Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Aboutness Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
I 185
Object/Activity /about/represent/stand for/singular term/predicate/StrawsonVsGeach: "about" can not be used to distinguish between singular term and predicate - E.g. Raleigh smokes can be regarded as a sentence on smoking. - Also "stands for" specifies no singular term - Both singular term and predicate term can stand for something. - VsGeach: Geach is forced to say that "smoking" stands for something because for him predicative expressions stand for properties.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Discourse Hintikka
 
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I 229
Thinking/Peirce/Hintikka: Thesis: all thinking is dialogical in its form. Thoughts are what you say to yourself.
Thinking/judgment/Geach: Thesis: thinking and judgement are analog to saying.
HintikkaVsGeach: his results are rather lean.

Discourse/Question/Answer/Hintikka: Thesis: we need a discourse logic that is different from logic for isolated sentences.
---
I 230
The different levels of knowledge of the questioner and of the one who answers must be taken into account. > Questions/Hiuntikka, > Answer/Hintikka.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

I, Ego, Self Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Frank I 24
Ich/EvansVsDescartes: ist der Körper! - Der ich-zentrierte Raum wird zu einem objektiven Welt-Ort erst, wenn das Subjekt ihn auf eine öffentliche Landkarte übertragen kann und wiedererkennen kann. - Die Konvertibilität der demonstrativ bezeichneten Sprecherperspektive verlangt einen unabhängigen Raum.
Frank I 485f
Ich/Evans: 1. kriterienlos, 2. begrenzt zugänglich (nicht jedermann, jederzeit) - 3. Die Gegebenheitsweise ist existenzabhängig: ich muß am Ort sein, um "hier" zu sagen, aber Wechseln ist möglich ("neuer Sinn, alte Bedeutung").
I 488
Ich-Gedanken sind de re. (Sie brauchen Information).
I 503
Ich/GeachVsDescartes: anstatt "ich gerate in eine schreckliche Verwirrung!" kann ich auch sagen: "Das ist wirklich eine schreckliche Verwirrung" - Strawson: auch "Es gibt einen Schmerz" statt "Ich habe Schmerzen" - EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: zur Referenz gehört es, sein Publikum zu etwas zu bringen.
I 504
Ich/Evans: unsere Auffassung von uns selbst ist nicht idealistisch: wir können folgendes verstehen, ohne es begründen oder entscheiden zu können: Bsp "Ich wurde gestillt" - "Ich werde sterben".
I 545
"Hier"/"Ich"/Evans: sind gleichrangig, beides nicht ohne das andere möglich.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
I, Ego, Self Geach
 
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Frank I 503
I / GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion" - Strawson: also "there is pain" instead of "I am in pain" - EvansVsGeach / EvansVsStrawson: for reference, it is necessary to get his audience into something.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Individuation Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
II 23/24
Theseus ship: this is not about the expression the same but the expression ship. Each general term has its own individuation principle.
---
II 158
Individuation: in our world, moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), crucial for predicates. > truth value. ---
V 84
Individuation/Object/language acquisition/Quine: in order to learn dog one has to learn more than the existence - we must also learn the individuating power of the term, the splitting of the reference - ((s)> shared reference) - one must learn what is to be regared as one dog and what as another - Dog is more like Water than like Mom: you can see several dogs - Thing: from similarity 2nd order (similarities) - pointing/Problem: This is a dog - must not exclude any dog - (general term). ---
V 88
Individuation/Overlapping/Pointing/Quine: no problem: Dogs never overlap: each consists exactly of the points that belong to the same dog as a particular point - dogs do not have common points - different: overlapping circular disks: here the shape needs to be redrawn while pointing at it - Quine: only at the beginning of learning - solution: you can easily tell a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: thus his relativism becomes untenable - Still identity relative in a deeper sense: I-standards are different.
---
V 102
Pointing: E.g. This body is an animal: here the outline must be carefully traced, otherwise it may be that only the trunk is regarded as an animal. ---
V 125
Individuation/General term/Quine: -Square is an individuating word - ((s) Fido is not: E.g. This is Fido.) ---
V 161
Individuation/Quine: its fineness depends on the number of the general terms in the language - lexical glasses - individuation takes place in the eye of the beholder. ---
VII 157
Properties/Individuation/Quine: properties are individuated as follows: two open sentences which determine the same class do not determine the same property if they are not analytically equivalent. (!). ---
XII 64f
Individuation/Apparatus/Translation indeterminacy/ontological relativity/Quine: words for object, identity predicate the same as, a different one, plural form, logical particles, pronouns - that’s the frame of reference (coordinate system) - Important argument: this is not consistent in translation! - Uncertainty: you can counter: In what sense of rabbit? ((s) whether part or whole).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Introduction Strawson
 
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I 187
Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing (Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing). ---
I 188
VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech - one can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates not. ---
I 192
But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating. ---
I 193
Assertive mode primary. ---
I 194
Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode). ---
I 196
StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. ---
I 232ff
Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular. ---
I 234
Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement. ---
I 235
For universals nothing corresponding. ---
I 236
But no facts about the world but about the language - (s) no truth maker. ---
I 238
When U introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed. ---
I 239
Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease". ---
I 239f
U/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce - class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete - (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight - (2) have no factual weight. ---
I 241
Subject/predicate/thing/particular/U: 3. criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) - predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself. ---
I 242
E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact. ---
I 242
General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions. ---
I 254ff
Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition - new: other sense of introducing: introduction of practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also E1: introduces particular, E2: classes of particulars - then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universal) which can be introduced - where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal? ---
I 258
Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1. ---
I 263
Both theories independ, but connectable. ---
I 259
Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur - E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2 - Problem: What is at the end of the chain? -> Feature-universals.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Objects (Material Things) Strawson
 
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I 177f
Thing/Job/language/Strawson: 1. grammatical criterion: List 1: Language functions: Differences: A-expressions/B-expressions: refer/describe, designate/to state something about him, etc. ---
I 178
List 2: Differentiation of linguistic components: singular term/predicative term, referring term/predicate term, subject/predicate, etc. ---
I 180
List 3: Distinguishes between constituents of statements or between things: things, to which one refers/predicted thing, etc.... nothing can occur on both sides: the act of self-relating cannot be identical with the act of predicting, but some possible in both roles) list 3 presupposes distinction thing/roll. ---
I 182
List 4: (corresponds to Frege): Object/term: combines roll and thing - no object can ever be predicted - List 3: aligns the terms of List 2 (> Ramsey). ---
I 185
Thing/activity/"about"/represent/singular Term/predicate/StrawsonVsGeach: "about" cannot be used to distinguish between singular term and predicate - E.g. "Raleigh smokes" can be seen as a statement about smoking - also "stands for" specifies no singular term - both singular term and predicative term can stand for something - VsGeach: he is compelled to say that "smokes" stands for something, because predicative expressions stand for properties according to him. ---
I 203
Thing/property/singular Term/predicate/is/Strawson: if "Socrates is ..." with a description by "is" in the sense of "is identical to" is connected, then "Socrates is ..." can be understood as B-expression (predicate) -> (s) "sokratized" - (s) "the philosopher, that taught Plato, sokratized" (> equal sign instead of copula) - problem: what things should be introduced by "is a philosopher"? ---
I 207ff
Thing/predicate/singular Term/introducing/Strawson: the reason for the distinction between A (Noun-) and B-expressions (predicate) is distinguishing between different things: between particular and universal, not between object and term or singular term and predicate. ---
I 210
StrawsonVsTradition: already presupposes the distinction - external reason: might the tense function be the verb - Vs: this could also be expressed with two nouns and arrow notation. Socrates (Wisdom), then arrow either above Socrates or Wisdom, depending on whether Socrates died or became stupid.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Reference Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
I 314 ~
Meinen/Referenz/göttlicher Standpunkt/Wittgenstein/Evans: Bsp jemand ist in einen von zwei eineiigen Zwillingen verliebt - Gott, wenn er in seinen Kopf schauen könnte, könnte nicht sagen, in welchen von beiden, wenn der betreffende selbst es in einem Moment nicht weiß. - ((s) Weil in dem geistigen Zustand und an dem Zwilling keine Zusatzinformationen zu finden wären.) - Evans: die (Beschreibungs-)Theorie des Geistes kann nicht erklären, warum nicht irrtümliche Beschreibungen den Ausschlag geben können.
I 325
Referenz/Evans: Referenz ist auch möglich, wenn die Beschreibung nicht erfüllt wird, aber nicht Bezeichnen.
I 328
Referenz/Namen/Evans: im Allgemeinen referieren wir auf das Ding, das die Quelle der vorherrschenden Information ist.
I 333~
Referenz/Evans: wird durch Informationsmengen festgelegt, nicht durch Passen.
Frank I 22
Evans: zwischen Frege und Perry: rettet Fregeschen Sinn, aber Bedeutung = Referenz!
I 24~
Bedeutung ungleich Referenz/Evans: Bsp "heute": die Bedeutung bleibt, der Referent wechselt. >"Fido"/Fido-Theorie /Evans: setzt Bedeutung und Referent gleich: > ich/Evans.
Frank I 503
EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: zur Referenz gehört es, sein Publikum zu etwas zu bringen.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Singular Terms Strawson
 
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Substitutions/Strawson / (s):
of singular terms: reversible
of predicates: not reversible.
---
I 198
Singular Term/QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsRamsey: (Singular Term) can occur at the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions not - singular term: quantifiable, Generic Term: not quantifiable - StrawsonVsQuine: not so important. ---
I 198
Singular Term/Quine: abstract singular terms: E.g. "piety", "wisdom": names of abstract objects - no general terms - Names of concrete objects: e.g. "Earth" - on the other hand general term: E.g "philosopher" - StrawsonVsQuine: no good explanation: we would not like to say that this would be true of many things - solution/Quine: in reality distinction between singular term and predicates - general term/Quine: the location which is taken by them, has no own status - decisive: predicates cannot be quantified. ---
I 203
"a philosopher"/Quine: no singular term. ---
IV 63
QuineVs singular Term: eliminable StrawsonVsQuine.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Sortals Kripke
 
Books on Amazon
I 134
KripkeVsGeach: a sortal is certainly not a priori true of the designated object. It could turn out: E.g. Lot's guests, even if he calls them, are not people, but angels. Then why should it belong to the meaning of the name?

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Universals Kripke
 
Books on Amazon
I 134
KripkeVsGeach: a sortal is certainly not a priori true by the designated object. It may yet turn out that it is: e.g. Lot’s guests, even if he names them, are not humans but angels. Then why should it belong to the meaning of the name?

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Geach, P. Black Vs Geach, P.
 
Books on Amazon
III 22
Rationality/Geach/Black: Thesis: ~ "although it is reasonable to ask for reasons, it is not always reasonable. E.g. it is not reasonable to ask for what reason you should ever ask for reasons.
III 23
E.g. Someone who rejects the asking for reasons may not ask others why they need reasons. Otherwise the questioner shows that he is not totally independent of reasons. (Self-contradiction, contradiction). Black: thus Geach assumes that the Skepticus is a militant anti-rationalist who rejects all practice.
Rationality/Hume/Black: Hume, on the other hand, goes along with that, he was just never presented with the justification.
Geach/Black: with him we would have to say, "I cannot respond to the anti-rationalists at all, because his question is itself unreasonable."
BlackVsGeach: that means that we ourselves must have good reasons to reject the question, and that would not affect the anti-rationalists at all. According to Geach, the responder would be just as irrational.
Black: (see below) but it must not be assumed that the challenger is a militant anti-rationalist. Even a complete skeptic VsRationality can maliciously try to harass the defenders of rationality.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Geach, P. Evans Vs Geach, P.
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Klaus von Heusinger, donkey sentences and their horse feet Uni Konstanz Section Linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994
Heusinger I 5
Range/Quantifier/Conjunction/Geach/VsGeach/Heusinger: (4b) E.g. [man(x) & comes(x) & whistles(x)]
VsGeach: Problem: the existential quantifier has a longer range than the "and", i.e. it is regarded as a text operator. Then compositionality is violated, because the first sentence is not independent of the second one. This has caused much criticism.
EvansVsGeach: the plural shows that (4b) is still too strong and does not express the everyday language meaning: (ii) is too strong: - (ii) Some sheep are such that John owns them and Harry vaccinates them in spring.
I 17
Anaphora/Variable/Labeling/Existential Quantification/E Type/E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: Discourse anaphora not as bound variables, but as shortened (or disguised) descriptions. Representatives: Evans: semantic Cooper: pragmatic Neale: syntactic. Def E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: = specific descriptions: the pronoun denotes those objects that make the sentence true which contains the quantified antecedent ((s) antecedent of the anaphor). Anaphora/Pronoun/EvansVsGeach/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: anaphoric pronouns must be interpreted as decriptions.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Geach, P. Kripke Vs Geach, P.
 
Books on Amazon
I 133
Kripke: If I understand Geach correctly, the nominal essence should be understood in terms of a priori, not in terms of necessity. (Unlike here). Perhaps that is what Geach means with his statement that he treated "nominal", not "real" beings. "Nixon is a man" would therefore be an a priori truth. KripkeVsGeach: a sortal is certainly not true a priori of the designated object. It could yet turn out that e.g. Numerous guests are angels even if he calls them people. Why then should it belong to the meaning of the name?
E.g. The wife of a scientist hears a woman’s name. (In reality, the scientist simply muttered.) She wonders if there is another woman. Why is the use of the name no case of naming? If it is not, then the reason is not the indeterminacy of reference!

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Geach, P. Quine Vs Geach, P.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
V 18
Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavior criteria. It shows in the conditioning of reactions.
V 18/19
Dispositions/Quine: habits resulting from conditioning.
V 89
Identity/Geach: (Reference and generality, p 39f.): Only makes sense with reference to a general term like e.g. "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this is certainly true for the beginning of language learning.
Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in pointing twice and saying, "This is the same as that." Then you could still ask "The same what?".
E.g. you could have been pointing once to the dog and merely to the ear the next time.
Solution: you can easily say that a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear.
QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get accustomed to the identity way of speech.
Identity/Quine: in a deeper sense still relative. (see below § 30)
- - -
V 129
Pronouns/Pronouns/Quine: are the archetype of variables in logic and mathematics. Everyday Language: here pronouns are an important part of relative clauses.
Relative Clause/Language Learning/Quine: E.g. "I bought Fido from a man who had found him."
Function: the relative clause makes it possible to separate the object of what the sentence says about it.
Relative Clause: becomes a general term if the pronoun for the name of the object is out in front: E.g. "which I bought from a man who had found him" is a general term!
This general term says the same thing of Fido as the original sentence.
Relative Clause/GeachVsQuine: (Reference and generality, p.115 122, also "Quines syntaktische Einsichten").
Relative Pronoun/Geach: instead, conceive it as meaning "and he": e.g. "I bought Fido from a man and he had found him." ((s) paratactic analysis).
Or with "when he" or "since he".
V 130
Geach calls this the "Latin prose theory". Def Latin Prose Theory/Geach: Thesis: it's wrong to consider "who had found him" as a terminus or independent grammatical entity at all.
Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Quine: E.g.
Everyone who owns a donkey beats it;
Some donkey owners do not beat them.
Problem: that would turn into nonsense:
Every donkey owner beats it
Some donkey owners do not beat it.
Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun "who" with "if he":
Every person, if he has a donkey, beats it.
Example (by Emmon Bach): ((s)> Brandom, Bach Peter's sentences)
A boy who fooled her kissed a girl that loved him.
Geach: here, you cannot consider "boy who fooled her" as a separate term, because then the floating pronoun "her" would have no reference, not even to "girl who loved him", because the floating pronoun "him" would then have no reference.
Solution/Geach:
A boy kissed a girl and she really loved him, but he only fooled her.
Quine: pro Geach.
((s) sequence of main clauses.)
V 131
Relative Clause/Bach Peter's Sentences/Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Geach/Quine: Geach focuses on the quantification (1) (Ex) (x is a man and I bought Fido of x and x had found Fido)
(2) (x) (y) (if x is a man and y is a donkey and x has y, then x beats y).
(3) (Ex) (Ey) (x is a man, and y is a a donkey and x has y and not (x beats y))
(4) (Ex) (Ey) (x was a boy and y was a girl and y kissed y and y really loved x, but x merely fooled y).
QuineVsGeach: the description of the correct grammar is one thing, a plausible description of a child's language learning is another. It would be nice if both matched, which is to be expected according to Hall, Bloomfield and Chomsky.
QuineVsGeach: before this is proven, I tend to a more dualistic view. Geach's Latin prose theory correctly describes the grammar, but not the learning process. Most examples of relative clauses correspond to the Fido example.
The child is torn between analogies,
V 132
which are in the end described properly by Geach. Relative Clause/Quantification/Language Learning/QuineVsGeach: a reformulation of the relative pronoun depending on circumstances in "and he" or "if", etc. is too complicated. In addition, the quantification would need to be learned before the relative clauses. Instead, the child comes to the quantification the other way round, through the relative clause.
- - -
Strawson I 198
QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: Singular terms can take the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: quantifiable, General Term: not quantifiable.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Geach, P. Strawson Vs Geach, P.
 
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I 188
Reference/statement/StrawsonVsGeach: his definition is not enough because it does not distinguish between types of the introduction because you can state depending on the context that a statement says something about every thing in which it is introduced and not only about things that are introduced in the referring way. So the terms "Socrates" and "is wise" have in common that there is no difference in the mode of introduction.
Grammatical distinction between the substantive and verbal mode of introduction.
But not a sufficient condition:
---
I 189
"Nothing," what we would not like to classify as a subject expression, is a singularean noun. (In English even nouns) Our list-definitions also do not exclude that Frege wanted to permit expressly, namely, that an A-term may be part of a B-expression. If you can say "Socrates is" corresponds to the description of the B-expression, "wise" does not correspond to the A-expression. (Asymmetric)
A-expression/Strawson: singular term, subject term, referring - B-expression: predicate, descriptive.
---
I 190
We have to question according to the significance of the distinction between grammatically substantive and grammatically verbal nature of the fact introduction. E.g. The term "Socrates" is in such diverse expressions as "kill Socrates" and "Plato admired Socrates" the same.
---
I 191
It is different with "wise". The expression introduces the property, to be "wise", but its function is not only in the mere introduction, or it shows the mode of introduction not only in terms of the case ending. It performs its job in a very peculiar and very important mode, namely in the assertive one. ---
I 192
But perhaps I do not claim, but I give someone permission to do something. This is not a weakening of the launch mode. We can say that the primary function of the indicative verb is the function of the assertion.
What is the primary mode of the fact introduction, is thus at the same time something further, namely the revealing mode of introduction. (In the following no distinction between arguing and revealing).
---
I 193
We can retain the idea of the revealing mode without burdening us with further grammatical classifications. We can say that among the many modes of statements ((s) error? Does this not have to be about introduction modes?) the one that is the primary, is also the claiming mode. The symbolism of assertion is also a means to express something more comprehensive, namely the occurrence of a statement.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Geach, P. Verschiedene Vs Geach, P. EMD II 347
Truth Conditions/Tr.c./Geach: Bedingung (6) (s.o.,EMD II 330): (6) (Sxi)phi ist ein wahrer Satz, iff es einen Term t gibt, so daß phi’ wahr ist, wenn phi’ aus phi durch Ersetzen aller freien Vorkommnisse von xi durch t erhalten wird: Geach: das spezifiziert tatsächlich die tr.c. für eine Interpretation des Existenzquantors.
WallaceVsGeach: kritisiert, daß es einen Unterschied zwischen dieser Forderung gibt und der der Convention T: nach Geach kann ein Satz ohne semantisches Vokabular seine tr.c. durch einen Satz angegeben bekommen, der selbst semantisches Vokabular enthält, (also Metasprache mit semantischem Vokabular), nach Tarski angeblich nicht. (KripkeVs: das steht nirgends bei Tarski!).
KripkeVsWallace: das ist ein Irrtum! Er glaubt, daß wenn phi’ so ist, daß T(phi) ↔ phi’ beweisbar ist, daß es dann das T-prdicate selbst enthält! Aber das tut es nicht!.
Es ist nämlich nicht nötig R(a) als primitiven Grundbegriff anzunehmen! Oder daß seine Erklärung "semantisches Vokabular" enthalten muß.





EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Geach, P. Hintikka Vs Geach, P.
 
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I 229
Thinking/Peirce/Hintikka: Thesis: all thought is dialogical in its form. Thoughts are what we say to ourselves. Thinking/Judging/Geach: Thesis: is analogous to saying.
HintikkaVsGeach: his results, however, are rather meager.
Discourse/Question/Answer/Hintikka: Thesis: we need a discourse logic that differs from the logic for isolated sentences.
I 230
Here, the different level of knowledge of asking and answering person must be considered.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Geach, P. Wiggins Vs Geach, P.
 
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Simons I 213
"Relative Identity"-view der Superposition: a) (Vertreter: Geach): "sortal theory" der relativen Identität: bekannt als "Theorie R": für Sortale F und G ist es möglich zwei Objekte a und b zu finden, so dass a und b beides Fs und Gs sind , a ist dasselbe F wie b, aber nicht dasselbe G.
Nicholas Griffin: pro.
WigginsVsGeach: das verletzt Leibniz’ Gesetz. Und weil dieses notwendig gilt, ist die Theorie notwendig falsch.
DoepkeVsGeach: "relative Identity" ist nur ein falscher Name für Ähnlichkeit.
b) Grice/George Myro: (beide unpubliziert): VsWiggins’ Thesis, dass Dinge, die jemals (ever) verschieden sind, immer (always) verschieden sind.
GriceVsWiggins: die Annahme hängt davon ab, dass man Eigenschaften findet, in denen die Objekte in den Zeiten differieren, wo sie nicht superponiert sind. Dann ist Identität relativ zur Zeit. D.h.
TI a = t b ↔ (F)[Ft a ↔ Ft b]
Wo der Quantor nur über Eigenschaften läuft, deren Instantiation nicht die Instantiation irgendeiner anderen Eigenschaft zu irgendeiner anderen Zeit beinhaltet.
Das schließt aus: die Eigenschaft,
Bsp zwei Jahre alt zu sein,
Bsp Expräsident zu sein
Bsp Braut-in-spe zu sein.
Simons: das können wir die Relation der "zeitlichen Ununterscheidbarkeit" nennen. Sie ist charakterisiert durch eine Beschränkung des Leibnizschen Gesetzes.
I 214
SimonsVsGrice: wenn wir diese Ähnlichkeit "identity" nennen, dann kommt auch jede andere Art von Ähnlichkeit dafür in Frage, so wie Bsp "surface identity" eines Körpers mit seiner Oberfläche. Ununterscheidbarkeit/zeitliche/Simons: wird sich unten (bei Konstitution) als wichtig herausstellen.
System CT/Simons: (s.o.) mit ihm haben wir "zeitliche Identität" schon verworfen.
Ad (3): dichrone Sicht der Superposition: Thesis: superponierte Objekte müssen nicht zur selben Zeit existieren. Bsp das Gold formt sich zum Ring. Wenn der Ring geschmolzen wird, wird er durch das Gold "replaced". D.h. sie existieren zu verschiedenen Zeiten.
Bsp eine Person koinzidiert nicht mit ihrem Körper, sie verwandelt sich in ihren Körper (die Leiche. (Nur wenn "body" als "corpse" verstanden wird, wie es oft, aber nicht immer der Fall ist).
Dichrone Sicht: Thesis: es gibt kein Substrat das den Wechsel überlebt.
Wandel/dichrone Sicht: These: ist immer ein Ersetzen eines Objekts durch ein anderes.
SimonsVsdichrone Sicht: erklärt nicht, wieso so viele Eigenschaften vom ursprünglichen auf das spätere Objekte übertragen werden.
Lösung: ein (angenommenes) Substrat würde das erklären.

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Strawson Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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NS I 149
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysicsVsRevisionist metaphysics. Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day doing and speaking.
Definition revisionists Metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This stands in contrast to the everyday's way of thinking.
StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is just about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language.
Ontology/language/Strawson: Thesis: pro-thing-property-ontology. This is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form.
---
NS I 150
Space/Time/Strawson: are tools to differentiate different cases. Transcendental/Kant: are arguments that relate to the conditions of possibility.
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: his arguments are transcendental.
---
Strawson I 198
QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: singular expressions (singular term) can occur at the points of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: can be quantified, general term: not quantifiable.
StrawsonVsQuine: on closer inspection, these differences of approach seem far less significant.
Quine strongly distinguishes between types of non-linguistic objects on one side and the distinction between singular and general terms, on the other side. (Word/object).
In Quine "piety" and "wisdom" are singular expressions, namely names of abstract objects like the nouns "Socrates" and "earth" are the names of concrete objects.
Abstract Singular Term/Quine: E.g. "piety" (Universal).
The distinction between singular and general term is more important for Quine from the logical point of view.
The singular term gives the impression, and to name only one object, while the general term does not claimed at all, to name something, although it "may be true of many things."
StrawsonVsQuine: this is an unsatisfactory way of explaining that the word "philosopher" should be a general and not a singular term. We would not like to say that this expression is true of many things or people.
---
Strawson I 252
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: regardless of their captivating simplicity of this analysis, I believe that it will be unacceptable by the form in which it is created. The language terms, in which the analysis is drawn up, presuppose the existence of subject expressions of linguistic singular terms. Other consequence: we are invited, to see the expressions that replace the "Fs" and "Gs" in the quantified sentences as ordinary predicate expressions. That is allright.
---
I 253
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: but again these forms have only their place in normal language because singular terms, subject expressions occupy the place they have there. Circularity: because we cannot simultaneously regard Fs and Gs as predicate expressions and accept that they all resolve subject expressions totally in the form of quantified sentences.
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: the argument is based on the linguistic forms that require in turn the use of these expressions.
StrawsonVsGadamer/StrawsonVsQuine: one could argue against that this is too narrow, one must proceed inventively. In the case one would have to say what a teaching really should say, which is, taken literally, unacceptable.
---
Strawson IV 69
StrawsonVsQuine: Suppose we want to manage without quantification over properties. Does it follow that the belief in objects would be justified, but not the belief in properties? ---
IV 70
Strawson: we can accept a different kind of existence. A secondary, although a usual sense of existence, which applies to properties and relations. ---
IV 71
Vs: E.g. a) "There is at least one property that has no machine, namely perfect efficiency". b) "no machine is completely efficient." In a) I quantify, in b) I do not.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981