Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Conceptualism Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
I 72f
Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p" (>facts?) - VsObject Theory - VsConceptualism (concepts for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure) - TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion.
I 91
VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings"
I 184f
Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis - I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete idea. NominalismVsConceptualism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual - NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations.-
I 189
VsConceptualism: object dispensable - Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? - 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning.
I 204
Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color".

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Consciousness Adorno
 
Books on Amazon
Grenz I 213
Consciousness/Heidegger/AdornoVsHeidegger/Grenz: Heidegger, according to Adorno, tries to access a level of consciousness that was not even one in which the language (...) had not yet acquired imagery.

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Empty Set Frege
 
Books on Amazon
IV 13f
Nothing/FregeVsHeidegger: the nominalization of nothing leads to paradoxes. - E.g. The fact that the empty set is included in every set, also the universal class. - That does not mean that the universal class is identical with the zero class ("the nothing").
IV 98
Subset/Element/Frege: subsets and elements must always be distinguished. FregeVsSchröder/FregeVsRegion Calculus: zero cannot be included as an element in each class, otherwise it would depend on the respective manifold. - Sometimes it would have nothing, sometimes it would be something (E.g. negation of a). - Solution: zero as subset (empty set).
IV 100
Zero/0/Empty Set/FregeVsSchröder/Frege: zero must not be included as an element in another class (> Günter Patzig, Introduction to Frege IV), but only subordinate as a class. (+ IV 100/101). ((s) zero is only included as a subset in any other set, not as an element).
IV 102
Empty Class/Empty Set/Unit Class/Unit Set//FregeVsSchröder: it is not necessary to form a one class - if a is an individual of the manifold, then a is also a class and it is not necessary to admit this class a as a new individual, it is already such. - It is not necessary at all that a class should be given as an individual of a manifold. - It is not about the subter-relation (sic), but about the sub-relation (sic). - ((s) subset, not element.)
IV 108
Zero/Frege/(s): Solution: Zero corresponds to the class of objects that are unequal to themselves. - Then the zero sign has a meaning. - Logical form: "Either there are no self-dissimilar objects or they all coincide with P".

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Everyday Language Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
V 127
Ontology/QuineVsHeidegger: do not take everyday language literally. ---
V 128
But you come up with something and then determine the language according to it - ((s) no primacy of language in the ontology) ---
VII 103
Everyday language/Quine: is ultimately fundamental, but it does not decide in logical questions.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Existence Carnap
 
Books on Amazon
Graeser I 42
Being/CarnapVsHeidegger: copula "is" is not identical with "there is"- a) property relationship: E.g. "Shakespeare is a poet" - b) identity relationship: E.g. "Shakespeare is the author of Hamlet".
I 43
Subtractive fallacy/QuineVsHeidegger: from the mere presence of a word we infer the existence of something that is meant by this word.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
I, Ego, Self Heidegger
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 566f
I/Heidegger: the question "What am I?" is answered by itself: "I am the author of this question" Gabriel Marcel ditto - Kaplan ditto - EvansVs: that I am a physical entity, is not as safe as I think (Evans like Descartes, DescartesVsHeidegger) - Heidegger’s principle does not show the incoherence of the idea that I am different from my body - it can also not demonstrate that x in any instantiation is physical or not.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Heidegger
 
Books on Amazon
Adorno XIII 80
Identität/Heidegger/AdornoVsHeidegger: die absolute Identität, wie sie von Heidegger in seiner Lehre von dem sein heute stipuliert wird, ist in einer ihrer unbewussten und deshalb verderblichen, aber ganz ähnlichen Weise Identitätsdenken: in ihr wird verkappt der absolute Primat des Subjekts behauptet, und ihr Anspruch, sie sei etwas anderes als Idealismus muss deshalb notwendig zu Protest gehen.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006


A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Language Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 16ff
Mirror: Language is a tool and not a mirror (Rorty like Wittgenstein).
I 206
Language: the particularity of the language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens new perspectives to the consciousness". Its acquisition rather gives us access to a community whose members justify their assertions before each other.
I 228
Rorty: we can pursue Quine’s goals without useing his resources: we admit that the world can be fully described in a truth-functional language, but at the same time we also admit that parts of it can be described in an intensional language as well. If we were not able to refer to intentions, we would still be able to describe any section of the world.
III 25
Vocabularies: the world does not prefer one vocabulary over others. Newton’s vocabulary makes it easier for us to describe the world than that of Aristotle, but it does not prefer it! The human self is created by vocabularies
III 41
Rorty’s thesis: seeing the history of the language and thus of the arts, sciences and the history of morality as a metaphor is to abolish the image in which consciousness or language are always better suited for purposes that God or nature have imposed. Consciousness just happened in evolution, it’s not something at which the whole process was aimed
III 156
Language: people want to be described in their own terms
III 190
Language/noise/sound/Heidegger/Rorty: for him, philosophical truth depended on the choice of phonemes, the sound of the words themselves - III 197 Primordial words/RortyVsHeidegger: such words would be completely useless for people who do not share Heidegger’s associations -"
III 190
Writing/speech/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: Derrida puts Heidegger upside down: insists on the "priority of the written word". - Writing instead of sounds - "thought should become poet-like -" -the language speaks -

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Metaphysics Carnap
 
Books on Amazon
II 157 ff (in which book?)
PositivistsVsmetaphysics: there can be a reality that generally remains hidden from the experience.

VI 235
Metaphysics / Carnap: all the problems of "interpretation", "Declaration", "Basis" fall in the area of m. - Example parallelism: such parallel series (e.g. between visual and aural experiences) (e.g. report of the test person) can be easily set up; but their interpretation does not fall within the field of science, but within the field of metaphysics - VI 260, the "mystery of life" is not a question but a situation.
CarnapVsHeidegger: for the Brazil-Example: > see also Stegmüller I.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Metaphysics Habermas
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty II 27
HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "Subject Philosophy": a failed metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Mistake: to think that reflection and introspection could do what is really only possible through the extension of the discussion frame and the participants.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Metaphysics Bubner
 
Books on Amazon
I 19
Metaphysics/Bubner: its climax in Hegel (after Kant's rejection) proclaimed the resumption of the ancient project. Renewal of metaphysics. Provocation: that it is not opposed to science, but as a necessary perfection.
---
I 134
Metaphysics/Heidegger: Where does it come from? (HeideggerVsMetaphysics). BubnerVsHeidegger: the question contradicts a philosophia perennis, which manages the eternal questions.
       Where does the need to deal with so obviously empty questions like those about being come from?
Metaphysics/Bubner: 1. Thesis: it was by no means an eternal companion of mankind, but has developed as a task of philosophy in the face of special experiences.
The oldest documents of philosophy, on the one hand, are so profound, on the other, so unspecific that the metaphysics label does not fit.
Metaphysics/Ancient: first mentioned by Plato. The pre-Socratics, in his opinion, fail before the task of real understanding. So metaphysics arises.
Metaphysics/Bubner: Crisis in Descartes and Kant.
---
I 136
Skepticism/antiquity/Bubner: originally meant only accurate examination and judgment abstention (> Epoché)! Metaphysics/Bubner: as the supreme knowledge of the powers of pure reason, it cannot proceed otherwise than dogmatically.
       Thus skepticism is the natural enemy of metaphysics.
---
I 144
Metaphysics/Bubner: 3. Thesis: The Transcendental Revolution of Kant does not arise from a genius idea, but from the experience of the failure of metaphysics in its history so far. It serves the elimination of this lack and the insight into the efficiency of reason itself. ---
I 149
Metaphysics/Bubner: 4. Thesis: also the beginning of metaphysics is lead by an experience that brings the new discipline on the way. This is certainly not an experience with metaphysics, but an original experience, which involves knowledge when it is in pursuit of its intention diagnosing its lacks. Thus, metaphysics realizes a primal interest of all knowledge.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Natural Laws Heidegger
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 199f
Truth/man/reality/world/knowledge/existence/Heidegger/Rorty: before Newton Newton's laws were neither true nor false. - BrandomVsHeidegger: the truths existed before the emergence of the corresponding words. - Brandom: otherwise paradox.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nominalism Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 124
Def nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all creatures are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater measure to the true nature of an object than any other description.
NominalismVsPlato: nature cannot be dissected at its joints.
Materialistic MetaphysicsVsNominalism: these are representatives of a "language-bound idealism". The materialists believe that Dalton and Mendeleev actually cut nature at its joints. (Kripke also). Wittgenstein merely mesmerized by words.
II 125
Nominalism: protest against any kind of metaphysics. Hobbes mistakenly linked nominalism with materialism. Quine still links it to that. RortyVs: it is a contradiction to believe that words for the smallest particles of matter will dissect nature in a way in which is not possible with other words! A contradiction-free nominalism must emphasize that the prediction success of such a vocabulary is irrelevant for the "ontological rank". NominalismVsHeidegger: Words like "physique" or "essence" are not "more essential" than words such as "Brussels sprouts" or "football"
I 126
Nominalism: (like Gadamer): as far as we understand anything at all, we understand it with the help of a description, and privileged descriptions do not exist! Nominalism: what the approach to something fixed, hidden is to the metaphysicists, is the invention of a discourse to the nominalists.
Nominalism/RortyVsQuine: does not split the nature in a more secure way and does not create certainty about which is the true ontology - (Vs linking nominalism with materialism).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Presence Heidegger
 
Books on Amazon
Figal I 86
Ecstasy: three forms: past, present, future. They are the forms at present in the fact that they are directly interrelated, the future as such points to the essence and this to the present. ---
Figal I 98
"Presence": (horizontal scheme): both presence as well as absence. Absence is a special mode of something to be discovered (> Aristotle, "ousia" presence). Presence includes present and future. ---
I 98
FigalVsHeidegger: that suggests to see the future and the essence as modifications of the presence. Its threefold structure would have proved to be a peculiarity of everyday existence. With this the temporality that has been worked out in everyday existence would have had to be transcended. Difficulty: it is impossible, in accordance with the logic of the origin of his program, to make philosophy comprehensible analog to Aristotelian phronesis intended ordinariness of existence.
For this, the threefold structured temporality should have been interpreted as the time of philosophy (and not only as the ordinariness). Thus philosophy can no longer be explained by the structure of everyday life. The program of fundamental ontology has thus failed. (+ I 98.99)
---
Figal I 99
Heidegger now interprets philosophy in such a way that it is precisely understood in the structure of existence. Existence is essentially philosophical. And philosophy becomes historical.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006


Hei I
Günter Figal
Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016
Quotation Marks Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
II 109
Quotation marks/TugendhatVsHeidegger: misleadingly omitted: what do you actually mean when you use the term "being". - Then ambiguous whether sense of the word or of being - Typical shift - when Heidegger now asks about the meaning of being, does he ask for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. - He asks for the sense2 (which is not in any case the meaning of a word) of something what we mean when we speak of the being of a being - and what this something is, is left open. Insertion asterisk.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Terminology Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
I 72f
Veritative Being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject theory - VsConzeptualism (terms for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no-structure) - TugendhatVsTradition (Middle Ages): verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next unum and aliquid - would Aristotle have referred to the veritative being, he could have formed a semantics of assertion. ---
I 91
VsHeidegger: Being of facts instead of "all being is being of any beings". ---
I 162f
Object theory/TugendhatVs: states of affairs regarded as objects - VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus: state of affairs as a combination of object, fact as existence of state of affairs - Wittgenstein, late: (self-criticism), "complex is not equal to fact". ---
I 217
Object Theory simply ignored the communicative function of language. ---
I 337
Singular Term/TugendhatVsObject theory: cannot make that "standing for" understandable. Not even his own basic notion, that of the object. ---
I 338
Frege: singular terms are dependent expressions. ---
I 246
Hysteron-proton/Tugendhat: the later earlier - fallacy of interchanging the implication relation - here: also a state of affairs can only be identified by phrases. ---
I 266
Definition expulsion Game/Tugendhat: that the rule of use which is explained, is to be understood as a verification rule - (pro) - ((s) use> truth conditions> meaning. ---
I 276
The rules of the expulsion game are verification rules.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Unconscious Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 192f
Unconscious/Searle: according to the model of consciousness (pro) - VsHeidegger: e.g. Hammering not unconsciously but not alert - 2 differences: conscious/unconscious. ---
I 160f
Peripherals/center SearleVsFreud: unconscious for him like fish deep down in the sea (wrong idea of mental constance) - they seem to have the same form - problem - false analogy: consciousness/perception (regress) - requires yet another level of description, which does not exist - unconscious on the model of consciousness - What is the ontology of the unconscious, as long as it is unconscious (= revolt? hatred of the father?) - If I take away the object (bicycle) from the perception, it is a hallucination, but that is what I cannot do in case of conscious thought, to obtain the unconscious.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Use Theory Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 139
Language/Use theory/Rorty: no one would say that there is e.g. a "nature of crime" which could be found out by a study of our language - solution: it is about social practices, not just about language use.
II 70
Rorty: Analytical philosophy VsUse theory (Vschange in meaning).
III 36
RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what kind of work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets.
III 101
Use theory of meaning/Rorty: problem: that you know in advance for which purpose a tool is designed. This is not the case with language! As long as we are still trying to figure out how they can be used, we cannot consider Christianity, Newtonian physics, the romantic movement or political liberalism as tools!.
III 102
Use theory/Rorty: Problem: the purposes of language are not yet established - unlike tools.
III 194
SellarsVsHeidegger/SellarsVsUse theory: Physics prevail - HeideggerVsSellars - HeideggerVsWittgenstein: not physics but the poetry shows that the language game is inappropriate.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Carnap, R. Danto Vs Carnap, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Arthur Danto
Danto I 80f
CarnapVsHeidegger: denied that a sentence like "Das Nichts nichtet" was verifiable. DantoVsCarnap: we all know a feeling of anxiety . Why should it be less empirical than seeing a table.

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Derrida, J. Habermas Vs Derrida, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Derrida I 95
Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle).
I 196
HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity.
I 211
Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script.
I 213
HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below.
I 214
Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority.
I 233
DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding
I 240
Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function.
I 241
HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty)
I 243
HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. - - -
Rorty II 27
HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants.
II 30
Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken.
II 32
Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language.
II 33
RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens!
Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power.
II 35
RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous."
Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years.
II 36
Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here.
Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside.
RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism".
Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"."
HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Derrida, J. Rorty Vs Derrida, J.
 
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Richard Rorty
III 222
Deconstruction/RortyVsDerrida: not a new procedure. One can learn deconstruction just as one can learn to discover sexual symbols, bourgeois ideology etc. in texts. Reading did not become easier or harder, just as cycling does not become easier or harder if one makes discoveries about the nature of energy during it. Recontextualisation/RortyVsDerrida: has existed for a long time: Socrates recontextualised Homer, Augustine the pagan virtues, Hegel Socrates and Augustine, Proust himself, and Derrida all.
Why does it sound so frightening when Derrida does it as opposed to Hegel? Because Derrida uses the "accidental" material form of words while Hegel no longer wanted to abidy by the rule that the "opposition" relation applies only to sentences, and not to cconcepts, but nevertheless subjugated to the other rule that no weight has to be attached to the sound and form the words.
Derrida: in communicating with other people one has to comply to these rules, of course, but not when communicating with other philosophers.
IV 9
Metaphysics/RortyVsDerrida: too dramatic s presentation of the role played by metaphysics in our culture. He puts too much emphasis on the particular kind of centripetal thinking that ends in philosophizing that is oriented towards justification.
IV 118
Scripture/Derrida/Rorty: we should "think about a writing without presence and without absence, without history, cause
IV 119
arché telos which deranged the entire dialectic, theology and ontology (sic)." Such scripture would be literature, which no longer would be contradictory to philosophy. Scripture/Text/RortyVsDerrida: dilemma: either he can forget about philosophy
IV 120
and the What of scripture would lose its wit, or he must accept the dependence of the text of philosophy on its edges. When Derrida recounts such tragicomedy he shows himself at his best. His weakest points are the ones where he begins to imitate what he hates and claims he would offer "rigorous analyses".
IV 121
SearleVsDerrida/Rorty: his arguments are simply awful. Rorty: that's right! RortyVsSearle: underestimates Derrida; he does not even seek knowledge bases!
RortyVsSearle: the idea that there were such a thing as an "intellectual content" measurable by general and ahistorical standards links him with Plato and Husserl, but separates him from Derrida. The weakness of his arguments Derrida is that he believes that he would be pursuing amateurish philosophy of language. He did not notice that Derrida poses metaphilosophical questions about the value of such a philosophy.
IV 122
RortyVsDerrida: every new type of scripture that can do without arché and without telos is also left without object!
IV 123
RortyVsDerrida: Dilemma: another meta vocabulary is a) either prudocing a further philosophical seclusiveness or b) more openness than we can handle.
Derrida is aware of that. Therefore, he distances himself from Heidegger who has failed to write about philosophy unphilosophically.
DerridaVsHeidegger: "there will be no unique name, even not of existence".
IV 125
Heidegger never goes beyond a set of metaphors that he shares with Husserl. These metaphors suggest that deep down we all possess the "truth of being"! Calling and listening also do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. (so.).
IV 126
Scripture/dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: "primacy of scripture" not much more than a cricket: not more than the assertion that certain features of discourse are more evident in the case of writing, as in the spoken language.
IV 127
This is no more than a stale dialectic of reversal that Hegel disproved already in his phenomenology and that Kierkegaard called "tricks of a dog".
IV 129
RortyVsDerrida: the distinction between relationships contitioned by conclusion and associations not conditioned by conclusion is just as unclear and blurred as the one between word and sentence or between the metaphorical and the literal.
IV 130
But Derrida has to do something with all these distinctions. He must ensure that they look distinct enough. He is concerned about being the first to turn to this issue, while all previous authors have done nothing more than to build the same old building again and again.
IV 129
sentence/Rorty: the distinction between sentence and non-sentence is blurred. ((s) But supra.
IV 49
World/Rorty: amount of non sentences. - This presupposes a clear distinction.).
IV 131
Text/scripture/RortyVsDerrida: it is simply not true that the text sequence that makes up the canon of tradition is trapped in a metaphor that has remained unchanged since the Greeks. The procedure to speak multiple languages at the same time and to write several texts at the same time is exactly what all important, revolutionary, original thinkers have practiced.
IV 135
Text/RortyVsDerrida: virtually all thinkers have written several texts simultaneously. Also "glass" is not new, but the realistic representation of a site on which we have lived for some time.
IV 136/137
RortyVsDerrida: he can not perform an argumentative confrontation without turning into a metaphysician. Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: Being has always only had "meaning" as something hidden in the being. The "differance" is in a certain and very strange way "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of being.
IV 138
Trace/Derrida: neither a reason nor a justification nor an origin. (Claimed to have "proven" that. RortyVsDerrida: how can he prove it? > Proof.)
IV 139
"Differance"/Derrida: "neither a word nor a concept". RortyVsDerrida: First of all it was a typo. That it is not anymore is because it has actually become a word. Also, any word that has a use refers to a concept.
IV 140
Concept/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we have learned from Wittgenstein that every word is interwoven with others. RortyVsDerrida: Opposition: Derrida is trying to utilize the explanation of the language game of the concept of meaning and to grant some magic words privileges at the same time.
RortyVsDerrida: does nothing more than to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics.
IV 142
RortyVsDerrida: that all does not mean that the word games are not funny, but only that the accompanying sound of urgency is inappropriate. - - -
VI 475
Order/Searle: a blurred distinction can still be useful. VsDerrida, who makes no distinctions in his opinion.)
VI 476
Sign/RortyVsDerrida: should not depict concepts as quasi People. ((s) that bring concepts mischief). Sign/Derrida: would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems. E.g. how intentionality were possible in a world of atoms and of empty space.
RortyVsDerrida: should not even ask the question "What is the Political?". Just as the "piety" of Euthyphro it presumes sime kind of being of which one would assume that it would only be of interest to Phallogozentristen!
Concept/Derrida: wants to write without concepts as "agents".
VI 477
RortyVsDerrida: one should not write about the adventures of concepts, but about the adventures of people. He should not argue frequently used words stood for incoherent concepts, because there is no better proof for the consistency than the use, that this language game is actually being played.
Derrida is itself quite transcendental, while he criticized others for ot.
VI 480
Shine/to seem/appearance/RortyVsDerrida: in accordance with Wittgenstein and Davidson we can do our work without even mentioning this dubious distinction (Being/appearance)!
VI 500
Text/Concept/RortyVsDerrida: if there really is a world in which concepts live and weave and exist regardless of the language behavior of word users, namely that world which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of transcendental philosophy, the question arises: Why can it also be an empirical fact that a concept is nothing more than the use we miserable existing individuals make of a word. If the world in which a concept is nothing more than this use is real, the question is: How is it possible that that other world is also real?

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Derrida, J. Verschiedene Vs Derrida, J. Derrida I 88
»Lichtung des Seins«/"Clearing of being," etc. RicoeurVsHeidegger: That is a return of the metaphor in a way of thinking that no longer sees itself as metaphysical. DerridaVsRicoeur: turns this criticism. The metaphor wears. It returns in a different form.
VsDerrida: he overlooks the fact that "wear" is a metaphor again. - Thinking in terms of its relation to the metaphor is not to determine or identify!





De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Gadamer, G. Habermas Vs Gadamer, G.
 
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Rorty II 127
Gadamer/Rorty: helps us to wipe out both the concept of "inner nature" and the concept of "identifying description" Gadamer/Rorty: helps us to replace metaphors of depth with metaphors of width, the more descriptions are available, the better.
II 129
VsGadamer/Rorty: many times he was blamed of having invented a language-bound variety of idealism. - - -
V 24
HabermasVsGadamer/Rorty: relativism and potential repressiveness.
VI 415/416
RortyVsKrüger/Rorty: his propagating of the "scientific and technological world" has lead authors such as C.P. Snow, Habermas and Popper to think that Heidegger and Gadamer were on the wrong political side, (representing the more "literary culture") and were enemies of human freedom. (HabermasVsGadamer, PopperVsHeidegger, SnowVsLiterature).

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Heidegger, M. Bubner Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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I 28
Good / goodness / Heidegger: suitability. BubnerVsHeidegger: impoverishment: the idea as something common to all. Practice disappears from view. Truth / BubnerVsHeidegger: shortened truth in his interpretation of the cave allegory on unconcealment (Uverborgenheit) and thus spoils the accuracy of the reference to objects.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Heidegger, M. Carnap Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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I 89
CarnapVsHeidegger: denied, that a sentence like "Das Nichts nichtet" ((s) "Nothingness destroys") be verifiable. DantoVsCarnap: we all know a feeling of anxiety. Why should it be less empirical than seeing a table.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Heidegger, M. Derrida Vs Heidegger, M.
 
Books on Amazon
I 29
DerridaVsHeidegger: La verité en peinture: VsHeideggers Van-Gogh-Interpretation. Heidegger: erblickt Verläßlichkeit in der Festigkeit und Robustheit erbauen Schuhe. Derrida will weitergehen: er sieht eine Chiffre für die Verläßlichkeit des Seins. Das kann er aber nur, indem er zugleich die Verläßlichkeit der Bäuerin mitdenkt.
I 43
DerridaVsHeidegger: nicht konsequent auf seinem Weg, die Metaphysik zu verlassen. Er bleibt verhaftet, weil er vom Denken verlangt, der »Stimme des Seins« grausam zu sein. Das scheint eine Instanz vorauszusetzen, die spricht. Der christlichen Gott wird assoziiert. Andererseits ist die »Stimme des Seins« für Heidegger natürlich schweigsam, lautlos und wortlos.
I 124
DerridaVsHeidegger: beachtet die Differenz zwischen Mensch und Tier nicht genügend. Heidegger stellt die Hand als Organ des Zeigens als das eigene des Menschen heraus. - Heidegger: »was ist Welt ?«: »1. Der Stein ist weltlos 2. Das Tier ist weltarm 3. Der Mensch ist weltbildend.« - - -
Rorty III 202
Sprache/Urworte/DerridaVsHeidegger: seine Litanei ist nur seine eigene, keineswegs die von Europa. es gibt auch keinen "universellen Namen".
III 203
Vs Mythos von einer "verborgenen Sprache". (Vs überpersönliche Macht, die gewissen Worten Kraft
III 207
DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty:: man kann Heideggers "wir" und der Falle, in die er lief - als er sich durch Affiliation an etwas größeres, als er selbst war, anlehnen wollte - durch das entgehen was Gasché (sein Biograph) "wilde private Gedankenspiele" nennt.
III 208
Metaphysik/Heidegger/Rorty: degradiert Sprache zum Sprachspiel, degradiert Winke zu Zeichen, Denken zu Metaphysik. DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty:: das Problem besteht nicht darin, an das Wesen der Sprache zu rühren, ohne sie zu verletzen, sondern wie man sich einen eigenen Stil schafft, der es unmöglich macht, einen mit es seinen Vorgängern zu vergleichen.
Sprache /DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: hat sowenig eine "Natur" wie der "Mensch" oder das "Sein".
III 213
Ursprache/DerridaVsHeidegger: der Tag, an dem ein elementarstes Wort gefunden würde, an dem es nur eine mögliche Lektüre der "Karte von Oxford" gäbe, wäre eine Tragödie! Das Ende der Geschichte!
Rorty IV 124
DerridaVsHeidegger: "es wird keinen einzigartigen Namen geben, und sei es der des Seins".
IV 125
Heidegger geht nie über eine Gruppe von Metaphern hinaus, die ihm und Husserl gemeinsam sei. Diese Metaphern deuten darauf hin, dass wir alle tief im Innern über die "Wahrheit des Seins" verfügen! Rufen und Lauschen entgeht auch nicht dem Zirkel der wechselseitig explizierbaren Begriffe.
IV 137
Sein/DerridaVsHeidegger: das Sein hat immer nur »Sinn« gehabt, immer nur als in Seienden verborgenes gedacht. Die »differance« ist auf eine gewisse und äußerst sonderbare Weise »älter« als die ontologische Differenz oder als die Wahrheit des Seins.

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Heidegger, M. Habermas Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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I 165
Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology.
I 178
HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one.
I 179
HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence.
I 180
 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence.  The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation).
I 182
HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason.
I 183
HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Heidegger, M. Luhmann Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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AU Cass 8
Other distinction: Reason / Life - (not life / death). Life romantically understood as irrational, direct - not conveyed through legislation. This runs through to Heidegger. (Immediacy / indirectness as a characterization of the relation to the world).
AU Cass 9
LuhmannVstradition: against the notion of ontology that time was "something there" ((s) "Es gibt Zeit"). (VsHeidegger?).

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Heidegger, M. Quine Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
V 127
Identity/Everyday Language/Individuation/Reference/Quine: also identity is part of our referential apparatus, but it is obscure in everyday language, because we use it without clear individuation principle. E.g. Do two editions of a novel have the same hero? How unlike may the heroes be? Or e.g. how unlike may the editions be to still be considered as versions of the same novel?
E.g. Was Baal the devil? E.g. Did the Indians rever God by worshiping the Great Spirit?
Identity/Possible Worlds/PoWo/Quine: all these examples fall under the issue of cross-world identity. Identity in various possible worlds.
Differently:
Attributes/Identity/Quine: E.g. when attributes are coextensive, they are not necessarily the same attribute. But when are they anyway?
Wrong solution: some say in case of "necessary co-extensivity" the two attributes are identical.
QuineVs: that only shifts the problem.
Ontology/QuineVsHeidegger: we do not clarify ontological ambiguities by taking everyday language literally and sifting through it. (>Existence >value of a bound variable).
((s) primacy of language not in ontology).
V 128
Solution/Quine: it is the other way round: one comes up with something and gears language towards it! Existence/Ontology/Language Learning/Quine: the existing things are genetically nothing but an interplay of grammatical analogies that cover up the differences in the forms of learning. In the center is talk of objects. Ontology begins with the generalization of object study. (see above: e.g. color words, which, as you learn, do indeed not refer to individual things).
Grammar is thus simplified, ontology is multiplied.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Heidegger, M. Rorty Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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Richard Rorty
III 195
Poetry/Philosophy/RortyVsHeidegger: could as philosopher not become a poet, because he himself could not bear to be provisional. He wanted to make a final point.
III 197
Language/Heidegger: he believed he knew words that do or should ring a bell for all here in modern Europe. RortyVsHeidegger: it must be realized that those words do not exist and not at any time. They would be completely useless for people who do not share his associations or have different experiences. ((s) >Primal Words, Goethe).
History/Continuity/Rorty: the notion of a crisis in history presupposes what it wants to destroy: the notion of continuity. (VsHeidegger).
III 198
Poetry/Language/RortyVsHeidegger: he is right in saying that poetry shows what language can be if it is no longer a means to an end, but he was wrong when he thought that there could be a universal poem. Language/Sound/Speech Sound/RortyVsHeidegger: phonemes are important, but no a single phoneme is important for many people over a long time. ((s) >Primal Language).
III 199
Fate/Destiny/RortyVsHeidegger: neither Europe nor people in general have a fate.
III 204
RortyVsHeidegger: Nietzsche fills wine in Kantian hoses in Being and Time. (Too discursive, contrary to his own intentions). He says things that come from Nietzsche in a university style.
IV 79
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: tries to understand him by reading him as the last of the metaphysicians. RortyVsHeidegger: one of those who Nietzsche referred to as "ascetic priests".
IV 80
Heidegger tries to encapsulate the West, to turn to something completely different. Not unlike Plato, when he tries to create a spiritual world, from which he can look down on Athens.
IV 142
RortyVsHeidegger: wrong longing for Greekness. Pointless desire for elementary Greek words. We must create our own words. - - -
VI 140
Knowledge/RortyVsHeidegger: contributes to that we hold on to the notion that our knowledge was somehow "based" on our non-linguistic causal interactions with the rest of the universe, rather than simply to say that these interactions are among the causes of our knowledge. Available/Present/RortyVsHeidegger: (with Brandom and Mark Okrent): what exists is merely a special case of the available, like words are a special case of tools.
I 390
RortyVsHeidegger: its selection of the philosophers with whom he furnished the "history of Being" stems from the doctoral regulations of the time! It's a bit suspicious that Being should have geared itself so much towards the curriculum.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Heidegger, M. Tugendhat Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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Habermas I 182
TugendhatVsHeidegger: by making the word of truth to a basic concept, he just avoids the problem of truth. - - -
Tugendhat I 88
TugendhatVsHeidegger: Sein: in allen Sprachen mehrdeutig. Heidegger war völlig naiv, das nicht vorher zu untersuchen. Def veritatives Sein: Bsp "Es ist der Fall, dass", "So ist es, wie du sagst, Sokrates.."
I 90
Erschlossenheit: alle Erschlossenheit, die sich in Aussagen artikuliert, ist insofern eine Erschlossenheit von (veritativem) Sein.
I 91
Heidegger/Tugendhat: hat sich nicht darüber Rechenschaft gegeben. Es erschien ihm selbstverständlich, mit der gegenständlichen Tradition zu sagen, dass alles Sein ein Sein von Seienden sei, obwohl dies auf das veritative Sein ("Wenn etwas der Fall ist, ist es auch wahr") gar nicht passt, geschweige denn auf den erweiterten Begriff. (TugendhatVsHeidegger).
I 92
Erschlossenheit/Heidegger: ursprüngliche Erschlossenheit ist überhaupt nicht auf Gegenstände bezogen. Dabei meinte er mit „Gegenständlichkeit“ in Sein und Zeit "Vorhandenheit", nicht nur das, wofür singuläre Termini stehen, sondern die gesamte ontologische Perspektive, die sich aus der Orientierung an einer Aussage ergibt. Vorsprachlich.
I 104
TugendhatVsHeidegger: das widerspricht der zentralen Bedeutung, die Heidegger der Sprache beimaß ("Die Sprache ist das Haus des Sein"). Heidegger fiel auf das Niveau primitivster Sprachtheorien zurück, indem er die Bedeutung des Wortes für die Entschlossenheit des Seienden hervorhob.
II 65
Sein/Heidegger: der Gehalt jenes universalen Existenzsatzes als Ermöglichung allen "ist"-Sagens ist quasi der Inbegriff des Seins. TugendhatVsHeidegger: dieser Sinn bleibt unklar. Zweideutigkeit: "das Sein und das Nichts" ist in seinen Formulierungen schließlich doch übergegangen in "Das Sein und das Nichtsein".
Durch diese Zweideutigkeit ist es ihm auch nicht gelungen, die Differenz zwischen seiner Position und der traditionellen Ontologie deutlich zu machen.
II 109
Anführungszeichen/Heidegger: seine Anwendung von Anführungszeichen ist nicht einheitlich. Sein/Platon: "..was ihr eigentlich meint, wenn ihr den Ausdruck "seiend" gebraucht.."
TugendhatVsHeidegger: er lässt die Anführungszeichen weg! Verfälschung! Man kann nun darüber streiten, ob er den Sinn des Wortes oder den Sinn von Sein meint.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: typisch: er macht unauffällige Verschiebungen von harmlosen Ausgangspositionen mit erheblichen Konsequenzen.
II 110
Sinn des Seienden/Heidegger/Tugendhat: kein anderer Ausweg, als von zwei verschiedenen Arten des Sinns zu sprechen: Sinn1 und Sinn2. Wenn Heidegger nun nach dem Sinn von Sein fragt, fragt er nach dem Sinn2 von einem Sinn1 des Wortes. Er fragt nach dem Sinn2 (was jedenfalls nicht der Sinn eines Wortes ist) von etwas, was wir meinen, wenn wir vom Sein eines Seienden sprechen. Und was dieses etwas ist, wird offengelassen. TugendhatVsHeidegger: er hat sich sogar damit begnügt, die Wörter, die ihm und uns die wichtigsten sein müssten, im Unklaren zu lassen.
II 111
Def Sinn/Heidegger: "Das Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird." Sinn hat nur das Dasein, sofern es erschlossen ist. Def Welt/Heidegger: Das "Woraufhin" des Verstehens
Def Worumwillen des Daseins/Heidegger: dessen eigenes Sein, das auf die eine oder andere Weise entworfen wird.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: Frage: inwiefern ist irgendetwas, auf das wir uns beziehen können, nicht sinnhaft? Heidegger hatte hier eine andere Bedeutung von "Sinn" verwendet, nämlich etwas wie den Zweck von Wörtern. So kann man wohl vom Sinn des Menschen sprechen, aber nicht vom Sinn des Seins.
Sinn von Sein/Heidegger: nichts hinter dem Sein, sondern im Dasein.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: suggerriert, dass dasselbe Sein einmal erschlossen sein kann, und einmal nicht.
II 112
Tugendhat: ist etwas, worauf wir uns beziehen können, nicht immer erschlossen? Sinn von Sein/Heidegger: Zeit. Wie das, was seit den Griechen unter "Sein" verstanden wurde: "Anwesenheit", "Gegenwart", "Präsenz".
TugendhatVsHeidegger: Gegenwart wird nicht erst dadurch erschlossen, dass sie im Horizont der Zeit gesehen wird, sie ist von vornherein in diesem Horizont. Das könnte nur von jemand übersehen werden, der ganz und gar in "Anwesenheit" versenkt ist. Und genau das hat Heidegger der antiken Philosophie vorgeworfen!
II 113
Aber es gibt einfach Worte (wie "Gegenwart", "Zeit") die wir nur im Zusammenhang mit anderen Worten verstehen.
II 115
Verstehen/Heidegger: alles menschliche Verstehen ist primär ein Seinsverstehen. Es reicht über Sprache hinaus. TugendhatVsHeidegger: er hat folgende Spannung nicht gesehen: einerseits soll Sein Sein von Seiendem sein, andererseits ist er am "ist" orientiert und verbindet das mit der These, dass alles Verstehen Seinsverstehen ist.
II 116
Bsp "Es ist so, dass es regnet" hier kann man sagen, das "ist" beziehe sich auf den Sachverhalt, und das ist eben auch ein Seiendes. Das geht aber nicht bei Einhörnern. Tugendhat: weshalb soll man sich so verrenken?
Bsp (von Heidegger): "Der Himmel ist blau". Frage: Auf welches Seiende bezieht sich das "ist" auf den Himmel, oder auf das, was mit "blau" gemeint wird, oder auf beides?
So liegt es nahe, die Orientierung am Seienden wegzulassen und nur noch vom Sein zu sprechen.
II 121
TugendhatVsHeidegger: sein Wille zum klaren Durchdenken eines einmal Erschauten war gering. Heidegger hat durchaus einiges neu gesehen, zwei Themen scheinen erhaltenswert.
II 123
Stimmung/Heidegger: die primäre Weise, in der wir auf die Welt "im ganzen" bezogen sind. Sein hat keinen intentionalen Gehalt (!), es ist richtungslos. ("Angst", "Entzug") richten sich auf das "Seiende im Ganzen". TugenhatVsHeidegger: hier taucht quasi wieder ein substantiviertes "Nichts" auf: ein (unmöglicher) negativer Existenzsatz: "Es gibt nichts, woran ich mich halten kann".
II 124
Sein/später Heidegger: das "von allem Seienden sich unterscheidende", "schlechthin Andere zu allem Seienden". Das hätte in "Sein und Zeit" noch gar nicht so formuliert werden können. Das "Sein" ist jetzt die "Welt". Es steht nicht mehr für "ist" sondern für "es gibt".
TugendhatVsHeidegger: ich sehe keinen Anhalt für die mitschwingende These, dass alles Verstehen von diesem Sein her verstanden werden kann. Alles andere als klar.
II 129
Griechischer Seinsbegriff/TugendhatVsHeidegger: Heidegger wendet einen Taschenspielertrick an: es fragt sich, ob er sich des Schwindels eigentlich bewusst war. "ousia" gehört zum Stamm von "einai". Ousia = "Seiendheit" vorphilosophisch: "Eigentum", "Haus", "Hof". Heidegger übersetzt mit "Anwesen" und projiziert zurück. In Sein und Zeit behauptet er: "pareinai" = "Seinbei" und könnte als "Anwesen" übersetzt werden, aber die Gleichsetzung von ousia mit parousia ist schlicht falsch!
II 130
Zeit/Heidegger: die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins ist ursprünglicher als die von Heidegger sogenannte "vulgäre" Zeit. (Mit einem Verhältnis von "früher" und "später"). Zukunft/Heidegger: das Sichverhalten zum eigenen Sein muss man als Zukunftsbezug sehen.
II 131
Wortspielerei: "Zu-Kunft" als das, was schon für das Sein feststeht im unterschied zur unbestimmten Zukunft. TugendhatVsHeidegger: aber diese vulgäre Zeit muss trotzdem vorausgesetzt werden. Natrülich beziehe ich mich in jedem wachen Moment meines Lebens auf die bevorstehende Zeit.
II 131
Zeit als Sinn des Seins/Zeit/Zu-Kunft/Heidegger: er versuchte, eine eigentümliche "Bewegtheit" des Daseins zu konstruieren, anders als das übrige Seiende. Das musste fehlschlagen.
II 132
TugendhatVsHeidegger: die Übertragung einer Struktur, die wesensmäßig bewusstseins- oder daseinsmäßig ist auf irgendetwas anderes - und sei es auch das Sein - ergibt keinen Sinn!
II 132
Kehre/Heidegger: lässt sich als Versuch verstehen, die "Bewegtheit" , die in der Zeitlichkeit des Daseins liegt, in das Sein selbst zu projizieren bzw. jetzt auf beiden Seiten anzusiedeln. Dabei spielen die Begriffe "Welt" und der angeblich ursprüngliche Wahrheitsbegriff der "Unverborgenheit" bzw. "Entdecktheit" eine Rolle.
II 133
Das Dasein hat seine Bewegtheit nur aus der Bewegtheit des Seins, aus der so verstandenen Zeit als Sinn des Seins. Seinsvergessenheit: HeideggerVsMetaphysik: die angeblich das eigentliche Sein vergessen hat und nur das Sein von Seiendem sieht.
II 134
TugendhatVsHeidegger: die neue "Bewegtheit des Seins" (verstanden aus der Bewegtheit des Daseins) ist der Knackpunkt der "Kehre". Tugendhat: das scheitert: Das Sich Beziehen auf des Daseins ist ein Phänomen sui generis. Es ist eine Erweiterung der Husserlschen Intentionalität (von Heidegger selbst auch so gesehen) sowohl in Richtung Welt wie in Richtung Zeitlichkeit.
TugendhatVsHeidegger. wir haben aber keine Möglichkeit, eine etwas spiegelbildliche Entsprechung aufseiten des Seins in Auge zu fassen. Alle Worte stehen für genau den Prozess, der sich in der "vulgären" Zeit abspielt!
Heidegger: möchte, dass das Dasein zeitlich und doch nicht prozesshaft sei. Das ist widersprüchlich. Ein Hervorgehen, das kein Hervorgehen in der "vulgären" Zeit ist, gibt es nicht.
Heideggers Reaktion auf diese Widersprüche war eine quasi religiöse Haltung, deren praktisches Pendant die "Gelassenheit" war.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Heidegger, M. Verschiedene Vs Heidegger, M. Derrida I 44
Paul de ManVsHeidegger: Heidegger zitiert Hölderlin »wie ein Gläubiger die Heilige Schrift zitiert«.
Derrida I 87
»Lichtung des Seins« usw.. RicoeurVsHeidegger: das ist eine Rückkehr der Metapher in einem sich nicht mehr als metaphysisch verstehenden Denken.
(+ I 98,99)
Heidegger: Präsenz umfaßt Gegenwart und Zukunft. FigalVsHeidegger: das legt nahe, Zukunft und die Wesenheit als Modifikationen der Präsenz zu fassen. Ihre dreifachen Gliederung hätte sich als Eigentümlichkeit des alltäglichen Daseins erwiesen. Damit hätte die am alltäglichen Dasein herausgearbeitete Zeitlichkeit selbst überschritten werden müssen. Schwierigkeit: es ist unmöglich, der Ursprungslogik seines Programms entsprechend die Philosophie aus der analog zur Aristotelischen Phronesis gedachten Alltäglichkeit des Daseins verständlich zu machen. Dazu hätte sich die die dreifach gegliederte Zeitlichkeit auch als die Zeit der Philosophie (und nicht nur der Alltäglichkeit) interpretieren lassen müssen. So ist die Philosophie nicht mehr aus der Struktur des alltäglichen Daseins zu erklären. Damit ist das Programm der Fundamentalontologie gescheitert.
II 101
JaspersVsHeidegger: Heideggers Philosophie ist »ihrem Wesen nach unfrei, diktatorisch, kommunikationslos.
II 127
VsHeidegger: Dasein: Mensch ist nicht Subjekt, degradiertes Bewußtsein. Antihumanismus.
II 161
Tod als Möglichkeit: die Möglichkeit der Unmöglichkeit jeglichen Verhaltens zu...-- bietet keinen Anhalt, auf etwas gespannt zu sein..VsHeidegger: bloßer semantischer Trick.
Spielge-Interview R. Augstein Heidegger 1966/1976
Kunst/Augstein: "die moderne Ku versteht sich oft als experimentelle Kunst, Ihre Werke sind Versuche..."
Kunst/Heidegger: "Ich lasse mich gern belehren". - "Die große Frage ist, wo steht Kunst? Welchen Ort hat sie? Kunst/AugsteinVsHeidegger: gut, aber dann verlangen sie etwas von Kunst , was sie vom Denken ja auch nicht mehr verlangen. Heidegger: ich verlange nichts von der Kunst, Ich sage nur, es ist eine Frage, welchen Ort sie einnimmt. AugsteinVsHeidegger: weil die Kunst ihren Ort nicht kennt, ist sie deshalb destruktiv? Kunst/Heidegger: Gut, streichen sie es. Ich möchte aber feststellen, daß ich das Wegweisende der modernen KU nicht sehe, zumal dunkel bleibt, worsie sie das Eigenste der Kunst erblickt oder wenigstens sucht.
AdornoVsHeidegger: ~das "Leben an sich " gibt es nicht, und niemand darf, wie Heidegger, seine Reste mit dem "Absoluten " verwechseln.





De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Heidegger, M. Nominalism Vs Heidegger, M.
 
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Rorty II 125
NominalismVsHeidegger/Rorty: Words such as "physique" or "nature" are not more "elementary" than words like "Brussels sprouts" or "football".

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nietzsche, Fr. Heidegger Vs Nietzsche, Fr.
 
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Habermas I 180
HeideggerVsNietzsche "Revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: exactly this applied Heidegger now himself as a solution to it! He turns the origin of philosophy upside down, without departing from the problem specifications.
Habermas II 87
VsNietzsche: increases the subjectivity by turning the subject as the absolute will to power into a totally mundane phenomenon. - - -
Rorty III 68
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: umgekehrter Platonismus: romantischer Versuch, das Fleisch über den Geist, das Herz über den Kopf, mythischen »Willen« über genauso mythische »Vernunft« zu erheben.
Rorty III 179
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: "umgekehrter Platoniker". Drang, sich an ein Höheres anzuschließen.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Ordinary Language Dummett Vs Ordinary Language
 
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Dummett III 185
Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl.
III 196
Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either!
However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense.
III 196/197
Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin).
Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained.
III 198
DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances.
According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct.
III 199
DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Various Authors Derrida Vs Various Authors
 
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Derrida I 50
DerridaVsLogozentrismus: Zwiespalt zwischen dem »Sagen-wollen« und dem unbeabsichtigt durch die Art der Beschreibung Kundgegebenen. Derrida versucht einen Punkt zu finden außerhalb: das »Exorbitante«. »Lichtung des Seins« usw.. RicoeurVsHeidegger: das ist eine Rückkehr der Metapher in einem sich nicht mehr als metaphysisch verstehenden Denken.
DerridaVsRicoeur: dreht diese Kritik um. Indem die Metapher verschleißt, zieht sie sich zurück. Wiederkehr in veränderter Gestalt.
Derrida I 88 (?)
Vs Derrida: er übersieht, dass »Verschleiß« wieder eine Metapher ist. - Das Denken in seinem Bezug zur Metapher ist nicht festzustellen oder zu identifizieren!
I 139
DerridaVsMarx: zu sehr von Aufklärung abhängig. Derrida dekonstruiert Marx und führt den Begriff "Messianik" im Unterschied zum Messianismus ein.
I 150
DerridaVsMauss: bemerkt nicht den Widerspruch zwischen Gabe und Tausch, weil zwischen Gabe und Gegengabe jeweils ein Aufschub liegt. Daher spricht Mauss nicht von der Gabe sondern in Wirklichkeit vom zirkulären Tausch. - - -
Habermas I 194
Derrida: kritisiert die Herrschaft des Logos, der stets dem gesprochenen Wort innewohnt. DerridaVsPhonozentrismus: verkappte Gestalt des Logozentrismus des Abendlandes. Die Metapher vom Buch der Natur als schwer zu dechiffrierende Handschrift
Habermas I 203
Jaspers: »die Welt ist die Handschrift einer anderen, niemals völlig lesbaren Welt; allein die Existenz entziffert sie.«. DerridaVsPlatonisierung der Bedeutung.
Habermas I 234
DerridaVsNew Criticism (Formalismus), Vs Strukturalistische Ästhetik.

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988