Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Competence Chomsky
 
Books on Amazon:
Noam Chomsky
I 307
Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: I do not claim that they consist in "knowing-that", that language is described by the rules of grammar - Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: not a number of habits, no reference to the ability of the cyclist - instead the mastery of generative grammar - (non-formulated knowledge) - less than the ability to speak a language. ---
Searle VIII 404
Competence/performance/Chomsky: Thesis: performance is just the peak of the iceberg of competence. ---
VIII 437
SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is wrong: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more like a theory of performance than one of competence - he does not see that ultimately competence is a performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: not true, because speech act theory involves intention. ---
Searle VIII 409
Chomsky: new: object of study is the language skills - old: random number of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. ---
VIII 414
SearleVsChomsky: not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Ethics Harman
 
Books on Amazon
Wright I 224
Ethics/Explanation/Harman: E.g. moral judgment without assessment, instead psychological characteristics and education - features of the assessor, not the action.
Wright I 244
SturgeonVsHarman: E.g. that our belief that Hitler was morally corrupt is based on things that he did precisely because he was morally corrupt, so his depravity is part of the explanation of our belief that he actually was. - I.e. we must be prepared for this kind of explanation simply because of the realization that moral discourses are at least minimally capable of truth and that thus the missing analogies (to science) will appear elsewhere.

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995


Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
Relativism Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 436
Realtivism/Putnam: My main concern in the book truth, reason and history. (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat - "Companions in guilt" argument: In case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens - (PutnamVsHarman). ---
Horwich I 503
PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: E.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. - I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. - Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. ---
Putnam III 139f
Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. ---
V 141
Awareness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have one, is a fact about our notion of consciousness - Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards. ---
V 165
Relativism/tradition: easy to refute, because he himself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. - PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): Regress "I think that I think that snow is white". - PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. - Modern Relativism/Foucault, discourse relativity: everything is relative, also the relativism - Vs: Problem: if "absolutely true relative to person P": then no total relativism - no relativist wants the relativism applies to everything. ---
I 241
Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: depends on the majority in a culture. - Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. - PutnamVsRorty: regardless of the majority, but not transcendental reality but characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language. ---
I 249
Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Values Lewis
 
Books on Amazon
Graeser I 190
Value/Validation/Lewis: These values ​​should be considered as feeling, believing, desiring - ultimately desire of desire - HarmanVsLewis: 1) intrinsic desire of a higher level misleading. "Desire" has the meaning of intention and is, just like any intention, already self-referential. ---
I 191
FrankfurtVsHarman: risk of blurring the distinction between the goal (s) and the means, and thus committing oneself to the assumption that goals are equipped with means in a certain way and that’s how we come across them. ---
Schw I 185
Value/ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: values are not inherent in the validated events, but in us. In our wishes - Problem: just because you want something, it’s not necessarily good - Solution: Wishes 2nd stage: desire not to want to smoke - best theory: dispositional - Problem: latent relativism. ---
Schw I 187
LewisVsUtilitarism: neglects perspective.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brentano, Fr. Putnam Vs Brentano, Fr.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 435
"Cling-Together" Argument/Justification/Putnam: (Thesis: the question of what is a good explanation or not, what is a good interpretation or not, and what is justified and what is not, are in the same boat). (Cling Together, Swing Together Argument/(s): that interpretation, justification and explanation are in the same boat). E.g. Suppose we took the concepts "competence", or "best explanation" or "justification" as undefined basic concepts. Since these are not physicalist concepts, our realism would be no longer of the kind that Harman wants to defend.
Why then not say that Brentano's right and there are irreducible semantic properties?
PutnamVsBrentano: if there is nothing wrong about it, then the question why one is not an ethical non-cognitivist becomes a serious question.
Harman/Putnam: would still say, however, that it makes a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago,
---
I 436
or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts that decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if mR has to break with Harman (and with Mackie), then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged.
Interpretation/Explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come as deeply from human needs as ethical values.
Putnam: then a critic of me might say (even if he remains mR): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument).
Putnam: and this is where I wanted him! That was my main concern in "Vernunft Wahrheit und Geschichte". (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are often not in the same boat" (companions in guilt" argument, cling together, swing together argument: in case of partial relativism total relativism threatens to ensue. PutnamVsHarman)
Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism and not total relativism at the same time.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Chomsky, N. Harman Vs Chomsky, N.
 
Books on Amazon
I 306
Competence/Performance/ChomskyVsHarman: competence as "knowledge that language is described by the rules of grammar". And that "grammar specifies this competence". ChomskyVsHarman: I have not only never asserted this, but also repeatedly rejected it publicly. It would be absurd if the speaker had to know the rules explicitly.
Knowledge/Language/Harman: a) knowing that b) knowing how. Since language is obviously not "knowing that", it must be "knowing how". The speaker knows "how he has to understand other speakers." Analogous to the ability of the cyclist.
I 307
ChomskyVsHarman: he uses "competence" very different than me. I see no relation to the "ability of the cyclist", not a "set of habits," or something like that.
I 308
HarmanVsChomsky: the internalized system (that limits the choice of grammars) must be represented in a more fundamental language, and the child must have understood the latter already, before it can apply this schematism a) this leads to a circle: If you said that the child mastered the "more fundamental language" "directly", without having learned it, then why do you not also say that it mastered the actual language "directly" without learning it. Or: b) Regress: If, however, you said that it has to learn the more fundamental language first, then the question is how this fundamental language is learned itself. ChomskyVsHarman: even if you assume that the schematism must be represented at an "innate language", it does not follow what Harman sees: the child may need to master the "more fundamental language", but it does not have to "speak and understand" it. We just have to assume that it can make use of it. ad a): the assumption that the child masters its native language without learning it is wrong. It is not born with perfect knowledge of German. On the other hand, nothing speaks against the assumption that it is born with perfect knowledge of a universal grammar.
HarmanVsChomsky: in a model, conclusions from the given data on a grammar can only be made, if detailed information on a theory of performance is included in the model. Chomsky: interesting, but not necessary.
I 310
Empiricism/Theory/HarmanVsChomsky: calls Chomsky’s strategy "inventive empiricism", a doctrine that uses "induction principles". Such "inventive empiricism" is certainly not to be refuted, "no matter how the linguistic data look". ChomskyVsHarman: empiricism is not so important. I’m interested in the question of whether there are "ideas and principles of various kinds" which "determine the form of the knowledge acquired in a largely defined and highly organized manner" (rationalist variant) or whether on the other hand "the structure of the appropriation mechanism is limited to simple and peripheral processing mechanisms..." (empiricist variant). It is historically justified and makes heuristic sense to distinguish that.

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995
Fodor, J. Harman Vs Fodor, J.
 
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Cresswell II 160
Thought Language/Mentalese/HarmanVsFodor/Cresswell: (Harman 1982) Thesis: the language of the thoughts is simply the public language. FodorVsHarman: (1975, 56).

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Grice, P.H. Harman Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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Avramidis I 63
HarmanVsGrice: has designed a counter E.g. that leads us back to Grice’s c". Personal dignity S says: "The earth does move" not in order to convince his listeners, of which he knows that they are not to be convinced. He would not even try to convince them. Avramides: I.e. this is not about activated belief. ((s) Activated belief: i.e. not the test situation of examination or repetition of knowledge). I 64 Avramides: the speaker does not speak to an audience at all. I 66 Solution/Schiffer: in these cases (self-talk, etc.) the speaker himself is the audience. That in turn means that these are not cases in which there is no audience!. SchifferVsHarman: (ad 10 "personal dignity", I 63): the misleading aspect in Harman’s example is that it seems like there is an audience, but there is not. The solution with the speaker as audience allows us to solve all the cases 1 - 10 together.

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995
Harman, G. Field Vs Harman, G.
 
Books on Amazon
II 59
Meaning//Truth/Field: if here (in representations) truth should play a role, truth must be correlated with meaning: E.g. the truth of "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" should follow from the meaning of the sentence together with the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. FieldVsHarman: and such a theory must be compositional.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Harman, G. Putnam Vs Harman, G.
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 421
Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: it is not merely idealized rational acceptability. It involves a relationship between a remark or a thought and the way how things are in the world.
Putnam/Harman: is right when he equates the decisive point with a determination to the localization of all the facts in a world.
Harman: when I suppose, thesis, there is one clear causal physical order, I ask myself the following questions: "What is the place of the mind in the physical world?", "What is the place of values in the world of facts?" I believe that it is a serious philosophical error, if we believe we can avoid these issues.
PutnamVsHarman: a position as Harman's leads to two implausible conclusions:
1. Identity thesis of body and mind. (HarmanVs! I do not think that it follows from the assumption of a single causal order, rather to functionalism, that Putnam himself represented)
2. moral relativism. (Harman pro! There is nothing problematic).
---
I 428
Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: I do not think that he would consider it as a good argument for the conclusion that truth is the same as consistency: Problem: but then his argument does not show that truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
---
I 434
Competence/Chomsky/Putnam: (Chomsky Syntactic Structures) promised us that there would be a normal form for grammars and a mathematical simplicity function that would explain everything precisely. Here you would have to look at various descriptions of the speaker's competence, which are given in the normal form, and measure the simplicity of every description, (with the mathematical function) in order to find the easiest. This would be "the" description of the speaker's competence. Putnam: actually Chomsky owes us also a mathematical function with which one measures the "goodness", with which the competence description fits with the actual performance.
Chomsky/Putnam: the idea of ​​mathematization has since been abandoned. The idea currently rests that the speaker's competence could be given by an idealization of the actual speaker's behavior, on an intuitive notion of a "best idealization" or "best explanation".
Justification/PutnamVsChomskyPutnamVsHarman: to assume that the concept of justification could be made physicalistically through identification with what people should say in accordance with the description of their competence, is absurd.
---
I 435
Harman/Putnam: but would say that there is a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago, ---
I 436
or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts, which decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if the metaphysical realism with Harman (and with Mackie) has to break, then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged.
Interpretation/explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come from human needs as deep as ethical values.
Putnam: then a critic might say of me, (even if he remains metaphysical realism): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument).
Putnam: and this is where I wanted it to be. That was my main concern in "truth, reason and history." (Putnam thesis explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat" ("companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism the total relativism is near. PutnamVsHarman).
Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism, but not at the same total relativism.
Reference/Harman/Putnam: Harman's answer is that the world has a unique causal order.
---
I 437
PutnamVsHarman: but that does not help: if my linguistic competence is caused by E1, E2 ... , then it's true that it was caused* by E*1, E*2 ... whereby* the corresponding entity designates in a non-standard model. ((s)>Löwenheim) Problem: why is reference then determined by cause and not by cause*?
Reference/Physicalism/Putnam: the only answer he could give, would be: "because it is the nature of reference". This would mean that nature itself picks out objects and places them in correspondence to our words.
David Lewis/Putnam: has suggested something similar: ... + ...

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Harman, G. Verschiedene Vs Harman, G. Wright I 244
Harman/Wright: drückte sich so aus, als sei die Anführung moralischer Tatsachen gar nicht zulässig. SturgeonVsHarman: Bsp unser Alltagsdenken kommt sehr gut mit der Tatsache zurecht, dass ein Aufstand durch soziale Ungerechtigkeit erklärt werden kann.,
Bsp Dass unsere Überzeugung, dass Hitler moralisch verkommen war, auf Dingen beruht, die er genau deshalb tat, weil er moralisch verkommen war, so dass seine Verderbtheit Teil der Erklärung unserer Überzeugung ist, dass er es tatsächlich war
I 246
D.h. wir müssen auf diese Art von Erklärung allein schon durch die Erkenntnis vorbereitet sein, dass moralische Diskurse zumindest minimal wahrheitsfähig sind und dass also die fehlenden Analogien (zur Naturwissenschaft?) an anderer Stelle auftauchen werden. Bsp Aufstände als Folge sozialer Ungerechtigkeit: das zieht doch niemand in Zweifel!
Es gibt eine Unterscheidung zwischen sozialer Ungerechtigkeit, und dem Gefühl des Unrechts.
Es gibt auch eine Unterscheidung zwischen der Ungerechtigkeit und jenen ihrer nicht moralischen Merkmale, die durchaus korrekt in einer Demonstration ihrer Ungerechtigkeit angeführt werden können.
I 247
Wir verbinden also nicht irgendwelche Behauptungen. Auch die Anführung weiterer nicht moralischer Faktoren kann die moralische Demonstration verstärken.





Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
Harman, G. Chisholm Vs Harman, G.
 
Books on Amazon
III 152
Knowledge/Harman/Chisholm: Thesis: if I know that h is true, I also know that every evidence against h is an evidence against something true. So I know that it is misleading. Then I should not notice it. And as soon as I know that h is true, I am able to do it. ChisholmVsHarman/Chisholm: That’s paradoxical, because I’m never able to leave any future evidence aside.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Compositionality Pro Field II 19
Field per compositionality of reference.
II 59
Field per compositionality - (VsHarman).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Mentalese Harman, G.
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell II 160
Gedankensprache/Mentalesisch/HarmanVsFodor/Cresswell: (Harman 1982) These die Sprache der Gedanken ist einfach die öffentliche Sprache,. FodorVsHarman: (1975, 56).
Schiffer I 74
Mentalesisch/Harman: (1978, 58) These es ist aber nicht unplausibel, anzunehmen, daß unsere inneren Zustände der Repräsentation -"Elemente und Struktur haben, in einer Weise, die analog ist zu der Weise in der Sätze Elemente und Struktur haben".

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Values Harman, G.
 
Books on Amazon
Graeser I 190
Value / Valuation / Lewis: values ​​should be regarded as feeling, belief, desire - ultimately desire of desire - HarmanVsLewis: 1 intrinsic desire of a higher level is misleading. "Desire" has the meaning of intention and is like any intention, already self-referential.
I 191
FrankfurtVsHarman: in danger of blurring the distinction between purpose and agent, and thus committed to the assumption that targets are to some extent equipped with means.

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Values Lewis, D.
 
Books on Amazon
Graeser I 190
Wert/Bewertung/Lewis: These Werten sollte man als Fühlen, Glauben, Verlangen betrachten -" letztlich Verlangen von Verlangen - HarmanVsLewis: 1. intrinsisches Verlangen höherer Stufe irreführend - . "Verlangen" hat die Bedeutung von Intention und ist wie jede Intention, schon selbstreferentiell - I 191 FrankfurtVsHarman: in Gefahr, die Unterscheidung zwischen Zweck(en) und Mittel zu verwischen, und damit sich zu der Annahme zu verpflichten, daß Ziele gewissermaßen mit Mitteln ausgestattet seien und uns so begegneten -
Schw I 185
Wertschätzen/Bewerten/Bewertung/Wert/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis ist These Realist und Naturalist in Bezug auf normative Tatsachen: Werturteile können wahr oder falsch sein. Ihre Wahrheit beruht auf natürlichen, physikalischen Umständen der WiWe.

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Values Frankfurt, H.
 
Books on Amazon
Graeser I 190
Value / Validation / Lewis: values should be regarded as feeling, belief, desire - ultimately desire of desire - HarmanVsLewis: 1. intrinsic desire of a higher level is misleading. - "Desire" has the meaning of intention and is just like any intention, already self-referential - I 191 FrankfurtVsHarman: he is at risk, to blur the distinction between the object and means, and thus commits himfelf to the assumption that targets themselves are to a certain extent equipped with means.

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002