Sense/Meaningless/Carnap/Stroud: something that is true, cannot contradict something that is meaningless. Moore/Carnap/Stroud: verificationism shows that everything Moore says can be true, without however refuting skepticism. But there is nothing meaningful that he does not consider.
VerificationismVsSkepticism/CarnapVsStroud: the skepticism is not, as Kant says, to be understood transcendentally, but it is meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable.
Def External/External Questions/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: are "philosophical" questions that relate to the whole (the outer frame, i.e. that is initially not possible).
Def Internal/Internal Questions/Science/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: these are questions about the existence of things that are asked within a science. E.g. the question of the existence of numbers is useful in mathematics, but not outside of it.
I 177
External/Existence/Verificationism/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: if skepticism allows the things outside of us to be useful at all ((s) The sentences about the things that cannot be things may be useful or useless), then he cannot describe them as unknowable.
I 178
Objectivity/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: this principle prevents any concept of objectivity that does not contain the possibility of empirical verification. VsSkepticism: every concept of objectivity which includes the possibility of knowledge then makes skepticism impossible.
Practical/Theoretical/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: the distinction theoretical/practical goes far beyond the verification principle.
Stroud I 187
CarnapVsSekpticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic framework (reference system). This does not follow from the verification principle alone. It is part of a theory of knowledge (epistemology) according to which the insignificance of the skeptical question is indicated by a non-skeptical answer to the question how it is possible that we know something. Knowledge/Carnap/Stroud: two essential components:
1. Experience,
2. linguistic frame (reference system) within which we understand the experience. Language/Carnap/Stroud: is a rule system for the formation of sentences and for their verification or rejection (ESO 208). Thus we are equipped to determine that some statements coincide with our experience and others do not. Without those statements, which are made possible for us by the acceptance of the language, we would have nothing either to confirm or to refute the experience. Skepticism: would agree so far. It also needs expressions of language for the things of the outside world. CarnapVsSkepticism: he misunderstands the relation between the linguistic context and the truths that can be expressed within it. He thinks the frame was only needed I 188
To express something that was "objectively" true or false. ((s)> Quine:> Immanence theory of truth, immanent truth > Ontological relativity: truth only within a theory/system).
Objectivity/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: every speech on objective facts or external things is within a reference system (frame) and cannot justify our possession of this frame. ((s) which is a practical choice (convention).
Theoretical Question/Philosophy/Carnap: the only theoretical question that can we ask here is that about the rules of language.
I 192
CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic context of the expression about external objects and the truths that are expressed within this reference system. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-skeptical approach to this relation?.
1) to what system belongs Carnap's thesis that existence claims are neither true nor false in the thing language?.
2) what does the thesis then express at all?.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Tarski, A. Wittgenstein Vs Tarski, A.
 
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I 134
WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would reject the logical semantics as a whole, because according to the view of language as a universal medium it cannot be articulated.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Various Authors Wessel Vs Various Authors
 
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I 17
Toleranzprinzip/Carnap: ("Die logische Syntax der Sprache", 1934): "Wir wollen nicht Verbote aufstellen, sondern Festsetzungen treffen. Verbote können durch eine definitorische Unterscheidung ersetzt werden. In der Logik gibt es keine Moral. Jeder mag seine Logik, d.h. seine Sprachform aufbauen wie er will, nur muss er wenn er mit uns diskutieren will, syntaktische Bestimmungen angeben, anstatt philosophischer Erörterungen." (Das Toleranzprinzip wurde zuerst von Karl Menger formuliert).
I 20
WesselVsToleranzprinzip: im ganzen lehnen wir es ab, aber wir stimmen Menger darin zu, dass der Konstruktivitätsbegriff unklar ist. VsMenger: der weiteste Konstruktivitätsbegriff ist nicht die Forderung nach bloßer Widerspruchsfreiheit! (Wessel wie Chr. Thiel).
Begründung/Logik/Wessel: alle Begründungsversuche sind hier letztlich zirkulär!
Pro Carnap: natürlich hat jeder Logiker und jeder Mathematiker das Recht, beliebige Kalküle erst aufzubauen, wobei er die Regeln korrekt anzugeben hat.
VsCarnap: das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass die möglichen oder vorhandenen Kalküle gleichberechtigt sind! Das wäre ein "Gleichgütligkeitsprinzip" .
- - -
I 136
Def analytische Implikation/Parry/Wessel: (1933): Wenn eine Formel A eine Formel B analytisch impliziert, so kommen in B nur solche Aussagenvariablen vor, die auch in A vorkommen.
I 137
Axiome: (Auswahl) + A 12. (A ‹-› B) u F(A) -> F[A/B]
A 13. F(A) -> (A -> A)
analytische Implikation/WesselVsParry: keine Lösung des Problems, da > wieder ein Operator ist und in Axiomen und Theoremen mehr als einmal vorkommen kann.
Pro: hier wird zum erstenmal der Gedanke ausgesprochen, dass in der Folgerung nur solche Variablen vorkommen dürfen, die auch in der Voraussetzung enthalten sind.
Paradoxien/Implikation/nichtklassische Richtung/Wessel: Fragen:
1. gibt es irgendwelche Garantien, dass paradoxe Formeln nicht beweisbar sind?
2. gibt es Garantien dafür, dass nicht nichtparadoxe Formeln irrtümlich ausgeschlossen werden?
3. gibt es Kriterien um zu entscheiden, ob eine beliebige Formel paradox ist oder nicht?
4. Kann man ein System aufbauen, in dem alle paradoxen Formeln nicht beweisbar, alle nichtparadoxen Formeln aber beweisbar sind?
- - -
I 219
Identität/M.Stirner: "ineinander den Menschen sehen und gegeneinander als Menschen handeln...sehe ich in dir den Menschen wie ich in mir den Menschen und nichts als den Menschen sehe, so sorge ich für dich wie ich für mich sorgen würde...wir stellen ja beide nichts als den mathematischen Satz vor: A = C und B = C folglich A = B, d.h. ich nichts als Mensch und du nichts als Mensch : ich und du dasselbe". WesselVsStirner, Max: das ist die gleiche Logik wie bei "J.Kaspar (Pseudonym von Stirner) ist ein Lebewesen, ein Esel ist ein Lebewesen, also ist J. Kaspar ein Esel".
Das ist die Verwechslung verschiedener logischer Formen.
((s) Prädikation ist keine Identitätsaussage: "ich bin ein Mensch" heißt nicht "Ich = Mensch".)
- - -
I 314
Eulersche Diagramme/Borkowski/Lejewski/"ontologische Tafel"/Wessel: Erweiterung der Eulerschen Diagramme: Bedeutungseinschluss und ausschluss, Existenz usw. WesselVsLejewski: seine Theorie ist mit gravierenden Mängeln belastet.
I 315
Terminitheorie/Wessel: es sind unbegrenzt viele sing Term möglich, aber jede Theorie kommt mit einer begrenzten Anzahl aus. WesselVsLejewski: Bsp bei ihm macht der Term "Kosmonaut" eine mysteriöse Wandlung durch. zunächst leerer Term, dann sing Term, dann allg Term!
WesselVs: er ist von Anfang an ein allg Term: die Referenz hat überhaupt nichts damit zu tun.
Bei der Unterscheidung von leer/nichtleer handelt es sich um eine ganz andere Klassifikation von Termini. Das ist keine rein logische Aufgabe.
- - -
I 352
Intension/WesselVsStegmüller: die Bezeichnung als "inhaltliches" Problem zeigt nur, dass es auf der logischen Ebene noch nicht gelöst ist. StegmüllerVsModallogik: da modale Kontexte intensionalen Charakter hätten.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Verificationism Stroud Vs Verificationism
 
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I 201
Verificationism/Wissen/Stroud: das lenkt den Blick auf ein wenig beachtetes Problem der Relation zwischen dem verification prinziple und dem traditionellen Skeptizismus: man sieht üblicherweise nur einen einseitigen Wettbewerb zwischen ihnen: das Prinzip impliziert, dass die skeptische Konklusion sinnlos ist. Asymmetrie: also ist das ganze Problem sinnlos.
Verification Prinziple/VP/Skepticism/Stroud: haben aber in Wirklichkeit dieselbe Aufgabe zu lösen: zu erklären, wie unser Glauben empirisch bestätigt wird.
SkepticismVsVerificationism: seine Standards der Bestätigung werden gar nicht erfüllt.
Stroud: das ist ein Disput darüber, was unsere Standards überhaupt sind, und ob irgendetwas sie erfüllt. Keine Seite ist in einer besseren Position, sie teilen das Problem.
I 202
Skeptizismus/Stroud: ist durch das verification prinziple nicht widerlegt: wenn wir nicht wissen, ob wir träumen, wissen wir auch nicht, ob die Bestätigung durch Belege nicht nur im Traum erfolgt. ((s) Das Argument der empirischen Überprüfung ist etwas ganz anderes als das Argument über den Sprachgebrauch.) Bestätigung/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: es gibt schon einen Konflikt darüber, wie das verification prinziple (VP) überhaupt zu formulieren ist, bzw. darüber, was als Bestätigung gelten kann. Wenn das VP adäquat sein soll, muss es implizieren, dass es keine bedeutungsvolle Schwierigkeit geben kann der Art, wie sie der traditionellen Skeptiker vorbringt.
Problem: bei der Formulierung des Prinzips kann man das Prinzip selbst noch nicht auf den entscheidenden Begriff der Bestätigung anwenden. ((s) Sonst zirkulär).
Empirische Bestätigung/confirmability/Stroud: ihre Definition würde eine Erklärung brauchen, wie und warum der traditionelle Begriff unserer alltäglichen Praxis falsch sein soll.
I 203
Skeptizismus/Stroud: kann nicht einfach zurückgewiesen werden, ohne dass die Relation zwischen "internem" und "externem" (distanziertem) Zugang als inkohärent gezeigt wurde. StroudVsVerificationism: im Alltag werden die Bedingungen des verification prinziple niemals vollkommen erfüllt. Eine erfolgreiche Theorie der empirischen Bestätigung muss daher zeigen, was mit dem Begriff der Bestätigung nicht stimmt.
Es könnte dennoch sein, dass der verificationism auf der richtigen Fährte ist.
I 204
Bestätigung/Tradition/Stroud: es gilt allgemein, dass das Problem der Außenwelt (Skeptizismus) empirisch unentscheidbar ist, egal, welchen Begriff von empirischer confirmability man wählt. Das ist das gemeinsame Problem, das Skeptizismus und verificationism teilen müssen. . Also scheint es vernünftig, dass das verification prinziple erst genau formuliert werden muss, bevor es gebraucht werden kann.
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism: solange mangelnde Verifizierbarkeit mit Sinnlosigkeit verbunden ist, wird eben unsere Rede über die Welt um uns herum zur Sinnlosigkeit verdammt sein, wenn der Skeptizismus recht hat.
StroudVsRational Rekonstruction/StroudVsCarnap: die r.r. können wir beiseitelassen, und einfach fragen, wie plausibel es ist, Sinn an verifiability zu knüpfen. Und das können wir anscheinend nicht, ohne die Plausibilität des Skeptizismus einzuschätzen zu versuchen ((s) und ihn nicht selber als sinnlos abzutun).
I 205
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: selbst wenn der verificationism wahr ist, brauchen wir immer noch eine Erklärung, wie und warum die traditionelle philosophische ((s) nicht-empirische) Untersuchung scheitert. ((s) soll hier dem Skeptizismus entsprechen). (>Warum-Frage). Verification Prinziple/Stroud: um es zu akzeptieren, brauchen wir eine verständliche Diagnose, warum und wie der Skeptizismus falsch ist. ((s) quasi zirkulär, das eine setzt das andere voraus).
StroudVsVerificationism/DescartesVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: Descartes’ Bsp "Ich weiß nicht, ob ich wirklich am Kamin sitze, mit einem Stück Papier in der Hand" ist doch ein vollkommen sinnvoller Satz! Wir verstehen ihn gut genug um zu wissen, was der Fall sein müsste, wenn er wahr wäre. Und er kann wahr oder falsch sein.
Es wäre Quatsch, wollte man behaupten dass Sätze wie Bsp „Hier ist eine menschliche Hand“ oder Bsp "Es gibt Berge in Afrika" sinnlos wären.
Verificationism/Stroud: behauptet allerdings nur, dass sie sinnlos sind in Verbindung mit der traditionellen Schlussfolgerung, dass ihre Wahrheit niemals gewusst werden kann (skeptische Konklusion).
I 206
Verification prinziple/Stroud: wir müssten zeigen, dass es nichts vom Skeptizismus zu befürchten

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Wittgenstein, L. Carnap Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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II 203
CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: Picture theory).
Hempel I 99/100
Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor. This means that relations in natural languages ​​with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. (> BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora).
CarnapVsWittgenstein: his significance criterion is too narrow. Carnap characterized empirical laws as general statements that allow many inferences and differ in their form from the so-called singular statements like "At the moment, the temperature in here is twenty degrees". A general statement is checked by examining its singular consequences. But as each general statement determines an infinite class of singular consequences, it cannot be finally and completely verified by them, but only more or less protected. A general statement is not a truth-function of singular statements, but rather has, in relation to them, the character of a hypothesis. Laws of nature: In other words: a general law cannot be formally derived from a finite set of singular statements. Each finite set of statements allows an infinite number of hypotheses. In addition, the singular statements themselves have the character of hypotheses, even when compared to the protocol sentences. What singular statements we accept depends on which of the formally possible systems we choose.
CarnapVsWittgenstein: truth: another fundamental principle of the Tractatus should be rejected: truth or falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements, whether they be atomic statements, protocol sentences or other singular statements. (After all, the singular statements are hypotheses compared to base statements). What follows is a loosening of the concept of truth: in science a statement is accepted as true when it is sufficiently supported by protocol sentences.
Carnap II 203
CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language, without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: picture theory). Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor.This means that relations in natural languages ​​with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. - (BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora)

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Theory/Observ. Language Versus Fraassen I 56
FraassenVsRamsey-Satz/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig - Vs distinction observation language/ theory language irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntatical interpretation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Ramsey-Sentence Versus I 56
FraassenVsRamsey Sentence / FraassenVsCarnap / FraassenVsCraig - Vs separation observation language / theory of language - irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntactic representation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Object Langauge Carnap, R.
 
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Stroud I 185
Dingsprache/Carnap: in ihr kann die Frage nach der Existenz der Dinge (Dingwelt) formuliert werden. Aber das heißt nicht, daß der Satz -žes gibt äußere Dinge-œ sinnlos wäre. Alternative zur Dingsprache: phänomenale Sprache.
I 191
Daß wir existieren und Erfahrungen haben, kann nicht einfach als eine -žinterne-œ Wahrheit der Dingsprache angesehen werden.
I 192
1. zu welchem System gehört Carnaps These, daß Existenzbehauptungen in der Dingsprache weder wahr noch falsch sind? 2. was drückt die These dann überhaupt aus?
I 193
Sprache/Gegenstand/Stroud: die Dinge waren schon lange da, bevor Sprache in der Welt entstand. Und das ist wiederum etwas, was wir -žintern-œ in der Dingsprache wissen. StroudVsCarnap: dann ist seine These, verstanden als der Sprache -žintern-œ, falsch. Sie widerspricht dem, was wir schon als Wissen über uns und die äußeren Dinge annehmen.
CarnapVsVs: würde sagen, daß man seine These natürlich nicht -žempirisch-œ und nicht der Dingsprache -žintern-œ auffassen darf.
Carnap/Stroud: seine These ist eine Version der -žKopernikanischen Wende-œ von Kant. Und er erlangt sie aus denselben Gründen wie Kant: ohne sie hätten wir keine Erklärung, wie ist"s möglich, daß wir überhaupt etwas wissen.
I 197
Bezugssystem/Rahmen/StroudVsCarnap: zu welchem Rahmen gehört Carnaps These, daß keine Sätze über äußere Gegenstände wahr oder falsch unabhängig von der Wahl eines Bezugssystems (Sprache) sind?
Extensionality Carnap, R.
 
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VI XXI
Extensionality-thesis / Carnap (1928): all statements are extensional.   Self-criticism VsCarnap: (1961) is not correct in this form.
  New: weaker form: every non-extensional statement is translated into a logically equivalent statement in an extensional language.
grue Carnap, R.
 
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Schurz I 219
glau/CarnapVsGoodman: Bsp Carnap: These nur qualitative Prädikate sind induzierbar (projizierbar) -žglau-œ ist ein Def -žpositionales-œ Prädikat: es nimmt in seiner Definition auf den Zeitpunkt t0 Bezug -" GoodmanVsCarnap: man kann eine gleichermaßen ausdrucksstarke Sprache mit grot/rün als Grundprädikaten einführen - SchurzVsCarnap: positional/qualitativ kann man durch Unterschied in ostensiver Erlernbarkeit unterscheiden -" Induktion/Goodman: Lösung: ei Induktion müssen wir wissen, was konstant blieb- das sind die qualitativen Merkmale -" -žgrot-œ bleibt beim Wechsel konstant! -" aber damit haben wir Anti-Induktion betrieben -

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Verifierbarkeit Carnap, R.
 
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I 16
Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap: the thesis of verifiability must be mitigated to the thesis of probation ability.
Analyticity Quine, W.V.O.
 
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V 116
Analytisch/Analytizität/Quine: die analytischen Sätze sind eine Teilklasse der reiz-analytischen Sätze, denen zuzustimmen jeder Sprecher einer Sprachgemeinschaft disponiert ist. QuineVsCarnap: doch auch jetzt haben wir keinen so strengen Unterschied zu den synthetischen Sätzen.
Lösung/Quine: These Sätze, die von vielen zuerst gelernt wurden, sind der Analytizität näher als Sätze, die nur von wenigen gelernt wurden. Die analytischen Sätze sind die, die von allen so gelernt werden. Diese Extremfälle unterscheiden sich aber nicht wesentlich von den benachbarten. Man kann auch gar nicht immer angeben, welche es sind.
Semantic Ascent Quine, W.V.O.
 
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XI 142
Ontology / Carnap / Lauener: (temporarily replaced): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language.   semantic ascent / QuineVsCarnap: this should not be misused for ontological evasive maneuvers.
Referential Frame Quine, W.V.O.
 
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Staln I 44
QuineVsCarnap / Stalnaker: all questions are asked within any linguistic context, and questions such as "it is reasonable to adopt a framework of numbers?" and "Are there numbers?" are not easy to separate.
Basis Sentence Schlick, M.
 
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Hempel I 102
Schlick: do not dispense entirely on basis sets, otherwise relativism"
I 104
SchlickVsCarnap / VsNeurath: the thesis that a statement is true if it is proven by protocol sentences leads to absurd results, as far as the idea of absolutely true pr. s. is rejected.- There are obviously many different systems of pr. s. by Carnap and Neurath each of these different, incompatible systems were true.

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Observability Maxwell, G.
 
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Fraassen I 14
Grover MaxwellVsCarnap/MaxwellVsPositivismus: (1962 -žThe Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities-œ): (locus classicus): These die Unterscheidung Theorie/Beobachtung kann nicht gezogen werden.
I 17
Beobachtbarkeit/Maxwell: These es gibt nichts prinzipiell unbeobachtbares, weil ich Elektronenaugen hätte haben können (>MöWe)

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980