Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Hegel
 
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Bubner I 182
Absolute Mind/Hegel: the eternal and self-contained idea operates as an absolute mind, creates and enjoys. (According to Aristotle, who distinguishes the self-thought as the highest activity of reason.)
I 183
Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object.
HegelVsAristoteles: Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities.
I 184
Absoluteness/Hegel/Bubner: Absoluteness of the idea presents itself as the method of logic, and fulfills the condition of self-reference with this typically modern trick. - - -
Adorno XII 115
Absolutheit/Bewusstsein/Hegel/Adorno: durch die Annahme einer absoluten Identität von Seiendem und Geist hat Hegel den ontologischen Gottesbeweis zu retten versucht. Diese Annahme ist eigentlich der Inhalt seiner Philosophie. (>Absoluter Geist). KantVsHegel: bestreitet eine solche Identität zwischen dem, was ist, und unserem Bewusstsein.



Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Change Wessel
 
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I 365f
Change/WesselVsHegel: not from "being" and "nothing", we need empirical givenness for introduction - empirical imagination already provided in the logic - time: introduced through relatively regular processes, e.g. Earth's rotation - change can also be introduced without time - "paradox of change": the body has the property and at the same time it does not - a) two-digit predicate: "something turns into something else" - b) single-digit: "something changed", "something becomes true" - E.g. "the water is moving" - >event: from change predicate sA => sB: "s(SA => sB)"

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Facts Brandom
 
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I 466ff
Definition Deflationism: denies that content in concepts can be explained with truth conditions and compliance with the facts, properties and objects (VsCorrespondence theory) Fact: "making true": misleading: it is not the fact that p makes true that p.
---
I 469
E.g. It is not the fact that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea, which makes that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea. Facts: if facts are to be explained, the explanation does not need to refer back to something normative: The planetary orbits would also be elliptical without beings that set standards.
---
Rorty VI 179 ff
Whether a statement is true does not depend on whether somebody makes it. But our linguistic practices could not be what they are, if the facts were different. However, the non-linguistic facts could be essentially as they are, even if our linguistic practices were completely different. Form of thought.
Definition Fact/Brandom, "something assertible" (neologism by Brandom: "claimable"). - There is the act of asserting and there is "the asserted" - facts are not the "true asserted" but the assertible. - Facts make assertions true. However, inferentially.
RortyVsBrandom: It is as if I, like Moliere, refer to "the soporific power" as inferential in order to make it seem to be above suspicion.
---
Brandom I 476
Fact/Brandom: no contrast between how things are and what we can say and think - Facts are (the content of) true assertions and thoughts - Wittgenstein: we don not stop opinionating when we are facing the facts. ---
I 477
Wittgenstein: Facts are connected and structured by the objects and their properties. ---
I 866
Negative Fact/Brandom: no mystery -> distinction between normative and non-normative expressions - also> conditional facts > modal facts - realm of facts and norms are not opposites - the normative is part of the factual. ---
Seel2 III 149
Definition Fact/Brandom: Content of true assertions - Assertions/Brandom: obtain their content through the use of concepts in the context of the sentences uttered in each case. So the concept of fact can only be analysed together with the concept of assertion. However, this conceptual dependency is not genetic - the world is the epitome of all the facts, no matter when and with what success thoughts about the world are created. "There was a time when nobody used concepts, because there was no discursive practice - but there was never a time when there were no facts - Seel: therefore, neither concepts nor facts depend on the existence of thinking beings - at the same time, the theory of discursive practice appears to be a theory of the fundamental structure of the world - Seel: KantVsBrandom: Warns just of that - (in the case of Hegel in vain) - KantVsBrandom/KantVsHegel: false: - Conclusion from thinking to being.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
God Heidegger
 
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Figal I 16
HeideggerVsHegel: the Absolute, God, is only accessible to the individual. ---
Figal I 14ff
God/Heidegger: "reservation" of the future. Gods/Heidegger: "Refusal of the Past."


Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006


Hei I
Günter Figal
Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016
Identity Wessel
 
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I 220
Identity/Wessel: identity statement: Abbreviation of a statement about the importance of equality of two terms: mutual meaning inclusion - ta tb = definition (ta > tb) and (tb> ta) - but that is only correct for individual subject termini. ---
I 220f
Identity/Hegel: a = a: E.g. Socrates is Socrates: demands that Socrates does not undergo any changes in time - WesselVsHegel: confusion of word and object - identity and difference two-digit predicates (relation) - not one-digit predicate. - x = y is existentially charged.
I 221
Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: suggests an incorrect comparison of separate objects. ---
I 227
Identity/logic/Wessel: x = x: existentially charged: only true if one thing x exists - not logically true, not a tautology, empirical fact (> Russell). ---
I 335
Definition identity/Wessel: i1 = i2 = definition S(i1, ti2). (s) S: the fact that i1 is designated by the name i2? - That a is designated with the name b? b stands for a? - Definition diversity/Wessel: -i (i1 = i2) = definition E(i1) u E(i2) ~ u (i1 = i2) - ((s), there are two expressions i1 and i2, which do not stand for the same object.) - identity/Wessel: we use the axiom: l- i1 = i2> ti 1 ti2. <((S) if the objects are identical, it follows that the corresponding expressions are equivalent in meaning.) ---
I 379f
Identity/Science Logic/Wessel: 1) at any time is the object a identical with the object b in any spatial order with respect to any method for determining the order - 2) always, if one of a and b exists, the other also exists - structure must take into account the relations of objects - there is nothing in nature that justifies the preference for one or another relation (not a fact). Identity in time/Science Logic/Wessel: if t2 after t1, one can no longer speak of identity - T1 and t2 are then only representative of the same class of objects a, if the objects were defined using time.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Logic Frege
 
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II 49
Grammar / logic: subject / predicate: always a thought, without a truth value, no extension.
Tugendhat II 54
Hegel: logic composed of concepts- FregeVsHegel: not composed of concepts, but of sentences! - Important: not objects can be negated, but only sentences. - - -
- - -
Thiel I 335
Logik/Frege/Thiel Freges Begriff der Logik, auf die er die gesamte nichtgeometrische Mathematik zurückführen wollte, war ein weiterer als der heutige. Für Frege nämlich zählt die Mengenbildung zu den logischen Prozessen, so dass der Übergang von der Aussage, dass genau dieselben Gegenstände unter zwei Begriffe A und B fallen, zur Aussage der Gleichheit der Begriffsumfänge von A und B bei Frege ein Gesetz der Logik ist.
I 335/336
Heutige Auffassung: Begriffsumfänge sind nichts anderes als Mengen, daher gehört das Gesetz nicht in die Logik, sondern zur Mengenlehre. In der Traditionellen Logik war die Lehre der Begriffs Umfänge Teil der Logik. Heute Teil der Menglehre, während die Lehre vom "Begriffsinhalt" in der Logik verbleibt. Das ist recht merkwürdig.



F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Metaphysics Leibniz
 
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Holz I 13
Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: the inner unity of his work can only be understood from metaphysics. His position lies between Kant and Hegel: he shows LeibnizVsKant the alternative of metaphysics as a science, by showing his method.
LeibnizVsHegel: he shows the possibility of metaphysics, which is not based on an absolutely idealistic way.
---
Holz I 24
Metaphysics/Holz: with Leibniz, it receives the scientific theory form of a non-empirically verifiable theory of the general connexion of the world. They are no longer "ideas" of the whole, but trans-empirical construction of the most plausible and most explanatory form. ---
Holz I 81
Metaphysics/Leibniz: since that looks like a circle, Descartes, for example, sought a justification in God. But metaphysically, the circle cannot be dissolved, for metaphysics rests precisely on an unbroken link!
The circle is also preserved logically.
The system has to be interrupted somewhere:
Solution/Leibniz: an ineluctable function of sensory perception - not as a "first reason," but as an extra-logical material beginning of the reflexion ratio, as a quasi "Archimedean point" (outside).
Leibniz is well aware of this break.
For its part, the metaphysical necessity can no longer be deduced from reasons.
---
I 82
Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: in the realm of reasons of truths (for example, mathematics) the reduction is real possible to the identity principle. ---
Holz I 119
Leibniz thesis: the structural character of the monad causes that something is happening. The structure guarantees the unity of being and is the being of unity. Metaphysics/Unity/World/Ultimate Establishment/Leibniz: the concept of the individual is a world concept. For this reason, the inner-world scientific justification given to the particular in its particularity is dependent on a metaphysical (underlying) principle which makes the being of the world intelligible.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Negation Adorno
 
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Grenz I 50
Negation/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: Adorno separates, against Hegel, the subjective from the objective positivity of negated negation. (Negative Dialektik, p. 159, FN). ---
I 50
Dialectic/double negation/PopperVsDialectic/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno agrees with Popper's dialectic criticism: the equation of the negation of the negation with the positivity is the quintessence of the identification and thus of the reification. ---
I 50
Negation/Adorno/Grenz: The consciousness of the absence of something or of falsehood; this moment of the particular negation as the subjective for its part, cannot and must not be credited to objective logic and even to metaphysics. (Negative Dialektik, p. 159, FN). ---
Grenz I 51
The definite negation does not alter the circumstances. It is only their consciousness. ---
I Grenz 80
Certain negation/MarxVsHegel/Grenz: e.g. the bourgeois revolution against the feudal society: N.B.: here, certain negation as a method was lost. Feudalism is abolished in the double sense: the rule of less over many is liquidated, the social character of the society is preserved. ---
Grenz I 83
Certain negation/AdornoVsHegel/AdornoVsMarx/Grenz: Adorno resolves the antinomy of the ambiguity of cancelling and incorporating of the practical element of history into the particular negation. ---
Grenz I 91
Certain negation/Adorno/Grenz: New conception as immanent criticism: a) As a cancellation conceptualized inner-worldly - so it escapes the immanence critique of Hegel.
---
I 92
b) Reveals the concept of purposive rationality as irrational (Dialektik der Aufklärung, p. 126). Thus the necessity arises to eradicate the something-characteristic of the particular nothing history-philosophical (Negative Dialektik, p.8). c) This necessity is supported by the pushing trough of nature-history antagonism.
Accordingly, the certain negation consists in the fact that the factual is opposed to its potentiality "which cannot suffice" (Ästhetische Theorie, p. 205).
---
Grenz I 106
Certain negation/art/Adorno/Grenz: Revealing the image content of a cultural phenomenon is only possible as a certain negation of its social content, or, what is the same, as gaining the truth of its untruth. ---
Grenz I 113
Double Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno understands the negation of negation as negative: full of content, but without something-character. (Negative Dialektik, p.159f) ---
Grenz I 116
Negation/Adorno/Grenz: certain negation and something-character of the particular nothing are separated by the transformation of the certain negation into the physiognomical analysis and of the determined nothing into a category of experience which is based on being and is only polemically related. This is the performance of Adorno's negative dialectic, with which it brings historical and dialectical materialism to itself. ---
Grenz I 180
Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Results of physiognomic negations are artworks or hermetic texts. They thus fail as negations, inasmuch as they negatively negate the negativity of their neganda in practice, but do so without meaning, and thus undefined and diffusely. Theory: on the other hand, the theory-performed determination of beings as negative is merely theoretical, but determined.

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Reality Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
I 264
World/reality/PutnamVsHegel/PutnamVsFichte: both would have asked us to describe the world, regardless of our language, but that is not possible. - How could one assume that that would go?

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Statements Ayer
 
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I 281
Statement / world: anything in the world must be distinguished from the statement.
I 289
Statements / Ayer: 3 conditions: they must 1st be checked directly 2nd be simply 3rd absolutely specific - then "fact" is definable:
  I 290
"Great statement" / Hegel / Ayer: (paraphrased): "the whole truth" - AyerVsHegel / AyerVsIdealism / AyerVsBradley: then all normal statements are wrong - wrong solution: "partially true." AyerVs: that makes all statements indistinguishable - (> indistinguishability).
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
Totality Adorno
 
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Grenz I 19
Totality/Adorno: totality expresses itself in the fact that one cannot ward off the comprehensive, all-managing world in any other way than through means which are similar to it. (Impromptus, p.22). ---
Grenz I 113
Totality/Hegel/Adorno/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: the negativity of the whole is expressed by Hegel as a positive totality according to Adorno. In this, Hegel's philosophy is an image, but a broken one. The structure of the blindness context is illustrated into that: 'mirror-inverted'. ---
Grenz I 158
Totality/Adorno/Grenz: the concept of totality is ambivalent - on the one hand, it is a description of the real but false totality, on the other hand the idea of the correct one. ---
Grenz I 130
Whole/Adorno/Grenz: ... the force effective in any single determination of the whole is not only its negation, but also the negative, untruth.

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Truth Russell
 
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Bertrand Russell
Horwich I 4
Truth/Russell: There are objective truths as objects of judgments, but not objective falsehoods - a) false: Judgment as relation to a simple object: E.g. that Charles I died on the scaffold - does not work in the case of false judgments - b) for a complex: (Russell pro):
I 9
Truth: exists if the objects have the relation to each other which is claimed in the judgment.
I 11
The fact that a judgment is made does not alter the objects - this is how falsehood becomes possible.
Russell VII 64
Truth/Russell: can only exist if there are also opinions - but it does not depend on the opinions.
IV 127
RussellVsHegel: a truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it has to belong to his "essence". - If the nature of a thing should be all truths, then we cannot recognize the "essence" before we know all its relations with all other things in the universe - but if we use the word "essence" in this sense, we have to assert that a thing can be recognized, even if its "essence" is unknown - or incompletely known - contradiction: this confuses knowledge of things and knowledge of truth -" acquaintance does not imply knowledge of the essence - (> naturalistic fallacy) - therefore we cannot prove that the universe is a harmonious whole.
Tugendhat III 214
Truth/Russell: early: a matter of belief and this one reaction dispo to react near B with "B" - (Quine, stimulus meaning) - TugendhatVsRussell: neither reaction nor triggering signs are w/f - because there is no assumption that something is this way or that - therefore no mistake possible.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Truth Adorno
 
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Grenz I 57
Truth/Adorno/Grenz: the relationship between truth and untruth is linked to the relationship between necessary and superfluous reign in society. ---
Grenz I 61
Truth/Adorno/Grenz: In Adorno's thinking only facts are true, namely a narrowly delimited sector of facts: true would be the state of society in which the full measure of possible freedom of reign would be realized. ---
I 64
Truth/subjective/objective/Hegel/Adorno/Grenz: the residual theory of truth, according to which objective is what is left after striking out the so-called subjective factors, is hit by Hegel's critique into the empty center. The recognition is fruitful not by the elimination of the subject, but by virtue of its supreme effort... (Gesammelte Schriften 5, p. 256). ---
Grenz I 70
Truth/Adorno/Grenz: three spheres of the historicity of truth:
1. Ideology
2. Idea of the possibility of the better to the true 3. Level of rationality or subjectivity.
---
I Grenz 73
Truth/Adorno/Border: Genesis of truth from the false appearance. Truth and appearance are identified openly: the "best dialectical truth" of art... ---
I 74
...and philosophy is that "which exists in appearance." (Adorno: Kierkegaard, Construction of the Aesthetic). ---
Grenz I 94
Hegel/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: You cannot choose in Hegel what suits you and reject what annoys you. His truth is in the Skandalon. Not renewal, only salvation suits him. To save Hegel, therefore, is to face his philosophy where it evokes the most pain; where its untruth is obvious, to snatch the truth from it. (Gesammelte Schriften Bd 5, p. 320). ---
I 95
Hegel/Truth/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: The affirmation registers, mirror-inverted, the experience of overpowering compulsion, which is inherent in all beings through its amalgamation under the reign. This is the truth of Hegel's untruth. (Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 5, p. 324).

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Vocabulary Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
III ~ 60
Nietzsche - Rorty - Derrida: we must be able to decide autonomously about our vocabulary and our speaking
III 127
Def final vocabulary/Rorty: we use it to tell our life story, sometimes with hindsight, sometimes looking forward - "Final": because there is no standpoint outside of it from which it can be justified - only circular justification possible -
III 135
Def "dialectics"/Hegel/Rorty: attempt to play vocabularies against one another, rather than merely derive sentences from each other - RortyVsHegel: constantly changed his vocabulary and changed the subject while doing so - he did not criticize his predecessors as misguided, but for using an outdated language -
VI 125
Vocabulary/correspondence/reality/world/language/Rorty: the assertion that some vocabularies work better than others is perfectly fine - but not that they represent reality more adequately - ((s)> detatching language from reality) -

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Zeno Hegel
 
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Bubner I 72
Zeno/Hegel/Bubner: his peculiarity is dialectic. Reason makes the beginning (Hegel pro).        The advantage over Parmenides is that assertions are not made in such a way, which presuppose an abstraction and are therefore not at all suitable for an actual beginning.
The zenonian reason does not intervene when something is developed when something is posed, because it allows the impossibility of opposite conception on the thing itself.
       Impossibility: because the one gets into contradictions who attributes the many, rather than the one being of the Parmenides.
Paradoxes/Movement/Zeno/Hegel/Bubner: Hegel takes over Aristotle's solution: the introduced distinction of two aspects in space and time, namely, continuity and discretion.
Bubner: this is unhistorical, because Zenon could not be yet aware of it.
Solution: the continuum introduced by Aristotle makes the infinite divisibility of space and time compatible with its unity.
Hegel: "the self-equality, continuity is absolute connexion, the dissolution of all distinction, all negativity, of being-for-itself.
The point, on the other hand, is the pure being-for-itself, the absolute self-differentiation, and the abolition of all equality and connexion with others.
But these two are placed in space and time in one, space and time the contradiction (!). It is closest to show it in the movement: For the movement also places something opposite for the presentation.
BubnerVsHegel: Here, Hegel discovers more than the translation can give. It is anachronistic to raise Zenon to the dialectician.
Anachronisms, however, are the price of structural comparisons that are philosophically illuminating.


The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Hegel, G.W.F. Bubner Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 44
BubnerVsHegel: verkürzt die konkrete Lebendigkeit der Platonischen Dialoge zur äußeren Reflexion, wegen seines eigenen starken Methodenverständnisses. Platons Dialoge lassen keine saubere Scheidung der philosophischen Aussage vom bildhaften Dekor zu.
Ihre Rätselhaftigkeit stehen zu lassen fordert die tätige Mitarbeit des bewussten Teilnehmers.
I 47
Die genaue Kenntnis der Methode fällt an keinem Punkt mit ihrer Ausübung derart in eins, dass kein Rest bliebe. Methode stellt bei Platon nie das Ziel dar, sondern dient der besseren Erkenntnis.
I 49
Andersheit/Hegel: das Andere ist zu nehmen als isoliert, in Beziehung auf sich selbst, abstrakt als das Andere. nicht von Etwas, sondern als das Andere an ihm selbst. d.h. das Andere seiner selbst. BubnerVsHegel: die Faszination des Wiedererkennens einer Grundform der eigenen Wissenschaft der Logik trägt Hegels Deutung weit über Platon hinaus.
Er liest in Platon eine Identität der Identität und Differenz hinein, die erst der deutsche Idealismus voll artikuliert hat.
I 72
Paradoxien/Bewegung/Zenon/Hegel: Hegel übernimmt Aristoteles’ Lösung: die eingeführte Distinktion zweier Aspekte bei Raum und Zeit, nämlich Kontinuität und Diskretion. Bubner: das ist aber unhistorisch, weil es Zenon noch nicht bewusst sein konnte.
Lösung: das von Aristoteles eingeführte Kontinuum lässt die unendliche Teilbarkeit von Raum und Zeit mit der Einheit derselben verträglich werden.
Hegel: "die Sichselbstgleichheit, Kontinuität ist absoluter Zusammenhang, Vertilgtheit alles Unterschieds, alles Negativen, des Fürsichseins.
Der Punkt ist hingegen das reine Fürsichsein, das absolute Sichunterscheiden und aufheben aller Gleichheit und Zusammenhangs mit anderem.
Diese beiden aber sind in Raum und Zeit in eines gesetzt, Raum und Zeit also der Widerspruch (!). Es liegt am nächsten, ihn an der Bewegung aufzuzeigen: Denn in der Bewegung ist auch für die Vorstellung Entgegengesetztes gesetzt.
BubnerVsHegel: hier entdeckt Hegel mehr, als die Übersetzung hergibt. Es ist anachronistisch, Zenon zum Dialektiker zu erheben.
Anachronismen sind aber der Preis für Strukturvergleiche, die philosophisch erhellend sind.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Hegel, G.W.F. Derrida Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 55
Hegel rates the spoken word higher than the written characters (DerridaVs).
I 64
Mind / Hegel: he finds himself by executing its nature. DerridaVsHegel: here a "Holocaust" takes place. The deleted residue also remains.

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Hegel, G.W.F. Frege Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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Tugendhat II 55
FregeVsHegel: his logic is based on certain concepts, but words have a sense (= meaning) only in complete sentences. - - -
Tugendhat II 51
Being/Hegel/Logic: "the pure being", "the indeterminate immediate", it cannot have a determination against other things. That with which the beginning of science must be made. II 52 Borderline case of quality as result of an abstraction. II 53 Since being is not part of the verbal system, there is no "being thing". Thus the "contemplation of being" as a "void" is in itself already nothing more than the contemplation of "nothing". II 54 But still immediate. No opposition, abstract immediate negation.
II 55
FregeVsHegel/Tugendhat: only sentences can be negated! (Frege). This crashes Hegel’s entire logic from the start.
II 56
Tugendhat: this discussion (if being and nothingness are the same thing and the same time different) starts at a far too high level: It is assumed that nothing is already something provable. TugendhatVsHegel: he remained rooted in the prejudices of formal logic of his time: that judgments are consist of concepts.
FregeVsHegel: the primary logical and ontological unit is the sentence!

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Hegel, G.W.F. Goodman Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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II 62
Error: to involve the "entire history of the object". It would lead to conclusion that the most rigid object would be called flexible if it is never subjected to a suitable power (VsHegel). A disposition predicate can apply to an object, if the manifest predicate is not true at all. A flammable object never needs to go up in flames.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989
Hegel, G.W.F. Heidegger Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 16
HeideggerVsHegel: the Absolute, God, is accessible only for the individual .
II 87
VsHegel: destroyed the last remnants of the concealment of the absolute self-knowledge of the absolute spirit. - - -
Rorty III 196
HeideggerVsNietzsche/HeideggerVsHegel: verstand die Schwierigkeit sehr gut, am Ende einer Erzählung die Leiter wegzuwerfen. Er selbst wollte keine Erzählung, sondern eine Litanei geben.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Hegel, G.W.F. Leibniz Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 13
Leibniz/Holz: die innere Einheit seines Werks ist nur von der Metaphysik her zu begreifen. He can be positioned between Kant and Hegel: He shows the alternative of a scientific metaphysics to LeibnizVsKant by showing its method,
LeibnizVsHegel: shows the possibility of a metaphysics which is not based on an absolute idealistic method.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Hegel, G.W.F. Luhmann Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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Reflexion: keine Hierarchie der Refexivität. Beobachtung 2. Ordnung hat keine hierarchisch höhere Position. Wer allerdings einen Beobachter beobachtet, verwendet eine andere Unterscheidung als er selbst. (LuhmannVsHegel).LuhmannVsSubjekttheorie. II 30
Subjekt/Objekt/Luhmann: schwieriges Problem. Zunächst: wer ist der Beobachter? Er ist die letzte Figur, die aber wiederum einen Explikationsbedarf über bestimmte Unterscheidungen hat.
LuhmannVsSubjekttradition: hier hat man Kontinuitäten und Diskontinuitäten, die erlauben, zu entscheiden, ob man den Begriff des Subjekt nach Lage anwenden möchte. ((s) nicht eigentlich Hegel ist hier der Kontrahend).
Luhmann: wir sollten vielleicht besser auf Unterscheidung abheben. Es gibt aber keine endgültige Entscheidung in dieser Sache. (Kass.7)
...klassische Subjekt, das immer wußte, daß es ein Subjekt ist.
Dagegen spricht, daß man leicht aus dem Auge verliert, daß auch Soziale Systeme Subjekte sind! Bsp diese Vorlesung ist ihr eigenes Subjekt! Bsp die Gesellschaft ist ein Subjekt. Aber keine Analogie zum Bewußtsein! Das gäbe bekannte Probleme. Am besten, wir benutzen den Subjektbegriff daher nicht.
Anderer Grund: unsere Zwei-Seiten-Unterscheidung, bei der die Welt in zwei Seiten unterschieden wird (S/U). Dann ist nämlich die Frage. wo kommt der Beobachter eigentlich vor? Im System oder der Umwelt?(K.7)
Zeit/Hegel/(Enzyklopädie): § 258:" die Zeit als die negative Einheit des Außersichseins ist gleichfalls ein schlechthin (gleichfalls ein?) schlechtes Ideales. Sie ist das Sein, indem sie es nicht ist und indem sie es nicht ist, ist."
Luhmann: warum wird hier die Unterscheidung Sein/Nichtsein eingeführt? Kass.9. - Bewegung/Luhmann: ist nach Hegel und Aristoteles dann etwas, was das Nichtsein mit dem Sein verbindet. Zeit/Bewegung/Luhmann: aber Bewegung genügt nicht für die Definition von Zeit, weil Zeit sich nicht an uns vorbeibewegt. Das sieht auch Aristoteles. Zeit ist von Anfang an von einer Unterscheidung abhängig. Zentrale Frage: wer ist der Beobachter? Daran schließt sich sofort die Frage an: wer stellt diese Frage?

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Hegel, G.W.F. Russell Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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Bertrand Russell
IV 127
RussellVsHegel: many unfounded assumptions. A truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it must be part of its "nature". If the nature of a thing should be all truth, then we cannot recognize the "nature", before we know all its relations with all other things in the universe. But when we use the word "nature" in this sense, we must claim that a thing can be recognized, even if its "nature" is unknown, or is imperfectly known. Contradiction: this confuses knowledge of things and knowledge of truth. ---
IV 128
Acquaintance/Russell: does not imply a recognition of the "nature". From the fact that a thing is what it is, we cannot infer that it must have the various relations which it has factually. This follows only apparently, because we already know it. (> Naturalistic fallacy). RussellVsHegel: we therefore cannot prove that the universe, as a whole, forms a harmonious system. If we cannot prove this, we also cannot prove the unreality of space, time and matter and the non-existence of evil. Because Hegel concludes its unreality from the fragmentary and relational character of these things. (Naturalistic fallacy).

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Hegel, G.W.F. Ryle Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 204
Knowledge/Recognition/RyleVsHegel: The distinction betw Trial and Done verbs (tasks and services) frees us from another theoretical nuisance: "know", "realize", "solve" cannot be used with adverbs such as "mistakenly" and falsely or "incorrectly", you cannot know something wrong, it is a different grammar. ((s) HegelVsRyle: Phenomenology, Preface - Hegel there: we can definitely know something wrong E.g. imperfect geometric drawings.)

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Hegel, G.W.F. Wittgenstein Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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Schurz I 224
Explanation/Hegel/Schurz: Thesis: is in principle beyond description, it is a kind of "showing nature". DuhemVsHegel/WittgensteinVsHegel: science can only ever describe. ((s) WittgensteinVsExplanation/WittgensteinVsHegel).
Law/Law of nature/NG/solution/Hempel: even laws are descriptions - simply general descriptions.
Explanation/Hempel: goes beyond description in it, that it sets up a logical connection.
---
I 225
Last clarification/Schurz: does not exist in science for this very reason: any explanation must presuppose something unexplained. E.g. law of gravity, e.g. the fact that there was a big bang.
Nothing can explain itself, there is no "self-explnation".

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Hegel, G.W.F. Verschiedene Vs Hegel, G.W.F. Kierkegaard I 109
Necessity: Question: has the past greater necessity than the future? KierkegaardVsHegel: The Necessary can not be changed, it will not be, but it is.





Kier I
S. Kierkegaard
Philosophical Fragments 2009
Hegel, G.W.F. Vollmer Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 220
Wissen/Kriterium/Erkenntnis/Vollmer: wir brauchen ein Kriterium dafür, wann Erkenntnis gültig ist. Ein solches Kriterium wäre nun selbst wieder ein Stück Wissen und brauchte wiederum ein Kriterium Regreß. Andererseits könnte das Kriterium keine einfache Konvention sein, da eine Konvention keine Erkenntnis rechtfertigen kann. Höchstens durch weitere Konventionen. Regreß.
Das ist ungefähr:
SchellingVsKant: wir brauchen ein Erkennen des Erkennens. Und das ist zirkulär.
HegelVsKant: Untersuchung des Erkennens: kann nicht anders als erkennend durchgeführt werden. Als ob man Schwimmen lernen wollte, bevor man ins Wasser geht.
Vollmer: das Argument ist von Leonard Nelson ausgebaut worden und heißt daher "Doppelnelson".
I 221
VollmerVsHegel: das Argument ist logisch korrekt, aber es behauptet nicht, dass Erkenntnis insgesamt unmöglich wäre, sondern nur im genannten Sinne.
Wenn wir uns zum Prinzip machen, die Gültigkeit von allem Wissen zu bezweifeln, kommen wir zum Skeptizismus, der (nach Russell) auch nicht widerlegt werden kann.
Erkenntnistheorie beweist nicht die Existenz von Erkenntnis, sie setzt Erkenntnis voraus.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Hegel, G.W.F. Wessel Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 221
Identität/Hegel: verwarf den Satz "a = a". "Kein Gegenstand bleibt sich selbst gleich". WesselVsHegel: Fehler: Verwechslung von Wort und Gegenstand.
I 222 ...+... Z.
Zahlen/Wessel: in der Mathematik sind Zahlen Objekte, die durch Definition eingeführt werden. Sie existieren erst, wenn man Zeichen für sie einführt. Man unterscheidet zwar zwischen Ziffer und Zahl, aber ohne Bezeichnungen (Ziffern) existieren auch die Zahlen als abstrakte Objekte nicht.
Das führte dazu, dass man Zahlen und Zahlentermini häufig nicht unterscheidet.
Identität/Hegel: Bsp "Der Baum ist der Baum" drücke "nicht das Ansich desselben" aus, weil es ihn "nicht als ein in sich selbst Reflektiertes darstellt". (WesselVs).
Identität/WesselVsHegel: 3. Fehler Hegels: Identität und Verschiedenheit nicht als zweistellige Prädikate (Relation) sondern zum einen als Subjektterminus und zum anderen als einstelliges Prädikat anzusehen. Verschiedenheit ist einfach die Negation der Identität!
WesselVsHegel: hat auch Unrecht darin, dass er sich bei seiner Erörterung auf die triviale Identität a = a beschränkt. Diese Identität wäre als einzige wirklich überflüssig. Wir können aus ihr keine Schlüsse ziehen und keine Veränderung beschreiben.
- - -
I 365
Sein/Nichts/Hegel: versucht, den Begriff des "Werdens" durch die Wörter "Sein" und "Nichts" zu bestimmen,. WesselVsHegel: das ist zum Scheitern verurteilt: ohne jede Rückgriff auf das empirisch Gegebene lassen sich Veränderungstermini nicht einführen. (>SellarsVs).
I 365/366
Ähnlich wie das Existenzprädikat lassen sich Veränderungstermini nicht rein logisch einführen. Empirische Vorstellung von Veränderung wird in der Logik bereits als bekannt vorausgesetzt. Z.B. werden Zeitbegriffe über Veränderung definiert.
- - -
I 366
Veränderung/Wessel: kann auf zweierlei Weise eingeführt werden, 1. mit Verwendung von Zeittermini - 2. ohne Verwendung von Zeittermini.
I 367
Problem: zwei Möglichkeiten: Merkmale an einem Gegenstand können sich modifizieren, oder ganz verschwinden bzw. neu entstehen. Dementsprechend kann man auch zwischen Übergangszuständen oder statischen Zuständen unterscheiden.
s(s~E(a) => sE(a)) ein Entstehen von a
s(sE(a) => s~E(a)) ein Vergehen von a
s(S~A => sA) ein Entstehen von sA
s(sP(a) => s -i P(a) ein Verlust des Merkmals P.
Paradox der Veränderung/Wessel: "ein sich verändernder Körper besitzt eine Eigenschaft p und besitzt sie gleichzeitig nicht".
dialektische Identität/Hegel/Wessel: logische Form:
es gibt eine Eigenschaft P derart, dass P(a1) u P(a2) gilt, und es gibt eine Eigenschaft Q derart, dass Q(a1) u -i Q(a2) oder -i Q(a1) u Q(a2) gilt. ((s) Etwas bleibt und etwas ändert sich).
Veränderung/Prädikat/Wessel: bisher haben wir das zweistellige Prädikat => betrachtet: etwas wird zu etwas anderem.
Es gibt aber auch das einstellige Prädikat llv (Pfeil nach unten) "etwas verändert sich" , "etwas wird wahr" oder unwahr.
Bsp "Das Wasser ist bewegt".
WesselVsHegel: daran wird klar, wie unbegründet die Entgegensetzung von Seins und Werdenstermini ist.
Veränderung/Ereignis/Prädikat/Wessel: mit dem Veränderungsprädikat sA => sB lassen sich nun Subjekttermini bilden: s(SA => sB). so nennt man Ereignisse!
(s) Ereignis: sing Term, der aus einem Prädikat für Veränderung gebildet ist).
Wessel: für solche Prädikate muss aber jeweils nachgewiesen werden, ob sie mit Subjekttermini dieses Typs verknüpfen darf.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Popper, K. Feyerabend Vs Popper, K.
 
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I 74
Einstein/Popper/Feigl: FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper and Feigl have tried to make Einstein a naive falsificationist. In reality, Einstein puts "the reason of the thing" above the "verification by small effects". "... If no light deflection or perihelion were known, the theory would be convincing, because it avoids the inertial system.
I 236
Falsification/FeyerabendVsPopper: that new observations disproved old ones and thus forced the establishment of a new astronomy is certainly not right for Copernicus. A process as complex as the "Copernican Revolution" cannot be traced back to a single principle.
I 356
FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper considers science as a problem solution. This overlooks the fact that problems can be formulated incorrectly.
II 82
PopperVsHegel: shows very laboriously that nonsensical consequences are obtained if the propositional logic is combined with Hegel. He concludes that Hegel must be eliminated. FeyerabendVsPopper: E.g. This is about as smart as calling for the theory of relativity to be eliminated, just because simple computers are no match for it.
Hegel + propositional logic are nonsense. Why should precisely Hegel be blamed for this nonsense? Logic: incompatible also with the earlier quantum theory and with the differential calculus at the times of Newton...
Explanation/Popper: explains "that the world of each of our theories can be explained by other worlds which are described by other theories." The doctrine of an ultimate reality collapses.
II 119
FeyerabendVsPopper: but only because it does not correspond to his favorite methodology. But if it turns out that the world is finite, then we have an "ultimate reality." FeyerabendVsPopper: Vs "third world": it is populated with just as many different (and often incommensurate) entities as there are beliefs in the "Second World". Does not solve the problem of relativism, but conceals it.
II 201
FeyerabendVsPopper: "mere propagandist." (His former teacher).

Fe I
P. Feyerabend
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Fe II
P. Feyerabend
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Subject Philosophy Habermas Vs Subject Philosophy
 
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I 119
Philosophy of the Subject: (HabermasVs, NietzscheVs,) ... the nihilistic domination of subject-centered reason is conceived as result and expression of a perverseness of the will to power.
I 180
...the existence is justified out of itself. Thus, Heidegger conceives the world as a process again only from the subjectivity of the will self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or the question of being. The monological execution of intentions, i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the cognitive relation).
I 309
HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: the attempt to escape the unfortunate alternatives always ends in the entanglements of self-deifying subject consuming itself in acts of futile self-transcendence.  Since Kant, the I simultaneously takes the position of an empirical subject in the world where it finds itself as an object among others. In the position of a transcendental subject it faces is a world as a whole which its constitutes itself as the totality of the objects of possible experiences.
 The attempts to understand these irreconcilable alternatives as self-generation of the mind or of the genus range from Hegel to Merleau-Ponty.
HabermasVsHegel: because these hybrid undertakings pursue the utopia of complete self-knowledge, they keep turning into positivism. (Today: the body-soul problem).
I 435
LuhmannVsSubject Philosophy: "Simple minds want to counter this with ethics." (Habermas: not without scorn.). HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: overall social awareness as a superordinate subject, it creates a zero-sum game in which the room for maneuver of individuals cannot be accommodated properly. ((s) Every social conflict would appear as schizophrenia.)
Habermas: Solution: alternative concept strategy: public communities can be understood as a higher-level intersubjectivities. In this aggregated public there is also an overall social consciousness. This no longer needs to fulfill the precision requirements of the philosophy of the subject to the self-consciousness!
Luhmann II 136
Subject Philosophy/Habermas: Problem: in philosophical discussions, ideological criticism not even survives the simplest self-application. At most, it can explain why someone is wrong, but it cannot show that there is a mistake.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Various Authors James Vs Various Authors
 
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I 17
JamesVsHegel.
I 29
JamesVsPhysiological Psychology (Lotze/JamesVsLotze).
I 52
Monism / James: (terminology): label for neo-Hegelian: existence of an omniscient mind is a prerequisite for knowledge and experience (JamesVsMonism/JamesVsNeo-Hegelianism). - - -
Stegmüller IV 494
W. K. Clifford: Thesis: it's wrong to believe anything at all! JamesVsClifford: our mind-like nature is not only allowed to, it must make a choice between alternatives.
Our extra-reasonable nature influences our beliefs. What hypotheses do for us are almost always acts of will. (Mackie pro).
Most of what one believes, is believed because of authority! (Mackie pro).
IV 495
It makes a difference whether you want to recognize truth or avoid error. Moral/James: is objective (MackieVs), but we cannot wait for empirical evidence.
IV 495/496
Moral/James: asserts two things. 1) the best things are the more permanent ones that reach into the afterlife.
2) we are already feeling better now if we believe the first statement.
Religion/James: the more perfect and more permanent part of the universe is understood personally. The only practical way to assume the religious hypothesis is to meet it halfway. >Moral; social interaction, trust.
Facts/Belief/James: even with fact questions the mind may well be the deciding factor. MackieVs: that is too close to Pascal.
IV 497
James: where speculative reason does not provide results, self-interest should make the difference. MackieVs: we should not welcome this, it should make us even more critical!
MackieVsClifford: we must not only be willing to come up with hypotheses and test them, we also have to be able to carefully agree with them.
IV 498
James: the only way to test a hypothesis is to enter into a relation with the (corresponding) person. Theism/James: "meet halfway", get involved in it! We will be better off in the end when we have at least tried to commit ourselves to it.
IV 499
James/Mackie/Stegmüller: of all criticized authors, James has the best stand with him.
Various Authors Kripke Vs Various Authors
 
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I 57
Kripke: It would be interesting to compare Lewis’ notions with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics by Wheeler and Everett. I believe that this notion of physics could suffer from analog philosophical problems. (>David Deutsch). KripkeVsEverett.
I 77
KripkeVsBundle theory: prevalent, one version would be, e.g.: (1) for every name "X" there is a corresponding batch of "phi" properties, so that the speaker A means: "phi X".
I 78
This thesis is true because it can easily be a definition! The following theses are, however, all wrong I believe.
(2) A believes that one of the characteristics or some together pick out a particular individual object and only one.
KripkeVs: That just means that A thinks that they are doing it. Whether he is right is a different thesis.That he is right, is another thesis.
(3) When the majority or a decisive set of properties from the batch are fulfilled, then y is the referent of "X".
KripkeVs: that would therefore mean that certain characteristics are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is done.+
I 117
Ruth Barcan-Markus: Identities between names are necessary. If somebody thinks that Cicero and Tullius are identical, and actually uses the two as a name, then it is thereby bound to the thesis that his opinion is a necessary truth. Mark speaks of a "mere tag".
QuineVsMarkus: One beautiful evening, we could give the proper name "Hesperus" to planet Venus. One day before dawn, we could give a new proper name to the same planet, this time "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, then our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names were descriptions.

EMD 413
Ontology/Kripke: thanks to Tarski and the difficult convention W our discourse is committed to the existence of ships and molecules, buildings and even lemons! KierkegaardVsHegel: His philosophy is bizarre (peculiar, funny).
KripkeVsWallace: dito! Why should an astronomer who found a new planet be informed that he does not have any "ontological commitments" according to the sQ?

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Explanation Hempel, C.
 
Books on Amazon
Schurz I 224
Erklärung/Hegel/Schurz: These geht prinzipiell über Beschreibung hinaus, sie ist eine Art "Wesensschau" DuhemVsHegel/WittgensteinVsHegel: Wissenschaft kann überhaupt nur beschreiben - Hempel: Erklärung geht über Beschreibung hinaus, indem sie einen logischen Zusammenhang herstellt - Schurz: genau deshalb keine Letztbegründung, keine Letzterklärung.
I 226
Strukturgleichheit/Voraussage/Erklärung/Hempel/Schurz: (früher und mittlerer Hempel): These Erklärung und Voraussage sind strukturgleich.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Explanation Hegel, G.W. F.
 
Books on Amazon
Schurz I 224
Explanation / Hegel / Schurz: goes in principle beyond description, it is a kind of "essences" - DuhemVsHegel / WittgensteinVsHegel: science can ever only describe - Hempel: explanation goes beyond description, by establishing a logical connection - Schurz: that’s why there is no ultimate justification, no last clarification.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006