Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


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Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Anaphora Kamp
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell I 184
Anaphora/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: a discourse section can be interpreted as a "long sentence". HintikkaVsKamp: that is unnatural.
CresswellVsHintikka: pro Kamp. It is only about a semantic ((s) non-syntactic) point of view. On the surface we have different sentences.
Hintikka: Thesis: a theory like that of Kamp/Heim cannot be applied to question-answer games.
CresswellVsHintikka: that does work: E.g.
(14) Here is a bee in the room.
(15) Will it stab me?
---
I 185
On a certain level one can consider (14) and (15) as a conjunction.

Kamp I
Kamp
From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy)


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Donkey Sentences Kamp
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell 172
Geach's Donkey/If-Sentence/Cresswell: E.g. (25) When a man has a donkey, he beats it.
Problem: (25) has two indeterminate noun phrases.
Kamp: (1983, 279) has an example with only one indeterminate noun phrase. E.g.
(26) When Pedro has a donkey, he beats it.
Undefined: a donkey - defined: Pedro.
Tradition/Problem: the phrase a donkey must be represented by an existence quantifier: (Ex) (donkey(x u ...).
But the obvious interpretation of (26) is
(27) (x)((donkey x u Pedro has x)> Pedro beats x).
Kamp: there are cases where the quantifier can be changed from the existence to the universal quantifier. If it does not bind a variable in the consequence, we have as a logical equivalence:
---
I 173
(28) (x) (Fx> P) ≡ (ExFx> P). Solution/Kamp: Kamp analyzes undetermined phrases (descriptions) as predicates (see above). And the universal quantification becomes part of the meaning of "if". (P. 288-90).
LewisVsKamp/Cresswell: (Lewis 1975a, S 11) that is fine for most natural meanings of (26), but there is a problem:
(29) Sometimes when Pedro has a donkey, Pedro beats it.
Seems to mean that there is at least one donkey that Pedro has and which is beaten by him.
Solution/Lewis: the role of "if" is merely to restrict the noun. That is, (29) has the meaning that (22) would have if we had ∃ instead of ∀.

Kamp I
Kamp
From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy)

Semantics Kamp
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell I 163
Semantics/Hans Kamp/Irene Heim/Cresswell: (Kamp 1983, Heim 1983, independent of each other):
1. Thesis:
Facts about descriptions, in particular their anaphoric use, require a representation level between surface form and logical form (surface/deep structure). 2. Thesis:
Sentence meaning/Kamp/Heim: the sentence meaning is no longer given by the truth conditions!
Description/CresswellVsHintikka/CresswellVsKamp/CresswellVsHeim: although there is a new view in terms of descriptions (among others, by Lewis 1975), we do not need a new kind of semantic theory.
Λ-categorial language/Cresswell: in it we can formulate the semantic insights of Kamp/Heim.
S: syntactic category: the syntactic category is either simple or complex.
Simple:
Syntactic category 0: sentence
Syntactic category 1: name
Complex syntactic category: form .

Kamp I
Kamp
From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy)


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Discourse Representation Partee Vs Discourse Representation
 
Books on Amazon:
Barbara Partee
Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse, Uni Konstanz Section Linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994
I 21
Discourse Representation/Discourse Representation Theories/DRT//File Change Semantics/FCS/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: (Heim 1982, 1983, Kamp (1981, with Reyle: 1993): Thesis the analysis should go beyond the individual sentence. Anaphora/DRT/FCS/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: should be able to go beyond the boundaries of sentences. NP: are not quantifier expressions, but precisely anaphorical. They can also refer to "virtual" objects. File/Terminology/Heim/Heusinger: the possibly virtual objects of discourse. Discourse Reference/Terminology/Karttunen: like Heim's files. I 22 Anaphora: anaphoric relations take place between files and certain operators can the bind files or give them a certain "lifetime". Discourse Representation/Heusinger: is displayed on a model only in the model-theoretic interpretation. Def Meaning/FCS/DRT/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: is a dynamic concept here, it is not the truth condition of sentences, but the information-changing potential of sentences. (Therefore terminology: file change) NP: new: they are discourse references here (with possibly changing correspondences) and more referential than quantifying. Referential/Heusinger: referring to particular properties. Quantifying/Heusinger/(s): not referring to properties.
I 23
Discourse Representation Theory/Heusinger: Solution: there is no anaphora paradox (because NP, like pronouns, are interpreted as a discourse reference) and the problem of the wide range of the existential quantifier is resolved. Problem/VsDiscourse Representation Theories: the problem of compositionality remains. Problem: the texts can then only obtain a truth value in their entirety. Chrysipp Sentences/Heusinger: New: the conditional is represented not as a material implication, but as unselective all-quantification over cases in the sense of Lewis (1975) Adverbs of Quantification. I 24 Proportion Paradox/Partee/ParteeVsHeim/ParteeVsDiscourse Representation Theory/Donkey Sentence/Heusinger:(Partee 1984): Problem (40) can only be represented as (40a), but that becomes incorrect if out of 6 farmers who each have a donkey, five beat theirs, while the sixth farmer has 10 donkeys, all of which he treats well. Problem: the quantification over cases only considers farmer-donkey pairs. I 25 Dynamic Logic/Groenendijk/Stokhof/Dekker/Heusinger: (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991, Dekker 1993): VsDiscourse Representation Theory: departs from a dynamic concept of meaning, like this one, which is not incorporated in the representation, but is coded in a new interpretation of the well-known logical inventory. Sentence meaning: no longer truth conditions, but contribution to the change of the context or information. Relevant information: is that on the variable assignment. Sentence meaning: is then the relation between two variable assignments. Discourse references: do not exist here. Dynamic Logic/Heusinger: Inspired by computer languages. I 42
Epsilon AnalysisVsDiscourse Representation/VsHeim/VsKamp/Heusinger: here, NP are not introduced as discourse referents on the additional semantic level of the discourse representation structure, but directly refer to selected objects of the model according to the principle of selection.

Part I
B. Partee
Mathematical Methods in Linguistics (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) New York 1990
Heim, Irene Cresswell Vs Heim, Irene
 
Books on Amazon
I 163
Semantics/Hans Kamp/Irene Heim/Cresswell: (Kamp 1983 Home 1983, independent): 1) Thesis: facts about descriptions, in particular their anaphoric use, require a level of representation between surface form and logical form (surface/deep structure). 2. thesis:
Sentence meaning/Kamp/Heim: is no longer given by the truth-conditions.
Description/CresswellVsHintikka/CresswellVsKamp/CresswellVsHeim: although there is a new point of view in terms of descriptions, (including by Lewis 1975), we do not need a new kind of semantic theory.
-categorical language/ Cresswell: in it, we can formulate the semantic insights of Kamp/Heim. So. I 82
s: syntactic category: either simple or complex.
simple:
syntactic category 0: Sentence
syntactic category 1: Name
complex syntactic category: form (t, s1, ... sn).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Kamp, H. Stalnaker Vs Kamp, H.
 
Books on Amazon
II 104
Possible worlds semantics//KampVsPossible worlds semantics/KampVsStalnaker: the approach is not rich enough to represent all differences. Kamp (1988) adopts an example by Barbara Partee: Example Pronoun/pronouns/anaphora/presupposition:
(2) a. Exactly one of 10 balls is not in the bag
b. It is under the sofa
(3) a. Exactly 9 of 10 balls are in the bag
b. It is under the sofa.
Kamp: Suppose the discourse takes place in the same initial context. That means
1. statement: changes the context.
2. statement: is made in the changed context.
II 105
Important argument: the first statements of the two pairs (2a) and (3) are truth conditionally equivalent. – that means they are true in exactly the same set of poss.w.. Context/possible world/poss.w./Kamp: if context are now sets of poss.w. and if assertions add only the truth conditional content to the context, the context will later be the same.
But the contexts on the other side must surely be different in both cases because although (2b) and (3b) are the same sentence it must express different propositions in both cases. "In the second case it cannot refer to "the ball".
KampVsPossible worlds semantics: if the sentences are truth conditionally equivalent no two different sets of poss.w. can be distinguished here.
StalnakerVsVs: it is true that our abstract approach does not predict this difference, namely, because it says nothing about how pronouns function.
Two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: is no meaning theory.
StalnakerVsKamp: it is not correct that you have to conclude from the fact that the former contexts are identical that the later contexts are also identical. By this you ignore the first way how a speech act changes the context (see above II 102 above).
That a statement was made at all is sufficient, together with any information that follows from it, along with a permanent background information on conventions. Thus one can distinguish two later contexts, relative to which (2b) and (3b) are interpreted.
Pronoun/Stalnaker: "it" apparently requires a context in which a particular individual is prominent.
II 106
Context/possible worlds semantics/StalnakerVsKamp/Stalnaker: solution: as long as the minimal assumption makes that information to determine the content may be relevant only if it is assumed by the speaker that this information is also accessible to the listener, we can be sure that the set of poss.w. that defines the presuppositions is sufficient to represent a context. An assertion changes the context already alone by the fact that it is made!

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Discourse Kamp, H.
 
Books on Amazon
Cresswell I 184
Kamp / Heim: a discourse theory section can be thought of as "long sentence".   HintikkaVsKamp: that is unnatural.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984