Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 24 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Quine | I 286 Intensional abstraction means "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring". I 289 Class abstraction re-traced to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) - instead of: x^(..x..) - is not possible for intensional abstraction. I 295 Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties is opaque (E.g. of the planet). I 322 Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)". New is the irreducible two-digit Operator "0": "a0x(..x..)". Variables are the only thing that remains. The pronoun has primacy. IX 12ff Class Abstraction/Quine: class abstraction "{x:Fx}" refers to "the class of all objects x with Fx". In the eliminable combination that we have in mind "ε" appears only in front of a class abstraction term and class abstraction terms appear only after "ε". The whole combination "y ε {x: Fx}" is then reduced according to a law: Concretization Law/Quine: reduces "y ε {x: Fx}" to "Fy". Existence/Ontology: thus no indication remains that such a thing as the class {x:Fx} exists at all. Introduction: it would be a mistake, e.g. to write "*(Fx)" for "x = 1 and EyFy". Because it would be wrong to conclude "*(F0) *(F1)" from "F0 F1". Therefore we have to mistrust our definition 2.1 which has "Fx" in the definiendum, but does not have it in the definiens. IX 16 Relations Abstraction/Relation Abstraction/Quine: "{xy:Fxy}" is to represent the relationship of a certain x to a certain y such that Fxy. Relation/Correctness/Quine: parallel to the element relationship there is the concept of correctness for relations. Definition concretization law for relations/Quine: is also the definition correctness/relation: "z{xy: Fxy}w stands for "Fzw". IX 52 Function Abstraction/lambda operator/Quine: before terms one must generate terms (expressions). (Frege/Church: is here also valid of statements and thus a second time class abstraction, but both group statements are under terms and classes under functions (QuineVsFrege,QuineVsChurch). Definition lambda operator/Quine: if "...x..." contains x as a free variable, λx (...x...) is that function whose value is ...x... for each argument x - therefore λx(x²) the function "the "square of" - general: "λx(...x...)" stands for "{ : y = ...x...}" - identity: λx x{: y = x } = λ. - λx {z: Fxy} = {: y = {z: Fxz}} -. "λx a" stands for "{: y = a}". The equal sign now stands between variable and a class abstraction term. IX 181 Abstraction/Order/Quine: the order of the abstracting expression must not be less than that of the free variables. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Beliefs | Schiffer | I 273 Def subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. >Unconsious, >Belief state, >Beliefs, >Inference. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. Schiffer thesis: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states. 1. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. In: Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518 --- I 26 Belief/Schiffer: problem: such a psychological theory does not create the meaning of beliefs. - Solution: functionalist reduction. >Psycho functionalism. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1st element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style"). >Meaning theory/Loar. I 28 Schiffer: It is already presupposed that one forms beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types. >Functional role/Schiffer. The criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p. I 150 Belief property/SchifferVs: if belief properties existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd). - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) This is the cause - then we have a mental proposition in addition. This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional. Counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation. >Counterfactual conditionals. I 155 Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled), i.e. no function of other things. Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above). Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible. >Language acquisition, >Learning. I 163 Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role. >Conceptual role. E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming. Conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" This is a benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). It has no causal power. Pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property... I 164 Belief/(s): Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true. Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... SchifferVsEliminativism/SchifferVsChurchland: the eliminativism should then have the result that nobody believes anything. >Eliminativism, >Reductionism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Church-Turing Thesis | Genz | II 329 Church-Turing-Thesis/Church/Genz: (Church 1936): thesis: everything that is calculable at all can be calculated by a Turing machine. Genz: whether this is true, is a physical question. It cannot be determined by logical evidence. For example, if nature allowed a Turing machine that would take infinite logical steps in finite time, the Church-Turing thesis would be wrong. It would also be wrong, e. g. if there could be countless physical states in a physical system. Analogous calculations would then be possible, and this exceeded the machine's repertoire. Quantum mechanics: rescues the thesis from refutation by classic computers by prohibiting to build some that could do this. On the other hand, quantum mechanics could allow to build computers that falsify the Church Turing thesis! Cf. >Quantum mechanics. Vs: But according to experts, this is not the case. II 330 Question: could one not add the "secret calculations" of nature to our repertoire and thus refute the Church-Turing thesis? Vs: without understanding the corresponding laws of nature we cannot know what nature calculates. >Laws of nature, >Laws, >Rules, >Knowledge, >Understanding, >Rule following. II 332 Church-Turing-Thesis/Genz: if it were wrong, it is an empirical question whether it can be valid in a weakened form ((s) after all, it has not yet been refuted). II 333 Weaker/variant: thesis: nature provides us with the mathematical and logical means by which its laws can be recognized. VsChurch-Turing-Thesis/Genz: the antithesis would be that at least the action of the human mind requires unpredictable functions to describe it. Then they are random, seen from the Turing machine (representative/group: Penrose). >Mind, >Dependence. 1. Alonzo Church (1936). A note on the entscheidungsproblem. Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):40-41 (1936) |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Church-Turing Thesis | Lorenzen | Berka I 266 Church thesis/Lorenzen: the thesis is an equation of "constructive" with "recursive". >Constructivism, >Recursion, >Recursivity. LorenzenVsChurch: this is a too narrow view: thus it no longer permits the free use of the quantification over the natural numbers. >Quantification, >Numbers, >Infinity. I 267 Decision-making problem/ChurchVsLorenzen: (according to Lorenzen): Advantage: greater clarity: when limiting to recursive statements, there can never be a dispute as to whether one of the admitted statements is true or false. The definition of recursiveness guarantees precisely the decision-definition, that is, the existence of a decision-making process. >Decidability, >decision problem.(1) 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200 |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Connectionism | Churchland | Fodor IV 199 Fodor/LeporeVsConnectionism: the connectionist draws diagrams in which the labeling (designation of the nodes) say what the intentional interpretation is supposed to be. --- IV 200 But no theory explains how the node comes to its designation. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: Churchland makes the same mistake. This is only semantics by stipulation. It does not matter whether semantics is postulated for points or whole dimensions. Problem: what should decide whether brown and dark blue correspond rather to regions (places) or dimensions? It does not provide any semantics at all because the brain does not represent colors as frequencies. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Connectionism | Fodor | IV 199/200 Fodor/LeporeVsConnectionsm: the connectionists draw charts in which the labels (name of the node) say what the intentional interpretation is supposed to be. But no theory explains how the node came to its label. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: Churchland makes the same mistake. This is just semantics by stipulation. It does not matter whether semantics is postulated for points or entire dimensions. IV 201 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. The brain represents red things as red and aunts as aunts (not as objects with certain psychophysical properties). Otherwise we could find out anything with introspection. There are very different interpretations of its charts possible. >Connectionism, >Introspection, >Representation; cf. >Neurophysiology. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Desire | Churchland | II 467 "Desire"/"Belief"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop those "categories". FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Elimination | Churchland | Schiffer I 159 Eliminativism/Churchland/Schiffer: (Paul Churchland 1981)(1): his eliminativism is quite different from that of Quine: Here the irreducibility of intentional vocabulary is denied. Folk Psychology/Churchland: is a functional theory. Belief is a functional state, with a functional role but future neuroscience will show that no inner states have these roles and therefore the folk psychology is wrong. Schiffer: this is a completely different route to eliminativism than that belief cannot be realized physically because our intentional vocabulary was irreducible. I 164 ... SchifferVsChurchland: his eliminativism would then have the consequence that no one believes anything. 1. Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (2, February): 67–90. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Identity Theory | Churchland | Pauen I 188 Explanation gap/Identity Theory/Consciousness/Ontology/Pauen: The gap was basically already recognized by Leibniz. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and psychological theories. Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness": I 189 Forces us to make enormous interventions in previously accepted conceptions and methods. >Consciousness/Chalmers. Identity theory: refers to the ontology. Explanation gap argument: refers epistemically to our knowledge. Context: if we accept identity theory we must expect that our respective knowledge can relate to each other. I 191 Churchland: it would be a fallacy that we wanted to conclude from today's ignorance to the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument of ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap this must not be plausible. Representatives do not rely on their own ignorance, nor do they lead the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other. Therefore, our methods must fail. >Irreducibility, >Reduction, >Reductionism, >Materialism. I 192 Causal characteristics play an important role in this difference. In this way the representatives of the explanation gap arguments must be able to characterize our natural phenomena, which are characterized by everyday concepts, by such causal properties. >Causality, >Causal role. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Inverted Spectra | Churchland | Fodor IV 195 Qualia/Quality/Sensation/inverted spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the change is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could reveal it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the inverted spectra appear to show that behaviorism is false. And also the functionalism. (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been interchanged. And precisely the concept of the sensitive identity becomes ambiguous. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The inscriptions of the points of the dice could also be inverted. ((s) One could always describe it, but one would not know which sensations are present in the other.) --- IV 195/196 Even though this frequency combination represents this particular pink, it is conceptually possible that something has the first property, but not the second. Inverted spectra/Qualia: Problem: there seems to be no property of a sensation except its qualitative content on which the qualitative content supervenes. In particular, there appears to be no proportioned or neurophysiological property on which supervenience is guaranteed. Inverted spectra/tradition: would say that Churchland's dimensions in the Qualia color dice represent by reference to properties that they do not necessarily possess. Or, if you think that it is "metaphysically necessary" that color sensations have the psychophysical properties that they have, then one would have to say that this necessity is not brought about by any necessity between sensual concepts and psychophysical concepts. One might well know that a sensation corresponds to a point in the color dice and still does not know how it is. The dimensions do not determine the content. Why not place a semantic space next to it, add the condition that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They would have to name content states through their content. E.g. Perhaps then one could identify uncle, aunt, president, Cleopatra etc. along these dimensions? --- IV 197 E.g. Cleopatra, as a politician, is closer to the president than to marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content instead of identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction. Problem: Equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Inverted Spectra | Fodor | IV 195 Exchanged spectra: nothing in the behavior can uncover the permutation (VsBehaviorism). >Behaviorism. Representation of the frequencies does not represent the sensation. The descriptions can be changed at will. Tradition: sensation is not a necessary property of color. If there is a "metaphysically necessary" connection between perception and neurophysiology, then still none between color concept and psychophysical concept. >Sensation, >Colour. IV 195 State space/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: the problem of identity will always return. Ultimately, there is no other criterion than observational concepts. >Observation lnguage, >Observation sentences, >Identity, >Criteria. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Linguistic View | Field | II 159 Linguistic view/Field: does not assume any meanings as mind-independent entities - but assigns the words of a speaker to interpreter's words. - The relations are based on other characteristics - that is, on inferences that contain that word. - This is what I call "meaning-characteristic" - e.g. II 160 ChurchVsLinguistic view/Translation/Field: (Church 1950)(1): ("translation argument"): allegdly says: that if the word "lapin" means [rabbit], then it says that "lapin" means the same as "rabbit", then its German translation should be: ""lapin" means [rabbit]"" instead of ""lapin" means [Kaninchen]"" (Kaninchen, sic). ChurchVs: but this disagrees with the purpose and normal use of translations. Schiffer dito: E.g. two monolingual German speakers: Karl is told that Pierre said something in French that is equivalent to "Schnee ist weiß" (german, sic) - Fritz : ... equivalent to "snow is white". Problem: absurd: then Karl thinks rather than Fritz that Pierre said that Schnee ist weiß (sic, german) - but only because of the linguistic view. FieldVsVs: the linguistic view only has to be formulated more cautiously. Solution: >quasi-translation or > quasi-meaning. II 162 Leeds/linguistic view/LeedsVsChurch/Meaning/Extension/Field: (Leeds, 1979)(2): literal meaning/Leeds: E.g. the German word "bedeutet" means literally not the same as the English word "means": it does not even have the same extension. N.B.: (hereinafter "Hund", sic) "means" refers to "Hund" and "Hund" to "Hund", but not to "dog". - "Means": "dog" refers to "dog" and "Hund" to "dog" but not to "Hund". But: "bedeutet" and "means" are nevertheless in an important homology relation: Homology/meaning/Field: E.g. following two predicates are extensively different: a) "the temperature-in-Fahrenheit of x is r" and b) "the temperature-in-celsius of x is r". Solution: this homology makes it sensibly to translate "bedeutet Hund" as "means dog" - Leeds: the literal meaning is not important. We cannot get it. Field dito. DummettVsChurch: that undermines his argument. >Michael Dummett. II 165 Linguistic view: Alternative to it: a) to assume that that-sentences do not denote and "means that" are "believes that" operators - E.g. inference of "Susan believes that E = mc²" to "Susan believes Einstein's theory". Then the first is only the abbreviation of the second. - Then that-sentences are still singular terms. b) That-sentences and parentheses refer to intentional entities. 1. Church, Alsonzo, 1950. On Carpa's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief. Analysis 10, pp. 97-9. 2. Leeds, Stephen, 1979. Church's Translation Argument. Canadian Journal of PHilosophy 9, 43-51 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Materialism | Churchland | Pauen I 100 Materialism, eliminative/VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the abandonment of the terminology of everyday psychology. This assumes, however, that the corresponding entities do not exist in fact. This is an ontological and not just a language-philosophical thesis. Churchland claims that there are no serious objections to the eliminative materialism. That is not the case, however. I 101 VsMaterialismus, eliminative/Pauen: 1. False claim to know that there are neural, but no mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true. There must therefore be no opinions (i.e., mental states). On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implicitly implies that the representative of a claim itself, is of the opinion that the facts are true. Patricia Churchland/Pauen: admits this performative contradiction, but sees in it only a further proof for our entanglement in the everyday psychology. VsChurchland: that is a mere announcement that the contradiction will be solved somehow. I 102 Performative contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: For example, the vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent asserts that there are no spirits of life. This opponent, however, is himself alive, so he must have spirits of life ... PauenVsChurchland: that is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level: The opponent of vitalism does not depend on vitalism, but has an alternative concept. In contrast, the defender of everyday psychology does not have to make such a presupposition: the assertion that knowledge implies an opinion (the controversial mental state), is after all no invention of everyday psychology, it is not an empirical thesis at all. 103 VsMaterialism, eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of intertheoretical reduction: everyday psychology is to be eliminated, especially because it cannot be reduced to neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: therefore the two theories must compete on the same level. E.g. Phlogiston/Chemistry. In contrast to that, everyday psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/third person, micro/macro). I 104 3. For example, split brain patients/Pauen: empirical evidence shows that, in particular, feelings are language-independent and thus can also be identified pre-theorytically. Patients react, but have no more conscious access. The stimuli occur in the right, unconscious, language-incapable hemisphere. Nevertheless, patients can provide correct information. They can neither be based on the generalizations of everyday psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object. I 105 This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: The latter then excludes the phenomenal states from the elimination. The everyday experience should no longer be changed by elimination. VsChurchland: this, however, diverges from the usual everyday psychology, which also includes pain. He had previously included pain in the states which would be changed by the elimination of the terms. Moreover, he is inconsistent when he insists on the elimination of cognitive consciousness. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Meaning | Field | II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: Quasi-translation is what most authors mean by meaning. - Not a literal translation but the use of the words by the interpreter in his own language at the time in his actual world. >Actual world, >Possible worlds. Comparability is preserved even in the quasi-translation, not in a literal. >Comparability, >Translation. Sententialism/sententionalism/Field: Thesis: When we say someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the set of 1st quasi- translation and quasi- meaning rather than literal 2nd "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #snow is white#. ((#): What stands between #, is to be "quasi-translated".) In the quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is obtained. II 167 Intentional meaning/Field: Intentional meaning is completely empty – E.g. Suppose we wanted a theory of intentional meaning, then we also needed one of their combinations. – We also need a theory of the corresponding truth conditions. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. Problem: if we set up a theory here, it is not completely trivial, that the intentional meaning of "Plato" is just Plato! - We need an extra explanation. - That would solve nothing. – It would only bring problems. >Meaning (Intending). Better instead: a compositional theory of expressions (not of meanings). >Compositionality, >Expressions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning | Leeds | Field II 162 Leeds/linguistic perspective/LeedsVsChurch/meaning/extension/Field (Leeds 1979)(1): - literal meaning/Leeds : e.g. the German word "bedeutet" literally means not the same as the English " means" : it does not even have the same extension - N.B. " bedeutet" refers "dog " to " Hund" and "Hund" to "Hund" , but not to "dog". "Means ": maps "dog" on "dog" and "Hund" on "dog" but not to "dog" but "bedeeutet" and "means" nevertheless stand in a homology relation: Homology/Meaning/Field: Example The following two predicates are extensional different : a) "The temperature in Fahrenheit of x r" b ) "The temperature in Celsius of x r". Solution : this homology makes it sensible to translate "means dog" as "means dog" - Leeds: the literal meaning is not important! We can not even get it. Field ditto. DummettVsChurch: that undermines his argument. >Translation, >Reference, >Translation/Field, >Meaning/Field. 1. Stephen Leeds (1979). Church's Translation Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):43 - 51 |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Modalities | Church | Quine VII 153 Modality/Modal Logic/Ontology/Church: (1943)(1) Proposal: the quantified variables should be limited to intensional values. >Intensions, >Intensionality, cf. >Extension, >Extensionality. Carnap: took this in extreme form for his entire system. He himself presented this as a complicated double interpretation of his variables. QuineVsChurch, QuineVsCarnap: see above. Proposition/Church: (late): complex names of certain intensional objects. >Propositions. Intensional Logic/Church: later: instead of a necessity generator (related to whole sentences): New: Necessity predicate: which is related to complex names of certain intensional objects, called "propositions". >Intensional logic, >Operators, >Necessity operator. VII 154 In these propositions, the constants and variables of the corresponding propositions no longer appear (otherwise circular). >Names of sentences, >Circular reasoning, >Levels, >Constants, >Variables. This reflects the interplay between events inside and outside the modal contexts. Church did not call this modal logic, nor should we. Cf. >Modal Logic. Modal logic in the narrower sense has to do with the modal operator in relation to whole sentences. >Modal operators. 1. Church, Alonzo. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 8, no. 1, 1943, pp. 31–32. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2267985. Accessed 18 Nov. 2022. |
Chur I A. Church The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Qualia | Churchland | Fodor IV 197 Sensation/Representation/Qualia/Semantics/Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: the question arises by itself: when are S1 and S2 the same state (in the semantic state space)? But with the frequencies the old problem simply comes back. --- IV 198 If we do not know what it is for two words to mean "marriageable", then we also do not know, for the same reason, how it is for two semantic spaces, if both have the dimension of marriageability. Empiricism Tradition: has explained the semantic network by reference to what is fixed there. The dimensions should express observation characteristics and an externalistic (e.g. causal) theory should explain the relation. This is independent from the interpretation of the rest of the vocabulary. Churchland: his suggestion is that the dimensions of the semantic space do not generally correspond to the observation properties. They can correspond to whatever the brain may represent. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: but then again the question arises as to how the identity of the state spaces is fixed. We have no other identity criterion than observation properties. Suppose we had one, the question of the semantic identity would be there again. State spaces: we have a criterion for their identity only if we have one for the identity of their dimensions. And we have a non-empirical criterion for the dimensions only if we have one for "the property expressed by a dimension of the state space" which applies to arbitrary properties, not only for observational properties. --- IV 199 But that would be a criterion for equality of meaning. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: already assumes an interpersonal concept for the identity of state spaces before it can reach its goal of explaining the concept of "content equality" (similarity). He has presupposed the designations of the dimensions without permission. The label of a dimension tells how to interpret it, e.g. Degree of F-ness. Why should a dimension then express F-ness and not rather G-ness? What makes it that the dimension in my state space expresses the same property as in yours? > Connectivity. Fodor IV 205 --- Note 11. IV 205 Empiricism/Tradition: our concepts are functions of our sensory concepts. We have seen that Churchland's treatment of Qualia depends on mixing sensory and psychophysical terms. (s) Sensory: (one aspect - but as a "sensory concept" again two aspects, but with the claim of providing the psychological explanation). --- IV 248 Note 13 IV 205 But it does not follow from this that organisms with the same sensory equipment must also have the same concepts. They would only have to do so if their concepts occupied the same or similar positions in the semantic space. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Reduction | Schiffer | I 158 Reduction/Schiffer: ... no more should be required than that theoretical terms are physically realized. >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities. But realization does not imply reducibility. Schiffer pro Brentano: in favour of irreducibility of the intentional vocabulary. >Intentionality, >Intentions. I 159 Eliminativism/Churchland: is quite different: intentional vocabulary is not reducible - but folk psychology (functional theory) will turn out to be wrong. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsChurchland: why should irreducibility imply unrealizability? >Patricia Churchland, >Paul Churchland. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Representation | Churchland | Fodor IV 189 Representation/Reality/Churchland: Thesis: The brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in a suitable state space. Fodor/Lepore: we only need to be interested in the neurophysiological aspect here. >Reality, >Brain. He refers to Quine's familiar picture of the theory as a network of beliefs: on the edge observation sets, easily revisable, in the center theoretical concepts and logical relations, not easily revisable. Nevertheless, the only fixed nodes are just the observation concepts. They are linked to the observation conditions, while the inferential conditions are linked to one another (causal/associative). >Association, >Causality, >Observation language. IV 191 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: also seems to be guilty of the illusion that ultimately there might be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could eventually be reduced to relations between concepts of observation. Fodor IV 200 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. The brain represents red things as red and aunts as aunts! (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties). Otherwise we could figure it all out with introspection. Introspection/Fodor/Lepore: would work if the brain represented colors as frequencies, but it represents red things simply as red and aunts as aunts. >Introspection. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Representation | Fodor | Rorty I 269 ff Rorty: Fodor's image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have adopted. What is decisive is that with respect to Fodor's "Language of thought" the skeptical question "how exactly do the internal representations represent reality?" cannot be asked! There is no gap. --- Fodor IV ~ 122 Representation/Fodor/Lepore: having a thought is not an action, therefore it is not subject to beliefs like speech acts. >Speech act, >Belief, >Thinking, >Actions. IV 124 Representation/Fodor/Lepore: today: representations have functional roles qua constituents of propositional attitude but the content must not depend metaphysically nor conceptually on their functional role. >Functional role, >Content. IV 126 Representation/tradition/Fodor/Lepore: their explanation does not use beliefs, wishes, etc. so the causal role is determined only by non-semantic properties. Representations are not used for anything. Computation/Fodor/Lepore: thesis: the causal role of representations is governed by the same syntactic properties that affect their compositionality. >Compositionality. IV 128 Not representations are interpreted, but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc. The representations themselves are also inaccessible to radical interpretation. IV 127f Interpretation: objects are not representations but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc. IV 201 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. The brain represents red things as red and as aunts as aunts (not as objects with certain psychophysical properties). Otherwise we could find out anything with introspection. There are very different interpretations of its diagrams (VsConnectionism). >Connectionism. --- Newen I 133 Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor presumes localizable, specifiable representations. VsFodor: today you rather assume neuronal networks. Representation: is preconceptual, e.g. spatial orientation. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Semantics | Churchland | Fodor IV 191 Churchland: Semantic identity originates from the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (namely from the whole language). Translation: therefore, we can also speak of the equality of sentences over languages. --- IV 192 Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, the translation should always take account of the observability. --- Fodor IV 201 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods quite differently. Churchland himself has not decided what kind of neighborhood he has in mind. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Similarity | Churchland | Fodor IV 188 Condition/Equality/Similarity/Quality/Paul Churchland: basic cncepts: State space, similarity space, similarity metric. E.g. "Anglophone hyperspace with logical relations on hypersurfaces." Should replace Chomsky's image. ((s) Hypersurface/Churchland/(s): something on that you can go up/down, right/left, and front/back, and that within a language. Is needed to describe objects and their relationships.) --- IV 189 Fodor/Lepore: that assumes that state spaces also reflect grammar. Churchland: It also has in mind that a kind of representations reflect "contents" of neurological states. Fodor: Thereby he's up to his neck in his intentionality. --- Fodor IV 193 Similarity/Equality/Semantics/Paul Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: surprisingly begins with sensations, not with intentionality (such as with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had an adequate access to sensations, this could be generalized to a general mental representation. Churchland: the qualitative character of our sensations is generally considered to be inaccessible as neurobiological reduction. But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here, reveals a considerable amount of explicit information. E.g. color dice with frequencies. --- IV 194 Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes here that this is an access to the sensations (via frequencies!), not only to the discriminatory ability of the nervous system. Churchland: so the inexpressible can be expressed. The "unspeakable pink" can be grasped by frequency. So maybe the everyday language can also be replaced. --- IV 195 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust concept of equality in general? |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Terminology | Fodor | IV 1 Def anatomical/Fodor/Lepore: a property is exactly anatomical if it is has anything, that at least a second thing has as a property ((s) but not all things, so unlike holism, e.g. twin but not male twin). Def atomistic: properties that are not anatomical are atomistic, e.g. "... ate the last one...". IV 13 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: e.g. assuming anatomical propositions would also be holistic. Then it could turn out that, e.g., no language would have an expression for "the pen of my aunt" if it did not also have expressions that correspond to the following expressions, e.g. "two is a prime". IV 134 E.g. Belief/shmelief/faith/shfaith/Fodor/Lepore: shmeliefs: are like beliefs but without charity being analytic for them, then the majority could be wrong, but beliefs must usually be true. IV 140 Projectivism/Fodor/LeporeVs: 1) Projectivism must assert that there are no beliefs on the twin earth. 2) It cannot explain the element of interpretation of intentional attribution. IV 148 Interpretation Theory/Fodor/Lepore: thesis: the interpretation theory states that there are no intentional states (Dennett pro?). Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: if intentionality does not exist, interpretation cannot attribute any properties to it. "If there are no beliefs and wishes, there can be nothing for what they are selected." IV 197 State space semantics/Churchland/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: the technical apparatus does not help if you do not understand the everyday concepts, e.g. "marriageable" is not explained by a dimension of marriageability. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Translation | Field | II 147ff Untranslatable/Translation/Extension/Deflationism/Field: Problem: Incorporation of untranslatable sentences. - Solution: potential extension of one's own language by accepting truth-preservation in conclusion. >Truth transfer, >Extensions, >Deflationism, >Language dependence. II 148 Names by index: "Georg-i": the George, to which Mary refered at the occasion of Z. Cf. >Situation semantics. II 149 Per sentence theory: "UTT Guru, Z": the sentence the Guru uttered at Z. - The special sentence is then superfluous. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotational true. >Disquotational truth, >Disquotationalism. II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def Quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: this is what most understand as meaning: not literal translation but reproduction as the interpreter understands the use of the corresponding words in his own language at the point of time in his actual world. >Stephen Schiffer. Comparison: is preserved in the quasi-translation at the moment, not in a literal translation. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Sententialism/Sententionalism/Field: Thesis: If we say that someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the sentence. 1. Quasi-translation and quasi-meaning instead of literal. 2. "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #Snow is white# - (#) what stands between #, should be further translated (quasi-). - In quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is preserved. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. II 273 Translation/Parameter/Field: in many cases, the relativization of the translation to a parameter is necessary to make it recognizable as a translation. - E.g. "finite": the non-standard argument tells us that there are strange models, so that "is in the extension of "finite" in M" functions as a "translation" of "finite" which maintains the inferential role of all what we say in pure mathematics. N.B.: "Is in the extension of "finite" in M" is a parameterized expression. Solution: what we are doing is to "translate" the one-digit predicate "finite" into the two-digit predicate "is in the extension of "finite" in x", along with the statements to determine the value of x on a model M with the necessary characteristics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Fodor Vs Behaviorism | Danto I 268 Rotary FiguresVsBehaviorism > Mental Representation (inner r) VsIntrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism), FodorVsBehaviorism. Fodor/Lepore IV 56 VsBehaviorism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. assuming "dog" and "shmog" are two words with which speakers react to exactly the same stimuli, namely dogs. Then for e.g. Skinner would follow that "dog" and "shmog" are synonymous. Then, the following sentence would be analytical in the language of the speaker: "Whatever is a dog, is a shmog." QuineVs: there are neither synonyms nor analytic sentences! IV 57 So Skinner’s semantics must be wrong. VsVs: it is namely a priori! Even worse: all the semantics must be wrong, a priori, because this nihilistic theory will say that there are no semantic properties at all. Fodor/Lepore: what went wrong this time? We have taken literally, that Quine has not shown in Two Dogmas (TD) (and also has not argued) that there are no semantic facts and no analytic truths. Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: what we rather concede is that if meaning is to have any sense at all, then it cannot be reconstructed by reference to the sentences to which the speaker agrees. Meaning/Two Dogmas/TD/Quine: meaning cannot be reduced to the inferences to which one is willing to agree. Reason: what inferences you agree to only depends on how you see the world, i.e. what you intend your words to mean. ((s)> interest, intention, meaning). Important argument: it is impossible to detect which of his/her views the speaker accepts a priori! So there are no analytic sentences. IV 195 Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the reversed spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong (and also functionalism: Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). You might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. ((s) You could always describe them without knowing what feelings are present in the other.) |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Church, A. | Quine Vs Church, A. | I 368 QuineVsChurch: The subject does not need to speak the language of the object sentence. There is a German phrase of which is true that the mouse, which is afraid of the cat, fears it. But in a certain way they remain language relative (Church). Ex A sentence in a given concrete translation might have a slightly different meaning. For Church this is even likely, because he also accepts all sorts of artificial languages. So we improve: (7) Thomas true-believes in German "Cicero..." I 369 According to Church, we would then have to make all other possible translations as well (8) Thomas believes true in German "Cicero has denounced Catiline." But an Englishman who does not speak German would find other information in (8) than in a full translation. (9) Thomas believes that Cicero denounced Catiline (in English). However, since (8) reflects the meaning of (7), (9) must miss the meaning of (7). QuineVsChurch: not necessarily because a certain concept of meaning is required. Quine: (7) not satisfactory because of the dependence on a language. Such relations of a sentence, a person and a language cannot be linked with the propositional attitudes. I 370 Sheffler + about expressions and degrees XI 55 Identity/Necessity/Church: the values of the variables could be reduced to intensions and thereby make all the true identity statements necessary. QuineVsChurch: it is a mistake to think that the quantified modal logic can tolerate only intentions, but no classes or individuals. Proof: Specification/Quine: every thing x, even an intention is, if it can at all be specified, specifiable in random matching manner. ((s) >indeterminacy of translation, indefinite >reference, >inscrutability of reference). XI 56 Suppose x is determined as the only thing by the condition "φx", so it is also determined as the only one by the conjunction "p u φx". Now you select any truth for "p" that is not implied by "φx", and both specifications contingently turn out to be consistent. So you gain nothing by taking intentions as values of the variables. Should we try again with necessary identity? Identity/Necessary Identity/Necessity/Quine/Lauener: let us consider the following postulate (1) ((w)(Fx w = x) u (w)(Gw w = x))> N(w) (Fw Gw) The demands that if there are always two open sentences that determine the same thing x as the only thing, they should be necessarily equivalent. Although this would repeal the referential opacity of the rules - it would also repeal modal distinctions themselves at the same time! (... + ...) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Church, A. | Searle Vs Church, A. | V 255 Term/SearleVsChurch/mistake: to think, a part of the meaning of "horse" was "with the term horse". It is incomprehensible how often this mistake is made. >Frege: The concept horse is no concept, >denotation, >designation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Church, A. | Sellars Vs Church, A. | Putnam I 66 Description/PutnamVsSellars: nor does the analysis of the description help Sellars: (1) "wheel" describes a wheel in English. Putnam: that means that "wheel" plays in English the role that "Rad" has in German. ChurchVsTarski: (1) is not statement on the German word "Rad". SellarsVsChurch: introduces a special means: the "point mention" (as Frege's "oblique sense"): A word in point mention denotes its own linguistic role: "Rad" and "wheel" are then both names for a certain role, namely the same! Important: wheel is not synonymous to a description of this role: it is rather a name of that role! That concludes: (2) "wheel" has in English the role "Rad". Then the extension of described is a class of ordered pairs (word/role), not (word/thing). (> Description). Sellars: no relation word world but word role. I 66/67 Description/Sellars: this is not a big restriction for him as nominalist as "roles" are not abstract entities for him. PutnamVsSellars: but this does not cast a particular light on the problem of reference. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Church, A. | Lorenzen Vs Church, A. | Berka I 266 Church thesis/Lorenzen: the thesis is an equating of "constructive" with "recursive". (S) so all structures are recursively possible? Or: there is only one recursive structure. (Slightly different meaning). LorenzenVsChurch: view to narrow: it allows no longer the free use of the quantification of the natural numbers. I 267 Decision Problem/ChurchVsLorenzen: (according to Lorenzen): Advantage: greater clarity: when limited to recursive statement forms there can never arise dispute whether one of the approved statements is true or false. The definition of recursivity guarantees precisely the decision definiteness, that means the existence of a decision process.(1) 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200 |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Church, A. | Stalnaker Vs Church, A. | II 127 Belief attribution/belief ascription/foreign-language/foreign language/Stalnaker: if O'Leary speaks another language it makes no difference for the explanation as long as he is somehow familiar with Venus. O’Leary's belief is one about mars and hesperus, not about language. Diagonalization/Stalnaker: works here likewise. Against: Belief on language use/conviction about language/Church/Burge/Stalnaker: Church 1954, Burge 1978): e.g. Alfred believes that "a fortnight" is a period of 10 days. This is then true in all possible worlds with this semantic rule for English and wrong in others. Translation/Church: problem: there is no translation test for it! (if an error is in play). E.g. a translation into German would not express the same because there is an equivalent for "a fortnight" in German. Stalnaker: Church seems to say with this that the proposition cannot express what it seems to express. Solution/Church: metalanguage. StalnakerVsChurch: we can explain the failure of translation tests without this conclusion: II 128 Solution/Stalnaker: diagonalization: translation into another language will change the possible contexts for propositions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Churchland, P. | Davidson Vs Churchland, P. | I (b) 27 Exhibitions / Churchland: "354 grams" could be interpreted as an adverb to "weigh" - like the whole sentence that follows "believes". DavidsonVsChurchland: that can not be substantiated by reputable semantics. Cf. >measurement/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Churchland, P. | Dennett Vs Churchland, P. | II 64 Language/numbers/measurement/Paul Churchland: has compared statements with numbers: E.g. "X is a weight in grams of 144" "Y has a speed of 12 meters per second." DennettVsChurchland: There are problems when we apply the same transformation rules and equating rules to different ways of expressing the same statement. Statements are, after all, unfortunately not so well-behaved theoretical structures such as numbers. Statements more closely resemble the dollar than the numbers! E.g. "This goat is worth $ 50". And how much in Greek drachmas?, Today more than in ancient Athens? etc. I Lanz 302 Churchland: (via everyday psychology/Sellars ChurchlandVsDennett): are building on Sellars: everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. It has to be checked whether a) the everyday psychological predicates actually denote natural species b) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, closely adjoining the everyday psychology, is plausible. Churchland negates a) and b). Instead, P.S. Churchland: >"Neurophilosophy": ad a): It is remarkable that we do not have the faintest idea of what underlies psychological phenomena familiar to us because of everyday psychology. I 303 ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis Theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not gifted with language. So, because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, you have to assume a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes also with humans. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Churchland, P. | Fodor Vs Churchland, P. | IV 189 Mind/brain/Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space. IV 191 FodorVsChurchland/LeporeVsChuchland: Churchland also seems to be guilty of the illusion, that there could ultimately be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could in the end be reduced to relations between observation concepts. Churchland: semantic identity goes back to the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (and that is of the whole language). Translation: therefore, we can speak of the equality of sentences across languages! IV 192 Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, translation should always take observability into account. IV 193 Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: Churchland surprisingly begins with feelings, not with intentionality (e.g. with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had adequate access to feelings, it could be generalized to a general mental representation. Churchland: the qualitative nature of our sensations is generally considered as inaccessible for the neurobiological reduction. But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here revealed a sizable chunk of expressible information, e.g. color cubes with frequencies. IV 194 Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes that this is an access to the sensations (through frequencies!), not only to the discrimination ability of the nervous system. Churchland: thus, the inexpressible can be expressed! The "unspeakable rose" can be grasped by indication of the frequency. This is perhaps a way to replace everyday language. IV 195 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust notion of equality in general? Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the exchanged spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong and functionalism, too (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: Churchland's approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. IV 196 Why should a semantic space not be put beside it and the condition added that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They must designate content states through their contents. E.g. Perhaps we could then identify uncle, aunt, President, Cleopatra, etc. along these dimensions? IV 197 E.g. Cleopatra as a politician is closer to the president in terms of marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content rather than identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction. Problem: equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. >State semantics: deals with the question of how the identity of the state spaces is fixed. IV 200 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. IV 201 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods very differently. --- Metzinger II 466 "Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: eliminative materialism means two things: 1) Materialism is most probably true. 2) Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes. II 467 "Request"/"conviction"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop these "categories" (FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland). |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Churchland, P. | Rorty Vs Churchland, P. | I 138 Science/RortyVsChurchland: that in the future brain states could be measured objectively is really irrelevant. It does not depend on that. The assumption that there is an excellent response, depends on the idea before Quine that there were "necessary and sufficient conditions built in our language" for the use of terminology such as "sensation" etc. I 139 mental/physical/VSeliminative materialism/Rorty: one can hardly say, "mental" in reality means something "that could turn out to be something physical," just as one can not say Ex "criminal behavior" means in reality so much like "behavior that may turn out to be innocent." (> Epiphenomenalism). IV 53 Layman Psychology/RortyVsChurchland: will continue to be the most appropriate way to talk about us. We will keep "convictions" and "desires" in our vocabulary. They are proven tools. On the other hand elementary particles are certainly the appropriate instrument to talk about tables and make predictions about them. One can not say better "tables are real". VI 169 Layman Psychology/DennettVsChurchland/Rorty: is not so bad, exactly because it is successful. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Churchland, P. | Searle Vs Churchland, P. | I 77 Churchland/Searle: thinks that "beliefs" and "wishes" have the same status in the theory of folk psychology, that "phlogiston" had in physics. Cf. >neurophilosophy/Churchland. SearleVsChurchland: this analogy has failed: unlike phlogiston beliefs and desires were not postulated as components of a specific theory, they are experienced as parts of our mental life. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Churchland, P. | Verschiedene Vs Churchland, P. | Metzinger II 412 GüzeldereVsChurchland: would an unlimited "introspective access" to the neurophysiological properties of our brain states help us as to gain introspective awareness of our perceptual states first stage? - No! E.g. Armstrong s truck driver: what runs his becoming conscious that he is at a traffic light? That he is at the traffic light, and that he drove for half an hour without consciousness. But not on his dopamine level! (> folk psychology). |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Churchland, P. | Güzeldere Vs Churchland, P. | Metzinger II 411 Bewusstsein/Churchland: introspektives Bewusstsein ist eine Unterart von Wahrnehmung. These: in der Sprache einer reifen Neurowissenschaft könnte es eine differenziertere Darstellung des "menschlichen subjektiven Bewusstseins" geben. Bsp Dopamin-Level könnte so gedeutet werden, wie in der Musik Gm7 Akkorde. Wir müßten dieses Begriffssystem lernen und seine Anwendung üben. (DavidsonVsBegriffsschema). Güzeldere: Churchland ist also nicht nur überzeugt, dass mentale Zustände mit Gehirnzuständen identisch sind, sondern auch, dass ihre Eigenschaften identisch sind. II 412 GüzeldereVsChurchland: würde ein unbeschränkter "introspektiver Zugang" zu den neurophysiologischen Eigenschaften unserer Gehirnzustände uns denn helfen, introspektives Bewusstsein unserer Wahrnehmungszustände erster Stufe zu erlangen? Nein! Bsp Armstrongs Fernfahrer: worauf läuft sein Bewusstwerden, dass er an einer Ampel steht, hinaus? Eben darauf, dass er an der Ampel steht, und dass er eine halbe Stunde lang ohne Bewusstsein gefahren ist. Aber nicht auf seinen Dopamin-Level! (> Alltagspsychologie). |
Güzeldere I Güven Güzeldere "Is consciousness the perception of what passes in the mind?" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Churchland, P. | Stalnaker Vs Churchland, P. | II 191 Methodological Solipsism/Paul u. Patricia Churchland/Stalnaker: a neuron does not know the causal predecessor of its inputs, e.g. a mussel withdraws into its shell because a muscle is activated not because the neuron would represent an enemy. Semantic content/Churchland: were the representation of an enemy (instead of the simple command to pull in the muscle. The semantic content is causally irrelevant. StalnakerVsChurchland: but to explain why the mussel withdrew we must mention the enemy or the representation of an enemy ((s) in the case of deception). Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./explanation/Stalnaker: and this explanation has to contain a counterfactual conditional (co.co.): the semantic content is causally relevant because if the mussel had not been in a state with this semantic content it would not have withdrawn. Can the mussel know the distant causation (enemy)? No. It cannot distinguish the situation from one in which something else would have caused the reflex. Important argument/Stalnaker: but if the neuron had actually been activated by an enemy and would not have been activated if no enemy had been present, then the mussel "knows" it due to the neuron's activation. ((s) If there is no alternative cause, knowledge exists). ((s) wide content/Stalnaker/(s): this is a defense of the wide content ((s) that considers a concrete causation). ((s) Semantic substance/(s): but must not be equated with "enemy" but rather with "sudden movement" or contact like.) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Churchland, P. | Pauen Vs Churchland, P. | Pauen I 99 Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories. I 100 VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis. All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though. I 101 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states). On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true. Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology. VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved. I 102 Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits... PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level: The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design. In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all. I 103 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry. In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro). I 104 3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object. I 105 This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination. VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts. He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness. I 188 Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories. Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness": I 189 forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology. Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge. Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other. I 191 Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible! The representatives do not rely on their own ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other. Therefore, our methods must fail. I 192 Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties: Levine: then there is a two-stage process: I 193 1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are. I 194 This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constructivism | Pro | Berka I 266 Constructivism: Lorenzen per - LorenzenVsHerbrand - LorenzenVsChurch (too narrow conception of constructiveness as recursivity) - LorenzenVsImpredicativity |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
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