Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Beliefs Schiffer
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 273
Definition subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. - Schiffer: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states. ---
I 26
Belief/Schiffer: problem: so a psychological theory does not create the meaning believes - solution: > psycho functionalism. - Functionalist reduction. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1 element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style"). ---
I 28
It is already presupposed that they form beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types - the criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p. ---
I 150
Belief property/SchifferVs: if they existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd) - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) - This is the cause - then mental proposition in addition. - This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional - counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation. ---
I 155
Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled) - i.e. no function of other things. - Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above). - Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible. ---
I 163
Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role.- E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming - conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" - (benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). - has no causal power - pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property... ---
I 164
Belief: (s) Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. - Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true. - Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... - SchifferVsEliminativisms/SchifferVsChurchland: should then have the result that nobody believes anything.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Connectionism Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
IV 199/200
Fodor/LeporeVsConnecionsm: the connectionists draw charts in which the labels (name of the node) say what the intentional interpretation is supposed to be - but no theory explains how the node came to its label. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: Churchland makes the same mistake - this is just semantics by stipulation. It does not matter whether semantics is postulated for points or entire dimensions.
IV 201
Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies - the brain represents red things as red and aunts as aunts! - (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties) - otherwise we could find out anything with introspection - there are very different interpretations of its charts possible.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Connectionism Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Fodor IV 199
Fodor/LeporeVsConnectionism: the connectionist draws diagrams in which the labeling (designation of the nodes) say what the intentional interpretation is supposed to be. ---
IV 200
But no theory explains how the node comes to its designation. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: Churchland makes the same mistake. This is only semantics by stipulation. It does not matter whether semantics is postulated for points or whole dimensions.
Problem: what should decide whether brown and dark blue correspond rather to regions (places) or dimensions? It does not provide any semantics at all because the brain does not represent colors as frequencies.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Desire Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
II Patricia Smith Churchland Die Neurobiologie des Bewusstseins - Was können wir von ihr lernen? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
II 467
"Desire"/"Belief"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop those "categories". FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland.


Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Elimination Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Schiffer I 159
Eliminativism/Churchland/Schiffer: (Paul Churchland 1981): his eliminativism is quite different from that of Quine: Here the irreducibility of intentional vocabulary is denied. Folk Psychology/Churchland: is a functional theory. Belief is a functional state, with a functional role but future neuroscience will show that no inner states have these roles and therefore the folk psychology is wrong.
Schiffer: this is a completely different route to eliminativism than that belief cannot be realized physically because our intentional vocabulary was irreducible.
---
I 164
... SchifferVsChurchland: his eliminativism would then have the consequence that no one believes anything.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Identity Theory Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Pauen I 188
Explanation gap/Identity Theory/Consciousness/Ontology/Pauen: Basically already recognized by Leibniz. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and psychological theories.
Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness":
---
I 189
Forces us to make enormous interventions in previously accepted conceptions and methods. Identity theory: refers to the ontology.
Explanation gap argument: refers epistemically to our knowledge.
Context: if we accept identity theory we must expect that our respective knowledge can relate to each other.
---
I 191
Churchland: it would be a fallacy that we wanted to conclude from today's ignorance to the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument of ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap this must not be plausible.
Representatives do not rely on their own ignorance, nor do they lead the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other.
Therefore, our methods must fail.
---
I 192
Causal characteristics play an important role in this difference. In this way the representatives of the explanation gap arguments must be able to characterize our natural phenomena, which are characterized by everyday concepts, by such causal properties.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Inverted Spectra Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
IV 195
exchanged spectra: nothing in the behavior can uncover the permutation, VsBehaviorism - representation of the frequencies does not represent the sensation - descriptions can be changed at will - Tradition: sensation not necessary property of color - if "metaphysically necessary" connection between perception and neurophysiology, then still none between color concept and psychophysical concept -
IV 195
State space/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: problem of identity will always return - ultimately no other criterion than observational concepts

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Inverted Spectra Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Fodor IV 195
Qualia/Quality/Sensation/inverted spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the change is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could reveal it.
VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the inverted spectra appear to show that behaviorism is false. And also the functionalism. (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker).
One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been interchanged.
And precisely the concept of the sensitive identity becomes ambiguous.
VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The inscriptions of the points of the dice could also be inverted. ((s) One could always describe it, but one would not know which sensations are present in the other.)
---
IV 195/196
Even though this frequency combination represents this particular pink, it is conceptually possible that something has the first property, but not the second. Inverted spectra/Qualia: Problem: there seems to be no property of a sensation except its qualitative content on which the qualitative content supervenes.
In particular, there appears to be no proportioned or neurophysiological property on which supervenience is guaranteed.
Inverted spectra/tradition: would say that Churchland's dimensions in the Qualia color dice represent by reference to properties that they do not necessarily possess.
Or, if you think that it is "metaphysically necessary" that color sensations have the psychophysical properties that they have, then one would have to say that this necessity is not brought about by any necessity between sensual concepts and psychophysical concepts.
One might well know that a sensation corresponds to a point in the color dice and still does not know how it is.
The dimensions do not determine the content.
Why not place a semantic space next to it, add the condition that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They would have to name content states through their content. E.g. Perhaps then one could identify uncle, aunt, president, Cleopatra etc. along these dimensions?
---
IV 197
E.g. Cleopatra, as a politician, is closer to the president than to marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content instead of identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction.
Problem: Equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Materialism Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Pauen I 100
Materialism, eliminative/VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the abandonment of the terminology of everyday psychology. This assumes, however, that the corresponding entities do not exist in fact. This is an ontological and not just a language-philosophical thesis.
Churchland claims that there are no serious objections to the eliminative materialism. That is not the case, however.
---
I 101
VsMaterialismus, eliminative/Pauen: 1. False claim to know that there are neural, but no mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true. There must therefore be no opinions (i.e., mental states).
On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implicitly implies that the representative of a claim itself, is of the opinion that the facts are true.
Patricia Churchland/Pauen: admits this performative contradiction, but sees in it only a further proof for our entanglement in the everyday psychology.
VsChurchland: that is a mere announcement that the contradiction will be solved somehow.
---
I 102
Performative contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: For example, the vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent asserts that there are no spirits of life. This opponent, however, is himself alive, so he must have spirits of life ...
PauenVsChurchland: that is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level:
The opponent of vitalism does not depend on vitalism, but has an alternative concept.
In contrast, the defender of everyday psychology does not have to make such a presupposition: the assertion that knowledge implies an opinion (the controversial mental state), is after all no invention of everyday psychology, it is not an empirical thesis at all.
---
103
VsMaterialism, eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of intertheoretical reduction: everyday psychology is to be eliminated, especially because it cannot be reduced to neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: therefore the two theories must compete on the same level. E.g. Phlogiston/Chemistry.
In contrast to that, everyday psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/third person, micro/macro).
---
I 104
3. For example, split brain patients/Pauen: empirical evidence shows that, in particular, feelings are language-independent and thus can also be identified pre-theorytically. Patients react, but have no more conscious access. The stimuli occur in the right, unconscious, language-incapable hemisphere. Nevertheless, patients can provide correct information. They can neither be based on the generalizations of everyday psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object.
---
I 105
This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: The latter then excludes the phenomenal states from the elimination. The everyday experience should no longer be changed by elimination.
VsChurchland: this, however, diverges from the usual everyday psychology, which also includes pain. He had previously included pain in the states which would be changed by the elimination of the terms.
Moreover, he is inconsistent when he insists on the elimination of cognitive consciousness.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Qualia Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Fodor IV 197
Sensation/Representation/Qualia/Semantics/Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: the question arises by itself: when are S1 and S2 the same state (in the semantic state space)? But with the frequencies the old problem simply comes back.
---
IV 198
If we do not know what it is for two words to mean "marriageable", then we also do not know, for the same reason, how it is for two semantic spaces, if both have the dimension of marriageability. Empiricism Tradition: has explained the semantic network by reference to what is fixed there. The dimensions should express observation characteristics and an externalistic (e.g. causal) theory should explain the relation. This is independent from the interpretation of the rest of the vocabulary.
Churchland: his suggestion is that the dimensions of the semantic space do not generally correspond to the observation properties. They can correspond to whatever the brain may represent.
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: but then again the question arises as to how the identity of the state spaces is fixed.
We have no other identity criterion than observation properties. Suppose we had one, the question of the semantic identity would be there again.
State spaces: we have a criterion for their identity only if we have one for the identity of their dimensions.
And we have a non-empirical criterion for the dimensions only if we have one for "the property expressed by a dimension of the state space" which applies to arbitrary properties, not only for observational properties.
---
IV 199
But that would be a criterion for equality of meaning. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: already assumes an interpersonal concept for the identity of state spaces before it can reach its goal of explaining the concept of "content equality" (similarity).
He has presupposed the designations of the dimensions without permission.
The label of a dimension tells how to interpret it, e.g. Degree of F-ness. Why should a dimension then express F-ness and not rather G-ness? What makes it that the dimension in my state space expresses the same property as in yours? > Connectivity.
Fodor IV 205
--- Note
11. IV 205
Empiricism/Tradition: our concepts are functions of our sensory concepts. We have seen that Churchland's treatment of Qualia depends on mixing sensory and psychophysical terms.
(s) Sensory: (one aspect - but as a "sensory concept" again two aspects, but with the claim of providing the psychological explanation).
---
IV 248
Note 13 IV 205
But it does not follow from this that organisms with the same sensory equipment must also have the same concepts. They would only have to do so if their concepts occupied the same or similar positions in the semantic space.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Reduction Schiffer
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 158
Reduction/Schiffer: ... no more should be required than that theoretical terms (TT) are physically realized - but realization does not imply reducibility - Schiffer pro Brentano: in favour of irreducibility of the intentional vocabulary. ---
I 159
Eliminativism/Churchland: is quite different: intentional vocabulary is not reducible - but folk psychology (functional theory) will turn out to be wrong. - SchifferVsChurchland: why should irreducibility imply unrealizability?

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Representation Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 269 ff
Rorty: Fodor s image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have adopted. What is decisive is that with respect to Fodor s "Language of thought" the skeptical question "how exactly do the internal representations (representations) represent reality?" cannot be asked! There is no gap.
Fodor IV ~ 122
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: having a thought is not an action, therefore it is not subject to beliefs like speech acts.
IV 124
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: today: Representations have functional roles qua constituents of propositional attitude - but the content must not depend neither metaphysically nor conceptually on their functional role. -
IV 126
Representation/Tradition/Fodor/Lepore: their explanation does not use beliefs, wishes, etc. - so the causal role is determined only by non-semantic properties. - Representations are not used for anything - Computation/Fodor/Lepore: Thesis: the causal role of representations is governed by the same syntactic properties that affect their compositionality.
V 128
Not representations are interpreted, but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc. - the representations themselves are also inaccessible to RI.
IV 127f
Interpretation: Objects not representations but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc.
IV 201
Representation/Neurophysiological/Mind/Brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies - the brain represents red things as red as aunts as aunts! - (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties) - otherwise we could find out anything with introspection - there are very different interpretations of its diagrams. - (VsConnectionism).
Newen/Schrenk I 133
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor presumes localizable, specifiable representations - VsFodor: today you rather assume neuronal networks. - Representation: preconceptual - e.g. spatial orientation.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Representation Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Fodor IV 189
Representation/Reality/Churchland: Thesis: The brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in a suitable state space. Fodor/Lepore: we only need to be interested in the neurophysiological aspect here.
He refers to Quine's familiar picture of the theory as a network of beliefs: on the edge observation sets, easily revisable, in the center theoretical concepts and logical relations, not easily revisable. Nevertheless, the only fixed nodes are just the observation concepts. They are linked to the observation conditions, while the inferential conditions are linked to one another. (causal/associative).
---
IV 191
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: also seems to be guilty of the illusion that ultimately there might be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could eventually be reduced to relations between concepts of observation. ---
Fodor IV 200
Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. The brain represents red things as red and aunts as aunts! (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties).
Otherwise we could figure it all out with introspection.
Introspection/Fodor/Lepore: would work if the brain represented colors as frequencies, but it represents red things simply as red and aunts as aunts.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Semantics Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Fodor IV 191
Churchland: Semantic identity originates from the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (namely from the whole language). Translation: therefore, we can also speak of the equality of sentences over languages.
---
IV 192
Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, the translation should always take account of the observability.
---
Fodor IV 201
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods quite differently. Churchland himself has not decided what kind of neighborhood he has in mind.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Similarity Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
Fodor IV 188
Condition/Equality/Similarity/Quality/Paul Churchland: Thesis: State space, similarity space, similarity metric. E.g. "Anglophone hyperspace with logical relations on hypersurfaces." Should replace Chomsky's image.
((s) Hypersurface/Churchland/(s): something on that you can go up/down, right/left, and front/back, and that within a language. Is needed to describe objects and their relationships.)
---
IV 189
Fodor/Lepore: that assumes that state spaces also reflect grammar. Churchland: It also has in mind that a kind of representations reflect "contents" of neurological states.
Fodor: Thereby he's up to his neck in his intentionality.
---
Fodor IV 193
Similarity/Equality/Semantics/Paul Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: surprisingly begins with sensations, not with intentionality (such as with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had an adequate access to sensations, this could be generalized to a general mental representation.
Churchland: the qualitative character of our sensations is generally considered to be inaccessible as neurobiological reduction.
But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here, reveals a considerable amount of explicit information.
E.g. color dice with frequencies.
---
IV 194
Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes here that this is an access to the sensations (via frequencies!), not only to the discriminatory ability of the nervous system. Churchland: so the inexpressible can be expressed. The "unspeakable pink" can be grasped by frequency. So maybe the everyday language can also be replaced.
---
IV 195
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust concept of equality in general?

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014


F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Terminology Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
IV 1
Def anatomical/Fodor/Lepore: is a property exactly in the case where, if anything hat it, then at least a second thing must have this property - ((s) but not all things, so unlike holism) - E.g. twin ((s) but not male twin) - Def atomistic: properties that are not anatomical - E.g. "... ate the last one...".
IV 13
Holism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. assuming anatomical prop would also be holistic - then it could turn out that, e.g., no language would have an expression for "the pen of my aunt" if it did not also have expressions that correspond to the following expressions, e.g. "Two is a prime".
IV 134
E.g. Belief/Shmelief/Faith/Shfaith/Fodor/Lepore: shmeliefs: like beliefs but without charity being analytic for them, then the majority could be wrong, but beliefs must usually be true.
IV 140
Projectivism/Fodor/LeporeVs: 1) must assert that there are no beliefs on the Twin Earth - 2) cannot explain the element of interpretation of intentional attribution.
IV 148
Interpretation Theory/Fodor/Lepore: Thesis that there are no intentional states - Dennett pro? Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: if intentionality does not exist, interpretation cannot attribute any properties to it- "if there are no beliefs and wishes, there can be nothing for what they are selected.
IV 197
State space semantics/Churchland/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: The technical apparatus does not help if you do not understand the everyday concepts - E.g. "marriageable" is not explained by a dimension of marriageability.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Behaviorism Fodor Vs Behaviorism
 
Books on Amazon
Danto I 268
Rotary FiguresVsBehaviorism > Mental Representation (inner r) VsIntrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism) - FodorVsBehaviorism
Fodor/Lepore IV 56
VsBehaviorism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. Assuming "dog" and "shmog" are two words with which speakers react to exactly the same stimuli, namely dogs. Then would follow for e.g. Skinner that "dog" and "shmog" are synonymous. Then, the following sentence would be analytical in the language of the speaker: "Whatever is a dog, is a shmog." QuineVs: there are neither synonyms nor analytic sentences! IV 57 So Skinner’s semantics must be wrong. VsVs: namely a priori! Even worse: all the semantics must be wrong, a priori, because these nihilistic theory will say that there are no semantic properties at all. Fodor/Lepore: what went wrong this time? We have taken literally, that Quine has not shown in Two Dogmas (TD) (and also has not argued) that there are no semantic facts and no analytic truths. Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: what we rather concede is that if meaning is to have any sense at all, then it cannot be reconstructed by reference to the sentences to which the speaker agrees. Meaning/TD/Quine: cannot be reduced to the inferences to which one is willing to agree. Reason: what inferences you agree to only depends on how you see the world, i.e. what you intend your words to mean. ((s)> interest, intention, meaning). Important argument: In that, it is impossible to detect which of his views the speaker accepts a priori! So there are no analytic sentences.
IV 195
Qualia/Quality/Sensation/Exchanged Spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the reversed spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong. And also functionalism! (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). You might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. ((s) You could always describe them without knowing what feelings are present in the other.).

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Churchland, P. Davidson Vs Churchland, P.
 
Books on Amazon
I 27
Exhibitions / Churchland: "354 grams" could be interpreted as an adverb to "weigh" - like the whole sentence that follows "believes". DavidsonVsChurchland: that can not be substantiated by reputable semantics.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Churchland, P. Dennett Vs Churchland, P.
 
Books on Amazon
II 64
Language/numbers/measurement/Paul Churchland: has compared statements with numbers: E.g.    "X is a weight in grams of 144"
   "Y has a speed of 12 meters per second."
DennettVsChurchland: There are problems when we apply the same transformation rules and equating rules to different ways of expressing the same statement. Statements are, after all, unfortunately not so well-behaved theoretical structures such as numbers. Statements more closely resemble the dollar than the numbers! E.g.
  "This goat is worth $ 50".
  And how much in Greek drachmas?, Today more than in ancient Athens? etc.
- - -
I Lanz 302
Churchland: (via everyday psychology/Sellars ChurchlandVsDennett): are building on Sellars: everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. It has to be checked whether a) the everyday psychological predicates actually denote natural species
b) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, closely adjoining the everyday psychology, is plausible. Churchland negates a) and b).
Instead, P.S. Churchland: "Neuro philosophy":
ad a): It is remarkable that we do not have the faintest idea of ​​what underlies psychological phenomena familiar to us because of everyday psychology.
I 303
ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis Theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not gifted with language. So, because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, you have to assume a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes also with humans.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Churchland, P. Fodor Vs Churchland, P.
 
Books on Amazon
IV 189
Mind/Brain/Churchland: Thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space.
IV 191
FodorVsChurchland/LeporeVsChuchland: also seems to be guilty of the illusion, that there could ultimately be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could in the end be reduced to relations between observation concepts. Churchland: semantic identity goes back to the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (and that is of the whole language).
Translation: Therefore, we can speak of the equality of sentences across languages!
IV 192
Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, translation should always take observability into account.
IV 193
Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: surprisingly begins with feelings, not with intentionality (E.g. with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had adequate access to feelings, it could be generalized to a general mental representation.
Churchland: the qualitative nature of our sensations is generally considered as inaccessible for the neurobiological reduction.
But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here revealed a sizable chunk of expressible information.
E.g. color cubes with frequencies.
IV 194
Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes that this is an access to the sensations (through frequencies!), not only to the discrimination ability of the nervous system. Churchland: Thus the inexpressible can be expressed! The "unspeakable rose" can be grasped by indication of the frequency. This is perhaps a way to replace everyday language.
IV 195
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust notion of equality in general? Qualia/Quality/Sensation/Exchanged Spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green.
If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it.
VsBehaviorism/VsFunktionalism: the exchanged spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong. And functionalism, too! (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker).
One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed.
IV 196
Why should a semantic space not be put beside it and the condition added that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They must designate content states through their contents. E.g. Perhaps we could then identify uncle, aunt, President, Cleopatra, etc. along these dimensions?
IV 197
E.g. Cleopatra as a politician is closer to the president in terms of marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that’s what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content rather than identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction.
Problem: equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. ...+... >State semantics: the question of how the identity of the state spaces is fixed.
IV 200
Representation/Neurophysiological/Mind/Brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies.
IV 201
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods very differently.
Metzinger II 466
"Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: means two things: 1) materialism is most probably true.
2) Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes.
II 467
"Request"/"Conviction"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop these "categories". FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Churchland, P. Rorty Vs Churchland, P.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 138
Science/RortyVsChurchland: that in the future brain states could be measured objectively is really irrelevant. It does not depend on that. The assumption that there is an excellent response, depends on the idea before Quine that there were "necessary and sufficient conditions built in our language" for the use of terminology such as "sensation" etc.
I 139
mental/physical/VSeliminative materialism/Rorty: one can hardly say, "mental" in reality means something "that could turn out to be something physical," just as one can not say Ex "criminal behavior" means in reality so much like "behavior that may turn out to be innocent." (> Epiphenomenalism). - - -
IV 53
Layman Psychology/RortyVsChurchland: will continue to be the most appropriate way to talk about us. We will keep "convictions" and "desires" in our vocabulary. They are proven tools. On the other hand elementary particles are certainly the appropriate instrument to talk about tables and make predictions about them. One can not say better "tables are real".
VI 169
Layman Psychology/DennettVsChurchland/Rorty: is not so bad, exactly because it is successful.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Churchland, P. Searle Vs Churchland, P.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 77
Churchland/Searle: thinks that "beliefs" and "wishes" have the same status in the theory of folk psychology, that "phlogiston" had in physics. SearleVsChurchland: this analogy has failed: unlike phlogiston beliefs and desires were not postulated as components of a specific theory, they are experienced as parts of our mental life.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Churchland, P. Verschiedene Vs Churchland, P. Metzinger II 412
GüzeldereVsChurchland: would an unlimited "introspective access" to the neurophysiological properties of our brain states help us as to gain introspective awareness of our perceptual states first stage? - No!   E.g. Armstrong s truck driver: what runs his becoming conscious that he is at a traffic light? That he is at the traffic light, and that he drove for half an hour without consciousness. But not on his dopamine level! (> folk psychology).





Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Churchland, P. Güzeldere Vs Churchland, P.
 
Books on Amazon
Metzinger II 411
Bewusstsein/Churchland: introspektives Bewusstsein ist eine Unterart von Wahrnehmung. These: in der Sprache einer reifen Neurowissenschaft könnte es eine differenziertere Darstellung des "menschlichen subjektiven Bewusstseins" geben.
Bsp Dopamin-Level könnte so gedeutet werden, wie in der Musik Gm7 Akkorde.
Wir müßten dieses Begriffssystem lernen und seine Anwendung üben. (DavidsonVsBegriffsschema).
Güzeldere: Churchland ist also nicht nur überzeugt, dass mentale Zustände mit Gehirnzuständen identisch sind, sondern auch, dass ihre Eigenschaften identisch sind.
II 412
GüzeldereVsChurchland: würde ein unbeschränkter "introspektiver Zugang" zu den neurophysiologischen Eigenschaften unserer Gehirnzustände uns denn helfen, introspektives Bewusstsein unserer Wahrnehmungszustände erster Stufe zu erlangen? Nein! Bsp Armstrongs Fernfahrer: worauf läuft sein Bewusstwerden, dass er an einer Ampel steht, hinaus? Eben darauf, dass er an der Ampel steht, und dass er eine halbe Stunde lang ohne Bewusstsein gefahren ist. Aber nicht auf seinen Dopamin-Level! (> Alltagspsychologie).

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Churchland, P. Stalnaker Vs Churchland, P.
 
Books on Amazon
II 191
Methodological Solipsism/Paul u. Patricia Churchland/Stalnaker: a neuron does not know the causal predecessor of its inputs, e.g. a mussel withdraws into its shell because a muscle is activated not because the neuron would represent an enemy. Semantic content/Churchland: were the representation of an enemy (instead of the simple command to pull in the muscle. The semantic content is causally irrelevant.
StalnakerVsChurchland: but to explain why the mussel withdrew we must mention the enemy or the representation of an enemy ((s) in the case of deception).
Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./explanation/Stalnaker: and this explanation has to contain a counterfactual conditional (co.co.): the semantic content is causally relevant because if the mussel had not been in a state with this semantic content it would not have withdrawn.
Can the mussel know the distant causation (enemy)? No. It cannot distinguish the situation from one in which something else would have caused the reflex.
Important argument/Stalnaker: but if the neuron had actually been activated by an enemy and would not have been activated if no enemy had been present, then the mussel "knows" it due to the neuron's activation. ((s) If there is no alternative cause, knowledge exists).
((s) wide content/Stalnaker/(s): this is a defense of the wide content ((s) that considers a concrete causation).
((s) Semantic substance/(s): but must not be equated with "enemy" but rather with "sudden movement" or contact like.)

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Churchland, P. Pauen Vs Churchland, P.
 
Books on Amazon
Pauen V 99
Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of ​​nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories.
V 100
VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis.
All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though.
V 101
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states).
On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true.
Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology.
VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved.
V 102
Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits...
PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level:
The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design.
In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all.
V 103
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry.
In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro).
V 104
3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object.
V 105
This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination.
VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts.
He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness.
- - -
V 188
Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories.
Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness":
V 189
forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology.
Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge.
Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other.
V 191
Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible!
The representatives do not rely on their own ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other.
Therefore, our methods must fail.
V 192
Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties:
Levine: then there is a two-stage process:
V 193
1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are.
V 194
This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001