Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 74 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Kant
 
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I 14
WittgensteinVsKant: In relation to the absolute, there is nothing to see -
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Analogies Kant
 
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Strawson V 102
Analogies of Experience/Kant: We do not find them in the axioms of intuition - "Experiences are only possible with the idea of a necessary connection of perceptions" - Transcendental Aesthetic/Kant: Principles of sensibility a priori - Transcendental Analytic: comprises the deduction of the categories, the schematism and the principles.
V 104
Analogy: Shows how the order of the perceptions must be represented with the terms - Kant brilliantly reduces it on temporal relations - 1. between the objects 2. between the experiences.
Stra V 105
1. Analogy/Kant: Quantum of substance in nature can be neither reduced nor increased.
V 106
Time/Kant: All determination of time presupposes something permanent. Only space is persistent.
V 107
StrawsonVsKant: That is not a reason for the objective order to be spatial.
V 108
StrawsonVsKant: There is no need for a conservation principle! Only a re-identification principle for loci (objects). - Nowadays: We see that something burns while no substance remains.
Stra V 112
2./3. Analogy/Kant: Question: Could perceptions also have occurred reversely? a) Events: No time indifference b) Object: Time difference
V 115
2. Analogy: The order of the sequence is not only necessary, but also specific, bound by our apprehensions. Causality: If the order is necessary, the change itself is necessary. StrawsonvsKant: He unconsciously uses two terms of necessity here: conceptual/causal
Stra V 116/117
3. Analogy/Kant: the interaction of simultaneously existing objects corresponds to a time indifference of perceptions- Strawson: unlike causality.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Analyticity/Syntheticity Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 120
Lasting sentences: meaning of the stimulus is more sparse -accordingly: synonymy of stimuli is less plumable > VsAnalyticity. ---
I 339
Material implication "p impl q" not equal to "p > q" (mention/use) - "implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms. ---
V 114
QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences e.g. - "A dog is an animal" oneself later. - Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. - Analyticity is as social as language. - Random first examples should not have any special status - Definition analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. - That’s bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. - Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs. ---
VI 79
Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. ---
VII 21
Analytical/QuineVsKant: limits them to subject-predicate form - reformulated: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts" - VsEssentialism: creature arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational - This is relative. ---
VII 23
Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried: problem: based on unclear synonymy. Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent - not with bachelor/unmarried.
---
VII 28 ~
Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning - A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be a unempirical dogma. ---
VII 37
Verification theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning - then "analytically" borderline case: method does not matter - synonymous: method of refutation and confirmation are the same. ---
VII 37
Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement. ---
VII 161 ~
Analyticity/Quine: approximate truth because of meaning - that says nothing about existence.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Appearance Leibniz
 
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Holz I 128
In itself/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: their relationship with Leibniz is a dialectical one. It again corresponds exactly to the scheme of the "Overlapping General": The in-itself is the genre of itself (!), The in-itself, and its opposite, of the phenomenon.
---
I 129
This does not mean the fact that the phenomenon is always the appearance of an in-itself (which is the meaning of the word). KantVsLeibniz: for then the phenomenon could still be different from that whose appearance it is, and hence no knowledge of the object is possible. (This is how Kant sees the relationship).
LeibnizVsKant: insists that the phenomenon is the same as the in-itself, which manifests itself in the phenomenon.
The world does this in perception. This it how it duplicates itself in two respects.
1. As a whole, however, from a different perspective
2. It appears spatially as the dissociation of the various substances,
3. It appears as a temporal succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded," because it is nothing but the self-restraining activity of the original power of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and the appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and principle of its difference.
---
I 130
Hence the phenomenon is not standing out from the in-itself, but a kind of the same, and as such something quite real. Appearance/world/Leibniz: the world always appears only insofar as it is expressed as being-such of a single monad.
Phenomenality/Leibniz: the way in which the thing-to-be-expressed is contained in the expressed. Every expression is a phenomenon. It is well founded because, the in-itself, the phenomenon is identical with it and establishes it as a appearing in-itself.
The phenomenon is not opposed to reality (VsKant), but precisely its specific mode of being in the process of universal representation.
Therefore, all perceptions in all individual substances must correspond to one another.
---
I 131
Unity/Leibniz: only in this way can all the different monads perceive one and the same appearance. This is the "harmony universal" (universal harmony, see above) in process form, in which all appearances are linked, because they are appearances of the same in-itself.
Phenomenon/Representation/Leibniz: that means, however, that all beings are phenomenal. (Just as it is at the same time in-itself).
Since representation with Leibniz is a universal and general process, every being must be a phenomenon for every other being.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Axioms Genz
 
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II 184
Axiome/Mathematik/Einstein/Genz: die Axiome selbst sind nicht sicher, nur ihr Zusammenhang mit ihren Folgerungen. Und damit sind auch die Konsequenzen der Axiome nicht sicher.
II 188
Axiome/Erkennen/Logik/Kant/GenzVsKant: Kant dachte noch, dass die inhaltlichen Axiome der Euklidischen Geometrie mit dem Parallelenaxiom genauso sicher wahr seien wie die durch die logischen Schlussweisen hergestellten Zusammenhänge der Geometrie. Also gab es für ihn sichere Erkenntnis.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

Categorical Imperative Cavell
 
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Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
II 196
Kategorischer Imperativ/CavellVsKant: sollte besser ein Kategorischer Deklarativ sein: eine Beschreibung dessen, was es heißt, moralisch zu sein.
II 197
Kategorischer Deklarativ: sagt, was man tatsächlich tut, wenn man moralisch ist. Er kann nicht gewährleisten, dass man nicht unmoralisch handeln wird.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Categories Kant
 
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I 91
Categories/Kant: "Terms of terms" - These principles are the principles of presupposing the general nature of a possible object of sensuous intuition - in an assessment a subject is determined in four ways: quality, quantity, relation, modality.
Strawson V 71
Categories/StrawsonVsKant: Cannot be derived from the concept of objective judgment.
Stra V 98
Categories/StrawsonVsKant: He derives them from the form of the assessment as a list - they are said to have non-sensuous meaning. - StrawsonVs: We cannot trust it, we can also not trust the synthesis.
Vollmer I 25
Categories/Kant/Vollmer: Nowadays, it is not believed anymore that his categories are necessary. - - -
Bubner I 106
Kategorien/Urteile/Kant: Kategorien machen Erkenntnisse überhaupt erst möglich, während wirkliche Erkenntnis von der Zufälligkeit der Erfahrung abhängt. - - -
Adorno XIII 67
Kategorien/Kant/Adorno: Kant bezeichnet seine Kategorien sämtlich als Funktionen.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Causality Kant
 
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Danto I 298
Causality/Kant/Danto: is not derived from experience - but condition or form of experience - idea of ​​causality not causality itself. ---
Kant I 26
Causality/Kant: things themselves are not subject to the time condition, so not causality. - (Solution of the third cosmological antinomy: namely, the antinomy of causality of freedom (that belongs to the things themselves) and causality according to nature (in the phenomenal world)). - KantVsHume: causality does not apply to things themselves. - VsKant: he does not stick to it himself - mind: has its own causality: the "spontaneity of terms". ---
I 32
Subjectivity arises not only from causality (of freedom) but from the spontaneity of the terms - therefore metaphysics begins in empirical science. ---
Vaihinger 280
Causality/Idea/God/Kant/Vaihinger: I only underlie the idea of ​​such a (highest) being to see the phenomena as systematically linked to each other according to the analogy of a causal determination. ---
Vollmer I 25
Causality/Kant: outside of causality we cannot experience.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Concepts Brandom
 
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I 152
Concept: One must have many concepts in order to get an idea. ---
I 948
Definition concept/Frege: the concept is the semantic correlate of predicates, namely their "meaning" not their "sense". So concept defined by reference. ---
I 599f
Concept: LL: Mere distinctive reactivity is not enough to recognize the application of concepts. ---
I 601
Rationalist addition: the inferential role of reaction is critical. ---
I 852
Concept/BrandomVsKant: should not be separated dualistically from the non-conceptual. ---
I 853
Concept/Conception/Kant/Brandom: B relates to A as 1) form to matter - 2) general to particular - 3) spontaneity (activity of the intellect) to receptivity - BrandomVsKant: these are orthogonal and independent - no contrast to the non-conceptual - Content of the judgment also conceptual - Brandom: ad 1: if the mind does not change its material, it is superfluous (> Hegel, Phenomenology) - ad 3) contrast between conceptual/causal order: Kant was unable to construct this as a contrast between concepts and causes. ---
I 856
Definiton concept/Brandom: inferential role - it is about relations between concepts (East/West) not about relations between concept and object. ---
I 860
Conceptual structure/Brandom/(s): by repetition (anaphora) - necessary for cognitive purposes - conceptual content: by substitution? - ((s) or, more precisely: exchange of frames?). ---
I 862
Inferential structure: ideally allows costruing thinking and the world as represented with an identical structure - conceptual structure of assertions: about E.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Concepts Kant
 
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Term/Kant: "intuitions without concepts are blind." (KrV B 75)
---
Strawson V 22
Terms/Kant: not any arbitrary amount of terms is sufficient for us - there must be terms of persistent objects and re-identifiable objects in the room. ---
V 23
The distinctions must be created in the terms themselves, because there is no "pure perception of a reference system". ---
Stra V 122
Terms/Kant/Strawson: objects can only be changed in the context of a recognition - respective restrictions must somehow be reflected in the terms - but it is not about a specific link but about the existence of any such links. ---
V 123
Terms for objects are always summaries of causal law. ---
Stra V 128
Terms/StrawsonVsKant: not yet socially characterized by him ---
Tugendhat I 191
Term/Kant: general idea, mediate - intuition/Kant: immediately - Tugendhat: ambiguous: Imagined or subjective imagined - Kant pro the latter - objective meaning: "nota communis" common feature -> = species/Husserl. - - -
Bubner I 105
Erkenntnis/Urteil/Kant: Erkenntnis formuliert sich in Urteilen, die stets Begriffe voraussetzen.
Begriff/Kant: in Begriffen muss daher, transzendental gesehen, die Erkenntnisermöglichung durch Urteile bereits garantiert sein.

I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Consciousness McDowell
 
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I 113 ff
Confidence/Kant: "I think" that must be able to accompany all my ideas. Temporal continuity. But only formally, otherwise Cartesian. ---
I 113 ff
Definition Person/Locke: "a thinking intelligent being in possession of reason and consideration, and able to consider itself as itself. Even in different places and times. ---
I 126/27
Consciousness/Apperception/Criterion/KantVsLocke: his point (chapter on paralogism): the self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. The subject does not need to make an effort to focus its attention on one and the same thing. ((s) Breathing does not need a criterion for air, important as air may be). ---
I 127
Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that is itself outside of consciousness. ---
I 128
"I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). ---
I 129f
McDowellVsKant: it is unsatisfactory if consciousness is to be only the continuity of one aspect, one perspective without a body. The notion of ​​continuity cannot be conceived without the notion of ​​the living thing - as little as digestion. But that is not to say that physical presence is always connected with a self-consciousness. Consciousness/Kant: only creatures with conceptual skills have self-consciousness. McDowell pro.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Consciousness Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
Rorty I 60
Consciousness: Antiquity had no name for it.
III 37/38
RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: their doubts about whether there is something like ’mind’ or ’consciousness’ have to do with the idea of ​​a medium between the self and reality, a medium that realists consider to be transparent and skeptics to be opaque. Rorty: there is no medium.
VI 176
Consciousness/Rorty: What outcome do we want to see as a result of our research? Why would we want to change our intuitive conceptions? Neither intuition nor ambitious pursuit yield an Archimedean point.
Frank I 584
Consciousness/Rorty: does not really exist in the sense of a separate area of ​​the mental - mental events are conventions, a contingent language play - thesis: it can be abolished without loss.
Rorty I 132
Mental/Ryle/Rorty: thesis: mental states like opinions, desires, etc. are properties not of the consciousness but of the person.
III 37
Consciousness/mind/RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: mind or consciousness are not a medium between oneself and reality.
III 67
Consciousness/Kant/Rorty: two parts: a) reasonable: same in everyone b) empirically contingent. - In contrast: Freud: treats rationality as a mechanism that adjusts contingencies to other contingencies. - Plato: (State) conscience = internalized parents and society. - Reason/Kant: general principles - FreudVsKant: return to the special. - Kant: honest people are paradigmatic. - Freud: nothing human is paradigmatic.
VI 147
Consciousness/behavior/Wittgenstein/Rorty: wrong question: Is the behavior a different fact than consciousness? - Wittgenstein: we should not try to come between language and object.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Dialectic Plato
 
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Bubner I 34
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: more than a method, the dialectician proceeds with methodical correctness, because he leads his local life by being awake, not by dreaming. ---
I 37
DialecticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the action-oriented speaker is entangled in the deception of the words. (VsSophists). ---
I 38
Sophism/AristotleVsPlato: makes use of the same reasons to argue for the incompleteness of the dialectic, precisely because it has to do with intersubjective practise of speech. Definition "Topoi"/Aristotle: pre-scientific community. The topics makes the illuminating and success-promising of speeches substantial.
Dialectics/Kant: the negative reputation adheres to the dialectic up until Kant. However, the adherence to Kant is recognized as necessary.
---
I 39
Dialectic/HegelVsKant: his fear of contradictions reveals the limitations of his understanding of science. The dialectic must be thought through until the end. Kant had stopped at the negative result. HegelVsAristotle: "speculative mind of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical rootedness of speculation is to assure again the rank of strict method, which Aristotle had just denied because of its connection with the language.
---
I 111
Dialectic/Plato/Bubner: A) knowledge theory: the non-seclusion of true knowledge and reflection leads to a whole ensemble of rules and structures. B) dialectic in Plato is also the logical relationship between assertion and inference.
C) way of determining terms. (Up and down process) The late Plato develops approaches of a propositional logic.

Dissimilarity Democritus
 
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Adorno XIII 202
Dissimilarity/Democritus/Adorno: How is the dissimilarity in things created? The problem of all ancient philosophy was to state a unified principle, from which everything could be explained, and with which one could react against the infinite variety of natural mythology. ---
XIII 203
Atoms/Democritus/Adorno: atoms do not have internal states, but only mechanical states. This notion that the essence of things can only be grasped from the outside and not from the inside, and that there is in fact no inner being, had a tremendous consequence for the entire history of the sciences. ---
XIII 204
AristotleVsDemocritus/Adorno: Thesis: the objectivity and reality of forms is immanent to the things themselves. Natural science: modern science has criticized this Aristotelian and medieval view, and has no longer attempted to comprehend the matter from within, from these forms. One has simply observed and registered from the outside.
This is VsKant, VsLeibniz, VsWolff.
Group: Leibniz, Wolff pro Aristotle.


A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Epistemology Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 16
Rorty thesis: knowledge has no foundations.
I 163
Def recognize/Aristotle: insertion of something material into the soul.
I 167
Epistemic problem: the next two centuries of philosophical thought might have been very different if the "epistemic problem" had been formulated in the terminology of relations between propositions and their degree of certainty, rather than in the terminology of alleged components of propositions. Kant: did not undertake the pragmatic turn. He did not talk about sentences, but but about inner ideas.
I 167
Knowledge/epistemic problem/Rorty: relations between propositions - not between components of propositions - VsKant: then you do not need synthesis - Kant/Rorty: he did not talk about sentences either, but about inner ideas.
I 175
Foundations/knowledge/Rorty: arguments instead foundations! - Before Locke, no one would have searched for a foundation of knowledge.
I 191
Def recognize/Rorty: the social justification of opinions. The contrasting of people and situations. This allows us to get rid of the mirror of nature.
I 210
Epistemology/SellarsVsEpistemology//Rorty: it confuses a theory of inner episodes with a theory about the right to make certain assertions.
I 248
Epistemology/Quine/Rorty: epistemology always wavered between two criteria: a) causal proximity to the physical stimulus - b) the focal point of consciousness.
I 249
Solution: The dilemma dissolves, if we merely speak of color spots - ((s)> sense data).
I 271
Rorty: there’s no way from psychology to epistemology. No way from the discovery of intermediary instances to a critique of opinions about the world. (RortyVsepistemology).
I 273
Epistemological Tradition: confused causal explanations of the acquisition of opinions with justifications of opinions.
I 278
Epistemology: can be done in an armchair, psychology cannot.
V 20f
Knowledge/Foucault/Rorty: knowledge and power can never be separated from each other. RortyVFoucault: but these are not rules of language

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Epistemology Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
III 184
Thing in itself SearleVsKant: from the fact that we cannot see it, it does not follow that it is different from what we perceive, and not that there is a different kind of reality. In particular, from the positioning within our cognitive system it does not follow that this knowledge could never be the knowledge of an independent reality. (independend from our knowledge). ---
III 194
Background: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box - the background helps us determine the truth conditions for our utterances.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Epistemology Vollmer
 
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I XX
EE/evolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: Lorenz is the father of the evolutionary epistemology. Precursor: Donald Campbell, Popper, Lorenz - two meanings: Popper: scientific theoretical: evolution of knowledge (interactionist, VsIdentity theory) - Lorenz: Evolution of cognition. (Identity theory) ---
I 16
Knowledge/history/quality/primary/secondary/Vollmer: with increasing progress more and more properties were recognized as subjective - with Locke impenetrability was still a primary quality - today even expansion is not regarded anymore as a primary quality. ---
I 59
Epistemology: is not "reflection" of the outside world - but also not purely algorithmically - in contrast Information/Lorenz embodied : E.g. hoof: "image" of the steppe soil - E.g. fin - "image" of the water - VollmerVsLorenz: misleading terminology - solution : texture of the hoof indicates texture of the soil. ---
I 73
Knowledge/Vollmer: its third level, scientific knowledge is not genetically determined - there are no "biological roots" of the space-time - we are only obliged to consistency - otherwise we are free in forming hypotheses. ---
I 173
Epistemology/tradition/VollmerVsKant: why do we have just these forms of intuition and categories? - How are they formed? - Why are we bound to these a priori judgments and not to others? ---
I 293
Definition He: (1983.30): an adequate reconstruction and identification of external structures in the subject - a) construct an internal image, b) compare the model with the stored engrams c) determine in how far object corresponds to already known - for that memory is required - reconstruction is therefore not a reflection - our concept of knowledge is narrower than any concept of information - Stegmüller: three-digit relation: subject recognizes object as image. ---
I 296
Recognize/Kutschera: the step from ignorance to knowledge - knowledge/Kutschera: only to explicate as true belief - neither truth nor subjectivity is gradable. ---
I 310
Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: - explication of terms - investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparing different cognitive systems - distinction of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements - clarification of the conditions for recognition - demonstration of limits of knowledge.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988

Ethics Husserl
 
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I 115 ff
HusserlVsHume: no ethics of feelings- VsKant: Vs categorical imperative / HusserlvsKant: formal generalization is not sufficient to characterize ethical correctness - Husserl: fictitious observer must be able to understand my assessment - a) passively, by chance circumstances, b) purpose, acting, reasonable
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart
Ethics Kant
 
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Stegmueller IV 169
Def hypothetical imperative / Kant: if you want X, do Y "- which is based on a causal knowledge - e.g. imperative of skill imperative of Wisdom - without desire. > Categorical imperative - MackieVsKant: the categorical imperative is not objectively valid - in addition you need a premise in which occurs a fact about a decision
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Ethics Nagel
 
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III 109f
Ethics/Nagel. Consequentialism: thesis: the consequences of action are important - not how the action feels for the actor - NagelVs: it about the permission to lead one’s own life - III 111 internal perspective: Problem: that murder is prohibited does not command to prevent others from committing it - utilitarianism: good/bad - internal perspective: legal/illegal.
III 112
Ethics/Nagel: core question: how far may the internal point of view be included? - Life is always the individual life - it cannot be lived sub specie aeternitatis - the limits are always the individual possibilities.
III ~ 87
Ethics/Nagel: the acting from one’s own perspective has such a strong value that deontological paradoxes cannot be excluded - they would only be avoidable at the cost of the impersonal world.
III 86
Parallel objectivity/consciousness/ethics/Nagel: the objective world must contain the subjective perspectives - ethics: the neutral reasons that consider the actions of the subject with all its seemingly superstitious reasons.
II 49
Determinism/ethics/Nagel: responsibility also exists in deterministic actions when the determination is intrinsic - actions determined by nothing are incomprehensible.
II 54
Ethics/law/moral/God/theology/Nagel: an act is not converted into something wrong just because God exists.
II 54
categorical imperative/NagelVsKant: nothing but a direct interest in the other can be considered as a basis of ethics - II 55 but: the reason not to do evil to someone else cannot be anchored in the individual person - II 61 Problem: Moral should not depend on the strength of interest in others.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

Ethics Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
III 310
Ethics/Rorty: it’s not about the fact that we are morally obliged to feel solidarity. Literature does not help with appeals, but with a detailed description. Solidarity is made, not found (VsKant).I 314
II 79ff
Walzer, Michael: skeptical of terms like "reason" and "universal moral obligation." VsKant: there is no idea or principle common to all. Def "thin" morality: Kant’s image of the beginning: a basis that will be expanded. WalzerVs.
Def "dense" morality: Walzer: all morality is "dense" from the beginning: it is culturally integrated. The road goes from initially "dense" to a "thin", more abstract morality. (s): "dense" morality: morality of the clans. War of all against all!
II 83f
RortyVsKant: we cannot dissolve conflicting loyalties by completely turning away from them towards something categorically different from loyalty - the universal moral obligation to act justly. We go with Hegel and Marx: the so-called moral law is, at best, a handy abbreviation for a specific tissue of moral practices.
VI 256
categorical imperative/moral/ethics/RortyVsKant: brotherhood of all humans cannot be justified by neutral criteria -

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Experience Dewey
 
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Suhr I 37
Experience/Dewey: he excludes from its essence completeness and finality. ---
Suhr I 71
Experience/Dewey: experience means to make an attempt with the world. It is not an experience when the child touches the flame. It is only an experience when the movement is associated with the pain. ---
I 72
DeweyVsKant: unlike Kant's idea of the synthetic activity of the mind, we are never dealing with a chaotic manifoldness. Our senses always supply already interpreted material. ---
Suhr I 102
Experience/Antiquity: the concept formed itself, when the arts were above all routine. Experience: experience is a collection of unreasonable customs. Skill, not insight. Experience/modern times: the concept formed itself, as the arts became more experimental!
---
I 141
Experience/Dewey: Things that interact in a certain way are experience! ("Double meaning" of the concept of experience,> James). ---
I 150
Experience/Dewey: cognitive experience is always embedded in non-cognitive experience. Pro empiricism.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004


Dew I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 2016
Exterior/interior Stroud
 
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I 206
General/Special/skepticism/verificationism/generalization/interior/exterior/Stroud: Descartes with him the special is representative and can therefore be generalized. - VerificationismVsGeneralization: it considers it suspicious: not apply statements of the system to the system itself. - StroudVsCarnap: the problem interior/exterior is not the same as that of the general and special. - StroudVsCarnap: the sentence that Descartes does not know whether he is sitting by the fire is not meaningless, only in connection to the skeptical presumption that it is not verifiable. - Problem: the verificationism could come easily in the situation to have to assume that then all of our everyday language would be useless. ---
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - so that the interior/exterior-problem is avoided. ---
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori "knowledge".

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Forms Hegel
 
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Adorno XIII 70
Form/Inhalt/Hegel/Erkenntnistheorie/Form/Inhalt/endlich/unendlich/HegelVsKant/Adorno: in der Erkenntnistheorie lehnt Hegel die Kantische Trennung von Form und Inhalt ebenso wie die von Erkenntnis des Endlichen und des Unendlichen mit außerordentlicher Konsequenz ab. Material/Hegel/Adorno: Das Material ist bei Hegel nichts Äußerliches und Zufälliges, sondern selber auch Geist.



A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Foundation Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
VI, 246f
Foundation / Dawkins / RortyVsDawkins: (thesis, that people are just vehicles for genes) - an inadequate thought of foundation - RortyVsKant: you should not hold on to an ahistorical "human nature" as well.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Good Hegel
 
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Bubner I 182
Good/Hegel/Bubner: the entire thought process (e.g. of the Encyclopedia) in the end comes down to the "self-knowing reason", which deserves the name of the absolute since it represents the total mediation between reality and knowledge where nothing remains external. Identity of goal and process. Reinterpretation of the classical idea of ​​the good under the caption of the idea of ​​"recognition", which in turn is placed between "life" on the one hand and the "absolute idea" on the other hand.
I 184
Def Life/Hegel: means the reality of the individual, life process and species, so "it may seem as though the domain of logic was overstepped." Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "idea of ​recognition", which in its turn is split into the
"idea of ​​truth" and the
      "idea of ​​the good".
      Here, however, instead of the usual triad of Hegelian dialectics, there is only a two-step procedure: because of the elementary subject/object relationship.
The subjective, theoretical concept of the good in knowledge is opposed by the "idea of ​​the good" in practical action.
Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation on two sides: theory and practice. (Following the example of AristotleVsPlaton's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience".

I 185
Subject/Object/Antiquity/Bubner: the entire ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing at all about it.
I 186
Good/Hegel: the truth of a purpose implanted in reality must be determined as "the good" beyond the perspective of action: objectivity, "rationality of the world." The finiteness of our everyday goals, their plurality and possible collision, as well as their postulatory status in the ought, must be interpreted merely as an expression of the "incompleteness" of the good.
      The executed good would be the abolition of otherness.
With that, the inadequate subject/object relation disappears, which characterized the metaphysical content that was discussed.
Metaphysical Content/Hegel: it must now be called "free, universal identity with itself". Thus, the dialectical genesis about the idea of ​​truth and the idea of ​​good is abolished.
Therefore, what "has its own objectivity as an object in its other" is the unity in the division as a construction principle of all reality.
After successful mediation it is no longer tinged with the work of reflection.
I 187
Parallel to Aristotle: Divine eternal life on the basis of purely rational self-activity. Good/Hegel/Bubner: for him the good is an auxiliary expression!

I, Ego, Self Kant
 
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Horwich I 404 f
I/knowledge/Kant: representations (according to Putnam) - "empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: is the author "in the game", not the right author - this is the transcendental ego (out of game). - internal realism/PutnamVsKant: 1. authors in the plural (social) - 2. the ones in the story are real!
PutnamVsSkepticism: Pointe: it would be "crazy" if that were only fictions because a fictional character cannot be a real author. - But these are true stories.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 322
I/Kant: "Empirical I": working as a cause and as effect - "Noumenal I": (metaphysical): superfluous, passive viewer - metaphysical I: addressee of the moral ought. - - -
Strawson V 146
I/subject/Hume/Strawson: is obliged to explain the idea of ​​what "I" means - as anti-rationalist he must declare our fiction - KantVsHume: Kant does not need that, he needs empirical criteria for the subject's identity. - - -
Bubner I 108
Ich/Kant/Bubner: es gibt nicht das Ich, dem Vorstellungen anhaften, sondern die verschiedenen Vorstellungen untereinander als die meinigen anzusprechen heißt allererst ein Selbstbewusstsein zu schaffen. - - -
Adorno XIII 64
Ich/transzendentales Subjekt/KantVsHume/Adorno: eben jenes Ich, das von Hume schlechterdings bestritten wird, muss in Wirklichkeit vorausgesetzt sein, um so etwas wie Erfahrung zu konstituieren. Kant hat aber gesehen, dass dieses dem Erfahrungsinhalt gegenüber doch auß0erordenlich verselbständigte transzendentale Subjekt in sich selber (…) eine Dynamik, die über die Erfahrung hinausgeht. Das hat er darin zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass die Vernunft, indem sie über ihren erfahrungsgemäßen Gebrauch hinausgehe, sich notwendig in Widersprüche verwickele, weil dem Denken, wenn es einmal ins Spiel gekommen ist, nicht willkürlich Einhalt geboten werden kann.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Idealism Kant
 
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Strawson V 211
Transcendental Idealism/StrawsonVsKant: non-empirical knowledge/Kant: geometric knowledge - but only when the analysis is complete. - StrawsonVs: this premise does not make more than the definition of the conditions to be explored - that means, they do not depend on the transcendental idealism. - And if the premise is not dependent on him, then the evidence is not either - and thus also not the whole non-empirical knowledge. - Pointe: it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine that what we perceive as objects, are no such objects in reality. ---
Stra V 213
Def Phenomenalistic Idealism: the claim that physical things are not independent of our perceptions. - Definition Problematic Idealism: claims that the assumption of external objects is only a conclusion from internal perception. - KantVs: this presupposes what is wrong, namely that bodies exist independently of our perception - what is wrong is the transcendental idealism. (KantVsTranscendental Idealism) ---
Stra V222
Transcendental Idealism/Kant: claims he is an empiricist Realism. Confidence must include an awareness of specific awareness-independent objects. - StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism - this dualism questions the "our". ---
Stroud I 129f
Definition Dogmatic Idealism/Kant/Stroud: the thesis that there is no world besides me - KantVs: that would be a statement about the world we want to investigate: that's absurd. ---
Stroud I 130
Def Problematic Idealism: Thesis: that the independent world from us was unknowable. - KantVs: that misinterprets our actual situation in the world. - - -
Adorno XIII 58
Transzendentaler Idealismus/Kant/Adorno: Kant ist transzendentaler Idealist in dem Sinn, dass er glaubt, dass die Urteile, die wir als gültige Urteile über die empirische Welt fällen können, konstituiert seien durch ursprüngliche Formen unseres Bewusstseins, dass aber dann die so einmal konstituierte Welt als eine je schon konstituierte, in der wir leben, eben die Welt ist, die den Gegenstand unserer Erfahrungen bildet; von deren empirischer Realität dürfen wir deshalb überzeugt sein, weil die Organisationsformen, durch die wir sie transzendental (…) stiften, ihrerseits sich immer auf ein Material beziehen müssen, das selber aus der Erfahrung stammt. KantVsPlaton/Adorno: darin steckt eine Kritik der (Platonischen) Ideen. In diesem Sinn ist er einer der großen Vollstrecker der gesamtnominalistischen Tradition der neueren Aufklärung.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Infinity Kant
 
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Strawson V 174
infinity / StrawsonVsKant: not Kantean: every cosmological series presents an infinite number of possibilities - but that does not mean that the answer involves an infinite number - but each of the infinitely many answers that mentioned a finite number may be true - that questions the term infinity with respect to sets with empirically distinguishable circumstances - this does not question the paradoxes of the concept of infinity, but empirical objects do not have to have these properties.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Infinity Cantor
 
Books on Amazon
Thiel I 165
Unendlich/CantorVsKant: "vager, instinktloser Gebrauch des Unendlichkeitsbegriffs". Cantor: These das "potentiell Unendliche" (Prozess) setzt das "aktual Unendliche" ("ein in allen Teile festes, bestimmtes Quantum") voraus, da zur Ausführung eines Prozesses "ein geebneter Weg und fester Boden unbedingt erforderlich sind".

Wollen wir analog zu den Grundzahlen, welche die "Größe" endlicher Mengen "messen" auch "Maße der Größe" unendlicher Mengen einführen, so werden diese neuen Zahlen angesichts der Auseinandertretens von Größe und eindeutiger Zuordenbarkeit bei unendlichen Bereichen nicht alle Eigenschaften der Grundzahlen teilen können. Hier gilt nicht immer n + n ungl. n. Auch gilt ϑ + ϑ = ϑ.
I 166
Cantor hat für die "Anzahl" den Buchstaben Aleph eingeführt. Bei Ao bezeichnet der Index dass dieses Anzahl nur die erste in einer selbst unendlichen Reihe unendlich großer Anzahlen, der "transfiniten" Zahlen sein sollte. Die als Ao + Ao+ formulierte Eigenschaft ist nicht absurd, sondern ein "Rechengesetz" im Bereich der transfiniten Zahlen.
I 167
WittgensteinVs: die Lehre von den transfiniten Zahlen krankt daran, dass sie von falschen Bildern begleitet ist. "Etwas daran ist unendlich" suggeriert: "etwas daran ist riesig". Aber was an Ao ist riesig?. Nichts. Bsp Wittgenstein: Ich habe etwas unendliches gekauft! - Es war ein Lineal mit unendlichem Krümmungsradius." - - -
Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967
17
Cantor/Russell: Cantor stellte fest, dass alle angeblichen Beweise, die gegen die Unendlichkeit sprachen, auf einem bestimmten Grundsatz fußten: Die betreffende Maxime lautet, dass eine Menge, die in einer anderen enthalten ist, weniger Elemente hat, als die Menge, in der sie enthalten ist. Diese Maxime gilt aber nur für endliche Zahlen. Das führte geradenwegs zur Definition des Unendlichen:
Def unendlich: eine Menge ist unendlich, wenn sie sich aus Mengen zusammensetzt, die ebenso viele Elemente enthalten wie sie selbst.



T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Internal/external Putnam
 
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I 167ff
Truth/knowledge/Kant/Putnam: first separation of internal and external view: according to Putnam: ~ what we say about qualities of objects, applies with equal force to our sensation ("objects of the inner sense") - PutnamVsKant/Vs "noumenal world": the question of whether my feelings at different times are "really" alike (have "same noumenal property"), is useless - my sensation "red" cannot be compared directly to noumenal objects - truth/Kant: "agreement of knowledge with its object" - Putnam: this is not a correspondence theory but any judgment says, the noumenal world is as a whole in such a way that this is the description that a rational being would construct, if it has the information that a being acquires through our senses. - Putnam pro: this is truth as an ideal fit.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Knowledge Vollmer
 
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I 206
Knowledge / VollmerVsKant: according to Kantians, we can in fact know only what is given by the senses. - Then we can not know, for instance that the earth moves - E.g. that the space is non-Euclidean. - e.g. Then quarks and black holes should never be objects of empirical science, because they are not vivid.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988

Logic Kant
 
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Strawson V 64
Logic / Kant: does not contribute to the conditions the objects have to meet - logic uses terms, but not the content of knowledge - General L.: abstracts - Transcendental Logic: is confronted with a manifold of sensory input - 68 V there cannot be a specific way in which we need to think about the objects of experience, in order to enable the thtruth-functional composition of statements - the ability of the composition cannot depend on our disposal of any other a priori concept of an object in general - StrawsonVsKant: "metaphysical deduction": failed attempt to derive the categories of logic - Strawson: the logic did not help Kant to get ahead. - - -
Bubner I 105
Logik/KantVsTadition: alt: während die herkömmliche Logik die Begriffslehre der darauf aufbauenden Urteilslehre vorausschickt, geht neu: die transzendentale Logik umgekehrt vor und orientiert die fundamentalen Kategorien bereits an der Synthesisleistung der Urteile.
I 106
Die kategoriale Vorstrukturierung durch Begriffe a priori konstituiert Gegenstände als Gegenstände und "macht" sie damit zum Thema möglicher Erkenntnisurteile .((s) Reflexiv, >Kritik). Bsp der "schwarze Mensch" und "der Mensch ist schwarz": im ersten Fall bloß als schwarz gedacht (problematisch)
im zweiten als solcher erkannt!
Beidesmal aber derselbe Verstand durch dieselben Handlungen!

I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Mathematics Frege
 
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I 121
Conclusion / Mathematics / Frege: mathematical inferences are included in the definitions already. - FregeVsKant: therefore they should be called not only synthetic but also analytical.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Metaphysics Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
III 127 ff
Metaphysicisit: E.g. Hegel: despite historical realization of the truth still approaching something fixed. III Introduction Metaphysics: questions about the unchanging, possibly hidden things that underlie the phenomena. Typical: Socrates’ questions. ("Immanent nature"). (HeideggerVs). In this respect, coupled with common sense! He gives no redescription, but analyzes old descriptions with the help of other old descriptions. The metaphysicist calls everything else "relativistic". He assumes that our tradition cannot provide problems that it is unable to solve.
Metaphysics: thinks that there is a connection between redescription and power, and the right redescription could liberate us.
IV 77ff
Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: Heidegger thought he might escape metaphysics - (the idea of ​​a single truth) - by understanding being and truth historically -
VI 154ff
Metaphysics: wants to see our desire to be friendly supported by an argument that contains a self-description. It is supposed to throw a highlight on a thing common to all humans Transcendence: the assumption that there is something with which we may not be connected. RortyVs: it does not exist! Our beliefs themselves are secular objects in constant causal interaction with others.
Rorty: the fact that we keep open whether we describe the world differently later has nothing to do with transcendence.
VI 480
Transcendence/DavidsonVsKant/Rorty: not needed

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Metaphysics Leibniz
 
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Holz I 13
Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: the inner unity of his work can only be understood from metaphysics. His position lies between Kant and Hegel: he shows LeibnizVsKant the alternative of metaphysics as a science, by showing his method.
LeibnizVsHegel: he shows the possibility of metaphysics, which is not based on an absolutely idealistic way.
---
Holz I 24
Metaphysics/Holz: with Leibniz, it receives the scientific theory form of a non-empirically verifiable theory of the general connexion of the world. They are no longer "ideas" of the whole, but trans-empirical construction of the most plausible and most explanatory form. ---
Holz I 81
Metaphysics/Leibniz: since that looks like a circle, Descartes, for example, sought a justification in God. But metaphysically, the circle cannot be dissolved, for metaphysics rests precisely on an unbroken link!
The circle is also preserved logically.
The system has to be interrupted somewhere:
Solution/Leibniz: an ineluctable function of sensory perception - not as a "first reason," but as an extra-logical material beginning of the reflexion ratio, as a quasi "Archimedean point" (outside).
Leibniz is well aware of this break.
For its part, the metaphysical necessity can no longer be deduced from reasons.
---
I 82
Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: in the realm of reasons of truths (for example, mathematics) the reduction is real possible to the identity principle. ---
Holz I 119
Leibniz thesis: the structural character of the monad causes that something is happening. The structure guarantees the unity of being and is the being of unity. Metaphysics/Unity/World/Ultimate Establishment/Leibniz: the concept of the individual is a world concept. For this reason, the inner-world scientific justification given to the particular in its particularity is dependent on a metaphysical (underlying) principle which makes the being of the world intelligible.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Morals Kant
 
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Stegmüller IV 299
Morality/ethics/Kant must necessarily apply -> categorical imperative - as a hypothetical imperatives ("if you want that, do ...") they would be superfluous. ---
IV 429
Moral/Kant/Stegmüller: is autonomous: the morally right thing is right in itself and mandatory - it can be detected by practical reason. - Every rational being is competent enough to give the moral commandments themself. - If there was divine reward, morality would be corrupted by self-interest. -> Rawls: the veil of ignorance. - ---
IV 430
God/practical reason/Kant: nevertheless, the moral asks us that we set ourselves the highest good for goal - therefore a cause different from nature must be demanded from nature. - The highest good is only possible in the world, if the highest cause of nature is assumed. ---
IV 431
In addition, the immortality is necessary so that an infinite progress for the first element of the highest good is possible. MackieVsKant: this is a false transition from "should" to "should be possible."
---
IV 433
MackieVsKant: The consistent recognition of the autonomy of moral should have brought him to a more stoic conception: that moral does not need any other bliss as the consciousness of righteousness itself - (possibly> Hume, Marc Aurel, Adam Smith).. ---
Strawson V 134
Moral/Kant: we need that to ensure that the limitations of knowledge do not strengthen the materialism and atheism. ---
Vaihinger 306
Moral/Kant/Vaihinger: the theoretical reason forbids to accept a moral world order - the practical reason dictates that it is necessary to do good.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Morals Walzer
 
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Rorty II 83
Moral / WalzerVsKant / Walzer/ Rorty: Def "thin morality": Kant s universalistic basis. - WalzerVsKant: these do not exist - on the other hand: "dense" moral / Walzer: culturally integrated - the road goes from an initial dense to a thin morality.
II 85
WalzerVsKant: loyalty before principles - (according to Rorty).


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Motion Leibniz
 
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Holz I 133
Movement/Leibniz: something takes the place of something else. ((s) It is not replacing a previously "empty space"). ---
I 134
What encompasses all these places is "space". For this, one does not need to assume "absolute reality" of space. Space/time/LeibnizVsKant: is the epitome of possible relationships, but not as forms of intuition, but rather real ontological as structures of the relationship of the material being-in-themselves to one another.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Naturalism Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 169
Naturalism: thinking of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confused cause and reason).
I 324
Def naturalization: to call something the foundation.
VI 138
Def naturalism / Rorty: a) there are no inhabitants of the space-time, which would not be connected in a single network of causal relations with all the other residents        b) any explanation consists in assigning a place to an object in this network.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Naturalized Epistemology Stroud
 
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I 209
Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence - there is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. - brains in a vat - Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world. ---
I 211
QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory - solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. - QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge. ---
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. ---
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. ---
I 250
Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? - But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) - Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain - then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another - ((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) - underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things - Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events. ---
I 251
Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy at events - StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness - the proof has to be one, too. ---
I 253
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects).

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Nature Kant
 
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Rorty (where?):
Nature / Kant / McDowell: with him nature is the same as the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although he very well knows the concept of education. But not as a background.
Second Nature / McDowell: thesis: there are rules of nature, regardless of whether one is susceptible to it or not. That is the consequence of correct education. "Naturalism of the second nature", "naturalized Platonism".
Vollmer II 48
Def Nature / Kant: "The existence of things, as long as it is determined according to universal laws." Nature / VollmerVsKant: that is unnecessarily narrow and begging: because the generality of the categories thus becomes an analytical consequence of this definition - (circular).
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Negation Frege
 
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Chisholm II 181 ff
Negation/Frege/Simons: Problem: negative facts - Solution: simply two truth values ​​(t/f) and a function that swaps the two - WittgensteinVsFrege: connection should not be represented as a function - Operator N: forms a conjugates negation from a sentence: the asserted (the used variables) is false - Notation: x^: all values ​​of x. - Negation/Simons: only has the smallest range: atomic sentences. - Operator N: always negates the disjunction, never the conjunction, because of Wittgenstein’s need for atoms. - Ontology: only complexes and the verbs E! and N. - - -
Frege IV 61
Negation/Denial/Judgment/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. - That’s quite unnecessary - even a negative one judgment is a simple judgment.
IV 64
Negation/Denial/Frege: is not equal to the judgments. - It is not an "opposite pole" to the judgments.
IV 69
Description/Subordinate Clause/Subset/Name/Frege: E.g. "the negation of the notion that 3 is greater than 5" - this expression refers to a specific individual thing. - This individual thing is a notion. - The definite article turns the entire expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name.
IV passim
Thought/Frege: to every idea belongs its denial as an independent second idea. - Thoughts are not made up, but composed. - Their truth is not their being thought. - They are timeless, precisely because they must always carry a determination of time with them. - Thus, "today", "yesterday" and "I" become "He" (two thoughts). - By replacing "horse" with "mare" the thought does not change, only the coloring. - - -
Tugendhat II 66f
Negation/Frege: not a property - not always with the sign of negation. - E.g. "Christ is immortal" is not negative per se. - The negation sign applies only to the propositional content. - Proof: Negation in subsets: only the whole sentence is asserted. - In the subset (non-asserting) the "not" belongs to the propositional content from the outset.
Tugendhat II 12
Proposition/Frege/Tugendhat: negation always refers to the propositional content, not the assertion.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Norms Brandom
 
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I 83
Norms/standards/Brandom: not from collective action, that does not exist - Community must not be personalized - it is always about individual members. ---
I 84
Basic: I-You relationship - instead I-We-relationship. - Community: how much agreement is enough? - Brandom: there are always authorities and experts. ---
I 96
Normss/Brandom: from what we do, not part of the nature of things. ---
I ~ 105
Norms/standards/Brandom: depend on our community: they are our standards - concepts: irrespective of community, the facts decide about it - concepts are non-discoursive: Discussions do not decide about them. ---
I 867
Norms/standards/Brandom: normative attitudes prevail - definitions are not causally effective on their own - standards are not objects in the causal order - talking about status cannot replace talk about actually occupied positions - what follows from p cannot be identified with my actual accounting - A: phenomenalistic view the standards, but it is a normative phenomenalism. ---
I 898
Norms/Brandom: our own practices confront us already with internal standards - 1) in the guise of deontic status: definition and authorization - (in the eye of the beholder) - 2) The accuracies themselves are being reflected (account management). ---
II 52
Norms/HegelVsKant: not only noumenally but socially rooted. ---
II 54
Standards/Hume: attributed to wishes - BrandomVsHume: explanation by definition on patterns of practical inference - i.e. What is a desire and what is not?

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Perception Kant
 
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Strawson V 126
Perception/Kant/Strawson: between veridical and non-veridical perception we can only distinguish when the general conditions of objective determination of time (objective perception) have been met. ---
V 169f
Perception/Kant: it exists very well "in itself"! - Problem: then the question of the beginning of the series is repeated - StrawsonVsKant: always talks of our perception. - But your perceptions are not given to me. ---
Stroud I 164
Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept empirically direct perception of independent things, because he does not accept them transcendental. - Direct perception: only possible with dependent things . - E.g. representations. KantVsTranscendental realism: this would also have to take independent things. - Problem: then we would have to denote our representations inadequate as these things. - StroudVsKant: I'm trapped in my subjectivity. - Thus the transcendental idealism can hardly be distinguished from skepticism. - StroudVsKant: according to him the best science (physics, etc.) is possible, but still dependent on our subjectivity.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Phenomena Leibniz
 
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Holz I 128
Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: a phenomenon must not be regarded in Kant's way as separated from the essence! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". This is also not a duplication, but a "translation".
The phenomenal is the substance itself, but under conditions of the imagination, for which space and temporality are decisive.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Pragmatism James
 
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Diaz-Bone I 68
Pragmatism/James: the term pragmatism is used for the first time by James 1898. He, however, refers to Peirce, 1878. ---
I 68f
Signs/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce every thought is a sign. ---
I 70
Pragmatism/Peirce: pragmatism is a voluntary action theory. Definition Voluntarism: Will as the basic principle of being.
---
I 76
Pragmatism: pragmatism is like a corridor in the middle of many rooms, it belongs to all who use it. Concept/Pragmatism: He considers all concepts hypotheses. Use is always a personal decision.
---
I 78
We do not live to think, but we think to live. ---
79
Science/James: Science, comon sense and individual consciousness have one thing in common: they should increase the human adaptability.
---
I 88
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> Realization,> adjustment). ---
I 102
VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with certainty: it can never be ascertained whether an observation is properly translated. (> Basic problem).


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Proof of God’s Existence Kant
 
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Strawson V 194
cosmological proof of God / StrawsonVsKant: Kant: if there is an unlimited being, it exists necessarily - Strawson: we cannot turn it the other way round: if it is necessary, it is unlimited. ontological proof / Kant: from non-contradictory existence should follow necessary existence.
- KantVs: it is one thing to form an idea - it is another thing to declare that the idea ((s) concept) has an application.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Reality Goodman
 
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I 18ff
Reality/world/Goodman: The many materials from which one generates worlds - matter, energy, waves, phenomena - are produced together with the worlds. But not from nothing, but from other worlds. Our creation is re-creation. The beginning should be left to theology. No hope of firm foundation.
The talk of unstructured content or given contradicts itself, because speech cannot be unstructured.
---
I 18
Kant: the concept of a pure content is empty. ---
I 34
... should we stop speaking of right versions as if each world would be its own and should all be recognized as versions of one and the same neutral, underlying world? Goodman thesis: The world which is regained like this is, as noted earlier, a world without kinds, without order, without movement, without peace and without structure. - A world fighting for or against is not worth it. ---
II 70f
Reality/Goodman: the whole reality, also space and time are dependent on description, VsKant, VsSalmon, VsRead - conceivable: space-time points do not exist all the time. - Solution: sum object p + t ----
IV 44
Reality/Goodman: Nothing is realized by a mere decision. The admission that there are many standards of accuracy, can therefore not collapse the distinction between right and wrong.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Reality Kant
 
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Strawson V 76
Reality/StrawsonVsKant: why should the object of consciousness not have a distinct (from this independent) existence, even if they coincide point by point with the experience? ---
Stra V 156
"Everything else"/StrawsonVsKant: the term that everything would be arranged differently with respect to the present time, is completely empty (> Davidson) - as empty: assumption of a change in the external temporal relations ---
Stra V 231
Reality/appearance/Kant: it is pointless to deny that there is something beyond our experience, as it would be pointless for the blind to deny that the objects have further characteristics- what we must deny is that any other aspect of reality is in a kind of systematic connection with the aspects that we already know - noumenal world/StrawsonVsKant unnecessary to ever assume unperceivable - instead modest noumenon: that what we can still discover
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Reason Kant
 
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Bubner I 142
Reason/Kant/Bubner: no one but the reason can say what reason really is - reason is bothered by the questions it can not reject, nor answer.
Kant I 105
Reason/unit/Kant: the law of reason to seek unity is necessary because we would not have any reason without it - and therefore no sufficient feature of empirical truth - thus we have not only punctual correspondence, but systematic coherence.
I 105
Kant assumed reason in nature.
I 113
Reason/Kant: reason in itself, is not something objective, even ideas of purposes aren t - we project reasonable causes into the object - however: this projection is necessary - but it is only a projection that justifies no real science. - - -

Verstand:
Definition Pure Reason/Kant: unifies ideas in an intuition by categories. - Definition Pure logic: unifies different ideas in a judgment. ---
I 87
Definition reason/Kant: the capability of concepts. Also the pure reason can be a source of knowledge, for "philosophical" knowledge, and formal-logical. Term/Kant: "nothing but the synthesis is possible intuitions that are not given a priori ". Philosophical propositions are therefore always general principles for possible empirical intuition connections, for example, the principle of causality. ---
I 93
"Inside" acts of reason/Kant: "inner sense, of which time is the shape". - The images, which prescribe the objective units of things, are images of I of itself in time. - The unity of consciousness of the object is then also the unity of the thing. -> Schematism: recognizes categories as useful as illustrative determinations.
I 99
Reason/Kant: term - power of judgment: judgment - Reason: End- all three are forming the reason in a broader sense. - - -
Münch III 327
Definition reason/Kant: the capability of rules. For Kant separated from intuition. Holenstein: modern: intelligence. - - -
Strawson V 24
Reason/Kant: general functions also without sensuality - pure reason terms: = categories. - - -
V 25
Schematism: transition to categories-in-use. - Only time without space. - transcendental deduction: each category must have a use in experience. StrawsonVsKant: that is logically flawed.
- - -
Bubner I 103
Kant/neu: Verstandeshandlung besteht im Urteilen, Tafel reiner Verstandesfunktionen, die aber in Ansehung alles Objekts unbestimmt sind. Aus der Handlung ergibt sich die Vereinigungsleistung. Sie ist nicht von außen angestoßen! >Synthesis.
- - -
Adorno XIII 105
Verstand/Kant/Adorno: soweit es sich um die Vernunft handelt, die sich auf die Möglichkeit bezieht, Inhaltliches, Materiales zu erkennen, spricht Kant von Verstand. Verstandestätigkeit/Kant: ist die Vernunfttätigkeit, die sich auf ein Material bezieht, das ir azus den Sinnen zugekommen ist und das sie vereinheitlicht und sich mit dessen Synthesis befasst.
Vernunft/Kant: hier soll diese Tätigkeit nicht mehr gebunden sein an ein solches Material, sondern frei davon sein. In der kognitiven oder noologischen Bedeutung gibt die Vernunft uns wenigstens die Regulative, in deren Sinn unsere Erfahrung von Sinnlichem fortschreiten soll. Vernunft in diesem prägnanten Sinn wäre als die Fähigkeit, Ideen zu erkennen.
Vernunft/Kant/Adorno: in einem dritten Sinn gibt die Vernunft in vollkommener Freiheit ihre Objekte sich selbst. Das ist der praktische Gebrauch der Vernunft. Paradoxerweise sind wir hier nach Kant gerade
XIII 106
nicht gebunden an einen Stoff. Praktische Vernunft/Kant/Adorno: unsere Vernunft oder wir verhalten uns praktisch, insofern wir rein nach der Vernunft und nach ihren Zwecken handeln, ohne dass wir diese Zwecke uns vorgeben ließen.
Zweck/Kant/Adorno: Damit dürfen wir uns diese nur von unserem eigenen Prinzip, dem, innersten Prinzip der Subjektivität selber vorgeben lassen.
Vernunft/Kant/Adorno: ist dann eine absolute Tätigkeit des Geistes im Gegensatz zu einer durch Materialen eingeschränkten. Damit wird sie zu einer höheren und gewissermaßen zur Gegeninstanz des Verstandes.
XIII 110
Verstand/Kant/Adorno: diejenige Vernunfttätigkeit, die sich bezieht auf die Ordnungsfunktionen, die wir gegenüber einem uns nach Kant von außen zukommenden und in sich chaotischen, nicht strukturierten, in sich ganz unbestimmten Material ausüben. Vernunft/Kant: reflektiert noch einmal auf den Verstand, auf den Gebrauch, den der Verstand von sich selbst macht und danach beurteilt, entscheidet, ob er im Sinne der Zwecke, die er sich
XIII 111
sich selbst gibt, ein höhergearteter sei.
XIII 112
Vernunft/Hegel/Adorno: bei Hegel und schon bei Kant finden sich Anklänge der Verdinglichung der Vernunft in dem Sinne, dass der gemeine Mann nicht zu viel nachdenken soll.
XIII 113
Vernunft/Horkheimer/Adorno: Problem: die Vernunft soll das Prinzip der Freiheit, aber gleichzeitig auch ein Gesetz und insofern etwas schlechterdings Repressives sein. In ihrem Begriff selber ist das Verhältnis von Freiheit und Zwang aber eigentlich nicht artikuliert worden.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Reductionism Damasio
 
Books on Amazon
II Patricia Smith Churchland Die Neurobiologie des Bewusstseins - Was können wir von ihr lernen? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
II 486
KantVsReductionism: the self will never be investigated, it is only to be thought of in the highly abstract conceptualization of "transcendental apperception." DamasioVsKant: we have a much safer foundation in our body with its skin, bones, muscles, joints, internal organs, etc.


Damas I
Antonio R. Damasio
Descartes’ Irrtum: Fühlen, Denken und das menschliche Gehirn München 2004

Relations Hume
 
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I 121/122
Relation/KantVsHume: relations are not externally to ideas. HumeVsKant: each relation is external in their terms - e.g. equality is not a property of the figures themselves - e.g. neighboring and distant figures do not explain what neighborhood and distance is - relation anticipates a synthesis - space/time: in mind only composition, bearing relation through fiction - E.g. association: creates relation, but does not explain that distance is a relation.
---
I 135
Relations/Hume: cannot be derived from experience, they are effects of association principles - external to the things (atomism). KantVsHume: not externally - Kant: therefore critical philosophy instead of empiricism.
---
I 139
KantVsHume: relations are so far dependent on the nature of things, as things presuppose a synthesis as phenomena that result from the same source as the synthesis of relations. - Therefore, the critical philosophy is not empiricism. - There is an a priori, that means, the imagination is productive. ---
I 145
Causality/Hume is the only relation, from which something can be concluded.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Self- Consciousness Castaneda
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 211ff
Self-consciousness / Fichte: all consciousness includes a s.-c. - CastanedaVsFichte: mixing of external reflexivity (in relation to others) and internal reflexivity (the fleeting egos among themselves) - CastanedaVsKant: not apperception, but conversely! - No I is a naked isolated individual, but a collective point of connections - false problem: how to be subject and object of self-reflection at the same time: starts from a false assumption of amonolithic self.
I 231f
Self-consciousness/ Castaneda: is based on the basis of beliefs, that consist of a hierarchy of powers, dispositions and inclinations - lowest levels: metaphysical, self-evident - postulates an infinite number of aspects.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Self- Consciousness Kant
 
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Strawson V 22
Self-consciousness / Kant: we need to distinguish between consequences of our experience and consequences of objects of the experience.
Stra V 215
Self-consciousness / Kant: a) "original": merely thinking, not watching - b) empirical - StrawsonVsKant: these are just spells when we are not allowed to apply time to "appear" - how should we then understand? - Should it atemporally be the case that something appears in time? - its an old belief that reason is atemporal and yet in us.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Signs Peirce
 
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Berka I 29
Sign / Logic / Peirce: in Logic all three types of signs must occur - symbols: without it there is no universality - universality: essential for conclusions - I 30 Problem: a symbol alone says nothing about the subject matter - a general term, can only be allude to an object.
I 29
Symbol / Peirce: says nothing about the subject. - - -
Diaz-Bone I 68f
Zeichen/Peirce/ VsKant: Vs Konstruktion vom transzendentalen Subjekt: Pragmatismus ist diejenige Methode, die erfolgreiche sprachliche und gedankliche Kommunikation und klare Ideen ermöglicht. Für Peirce ist jeder Gedanke Zeichen.

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011


Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Skepticism Kant
 
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Stroud I 128
Skepticism/Kant: it remains a scandal of philosophy that the existence of things outside of us must be accepted solely on the basis of belief. - KantVsDescartes: the relation between philosophical question and everyday knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. - ((S) But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct.) --
Stroud I 136
KantVsSkepticism: two stages: 1. prove external things (Moore has managed) - 2. show the general possibility of such evidence - ---
Stroud I 138
Stroud: Problem: we do not have a specific text (sentence) with which Kant would formulate his realism and could prove it to Moore. ---
Stroud I 142
Everyday knowledge is unproblematic, complete and does not have to be proved. ---
Stroud I 140
Skepticism/KantVsSkepticism: can never reach a conclusion because of the premises accepted by himself. ---
Stroud I 147
KantVsDescartes: he does not go far enough and relies too heavily on "testimonies" - (documents, evidence) - more important: the conditions of possibility -> Davidson: Kant: no study of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects we assume around us. Solution/Kant: "Copernican revolution": idealism of all appearances. - "We only have direct consciousness of what belongs to us. Our perception depends on our capacity - wrong. That our experience would be in accordance with the things, but vice versa.
---
Stroud I 149
Things of the outer world/objects/world/reality/Kant/Stroud: all our perception, whether internal or external, and all "external objects of perception ... we have to regard them as representations of what we can be immediately conscious . - ((s) so the thing is the representation of our consciousness -> Transcendental idealism - founds the a priori character of our knowledge of space and time (geometry) - therefore things cannot exist independently of our thoughts and experiences. ---
I 163
StroudvsKant: that we need to be aware of our experiences is the return of the "epistemic Priority" (from Descartes).
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Space Kant
 
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I 85
Space/relativism/rationalism/Leibniz: (according to Kant): only capability exists of the mutual relationship of the things in it. - KantVsLeibniz: counter-example: incongruity of left and right hands or mirror image - an inversion does not restore the identity here. ((S) It would have to, if only the relations played a role.) - ((S) chirality/VsRelationismus). ---
Strawson V 28
Space/Time/Kant: totality seems to impose a disjunction on us: either limited, there is one last element, or unlimited. - Since the antinomies are not empirically decidable, it thus confirms that space and time only exist as phenomena, and not as things in themselves. StrawsonVsKant: it is not clear if there is no empirical solution. ---
Stra V 48
Space/Time/Kant: not produced by things, but by the subjects - space and time are states of consciousness - state of consciousness: not of high importance, merely effects of things, not their states. ---
V 49
Space does not arise from experience, but experience presupposes space.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Space Leibniz
 
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Holz I 132
Space/Leibniz: space is the order. It is not an in-itself, but the structure of a material plurality, which in turn possesses the actual substantial in-itself in the self-limiting nature of the original force. There is no (infinite) "empty space". The idea of this would be a futile action: to work without doing something with it. There would be no observable change for anyone.
The space appears only in the mutual representation.
Spatiality is something different than space.
Space and time are something ideal.
---
I 133
Space outside the world is just imaginary. (Scholasticism already represented this view). Space/Leibniz: the arrangement of things causes the appearance of space in perception.
Appearance/"well-founded"/Leibniz: the appearance of space is "well-founded" when it is related to the multiplicity of things.
Space is "imaginary" or "ideal" when the multiplicity is seen as being isolated from the things. (s). e.g. as a set?
Movement/Leibniz: something steps into the place of something else. ((s) Not replacing a previously "empty space").
---
I 134
What encompasses all these places is "space". For this, one does not need to assume "absolute reality" of space. Space/time/LeibnizVsKant: is epitome of possible relationships, but not as forms of intuition, but rather real ontological as structures of the relationship of the material in themselves to one another.
In-itself/Leibniz: in-itself is the force. Two aspects:
1. Intensional as a point of force.
2. Extensional in effects.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Spirit Hegel
 
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Adorno XIII 62
Subjektivität/Idealismus/Geist/Hegel/Adorno: …man ist dann gezwungen, die Subjektivität zu erweitern über das individuelle Bewusstsein hinaus. Bei Hegel heißt das gar die Idee, (…) das ist nun gar nichts anderes als jenes Prinzip des Geistes, das von den einzelnen Menschen und ihrem Inbegriff unabhängig sein soll und das selber, und zwar motivierterweise, das Absolute sein soll, das alles Bedinge erst konstituiert.
XIII 63
Dabei ist stillschweigend die Voraussetzung eingegangen, dass dieses Bewusstsein in den verschiedenen Individuen gleicher Art und gleicher Logizität sei. Wir/Idealismus/Adorno: dieses Wir ist eigentlich selber nur der Inbegriff der empirischen Subjekte, es kann nicht ein konstitutives, transzendentales Subjekt sein.
Adorno XIII 128
Geist/Hegel/Adorno: Wenn bei Hegel die Wahrheit das Ganze sein soll, so als Prozess, dass die Wahrheit sich verwirklicht.
XIII 129
Das ist der neue Begriff des Geistes im prägnanten Sinn, das heißt, Geist ist der Inbegriff der Welt oder der Inbegriff der Realität, soweit sie durch die spezifische geistige Erfahrung des Einzelmenschen hindurchgegangen sind. HegelVsKant/Adorno: diese Erkenntnis bestimmt die Gegenstände als Dinge an sich und nicht als bloße Phänomena.



A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Subjects Hegel
 
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Bubner I 184
Subject/object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of cognition, Hegel determines the subject/object relationship on two sides: theory and practice. (Following AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "Radical separation of reason from experience". ---
I 185
Subject/object/antiquity/Bubner: the whole ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing of this at all.

Substance Kant
 
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Strawson V 187
Substance / StrawsonVsKant: it is wrong, to conclude an underlying substance from the variability of the things - even according to his own principles - because if it should be a condition of experience, then circlular. - - -
Holz I 31
Substanz/Spinoza: ist bei ihm ihrem Wesen nach einzig, unendlich und unteilbar. Substanz/HegelVsSpinoza: wer von der Denkvoraussetzung der substantiellen Einheit der Welt und der Erfahrungsvoraussetzung der qualitativen Verschiedenheit der Seienden (der Mannigfaltigkeit) ausgeht, kann diese Mannigfaltigkeit nur als Erscheinungsformen oder Aspekte der einen Substanz begreifen, in der "alles was man für wahr gehalten hatte, untergegangen ist".
Damit ist jedoch die tatsächliche Voraussetzung des Denkens, die Unterschiedenheit der Denkinhalte, preisgegeben! Die Gefahr sah Leibniz.
I 32
Hegel: man darf nicht "die Vielheit in der Einheit verschwinden lassen". Wenn die Deduktion nur als Reduktion möglich wäre, (wie bei Spinoza), wäre das die Selbstaufhebung der Welt im Denken.
Kant: zieht daraus die Konsequenz, die Einheit der Welt in der Priorität des Denkens zu begründen. Die Einheit ist dann nur transzendental oder subjektiv idealistisch begründet.
HegelVsKant: versucht die Substanzmetaphysik zu erneuern, die die Einheit des Seins in der Einheit eines Seienden begründen möchte: Die Selbstentfaltung des absoluten Geistes in der Weltgeschichte.

I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Substance Descartes
 
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Adorno XIII 68
Substanz/Descartes/Adorno: die denkende Substanz wird bei Descartes einfach als eine Substanz und nicht als eine Tätigkeit bestimmt. DescartesVsKant, DescartesVsSpontaneität.
Adorno XIII 154
Substanz/Descartes/Adorno: der Substanzbegriff wird bei Descartes definiert als das, quod nulla re indiget ad existendum, was keines anderen Dinges zu seiner Existenz bedarf. Man könnte folgern, dass es mit absoluter Notwendigkeit sein muss.


A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Synthesis Kant
 
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Danto I 133
Synthetic a priori/Kant: before any exploration of the world recognizable - on this he builds the mere possibility of doing philosophy at all. - Because it is non-empirical- Analytically/Kant: E.g. "Every cause has an effect." - Not analytically: "All events have causes." - It does not belong to the meaning of "event" that it has a cause. - But still synthetically a priori: - E.g. "Every event has a cause". - (Variation of Leibniz's law). - It defines what it means for the universe to be intellectually understandable.
---
Danto I 211
Experience/representation/continuity/internalism/Danto: continuity is not given in experience. - Otherwise, there would not be the question of whether existence is continuous. - Solution/Kant: mental synthesis. ---
Strawson V 26
Synthesis/Kant: the process of production of the unity of experience - there cannot be empirical knowledge of the synthesis - is only obtained through it. ---
Stra V 81
Synthesis/Kant: aware, but not how I appear to myself, but only that I am. - Thinking, not watching. - Kant/Strawson: Kant Synthesis is based on differentiation of the capabilities of sensibility and understanding. - StrawsonVs: We try without them. - - -
Bubner I 100
Urteil/Synthesis/Kant: die Einheit des synthetisch Zusammengefassten gibt dem fraglichen Verhältnis der Begriffe erst die nötige Bestimmtheit. Diese Bestimmtheit trägt des Weiteren den Gegenstandsbezug, der im Urteil als Erkenntnisanspruch stets mit enthalten ist. "Allein die Synthesis ist doch dasjenige, was eigentlich die Elemente zu Erkenntnissen sammelt und zu einem gewissen Inhalt vereinigt."
Das gelingt dadurch, dass Kant Def Begriffe mit Vorstellungsinhalten gleichsetzt.
I 103
Synthesis/Kant: sie ist ursprünglich einig und für alle Verbindung gleich geltend. Der Hinweis auf die Handlung scheint auch die Frage der Einheit zu beantworten. ((s) weil aus Tätigkeit, nicht aus den Objekten herrührend). Sie enthält drei Momente.
1. das gegebene Mannigfaltige
2. das Verbinden
3. die Einheit Dabei existiert kein unabhängiger "Einheitspol", der sozusagen als ein weiteres neben den vielen zu verbindenden Elementen erscheint.
Die Einheit steht dem Vielen nicht als isoliertes Prinzip gegenüber.
Daher spricht der Idealismus von der Identität von Identität und Nichtidentität.
I 104
Einheit/SynthesisIdealismus/Kant: der Ort der Einheitlichkeit lässt sich jetzt bezeichnen, es ist der reine Handlungscharakter der Synthesis. Dieser Handlungscharakter geht über alle Einzelverknüpfungen hinaus, liegt allem tatsächlichen Zusammenstellen voraus und ist durch noch so viele synthetische Akte niemals zu erschöpfen.
I 108
Synthesis/VsKant: seine Nachfolger haben die Schwäche aufgedeckt, daß es für den obersten Punkt dieser Gedankenkette keine Evidenz gibt.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Syntheticy Wittgenstein
 
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Hintikka I 204
Synthetic a priori/HusserlVsKant/WittgensteinVsKant/Hintikka: all examples stem from experience.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Terminology Hume
 
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I 7
Affection/Hume: 1. affectivity (on sensations) - 2. The Social (above the reason)
---
I 23
Affect/affection/Hume: 1. Effects of the association (provides generality, rule) - 2. Effects of affect (gives content, allows practical and moral action) - affect is not a representation - reason: does not determine action - affect: determines the act. ---
I 31
Sympathy/Hume: leads us to abandon our interests - basis of morality - but only with respect to close loved ones, relatives-> partisanship. - The human being is less selfish than partisan - so the sympathy does not go beyond the individual interest or the affect. Human/Hume: naturally selfish - Moral/Hume: not dependent on instinct.
---
I 49
Vivacity/Hume: Problem: the general rule does not know an owner, it is abstract - uniformity of the true moral judgment: not alive. ---
I 56
general rule: unity of a reflection and an extension - (here always expansion) - the affect reaches beyond itself, because it reflects itself - the general rule is the reflected affect in the imagination. ---
I 66
Affect/imagination/Hume: Problem: how is their relationship that enables the affect to develop a complex effect? ---
I 67
Solution: the principles of affect exceed the mind (like the principles of association). - E.g. imagination goes easily from a remote thing to the next , but not vice versa - E.g. from brother to I, but not vice versa. - Affect: gives these connections a meaning. ---
I 71 f
Custom/Hume: Paradox: it is formed gradually and is also a principle of human nature. - A principle is the habit to adopt habits. - So the development is itself a principle (= experience). ---
I 89
Definition Purpose/Hume/Deleuze: The purpose (Deleuze: finalité) is thought not recognized as the original conformity of the principles of human nature with nature itself - unity of origin and the qualitative determination - four principles: reason, instinct, procreation growth. ---
I 118
Affect/Hume: is produced by the body: a) directly from within itself: E.g. Hunger - b) with other causes: joy, pride, humility, etc. - Nature has also provided the mind with certain instincts. ---
I 139f
Transcendence/Kant/Deleuze: the thinking goes beyond the imagination, without disengaging from it - the transcendental makes transcendence immanent. Something = X. - HumeVsKant: in his work nothing transcendental - instead: finality: the conformity of the subject with the given (not random). - (The conformity requires a connection of the moments of the subject.) ---
I 160
Vivacity/agile/Hume: origin of mind - basic feature of the impression - not a product of principles.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Thing in itself Kant
 
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I 17
In itself Kant: question: what is in itself, namely beyond me or without me, but that I behold myself as in itself? - So: what on me is in itself? - - -
Strawson V 33/34
Thing in itself/Kant/StrawsonVsKant: that things in themselves should not be in space and time, is making the whole doctrine incomprehensible. - - -
Stra V 95
Thing in itself/Kant: must not meet the conditions of subjectivity itself - it has to meet only the appearance . Then the knowledge of things could be owed to more than a pre-stabilized harmony. - (KantVsLeibniz) ---
Sra V 168
Thing in itself/idealism/Kant: if we assume that things exist independently of our perceptions, then they must also exist independently of us (> Realism). - But Kant does not accept this! - Kant: they exist only through our minds and sensuality. - - -
Adorno XIII 40
Ding an sich/VsKant/Adorno: man hat gegen Kant eingewandt, dass wenn die Dinge an sich und damit die Ursachen der Erscheinungen gänzlich unbekannt sind, woher wir dann überhaupt von ihnen reden und von ihnen wissen können.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Thing in itself Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
IV 115
Thing in itself / RortyVsKant: he needs the noumenal (thing in itself) only to introduce appearance - no appearance without appearing - as Aristotle requires a form of the formless - and e.g. Spinoza the distinct idea of ​​indistinct - similar: Wittgenstein s silence in the face of discrimination useful / useless - RortyVsWittgenstein: one has to know a lot before one can conclude that the metaphysician says something meaningless
VI 129
is / be / translucent / appear / appearance / Rorty: false distinction between things - "in itself" and "for us" - RortyVsKant.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Thing in itself Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
III 184
Thing in itself: SearleVsKant: from the fact that we cannot see it, it does not follow that it is otherwise as we perceive it, or that there is a reality beyond our knowledge.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Ultimate Justification Leibniz
 
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Holz I 50
Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. ---
Holz I 50
Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change. ---
I 51
Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself). ---
Holz I 51
Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself. Evidence is not a logical category.
Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin.
Logic/Husserl: logic has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content.
---
I 52
Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical. ---
Holz I 75
Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series.
Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all
---
Holz I 83
Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason. Two principles are sufficient:
1. Principle of contradiction
2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking.
This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel.
---
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form.
Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted.
Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate.
---
Holz I 123
Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization. Now it turns out that the two principles:
1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself)
2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all.
One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place).
---
I 124
But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all. The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths:
Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first.
According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all.
In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible).
A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions).
From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Unconscious Freud
 
Books on Amazon
Searle I 197
Searle: In contrast to Freud's concept of the unconscious, the cognitive-scientific concept of the unconscious is not potentially conscious. ---
Rorty V 47
Unconscious/unconscious/Rorty: two meanings: 1. Several well-articulated beliefs and desire systems (quite rational).
2. Boiling mass in articulated instinctive powers, in which freedom of contradiction is irrelevant. If Freud had limited himself to this meaning, he would have left our self-image essentially unchanged.
---
V 47/48
Freud/Rorty: the new thing about him is that the unconscious ego is not a silent, stubborn staggering animal, but an intellectual equal to the other. If psychoanalysis had limited itself to the neuroses, it would never have attracted the attention of intellectuals. Unconscious/I/Rorty: the unconscious as a rational opponent. I can also discover that my unconscious knew better than myself. This discredits the idea of a "true" I.
---
V 60
FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equally authorized. Mechanization, process, to change ourselves. ---
V 61
Definition Conscience/Freud/Rorty: memories of idiosyncratic events. No substitute for moral reasoning.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Understanding Vollmer
 
Books on Amazon
I 80
Def intuitiveness / Vollmer: something is clear, if it can be transformed. E.g. Planetarium - e.g. molecular models.
I 173
Understanding / VollmerVsKant: he deid not answer: why can t we understand each other? - How is intersubjective knowledge possible? - Can the categories be shown to be complete? - (Vollmer: No).

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988

Unity Kant
 
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Strawson V 82
Unity/Consciousness/Thinking/Subject/StrawsonVsKant: the thesis of the unit itself is based on a deeper distinction: between intuition and concept - V 83 Strawson: objects could be accusatives and form a sequence, so that no distinction between it and the result of relevant events can be made - such objects could be sense-data and the terms only about these - V 84 this could not be unified to the concept of an "object" - problem: the interest of the objects of experience is their percipi and vice versa - no reason for the distinction between esse and percipi. - - -
Adorno XIII 103
Einheit/Kant/Adorno: nach Kant ist das Einheitsmoment all der subjektiven Fähigkeiten, die den verschiedenen Kritiken zugrunde liegen, eigentlich die Vernunft selber oder der Verstand.
Adorno XIII 122
Einheit/Subjekt/Objekt/Material/Inhalt/Fundierung/Idealismus/Kant/Adorno: man hat aus der Identität der Vernunft einen weiteren Identitätsbegriff abgeleitet, nämlich den der partikularen Identität von Subjekt und Objekt. Das Ich und die gegenständliche Welt sollen miteinander identisch sein, weil jedes gegenständliche Einheitsbewusstsein ein Einheitsbewusstsein von Vernunft sei. Da aber diese gegenständliche Identität bei Kant möglich ist immer nur dadurch, dass sie sich auf ein Gegebenes, auf Material der Sinne bezieht, ist sie nicht rein durchgängig. Material/Kant/Adorno: das, was dem Gegenständlichen jeweils zugrunde liegt, soll nicht selber ein Produkt der Vernunfttätigkeit sein können.

I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
World Lorenz
 
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Vollmer I XIV
World view/LorenzVsKant: in no organism, we encounter a world view that would be contrary to what we humans think of the outside world - the comparison of world views of different kinds helps us to expect and to recognize the limitations of our own worldview apparatus.

Lo II
K. Lorenz
On Aggression


The author or concept searched is found in the following 83 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity Fodor Vs Analyticity
 
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IV 185
Analytic/Synthetic/Gradual Analyticity/Block/Fodor/Lepore: some authors have concluded from "Two Dogmas" that a certain "gradual analyticity" is not excluded.
IV 185
Fodor/LeporeVs: this then presupposes equality of meaning rather than identity of meaning. But we have already seen that for inferences analyticity and compositionality are the same. Then one must live with gradual compositionality as well.
Question: Is this also possible with systematicity (Systematics: believing related attitudes), isomorphism (see above), and productivity together?
Would gradual compositionality not only include a finite acquaintance with (infinite) language? So that you only "kind of" understand new concepts?
E.g. if you understand aRb, then you "kind of" understand bRa.
E.g. the constituents of the sentence S "kind of" express the constituents of the proposition P?.
E.g. "John loves Mary" "kind of" expresses that John loves Mary, but only because "John" refers "approximately" to John?.
29 IV 185
Analytic/Synthetic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: You may wonder how we agree with Quine about the a/s distinction (camp), but still stick to compositionality including analyticity and that languages ​​are compositional. This is not a paradox: compositionality licenses structurally determined analyticity:
IV 245
E.g. "Brown Cow", "brown" but not "cow" >Animal. Quine: "Logic is chasing truth up the tree of grammar".
Fodor/Lepore IV 178
QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for conclusions to turn out to be wrong.
IV 178/179
VsFodor/Lepore: then one might make do with a reformulated CRT: compositional meaning, but inferential role not compositional, only within analytical conclusions?. Fodor/LeporeVsVs: risk of circularity: If you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!".
Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability. ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): Originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological. (>Computation).

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Aristotle Rorty Vs Aristotle
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
IV 117
Comprehensibility/Rorty: It is difficult to explain what it means to say that tables and chairs are incomprehensible, but God is not (or vice versa!). The logical positivism with its formal speech is in saome way a solution. Comprehensibility/Rorty: Problem from Parmenides to Ayer: we are constantly trying to define "conditions of intelligibility of a statement ..." although this statement itself does not meet the conditions specified.
Comprehensibility/Aristotle/RortyVsAristotle: does not solve the problem at all, if he demands that the intellect become identical with the object, that renders the term "matter" incomprehensible.
Comprehensibility/Noumenon/thing in itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: in him, the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible, when he says an expression is meaningful if it stands for a mental content which forms a synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the mental).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Brandom, R. Rorty Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 195
De re/objective/subjective/Brandom: (according to Rorty): with de re attributions he wants to re-introduce the old distinction subjective / objective. Ex Mary thinks of a cow that it is a deer.
VI 196
RortyVsBrandom: instead: distinction between better and worse tools. Not "real properties". Progress/Brandom: more and more true assertions about the outside world.
Progress/RortyVsBrandom: ever better tools for ever better purposes. Brandom does secretly fancy a "bird's eye view", that he himself had declared impossible.
Norm/RortyVsBrandom/RortyVsKant: as Kant, Brandom endeavors too much to reach a compromise where none is tolerated! So he ends up between two chairs. When he says:
VI 197
"In our standards, the interest to represent things right is invested from the outset", then he is being interpreted differently by aggressive realists like Searle than by well-meaning pragmatists. Truth/Brandom: what corresponds to non-persons.
SearleVsBrandom: would ask him how he knew what these non-persons expect and deserve.
VI 198
Def fact/Brandom: "something claimable" (neologism of Brandom). There is the act of claiming, and there is "the alleged". Facts are not the "true alleged" but the claimable. Facts make assertions true. However, inferential!
VI 198/199
RortyVsBrandom/RortyVsInferentialism: that's like when I call Molière Ex "soporific power" (vis dormitiva) inferential, to make it seem beyond any suspicion. But that tells us nothing more than with the combination of two clauses: If something has soporific force, it will put people to sleep. "The claimable" is of no use to us, not even inferentially!
Reality/knowledge/world/BrandomVsRorty: it has paradoxical consequences, if one denies that there were truths regarding photons before the appearance of the word "photon". Ex chain of reason:
1. five million years ago there were photons.
2. It was then the case that there were photons.
3. It is true that it was then the case that there were photons.
4. It was then true that there were photons.
Rorty: of course, there is nothing to criticize about that, yet there were philosophers who did!
Heidegger:
Truth/person/reality/world/knowledge/existence/natural laws/NG/Heidegger/Rorty: "before Newton, Newton's laws were neither true nor false". (sic).
Rorty: Heidegger might have said: "Because the truth is a property of sentences, and since vocabularies are created by people, the same applies to truths."
Truth/Rorty: property of sentences!
RortyVsBrandom: Heidegger and I according to Brandom: paradoxical assertion, but perhaps it is just as paradoxical if Brandom denies dogs and toddlers convictions (unless in the "secondary meaning").

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Carnap, R. Kant Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Stroud I 173
Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that he could not be wrong, because it is necessary in order to clarify any other meaningful questions empirically. CarnapVsKant: According to the verification principle this is but a "pseudo-theory", which cannot explain or guarantee anything. Meaning/Sense/CarnapVsKant: In order to make sense, we need to know the truth value of the propositions which contain the corresponding expressions. weaker: We must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something then his falsehood.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Compositionality Fodor Vs Compositionality
 
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IV 64/65
Truth Conditions/tr.cond./Holism/Fodor/Lepore: (Fodor/LeporeVsCompositionality as a solution:) "Snow is white", has the truth condition it has, because it belongs to a language that contains "This is snow" and "This is snow", and an indefinite number of other sentences with "is white" and "snow". Semantic Holism/SH: Now, of course, it would be a good argument for semantic holism if only compositionality were really necessary to exclude sentences such as W.
Problem: if it’s really only because of the structural similarity between "snow is white" and "This is snow" that the former means that snow is white (and not that grass is green), then it would look like an a priori argument against the possibility of non-compositional language! I.e. the expressions of such a language could not have truth conditions! But:
Non-Compositional Language/Non-Recursive/Recursive/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. Suppose a child has mastered the entire non-recursive apparatus of German. It can say things like
It’s raining, snow is white, grass is green, that’s snow, that is frozen, everybody hates me, I hate spinach etc., but not:
"Snow is white and grass is green" or
"Everyone hates frozen spinach", etc.
We assume that the dispositions of the child towards the sentences that it has mastered are exactly the same as those of a normal adult who uses these sentences.
It is very plausible that this child, when it says "snow is white", it actually says that snow is white.
So far, the compositionality principle of holism is not in danger if we assume that the child has "snow is white" and "this is snow" in its repertoire (idiolect).
IV 66
E.g. Suppose a second child who uses the unstructured expression "Alfred" instead of "Snow is white". For "This is snow": "Sam", and for "This is cold": "Mary".
1st child: infers from "this is snow" to "this is cold"
2nd child: infers from "Sam" to "Mary".
We assume that the translated verbalizations of child two do not differ from the verbalizations of child 1.
Nevertheless: if compositionality were a necessary condition for content, then there would be an a priori argument that child 2 could not mean anything specific with his statements.
Meaning/Vs: what someone means with their statements depends on their intentions! ((s) and not on the sound chains.)
Which a priori argument could show that the child could not make its statement "Sam" with the intention to express that snow is cold?
W sentence: perhaps the W sentence
"Alfred" is true iff. snow is white is to be preferred over the W sentence
"Alfred" is true iff. grass is green.
Important argument: but this cannot be a consequence of the compositional structure of "Alfred", because it has none.
It can also be doubted that compositionality is sufficient for the solution of the extensionality problem:
 IV 178
QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for inferences to turn out to be wrong (?).
IV 178/179
VsFodor/Lepore: then one might make do with a reformulated CRT: compositional meaning, but inferential role not compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: risk of circularity: If you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!"
Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability. ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): Originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological. (>Computation).

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Descartes, R. Brandom Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Brandom I 40
BrandomVsDescartes: failed to show what it means to grasp or understand such contents as representations. He does not explain what makes a rabbit thought to a thought, which is about rabbits or anything at all. He also does not explain what it means that someone understands a thought as a thought.
I 131
BrandomVsDescartes: has burdened the tradition of representation: the privileging of knowledge and therefore the successful representation against the understanding and the intended representation. For Descartes representational intention is "as if about" intrinsic and characteristic property of thoughts. He does not explain the importance of understanding.
II 13
Kant and Descartes: mind primary, secondary language - BrandomVsKant and BrandomVsDescartes.
II 17
BrandomVsDescartes: expression rather than representation (Sellars ditto).
II 69
Content / representation / BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer.
II 213
Mind / Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules. KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Descartes, R. Evans Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Gareth Evans
Frank I 497
EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas.
I 522
Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Descartes, R. Kant Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Danto I 179
KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking.
- - -
Kant I 73
Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I ​​think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing.
- - -
Field I 80
KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral.
But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle!
For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.)
Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise.
Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence.
Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here).
- - -
Stegmüller IV 362
Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis.
2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed.
3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim).
IV 364
VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic.
4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula).
MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it?
Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege.
IV 365
MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this.

- - -
Strawson V 22
"Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them.
V 23
StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system!
V 103
KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis.
- - -
Strawson V 140
Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim.
KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity.
V 143
KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject.
V 145
Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Descartes, R. Freud Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Rorty V 60
FreudVsPlaton/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: das Unbewusste, unser Gewissen, ist nichts Unveränderliches, nicht einmal ein zentraler Teil. Alle Teile sind gleichberechtigt. Mechanisierung, Verfahren, uns selbst zu verändern.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Dogmas (Quine) Davidson Vs Dogmas (Quine)
 
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Brandom I 854
DavidsonVsDualism scheme/Content. The problem is that the mind, if it is not to be superfluous, must change its material in applying the concepts somehow. (Hegel’s phenomenology). (See also BrandomVsKant).
I 85
The idea of ​​a really alien scheme is inconceivable for us. If others are in a state which cannot be determined with our methods, this cannot be because our methods fail (with which we determine the states of consciousness), but because such states are not referred to as states of consciousness. These are not desires, beliefs or intentions. The futility of imagining conceptual scheme that is forever unreachable for ​​our understanding is not owed to our inability to understand such a scheme, but is simply due to what we mean by such a scheme.
We cannot remove the conceptual layers sentence by sentence. Nevertheless, according to Quine a distinction is to be made betw. the invariant content and the changing layers. "Between report and invention, content and style, cue and conceptualization." "...by subtracting these indications from the worldview of man we get as a difference what he contributes to this worldview. This marks the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of man, the area in which one can change theories, without changing the data."
I 89
Davidson: That is precisely the distinction between scheme and content.
I 91
If now the last evidence is subjective in the manner described, this also applies to our beliefs, desires, etc., and everything we mean by words. Although they are fruit of our worldview, they maintain their Cartesian independence from that what they are about. They could be different, without anything changing in the world. One could say that modern philosophy has been dominated by the dualism scheme/content or equally by the dualism subjective/objective.
DavidsonVs we need a radically changed view of the relationship between mind and world.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Epiphenomenalism Verschiedene Vs Epiphenomenalism Münch III 270
Phenomenology / Kosslyn: he who calls a phenomenon as epiphenomenal, thus does not makes it disappear.
Frank I 31
Physisch/psychisch/FrankVsEpiphänomenalismus: 1. die Zuordnung von kausalen Rollen, (die den Schmerz nur als Nebeneffekt einer C Faser Reizung erklären will) durchläuft ein Feld nicht evidenten Wissens (es könnte sein, dass es nicht stimmt),
I 32
2. die Annahme lässt sich nicht beweisen, dass die Ebene physischer Phänomene kausal geschlossen ist. Der Determinismus macht im Gegenteil die kontrafaktische Annahme, (Peirce: nicht weiter begründbar, "necessitarism") dass die Wirklichkeit überhaupt nomologisch charakterisierbar sei.
FrankVsKant: oder sie rechtfertigt sich selbst aprioristisch, wie bei Kant, damit wechselt sie vom physikalistischen ins mentalistische Vokabular.
Kategorienfehler: ich begründe den nomologischen Charakter der physischen Welt aus einer "notwendigen" Eigenschaft der Gedanken!
Sage ich nun, diese oder jene Erscheinung sei Ursache dieses oder jenen psychischen Zustands, dann erkläre ich das Wahrscheinliche (aber Fallible) zur Ursache des Gewissen das ist nicht triftig.





Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Fichte, J.G. Castaneda Vs Fichte, J.G.
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 211
Experience/CastanedaVsFichte: do not need to belong to Is (plural of I) But if they do, so the integration in the I requires unity of the experiences in its possession. Likewise CastanedaVsKant: against the role of apperception, instead: vice versa! Fichte: demands that the unity of consciousness contents transmits itself top down, from the self that experiences itself through experiencing, on the contents, which belong to the non-self. Castaneda: that contradicts the facts of experience and prevents an explanation of animal consciousness. VsFichte: unwarranted mixing of external and internal reflexivity! I 239 Consciousness/Accumulation/Subsumption/Castaneda: assuming the subsumtiven nature of consciousness, lower levels can exist irrespective of the higher levels. CastanedaVsFichte: not every consciousness is self-consciousness. This is the anti-idealistic naturalization of consciousness. The unity of consciousness episode cannot be explained, because this consciousness belongs to a self or I. In fact, the unity of experience in an I requires the unity of any consciousness content! That means if a consciousness episode internally belongs to an I, then the unity of that consciousness is an element in the constitution of this affiliation, i.e. it is an internal requirement of the existence of that I. Castaneda: nevertheless Fichte’s view is still widely spread, even among anti-Cartesian philosophers of our time. Consciousness/Fichte: "Wissenschaftslehre nova methoda, 1798, 1982, p 34" "All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness"...
- - -
I 244
Perception/Physiology/Castaneda: in complex cases, a kind of blind physical monitoring arises from finely tuned adaptation. This includes such things as the presentation of stimulus levels. This works even without the emergence of visualizations of the monitoring itself. VsFichte: Then consciousness without self-consciousness would exist (s.c.). Of course there can be recording systems. However, this recording is not identical with s.c. Fra I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference.
Consciousness/CastanedaVsFichte: is only a special case of consciousness, it is not present in every consciousness episode. E.g. purely sensitive consciousness, e.g. cognitive, but not self-conscious (>E.g. Friedrich watches the bees). Not only evolutionarily differentiated, but also in adults.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Hare, R.M. Newen Vs Hare, R.M.
 
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NSI 155
"Good"/"Should"/Prescriptivism/Hare: Thesis: these words have even primarily prescriptive meaning. E.g. speaking about a good book, a good exhibition is to recommend these things. (s) VsHare: then it would be conceptually contradictory, e.g. to say of a finished exhibition that it was good. Or e.g. to praise for a sold-out book) Def Secondary Prescriptive/Hare: e.g. "proper", "hardworking". Universalizability/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: every should-statement contains a principle that this statement is applicable to all exactly similar cases.
E.g. Dagmar is pregnant, you should carry the groceries into her apartment for her. And that is what every healthy person should do who has nothing better to do at the moment.
This universalizability is reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative which is, however, not linguistically motivated.
NS I 156 HareVsKant: it is the logic of language that imposes the categorical imperative on us.
Moral/Logic/Hare: Thesis: someone who acts contrary to a moral statement does not understand the meaning. Hare: e.g. in a train compartment it says: "Please do not smoke, there are children on board." If the smoker then says, well, I'll smoke next door where there are also children, he did not understand the meaning. On the other hand: e.g. "No smoking!" Such signs were distributed at random in otherwise identical compartments.
Point: there is no universalizable principle. Therefore, the sign expresses no moral should-sentence.
Moral Principles/Principle/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: how to generate moral principles. Problem: how to recognize the essential in a situation. E.g. Dagmar is pregnant. Is it necessary for the principle that she could swap roles with her husband? Is imaginability sufficient? VsHare: some authors see a fundamental impossibility when comparing such situations. Universalizability: must also accommodate subjective desires and dislikes. This makes the objective description of situations very difficult.
NS I 157
Utilitarianism/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Hare is close to utilitarianism in as far as a theory instructs to ensure the fulfillment of the preferences of the greatest number of parties. Universalizability/Generalizability/Moral/Descriptivism/Hare: moral judgments possess their descriptiveness because of their universalizability.
Newen/Schrenk: the descriptive portion then consists of the should-portion along with the situation in which it is expressed.
So moral statements can certainly be assessed as correct or incorrect.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Hegel, G.W.F. Leibniz Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 13
Leibniz/Holz: die innere Einheit seines Werks ist nur von der Metaphysik her zu begreifen. He can be positioned between Kant and Hegel: He shows the alternative of a scientific metaphysics to LeibnizVsKant by showing its method,
LeibnizVsHegel: shows the possibility of a metaphysics which is not based on an absolute idealistic method.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Hegel, G.W.F. Vollmer Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 220
Wissen/Kriterium/Erkenntnis/Vollmer: wir brauchen ein Kriterium dafür, wann Erkenntnis gültig ist. Ein solches Kriterium wäre nun selbst wieder ein Stück Wissen und brauchte wiederum ein Kriterium Regreß. Andererseits könnte das Kriterium keine einfache Konvention sein, da eine Konvention keine Erkenntnis rechtfertigen kann. Höchstens durch weitere Konventionen. Regreß.
Das ist ungefähr:
SchellingVsKant: wir brauchen ein Erkennen des Erkennens. Und das ist zirkulär.
HegelVsKant: Untersuchung des Erkennens: kann nicht anders als erkennend durchgeführt werden. Als ob man Schwimmen lernen wollte, bevor man ins Wasser geht.
Vollmer: das Argument ist von Leonard Nelson ausgebaut worden und heißt daher "Doppelnelson".
I 221
VollmerVsHegel: das Argument ist logisch korrekt, aber es behauptet nicht, dass Erkenntnis insgesamt unmöglich wäre, sondern nur im genannten Sinne.
Wenn wir uns zum Prinzip machen, die Gültigkeit von allem Wissen zu bezweifeln, kommen wir zum Skeptizismus, der (nach Russell) auch nicht widerlegt werden kann.
Erkenntnistheorie beweist nicht die Existenz von Erkenntnis, sie setzt Erkenntnis voraus.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Hume, D. Kant Vs Hume, D.
 
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Kant I 27
KantVsHume: Causality: Limited to the range of experience. It does not apply to the domain of things themselves.
Kant I 98
Hume: Imagination compounds are principally created by association. KantVsHume: Unity of apperception. I’m being conscious that all ideas are my ideas. Therefore, I stick to the unity of consciousness that accompany all my ideas. In addition, I need to bear in mind how I am adding an idea to another one, otherwise I will scatter myself.
McD. I 123
McDowell: Laws of nature/natural/understanding/KantVsHume: wins the intelligibility of natural laws again, but not the clarity of meaning. Nature is the realm of natural laws, and therefore of no importance. However, the empirical world is not outside the terms.
Hume I 37
Moral/action/ethics/Hume: A in this way (avoiding wrong) created obligation is artificial however, contrary to the natural obligation arising from the natural interest as the driving force of every action. Moral obligation.
It’s in my best interest to let the other have his property, provided that the other acts in the same vein towards me. (KantVsHume:> categorical imperative).
- - -
Hume I 122
KantVsHume: The latter erroneously presented mathematics as a system of analytic judgments.
DeleuzeVsKant.
Relation / HumeVsKant: Every relationship is external in its terms: the equality is not a property of the characters themselves, but only comes through comparison.
Hume I 133
Associations / KantVsHume: Although it is merely an empirical law, according to which ideas, which often followed each other, thereby produce a link. This law of reproduction requires that the appearances themselves are indeed subjected to such a rule. Because without this our empirical imagination would never get to do something it is able to, so would lay like dead unknown wealth within us. If a word would be applied one time to this thing, another time to another one, no empirical synthesis of reproduction could happen.
So there must be something that makes even this reproduction of phenomenons possible because it is the fact that it is the a priori reason of a necessary synthetic unity of itself.
I 138
If we can now show that even our a priori purest intuitions do not provide knowledge, except if they contain such a connection that makes a continuous synthesis possible, this synthesis of imagination is also established on a priori principles prior to all experience. KantVsHume: His dualism forces him to understand the relationship between what is given and the subject as a match of the subject with nature.
I 139
But if the given would not align itself and a priori, in accordance with those same principles, which the link of ideas also aligns itself, the subject would only notice this concordance by chance. Therefore, it must be reversed:
The given is to refer to the subject, as a concordance of given and subject. Why? Because what is given is not a thing in itself, but an overall context of phenomena that can be only represented by an a priori synthesis.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Hume, D. Kripke Vs Hume, D.
 
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Apriori: Some philosophers modify the modalities in this characterization somehow from "may" to "shall". They think that if something belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge it is impossible to recognize it empirically.(Hume). This is wrong! (KripkeVsHume).
E.g. The computer can give an answer to the question of whether particular numbers are primes. Nobody has calculated or proved this, but the computer gave the answer. I 45
A posteriori: A mathematical truth can be known a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent and therefore all empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant) I 181

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Idealism Russell Vs Idealism
 
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Bertrand Russell
IV 80
RussellVsKant/RussellVsIdealism: it is not the thinking that the truth of the sentence "I am in my room" generates (relation). (> Making true). E.g. it could be that there is an earwig in the room, and neither I know about it, nor that the earwig may think these thoughts. The result is that we have to admit universals for the relations.


R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Intuitionism Mackie Vs Intuitionism
 
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Intuitionism
Stegmüller IV 175
MackieVsIntuitionism ethics: is not based on incorrect analysis but is a false (not some pointless) theory. (as objectivism).
IV 176
3. The mystery of accruing (Zukommen): what is the kind of relation between the natural fact that murder is a cruel act and the moral fact that it is morally wrong? Objectivism/ethics/Stegmüller: moral falsity "accrues" or was supervenient. Sometimes called "non-causal because": the action would be morally wrong because it would be an infliction of pain.
VsObjektivism: the meaning of this relation would have to be explained.
IV 177
Subjectivism/ethics/Stegmüller: for him there is no such problem. He invokes the fact that such acts are condemned socially. - - -
IV 213
Ethics/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: five theses: 1. Anti-objectivism: there are no objective values and no metaphysical substantiation. No moral law, no good in itself for mankind, no categorical imperative. (MackieVsKant).
Mackie: "Argument of peculiarity": "Shall Be Done", etc. (as an entity), "Mystery of accruing". (see above).
2. VsIntuitionism: if objectivism is false, intuitionism is also based on a falsity: (special ability to recognize, moral "knowledge") .
IV 214
3. VsUtilitarianism: cannot answer important questions of moral philosophy and demands a change of mankind. 4. VsUniversalization: all descriptive interpretations are only of metaethical interest. In normative interpretations the issue of justification is unresolved. The third stage U3 is congruent with illusionary utilitarianism.
IV 215
5. confusion of ethics and metaethics: in normative interpretation we have 2nd order moral statements, which require moral justification themselves. "Metaethical fallacy": transition from opinions to the determination of truth.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Kant, I. Black Vs Kant, I.
 
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III 132
Lie/Kant: we have the absolute obligation not to lie. E.g. Even if this means showing a killer the way to his victim.
BlackVsKant.
III 133
Kant: the greatest damage caused by a lie is for mankind as a whole. BlackVsKant: that can be said about all misdeeds.
Language/Montaigne: as human beings we are held together by language.
Lie/language learning/language acquisition/Montaigne: if we were brought up by liars, we could not learn the language. Or if our teachers were lying at random occasions.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Kant, I. Brandom Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 852
Kant: dualistic character of his distinction of the conceptual and non-conceptual (BrandomVs).
I 853
Kant: 1) Judgments are the basic form of consciousness. 2) Recognition and action are determined by normative assessments in conscious beings as opposed to non-conscious beings. 3) Dualism spontaneity and receptivity.
I 855
Brandom: For Kant, concepts relate to views 1) like shape to matter - 2) like the general to the specific - 3) like the work of spontaneity or intellectual activity to that of receptivity
Brandom: these are real differences, but they are independent and orthogonal to one another. None of the above differences is understood between the conceptual and something non-conceptual in the judgment. That which a judgment expresses, its content, is conceptual through and through.
So Kant threw together the second and the third point, by systematically not distinguishing between representations of the individual and individual representations. (see BrandomVsKripke)
II 13
Kant and Descartes: Mind primary, language secondary - BrandomVsKant and Descartes.
II 123
Law/action/BrandomVsKant: Proposal to replace "image of a law" with "recognition of a determination".

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Kant, I. Bubner Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 80
Kant: wehrte sich mit dem Aufsatz "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796) gegen zeitgenössische Transzendentalsphilosophie. KantVsJacobi). Kant erfindet für seine Polemik eine Position die "Enthusiastisch statt kritisch" mit der Philosophie umgeht. er führt diese Schwärmerei auf Platon zurück. Gegenposition: wird Aristoteles zugeschrieben.
BubnerVsKant: beide Positionen sind nicht historisch zu belegen. Kant hatte sehr wenig Kenntnisse über die Antike.
I 88
KantVsPlaton: der Mathematiker Platon tauge nicht zum Metaphysiker. Undurchschaute Verwechslung von Anschauung und Begriff.
"Intellektuelle Anschauung" bringe fälschlich Unmittelbarkeit und Diskursivität zusammen.
Es gebe keine Aufklärung darüber, wie beides zusammenkomme.
"Undemokratische Esoterik" nur verständlich für Mitglieder eines "Klubs" >Verbindung zur zeitgenössischen Diskussion über die Französische Revolution. Verstößt gegen die Rousseauschen Gleichheitsforderungen.
I 89/90
BubnerVsKant: der Vorwurf der Verwechslung lässt sich nur aufrechterhalten, wenn man die Kantischen Prämissen akzeptiert. In Wirklichkeit ist Platons Text anders: die Phaidon preist die "Flucht in den Logos" als Ausweg aus dem Immediatismus der Vorsokratiker, Die "zweitbeste Fahrt" verzichtet auf den ungebrochenen Blick und such in den Reden den Spiegel der Dinge. Der synthetische Aufbau der Logik ist der Zugang zur Welt, auf den wir uns beschränken müssen. Platon steht in seiner Verachtung des "vornehmen Tons" Kant keineswegs nach.
I 108
Synthesis/Kant: während die anderen Synthesen irgendetwas anderes vorfinden, das sie durch ihr Tun zu einer davon nochmals unterschiedenen Einheit ((s)also doch??) führen, hat es die oberste Synthesis nur mit sich selbst zu tun. Synthesis/VsKant: seine Nachfolger haben die Schwäche aufgedeckt, dass es für den obersten Punkt dieser Gedankenkette keine Evidenz gibt.
Ich/Fichte: Tathandlung des sich setzenden Ich
Ich/Hegel: Lebendigkeit des in steter Selbstvermittlung begriffenen Geistes. (Als absolutes Prinzip).
I 109
"Intellektuelle Anschauung"/Bubner: von Kants Nachfolgern VsKant eingeführte Vorstellung die Unmittelbarkeit und Reflexivität zusammenbringen soll. BubnerVs: zwitterhaft. Diesem Modell folgt der anonyme Autor des "Ältesten Systemprogramms".
Sie verlangen vom Philosophen die ästhetische Begabung, die die Barriere zur Knst Produktion niederlegt.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Kant, I. Carnap Vs Kant, I.
 
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Newen I 112
CarnapVsKant: keine synthetischen Urteile a priori möglich. - - -
- - -
Stroud I 171
Def Pseudo-Frage/CarnapVsMetaphysik/CarnapVsKant//Stroud: sind Fragen, die deshalb nicht beantwortet werden können, weil es keine mögliche Sinneserfahrung gibt, die über die Wahrheit oder Falschheit der Sätze entscheidet, in der bestimmte Ausdrücke vorkommen. ((s) z.B. metaphysische oder transzendentale Ausdrücke). Carnap: Bsp zwei Geographen wollen ergründen, ob ein bestimmter Berg in Afrika real oder bloß eine Legende ist.
I 172
a) Wenn sie einen Berg dort finden, der mehr oder weniger dem entspricht, was man angenommen hat, können sie sagen, dass er real ist, dass er existiert. Realität/Carnap: damit wenden sie einen empirischen, nicht-metaphysischen Begriff von Realität an. (Carnap , Chicago 1958, 207).
b) Angenommen, die beiden wären nicht nur Wissenschaftler, sondern auch Philosophen: einer der beiden nennt sich 2Realist", der andere "Idealist":
"Realist"/Carnap: wird sagen, der Berg habe nicht nur die Eigenschaften (Charakteristika) die man an ihm entdeckt habe, sondern er sei auch real, d.h. unabhängig von unserer Wahrnehmung.
"Idealist"/Carnap: leugnet, dass der Berg von unserer Wahrnehmung unabhängig ist. D.h. er sei nicht real im Sinne des Realisten.
Wissenschaften/Empirie/Carnap: hier kann diese Divergenz zwischen den beiden gar nicht aufkommen. (333f)
D.h. aber nicht, dass beide Thesen falsch wären.
I 173
transzendentaler Idealismus/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: würde sagen, dass er nicht falsch sein könnte, weil er notwendig ist, um alle anderen sinnvollen Fragen empirisch zu klären. CarnapVsKant: nach dem Verifikations-Prinzip ist das aber eine "Pseudo-Theorie", die gar nichts erklären oder garantieren kann.
Sinn/sinnvoll/CarnapVsKant: damit etwas sinnvoll ist, müssen wir den Wahrheitswert (WW) der Sätze kennen können, die die entsprechenden Ausdrücke enthalten.
schwächer: wir müssen einen Grund angeben können, warum es besser ist, die Wahrheit von etwas zu glauben, als seine Falschheit.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant, I. Davidson Vs Kant, I.
 
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Rorty VI 217
DavidsonVsKant: language behavior that is not ultimately interpreted by reference to its causal interactions is not interpretable. VsKant: VsMetaphors of fullness and emptiness.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant, I. Deflationism Vs Kant, I.
 
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Field I 81
Def Deflationismus/Mathematik/Wissen/Field: die These, daß der Unterschied zwischen dem, der viel über Mathematik weiß und dem, der wenig darüber weiß, nicht darin besteht, daß der eine viel und der andere wenig weiß, sondern in zwei Arten von Wissen. Einiges von dem trennenden Wissen ist empirisch: Bsp "Wissen wie" man etwas beweist.
I 82
Bsp Wissen, was andere Mathematiker akzeptieren. Der Rest ist logisches Wissen.
Vorteil: das vermeidet die Notwendigkeit, nicht logisches mathematisches Wissen postulieren zu müssen, denn das müßte dann synthetisch a priori sein. (FieldVsKant/ DeflationismusVsKant). Also auch einen mysteriösen Zugang zu einem Reich von mathematischen Entitäten.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Kant, I. Dennett Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 703
DennettVsKant: categorical imperative: requires a deus e.g. machina, a master of ceremonies, who whispers in our ear, where the boundaries of the spectrum of "maximes" would have to be fixed.
I 704
Ethics/Dennett: no convincing ethical system ever was designed so that ​​it was accessible to calculation.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Kant, I. Derrida Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 137
DerridaVsKant: this "idea of an infinite justice" is not consistent with its identification as a "gift without exchange, without circulation". - "Without calculus, without control, without reason." - - -
Rorty III 203
DerridaVsKant: Verwechslung von kausalen Bedingungen mit mysteriösen "transzendentalen" Bedingungen.

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant, I. Descartes Vs Kant, I.
 
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Stroud I 131
Direct Perception/= Consciousness/Kant/Stroud: of things (of this kind) is then a sufficient proof of their reality! Stroud: thus we are in the everyday situation where the (Kant): "external perception ... provides the immediate proof of something real in space." (A 375).
DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is not in a position to do so.
Stroud: it is not about which of the two gives the correct description of the situation.
KantVsDescartes: his description cannot be correct. But he does not simply give a competing alternative. Rather, he defines conditions for access to knowledge.
Kant, I. Dewey Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 72
DeweyVsKant: in contrast to Kant s idea of ​​the synthetic activity of the mind, we never have to deal with a chaotic manifold. Our senses always deliver already interpreted material.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004
Kant, I. Esfeld Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 180
Eigenschaften/Wesen/intrinsisch/Esfeld: es mag sein, daß wir die intrinsische Natur der Welt nicht erkennen können. Aber wir brauchen uns nicht auf eine solche Metaphysik festzulegen. (EsfeldVsKant). Selbst wenn alle Eigenschaften relational sein sollten, würde uns nichts daran hindern, die daraus resultierende Beschreibung der Welt als im Prinzip vollständig betrachten zu können.
Ob unsere Welt so ist, daß alle Eigenschaften relational sind, ist eine empirische Frage.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Kant, I. Foucault Vs Kant, I.
 
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Habermas I 300
FoucaultVsKant: no longer synthetic performance of a subject, but pure structuralist activity. (Structuralism, in Foucault: "pure, decentered, rule-guided activity with elements of a transsubjective system).

Fouc I
M. Foucault
The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences 1994

Fouc II
Michel Foucault
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Kant, I. Frege Vs Kant, I.
 
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III 30
HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature!
III 30
Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious.
III 41
Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds
III 42
Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!.
III 43
A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity.
III 120
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
III 121
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts!.
IV 61
Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic.
I 119
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
I 120
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection.
I 121
The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts.
Stepanians I 34
Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics.
Stepanians I 34
pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view.
I 36
Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic.
Newen I21
Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical.
Quine X 93
Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory.
Tugendhat II 12
"Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable!

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Kant, I. Hacking Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 344
reciprocal space / electron microscope: the points of the diffraction pattern behave inversely related to the atomic structure of a crystal. The conventional space is turned to the outside. The near is far and the far is near.
I 344
 The crystallographers find it the most natural! Do they see the objects in reciprocal space? VsKant: there is no unique perceptual space any more.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Kant, I. Heidegger Vs Kant, I.
 
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Derrida I 47
HeideggerVsKant: the "I think that must be able to accompany all my ideas" this highest principle is metaphysical. - At the same time Kant is, for Heidegger, the "first and only" who thought the temporality of categories, since they have to be applicable to intuitions. Categories / Kant/Heidegger: makes clear, that Kant already thought the categories and their unit not as eternal and immutable principles, but as variable in time and through time!
II 87
VsKant: defines the being under the spell of being imagined.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Kant, I. Husserl Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 120
Ethics / Kant: can only be realized in autonomy, that is in distance to all the needs and inclinations. HusserlVsKant: for him missing and valuating acts are not already foreign regulations.
HusserlVs categorical imperative: the empty way of generalization is not sufficient to characterize ethical correctness.
Ethics / Husserl: feeling or value predicates have their own legalism.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart
Kant, I. Kripke Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 135Kant: "All analytic judgments are based entirely on the principle of contradiction and by their nature are a priori knowledge, the definitions on which they are based on may be empirical or not. Since the predicate has been thought of in terms of the subject, it cannot be negated by the first."
I 181
That is precisely why all analytic propositions are a priori judgments even though their terms are empirical. E.g. gold is a yellow metal. In order to know this, I need no further experience beyond my definition of gold. If that makes up my definition, I am only able to segment my definition, I cannot look anywhere else for it. Kripke: Kant seems to say that gold means simply yellow metal.
KripkeVsKant: Is Kant right? According to scientists, it is very difficult to define what a metal is. We also need to know the periodic table. One might think that there are actually two definitions, a phenomenological and a scientific one, where the latter replaces the former. Phenomenological: Stretchable, deformable, scientific: Periodic table. (KripkeVs).
A posteriori: one can learn a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent, and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant)

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Kant, I. Leibniz Vs Kant, I.
 
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Frege III 31
Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1, one can prove it, in a way:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2,
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
  Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains.
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4
  So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4
- - -

Leibniz I 83
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient.
1. Principle of contradiction
2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality).
as panlogically as Hegel's system.
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form.
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created.
Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate.
I 128
Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation".
The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential.
In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines":
The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „Das übergreifende Allgemeine“, >Paradoxies)
I 129
The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.)
LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance.
The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways.
1. as a whole but each time under another perspective
2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different substances,
3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference.
I 130
This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and
constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes].
The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation.
This is why all perceptions in each substance need to correspond to each other.
- - -
I 133
Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else.
I 134
The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Kant, I. Locke Vs Kant, I.
 
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Locke I 42
LockeVsKant: Locke geht es nicht um eine Analyse der transzendentalen Bedingungen von Erfahrungen, wie sie später von Kant unternommen wurde. Das hätte außerhalb seines Problemhorizonts gelegen.

Loc II
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Kant, I. Luhmann Vs Kant, I.
 
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AU Kass 7
Subjekt/LuhmannVsKant: Problem: ist das transzendentale Subjekt (Kant) eigentlich außerhalb der Welt? Ist es eine logische Folgerung der Transzendentalphilosophie, die ja keine empirische Theorie sein will, sondern sich auf Tatsachen des Bewusstseins berufen will, aber diese Tatsachen sollen keine empirischen Tatsachen sein. Also nicht ausdifferenziert in 5 Milliarden verschiedene Köpfe, sondern Auskunft über die Notwendigkeit der Formen des Denkens.
Von daher liegt es nahe zu vermuten, dass das transzendentale Subjekt außerhalb der Welt existiert.
Dann hätte man aber mit dem Beobachter-Begriff Schwierigkeiten, weil der Beobachter operieren und etwas bezeichnen muss, aber das geht nicht außerhalb der Welt, weil man die Unterscheidung innerhalb/außerhalb (der Welt) benutzt und diese Bezeichnung dann irgendwie spezifizieren muss.
Das ist in der Theologie am Gottesbegriff diskutiert worden: wie unterscheidet Gott als Schöpfer sich von der Welt und wie kann er ein Verhältnis zu sich selber gewinnen, wenn er die Unterscheidung ja praktizieren muss, um das zu tun!
Gott/Theologie: bei ihm ist eben alles anders, bzw. er hat Intuition, und kann ohne Unterscheidung zugreifen!
Gott/Nikolaus von Kues/Cusanus/Luhmann: für Gott gibt es keine Unterscheidung von Gott und Welt.
Subjekt/Fichte: das Subjekt ist ein Individuum.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Kant, I. McDowell Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 69
Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito.
McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality.
I 69
Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other.
I 109/110
Second Nature/(S): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education.
I 111
Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object).
McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature.
I 122
Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world.
I 123
McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background.
I 126
Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm.
I 127
"I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Kant, I. Moore Vs Kant, I.
 
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Stroud I 83
Existenzbeweis/Skeptizismus/Bsp Moores Hände/Problem der Außenwelt/Moore/Stroud: (Moore Proof of the external world, 1959, 127ff "PP"). Moore: will die Philosophen daran erinnern, dass sie in der Tat viele Dinge wissen, die sie angeblich bezweifeln.
Stroud: Moore erreicht tatsächlich einiges, selbst wenn sich herausstellt, dass es nicht das ist was er selbst denkt, das er es erreicht.
Kant/Moore/Stroud: Moore glaubt – was die meisten Autoren für mehr als fraglich halten – dass Kant angeblich beklage, dass es niemals einen Beweis der Existenz der Außenwelt gegeben habe. ((s) Kant bezweifelt nicht die Außenwelt, sondern unser Wissen von ihr).
MooreVsKant/Stroud: Moore denkt, dass er den Existenzbeweis liefern kann.
Kant, I. Nagel Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 129
NagelVsKant: unrestricted judgments about astronomy belong to a worldview that, compared to the Kantian alternative, is quite durable! In a conflict with Kant both opinions would be in competition, as there is no independent position from which to assess them.
- - -
I 137
NagelVsKant: but to defend ourselves against Kant's limiting of the reach of reason, we have to claim more than this.
I 138
Kant admits that we cannot help but understand ourselves as part of an independently existing world, though. But his thesis is not a thesis about the phenomenal world, but one about the relation of the phenomenal world to the world itself.
I 139
But since he claims that the normal scientific thinking only applies to the phenomenal world, he exempts himself from the usual conditions of evaluation. The thesis of transcendental idealism is itself not one of the synthetic judgments a priori whose validity it claims to explain, but a thesis, a priori it still is. If this is unimaginable or self-contradictory, the story ends here. It implies, as Kant says, thesis: that Berkeley's idealism is inevitable if we assume that the things themselves have spatial properties!
Nagel: the whole idealism becomes a hypothesis. There is something wrong with insisting that we had a bare idea of ​​our position in an consciousness-independent world, while arguing the logical possibility of something that goes beyond it.
PutnamVsKant: (elsewhere) from the fact that we cannot recognize the world as such does not follow that it must be completely different from what we do recognize.
- - -
I 146
NagelVsKant: we note that our unrepentant empirical and scientific thinking unabatedly prevails even against Kant's skepticism. Kant is implausible for empirical reasons and thus simply implausible. - - -
III 126
NagelVsKant: the step towards objectivity reveals how things are in themselves and not how they appear to be. If that is true, then the objective picture always omits something.
- - -
II 54
Ethics/Law/Moral/God/Theology/Nagel: an act does not become wrong by the fact that God exists. Murder is wrong per se and thus prohibited by God. (>Eutyphron contrast?). Not even the fear of punishment provides the proper motives of morality. Only the knowledge that it is bad for the victim.
NagelVsKant: categorical imperative: we could say that we should treat others considerately so that do likewise by us. That is nothing but good advice. It is only valid in as far as we believe that our treatment of others will have an impact on how they treat us.
Nagel: as a basis of ethics, nothing else is in question than a direct interest in the other.
II 55
Nagel: there is a general argument against inflicting damage on others which is accessible to anyone who understands German: "Would you like it if someone else did that to you?"
II 56
If you admit that you had something against someone else doing to you what you just did to him, you admit that he had a reason not to do it to you. Question: what is this reason? It cannot be anchored in the particular person.
II 57
It is simply a matter of consequence and consistency. We need a general point of view that any other person can understand.
II 58
Problem: this must not mean that you always ask if the money for the movie ticket would bring more happiness into the world if it was given to someone else. Because then you should no longer care more for your friends and family than for any stranger.
II 59
Question: are right and wrong the same for everyone?
II 60
Right/Wrong/Ethics/Morality/Nagel: if actions depend on motives and motives can be radically different in humans, it looks as if there could be no universal right and wrong for each individual. The possible solutions, all of which are not very convincing:
1) you could say: Although the same things for everyone are wrong or right, not everyone has a reason to do what is right and not to do what is wrong.
Only people with the "right moral motives" have a reason.
Vs: it is unclear what it would mean that it was wrong for someone to kill, but that he has no reason not to do it. (Contradiction).
2) you could say that the reasons do not depend on the actual motives of the people. They are rather reasons that modify our motives if they are not the right ones.
Vs: it is unclear what the reasons may consist in that do not depend on motives. Why not do something if no one desire prevents you from doing it?
II 61
3) you could say that morality is not universal. I.e. that someone would only be bound by morality if he had a specific reason to act like this, with the reason generally depending on how strongly you care for others. Vs: while making a psychologically realistic impression this conflicts with the idea that moral rules apply for everyone.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
Kant, I. Nozick Vs Kant, I.
 
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II 12
Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible.
How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible.
One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant).
- - -
II 110
Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution:
II 111
I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception."
NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he?
2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment.
3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff.
II 112
A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property:
1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick"
2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that.
I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective.
Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it.
Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem:
1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring.
People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you,
II 113
but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ!
Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring!
- - -
II 318
Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance).
What are actions to be connected to?
Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best").
Then we need to know the relevant facts as well.
II 319
Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions:
(1) Action A is correct
(2) S does A on purpose (intentionally)
(III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally.
(IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A.
Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar:
"Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger.
Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others".
then:
correctness:
(3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A
(4) if A were mandatory, S would do A.
"the best":
(1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum)
(2) S does A intentionally
(3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A
(4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A.
II 320
So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present.
Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway.
NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4).
In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different.
E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods).
Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness.
Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions:
A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4).
- - -
II 352
Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result.
How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation?
II 353
Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused.
2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason
3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source,
II 354
but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) ​​Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature.
Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature?
Could external sources not be as binding for us?
Why should I want to be moral?
Do I have to wish to be happy?
Why should I want to be rational?
"Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature".
Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult.
"Your nature, that is you."
If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah?
"But you have no choice, you had to be what you are."
So, that is what you offer me as freedom.
Objective morality seems to be something inevitable.
Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows:
"Do this if you wish to be rational"
"Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command).
Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us.
II 355
Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature.
Nozick: but does that not bind us, too?
Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives?
NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear.
Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?"
Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good.
Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part!
Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice).

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Kant, I. Peirce Vs Kant, I.
 
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James I 68
Sign / Peirce / VsKant: Vs construction by the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method which enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce, every thought is a sign.

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011
Kant, I. Popper Vs Kant, I.
 
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Kanitscheider I 440
Infinite/Space/Time/Antinomies/PopperVsKant: Solution: all elapsed time intervals (for example, seconds) and all future points in time can be conceived both as a potentially infinite sequence on the other hand, and as infinite sets of periods. Therein lies the difference between past and future and the direction of the arrow of time.
Kanitscheider: but this difference does not affect the difference between the potentially and the actually infinite:
I 441
EllisVsKant: (antinomies): the expressions "before" and "later" can certainly relate to states before a fixed time t0 without assuming that all these states have really existed! Just as we can speak of a temperature of 0 K, even though we know that this temperature cannot be reached.
I 442
Scriven, Michael: Thesis: no verifiable statement can be made on the finite age of the universe: To find the meaning of the "temporal origin of the world" we have to depart from what we mean by
"Nothing exists at time T1",
because this is the only way the sentence:
"Time T2 is the first moment when something exists" can be understood.
E.g. "time without things" is like "color without object", "movement without a body".
       Solution/Scriven: meaning and verifiability must be kept apart! Our understanding fails at the latter. But we can certainly relate meaningfully to any point in the past, because our time scale has no zero. Neither from "time without things", nor from "time before the first thing" any empirical information can be expected.
I 443
Origin/Universe/Kanitscheider: the question of the finite or infinite age of the world is not empirically decidable. Temporal infinity cannot be defended by means of logic, but only through the success of a model.        Of course, we have well-functioning models with singularity, which can be shifted in time.
I 444
But even the models with the geodesic incompleteness (see above) never have an edge, i.e. the geodesists have no starting point. There are always precursors which are, however, ever more crowded.

Po I
K. Popper
Objektive Erkenntnis Hamburg 1993

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Kant, I. Putnam Vs Kant, I.
 
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Horwich I 402ff
Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game.
I: But the author of the game also appears in the game itself (as in Pirandello).
"Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he is the "empirical I".
transcendental ego/Kant/Putnam: is the "real" author of the game. (Outside the game).
I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I'd modify his picture in two respects:
1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions.
2. The authors in the stories are the real authors.
PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories.
---
Putnam V 52
Determinism/Kant: said that such a defense component is of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system.
---
V 88
Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly. ---
V 89
I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary. ---
V 90
If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things.
PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking.
---
V 118
Rationality/Putnam: is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense.
---
Putnam I 93
Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly. "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system.
PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? should we use the term system of someone else?
---
I 169
Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects.
E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E".: Kant: in reality no judgment has come about.
Puntam: merely an inarticulate sound, a noise.
---
I 169/170
Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/Noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense.
Kant ignores this completely.
The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property.
The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation.
Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example.
---
I 170/171
At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Definition Truth/Kant: "the agreement of knowledge with its object".
PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth.
Assets/Kant: is attributed to the whole noumenal world.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Kant, I. Quine Vs Kant, I.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Danto2 I 132
QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear.   Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant.
- - -
Quine IV 407
Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is
b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans."
c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here.
Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context!
- - -
Quine VII 20
Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and
Relations of facts.
Leibniz: distinguishing
Truths of fact and
Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!)
VII 20/21
QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form
2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level.
Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts.
- - -
Quine XI 72
Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation.
Stroud I 210
Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge.
I 211
Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world.
All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference).
Stroud I 214
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here.
Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct.
I 215
Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem.
Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc.
Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings.
Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon.
- - -
Stroud I 248
Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and
b) what is true or false about the world on the other side
would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above).
StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true.
I 249
QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts?
StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else.
Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces.
Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge).
Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all.


Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Kant, I. Rorty Vs Kant, I.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 166
Synthesis/Synthesis/Kant/Rorty: an object, something that is true for multiple predicates, is always the result of synthesis. RortyVsKant: Kant's conception of cognition did not have perception as a model. Unfortunately, he still remained in a Cartesian frame of reference: he still formulated it in response to the question of how we can move from inner to the outer space. His paradoxical answer was that the outer space will constructed from the material of ideas.
I 169
Naturalism/Rorty: musing of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confuses cause and reason here).
I 171
Kant/Rorty: accepted that you must not equate the individual judgment with "the individuality of a sensibly given". RortyVsKant: he would have had to proceed to conceive knowledge as a relation between people and propositions. Then he not would have needed the concept of synthesis. He could have considered the person as a black box.
I 173
Concept/Rorty: we want to know if concepts are connectors. VsKant: the information that they cannot be if it were not for a number of synthesis waiting views, does not help us.
RortyVsKant: either machinery (synthesis) and raw material (views) are noumenal or they are phenomenal.
a) if the two are phenomenal, we can be aware of them (contrary to the conditions of deduction). If they are
b) noumenal, we cannot know anything about them, not even the statements of deduction!
I 174
Copernican Revolution/RortyVsKant: it is no longer attractive for us. Because the statement that knowledge of necessary truths is more understandable for manufactured than for found objects depends on the Cartesian assumption that we have privileged access to our activity of making.
IV 117
Comprehensibility/Noumenon/Thing in Itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: with him the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible in that he says, an expression is meaningful if it stands for a spiritual content which forms the synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the spiritual).
VI 256
Ethics/Morality/RortyVsKant: it will never be possible to justify his good suggestion for secularization of the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man with neutral criteria.
VI 257
This is not because they are not reasonable enough, but because we live in a world in which it would simply be too risky, yes often insanely dangerous, to grasp the sense of the moral community to the point that it goes beyond the own family or tribe. It is useless to say by Kant "recognize the brother in the other": the people we are trying to convince will not understand.
They would feel offended if we asked them to treat someone with whom they are not related like a brother or to treat an unbeliever like a believer.
VI 263
Def "Supernaturalism"/Santayana: the confusion of ideals and power. RortyVsKant: that is the only reason behind Kant's thesis that it is not only more friendly but also more reasonable not to exclude strangers.
RortyVsKant: Nietzsche is quite right in connecting Kant's insistence with resentment.
VI 264
RortyVsNietzsche: he is absolutely wrong in regarding Christianity and democracy as a sign of degeneration. With Kant he has an idea of ​​"purity" in common that Derrida calls "phallogocentrism". This also applies to Sartre:
Sartre: the perfect synthesis of In itself and For itself can only succeed if we free ourselves from the slimy, sticky, humid, sentimental, effeminate.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant, I. Russell Vs Kant, I.
 
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Bertrand Russell
Rorty I 177
RussellVsKant: Kant was simply mistaken about the nature of mathematics.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant, I. Sartre Vs Kant, I.
 
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Kant I 12
I / Kant: general I (I, which is produced by the morality) overcomes affective subjectivity. - Problem: the absolute I, In I-experience I burden myself with the affective and sometimes psychological pathos of existence: to be unique, but still not necessary. - Fear of nothingness, helplessness of reason.
Kant I 13/14
The unconditioned: necessary idea of ​​reason: to be able to think the unconditioned without contradiction. The contingent is pointless, it must be disposed of in the moral purification of the self. SartreVsKant: "For forty years I was moved by the Absolute, the Absolute neurosis is gone There remain tasks, countless...".
- - -
Rorty II 150
Kant/Sartre/SartreVsKant/Rorty: selbstbetrügerisches Streben nach Gewissheit. (Rorty pro Sartre).

Sart I
J.-P. Sartre
Being and Nothingness 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant, I. Searle Vs Kant, I.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 169
SearleVsKant: we do not need a concept a priori of creating, just as we must not have a concept a priori of red. Kant was right in that that the experiences have been coming already as causal to us. - - -
III 183
The idea of a reality outside is empty.
III 184
Such realism is not wrong, but ultimately incomprehensible. SearleVsKant: from the fact that all knowledge takes place within a cognitive system simply does not follow that no knowledge is ever direct knowledge of a reality that exists independently of all knowledge. It simply does not follow.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Kant, I. Strawson Vs Kant, I.
 
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Rorty VI 359
StrawsonVskKant/Rorty: shows that thanks to the progress since Kant some concepts are no longer that attractive: e.g. "in the mind", "created by the mind" (Wittgenstein, Ryle have dissuaded us from this). ---
Strawson V 9
StrawsonVsKant: appears to violate his own principles by attempting to set sense limits from a point which is outside of them, and that, if they are properly marked, cannot exist. ---
V 16
Continuous determination/Kant/Strawson: everywhere through the mind guaranteed applicability of the concepts. StrawsonVsKant: seed for the disastrous model of determination of the whole universe.
---
V 19
StrawsonVsKant: this one had unlimited confidence in a certain complicated and symmetrical scheme, which he freely adopted from the formal logic as he understood it, and forced upon this the whole extent of his material. ---
V 23
StrawsonVsKant: this one is constantly trying to squeeze out more of the arguments in the analogies than there is. ---
V 25
StrawsonVsKant: the whole deduction is logically incorrect. The connection to the analysis is thin and is, if at all, brought about by the concept of "synthesis". ---
V 37
Dialectic/Kant: primary goal: exposing the metaphysical illusion. Instrument: the principle of sense. Certain ideas that do not have any empirical application, are sources of appearance, yet they can have a useful or even necessary function for the extension of empirical knowledge.
E.g. we think of internal states of affair, as if they were states of affair of an immaterial substance. ("regulative ideas").
StrawsonVsKant: which is obviously quite implausible. But why did he represent it?
---
V 29
StrawsonVsKant: It is not clear that there is no empirical mediation of antinomies. ---
V 32
Kant: I really appear to myself in the time but I do not really appear to myself in time. StrawsonVsKant: incomprehensible what "to appear" means here. It is no defense of an incomprehensible doctrine to say that its incomprehensibility is guaranteed by a product obtained from its principle.
---
V 33/34
Space/time/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: things themselves not in space and time. Strawson: thereby the whole doctrine becomes incomprehensible. ---
V 35
Synthetically a priori/StrawsonVsKant: Kant himself has no clear conception of what he means with it. The whole theory is not necessary. Instead, we should focus on an exploration and refining of our knowledge and social forms. ---
V 36
Limit/StrawsonVsKant: to set the coherent thinking limits it is not necessary to think from both sides of these limits as Kant tried despite his denials. ---
V 49
Space/Kant: our idea of space is not recovered from the experience, because the experience already presupposes the space. StrawsonVsKant: that is simply tautological. If "to presuppose" means more than a simple tautology, then the argument is not enlightening.
---
V 50
StrawsonVsKant: he himself admits that it is contradictory to represent a relational view of space and time and to deny its transcendental ideality at the same time. ---
V 58
StrawsonVsKant: there are the old debates about "inherent" ideas of space and time. They are unclear. There is the argument that the acquisition of skills presupposes the ability to acquire skills.
Experience/space/time/properties/Kant/Strawson: problem: the manifestation of the corresponding trait in experience, his appearance in the world, can be ascribed only to our cognitive abilities, the nature of our skills, not to the things themselves.
StrawsonVsKant: problem: then these ideas must themselves be prior to all experience in us.
---
V 66
Categories/Strawson: we have to understand them here in the way that to the forms of logic the thought of their application is added in judgments. StrawsonVsKant: his subdivision of the categories puts quite a bit on the same level, which certainly cannot be regarded as equivalent as e.g. affirmative, negative, infinite.
---
V 73
StrawsonVsKant: he thinks it is due to the (failed) metaphysical deduction (see above) entitled to identify "pure" concepts. ---
V 75
StrawsonVsKant: why should the objects of consciousness not be understood as realities that are distinguished from the experiences of consciousness existence, even if sequence and arrangement coincide point by point with the experiences of consciousness? ---
V 83
StrawsonVsKant: unity of the different experiences requires experience of objects. Can his thesis withstand the challenge?
Why should not objects (accusatives) form such a sequence that no differentiation between their order and the corresponding experiences has to be made?
E.g. Such items may be sensory data: red, round spots, tickling, smells, lightning, rectangles.
---
V 84
Why should the terms not simply be such sensory quality concepts? StrawsonVsKant: it is very easy to imagine that experience exactly has this sort of unrelated impressions as its content. Impressions that neither require nor permit, to become "united in the concept of an object".
StrawsonVsKant: the problem with the objects of experience is that their ESSE is at the same time entirely their percipi how their percipi nothing but their ESSE. That is, there is no real reason for distinguishing between the two.
---
V 106
Room/persistence/Kant: The space alone is persistent. Any time determination presupposes something persistent. StrawsonVsKant: unclear. For the concept of self-consciousness the internal temporal relations of the sequence are completely insufficient. We need at least the idea of a system of temporal relations, which includes more than these experiences themselves. But there is no access for the subject itself to this broader system than by its own experiences.
---
V 107
StrawsonVsKant: there is no independent argument that the objective order must be a spatial order. ---
V 116
Causality/StrawsonVsKant: its concept is too rough. Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single concept of "necessity", but he shifts in his application, the meaning of this concept. The required sequence of perceptions is a conceptual, but the necessary sequence of changes is a causal one.
---
V 118
Analogies/StrawsonVsKant: fundamental problem: the conditions of the possibility of objective determination of time. Possible objects/Kant: Problem: whether there should be a "at the same time" or "not at the same time" of possible and actually perceived objects. If there is no "at the same time", there can be no distinction made between possible and real objects.
---
V 124
Pure space/Kant: is itself not an object of empirical perception. StrawsonVsKant: element of deceptive logic: Kant seems to think that certain formal properties of the uniform spatiotemporal frame must have direct correlates in the objects themselves.
---
V 128
StrawsonVsKant: its entire treatment of objectivity is under considerable restriction, he relies nowhere on the factor onto which, for example, Wittgenstein strongly insists: the social nature of our concepts. ---
V 157
StrawsonVsKant: but assuming that the physical space is euclidic, the world could be finite in an otherwise infinite empty space. And that would be no meaningless question. ---
V 163
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: from the fact that it seems to be the case that there are things which are ordered in time or space in a certain way, it does not follow that it either seems that all things appear as members of a limited series, neither that it seems that all things exist as members of an infinite series. In fact, neither of the two members of the disjunction is true. ---
V 164
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: certainly the notion of a sequential order is justified, but it does not follow that the concept for the "whole series" of things must apply. ---
V 178
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: he was mistaken that the antinomies are the field, on which the decisive battles are fought. ---
V 184
Existence/Kant: "necessity of existence can only be recognized from the connection with what is perceived according to general laws of experience." StrawsonVsKant: this is a deviation from the critical resolution of antinomies and has to do with the interests of "pure practical reason": that is, with morality and the possibility of free action.
---
V 194
StrawsonVsKant: we can draw the conclusion from the assertion that when a being of endless reality exists, it does not exists contingently, not reverse in that way that if something exists contingently, it is a character of endless reality. ---
V 222
Transcendental idealism/Kant: claims, he is an empirical realism. Confidence must include an awareness of certain states of consciousness independent of objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism. This dualism questions the "our".
---
V 249
StrawsonVsKant: to say that a physical object has the appearance, a kind of appearance of a physical character, means, trying to brighten an unclear term by another dubious, namely the one of the visual image.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant, I. Tugendhat Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 359
Gegenstand/Kant: zur Vorstellung eines Objekts kommt es erst durch eine "Regel" die eine "Verbindung" von mannigfachen "Vorstellungen" "notwendig" macht. TugendhatVsKant: missverständlich: es wäre klarer gewesen, von "objektiven Zusammenhängen" zu sprechen.
Kants Frage ist jedoch nicht, wie wir uns auf die Dinge beziehen, sondern inwiefern die Zusammenhänge unserer Vorstellungen nicht bloß subjektiv, sondern objektiv sind.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Kant, I. Wittgenstein Vs Kant, I.
 
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Brandom I 75
WittgensteinVsKant: standards pragmatic, not explicit. ---
Münch III 327
WittgensteinVsKant: new: regulated use is viewed (only) constitutively for all intuitive beyond the realm of concepts. Kant considered the descriptive as another ability. Precisely the "view" with a radically different procedure.
---
Kant I 12
I/Kant: general I (an I, which is produced by the moral) overcomes affective subjectivity. - Problem: the absolute I, in the I-experience I burden myself with the affective and sometimes psychological pathos of existence: to be unique, but still not neccessary. - Fear of nothingness, helplessness of reason. ---
Kant I 13/14
The Unconditional: necessary idea of reason: to think the unconditioned without contradiction. The conditional is meaningless, must be eliminated in the moral purification of the self. ---
Kant I 14
WittgensteinVsKant: In relation to the Absolute, there is nothing to see, nothing scientifically expressible anyway. "The solution to the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem." ---
Putnam III 220
WittgensteinVsKant/Putnam: you can read it this way that the language game so far resembles our lives, since neither the game nor life is based on reason. Thus, a core of Kantian philosophy is disputed. - - -
Wittgenstein II 35
There are no true a priori propositions (the so-called mathematical propositions are no propositions). WittgensteinVsKant. ---
IV 109
Chirality/WittgensteinVsKant/Tractatus: 6.36111 right and left hand are in fact completely congruent. That you cannot bring them to cover one another has nothing to do with that. One could turn the gloves in a four-dimensional space.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Kant, I. Verschiedene Vs Kant, I. Kanitscheider I 434
KantVsNewton: Unendliches unvorstellbar! NewtonVsKant: nicht vorstellbar, aber begrifflich erfaßbar!
Kanitscheider I 441
EllisVsKant: (Antinomien): die Ausdrücke "früher" und "später" kann man durchaus auf Zustände vor einem festen Zeitpunkt t0 beziehen, ohne anzunehmen, daß es alle diese Zustände wirklich gegeben hat. Genauso, wie man von einer Temperatur von 0 K sprechen kann, auch wenn man weiß, daß diese Temperatur nicht zu erreichen ist.
Kant I 28
VsKant/Kausalität: daran hält er sich selbst freilich nicht! Bei seiner Vernunftkritik geht es dem um mehr als möglicher Erfahrung (nämlich um Metaphysik durch Freiheit und so um den absoluten Wert unseres Daseins). Hier zeigt sich Kants Begriff der Kausalität als völlig unbetroffen von Hume. - "Intelligible Ursache".
I 47
Verstand: hat seine eigene Kausalität: "Spontaneität der Begriffe". (VsKant: von Hume unberührt). Antinomie der Freiheit: VsKant: ein Bluff: wir können es nicht mit Objekten machen, »es wird nur mit Begriffen und Grundsätzen, die wir a priori annehmen, tunlich sein.« - I 49 - Freiheitsantinomie: Lösung: dritte kosmologische Antinomie: Thema: die dritte Beschaffenheit der Welt als ganzer: Ereigniszusammenhang. - VsKant: Zumutung: das »handelnde Subjekt«, also ich, soll mich als ein "Beispiel" für Dinge nehmen! Unterliegt an sich nicht der Zeitbedingung. Spontaner Anfang von Ereignissen.
I 53
Freiheit/Kant: Die Freiheit des anderen wäre ungewiß. VsKant: Eine Freiheit, die sowohl meine wie die des anderen sein könnte, kann auf diese Weise nicht gedacht werden. - VsKant: er unterschlägt das Problem der Identifizierung mit dem anderen. (> Intersubjektivität, Subjekt/Objekt). I 52 Für Kant war das kein Problem: für ihn lag die Rettung nicht in der Erscheinungswelt. Begriff: Prädikate müssen lediglich widerspruchsfrei sein. I 66 SchulteVsKant: das gilt nur für Gegenstände, für die das immer entscheidbar ist, nicht für chaotische Mannigfaltigkeit. - I 67 Prädikate/Kant: Kant läßt die negativen Prädikate einfach weg. I 68
I 69
MarxVsKant: Dissertation von 1841: Kants Hinweis auf die Wertlosigkeit eingebildeter Taler: der Wert des Geldes selbst besteht ja nur aus Einbildung! Im Gegenteil, Kants Beispiel hätte den ontologischen Beweis bekräftigen können! Wirkliche Taler haben dieselbe Existenz, die eingebildeter Götter haben!«
I 104
Erst durch diese Idee stimmt die Vernunft a priori überhaupt mit der Natur überein. Diese Voraussetzung ist die "Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur" für unser Erkenntnisvermögen. > Lediglich logischer Zusammenhang. - VsKant: eigentlich Rückfall in "Übereinstimmungsdenken". Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls
RawlsVsKant: religiös geprägter Manichäismus. Weil das "gute Ich" , das in der intelligiblen Welt des Verstandes lebt, vom "bösen ich" der natürlichen sinnenwelt bedroht wird, muß das moralische handeln in dem Glauben verankert werden, es sei der Wille Gottes, das "höchste Gut" des Daseins in Übereinstimmung mit dem idealen Reich der Zwecke zu verwirklichen.
Moral/HegelVsKant: in einem wohlgeordneten Staat mit funktionierendem Rechtssystem muß der Einzelne nicht zur Moralität verpflichtet werden, sondern handelt in freiwilliger Übereinstimmung mit der sittlichen Verfassung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.
- - -
Menne I 28
Kant: transzendentale Begründung der Logik. Sie muss apriori gelten. Kant: analytisches Urteil: so eng gefasst, dass bereits der größte Teil der Mathematik und Logik in den Bereich des synthetischen Urteils fällt. MenneVsKant: wollte er die Logik aus den zwölf Kategorien begründen, so läge hier ein Zirkelschluss vor. - - -
Vaihinger I 333
Ding an sich/F.A. LangeVsKant/Vaihinger wenn das Ding an sich fiktiv ist, dann auch seine Unterscheidung von den Erscheinungen. ((s)Vs: die Unterscheidung ist nur gedanklich, nicht empirisch). - - -
Vollmer I XIV
Weltbild/Konrad LorenzVsKant: in keinem Organismus begegnen wir einem Weltbild, das im Widerspruch stünde zu dem, was wir Menschen von der Außenwelt glauben. Grenze/Lorenz: der Vergleich der Weltbilder verschiedener Arten hilft uns, die Begrenzungen unseres eigenen Weltbildapparates zu erwarten und anzuerkennen.





Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

Me I
A. Menne
Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997

V I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924
Kant, I. Mackie Vs Kant, I.
 
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Stegmüller IV 319
KantVsDeterminism: freedom is a prerequisite of our moral thinking. MackieVsKant: this yields the prerequisite of a metaphysical objectivism.
IV 320
VsDeterminism: undermines the possibility of moral judgement in general! One cannot have a conviction and at the same time assume that it is causally determined! VsVs: this reasoning is simply wrong: the determinacy does not undermine the correctness of the judgement!
Determinism/Stegmüller: today we know too little to decide whether it is true or false. But if it were true, would it undermine our moral thinking?
Terminology:
Def Incompatibility Thesis/morality/Stegmüller: if determinism were true, there would be no moral thinking. Responsibility, duty, benevolence etc. became meaningless.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 171
Mackie/VsKant: the categorical imperative is not of objective validity! There must be at least one premise that is not truth-apt, but expresses the fact that a decision has been made. - - -
Stegmüller IV 323
Self/MackieVsKant: supposed to act on the basis of rational arguments. Problem: how is that possible if the self is not causally connected to its acts by its reasons for action? How can actions belong to the self and yet be only random events?
The theorist of incompatibility would have to construct an analogon to causality and deny its causal character at the same time.
metaphysical Self/Kant/Stegmüller: essential for Kant, because it is the addressee of the moral ought.
MackieVsKant: as a subjectivist he does not even need to introduce the metaphysical self.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 431
God/immortality/morality/MackieVsKant: (i) has an ambivalent position: on the one hand primacy of practical reason whose claims are to be adopted by theoretical reason. On the other hand he asks if our knowledge is truly broadened by that.
Kant: "Certainly, but only in a practical sense."
Mackie: this revokes everything. Two possible interpretations:
1. Kant wants to say that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul can be proven as facts,
2. not as facts, but as the necessary conditions for our consciousness as a rational being.
IV 432
MackieVsKant: greatest weakness: 1. the transition from "we should seek to promote the highest good" to "that must be still possible". Ought/Kant: elsewhere he had tried to show that the "Ought" presupposes a correspondent "Can." (Where?). But that had been about the obediance of the moral law.

MackieVsKant: the analogy to the summum bonum does not make sense. But that be granted.
2. then, the thesis that we should seek to promote the highest good includes that we can seek to promote it. To conclude therefrom the possibility of a full realization is ineligible.
Moral/MackieVsKant: Kant cannot even assert that the possible realization were a necessary condition for moral thinking.
IV 433
MackieVsKant: the tension between his theism on the one hand and his emphasis on the autonomy of morality on the other is irresolvable. KantVsPopular notion: neither our knowledge of God and his will nor this will itself are a rationale of the moral law, but only reason!
Therefore, "self-legislation" of practical reason.
MackieVsKant: yet, Kant speaks misleadingly of "laws of the Supreme Being". But God himself is just another rational being!
MackieVsKant: the correspondence of morality and happiness is still represented in an unconscious thinking in terms of reward and punishment.
The consistent recognition of the autonomy of morality should have brought him towards more of a Stoic conception: that morality requires no other happiness than the awareness of righteousness itself (possibly Hume, Marc Aurel, Adam Smith)..
Morality/God/Kant: Kant seems to have been aware of this difficulty. In his Metaphysics of Morals he anticipates the argument of conscience by J. H. Newman. Also, he oscillates between the idea of God as a purely intellectual construction (e.g. Adam Smith's ideal observer) and the assumption of a real existence.
V 437
MackieVsMoral proofs of God: there are better explanations for action than for the existence of a divine person. Practical decisions must be based on convictions about facts and not vice versa!
Whatever we are inclined to view as a rational act is no evidence of what is actually the case.
IV 438
MackieVsKant: problem with his moral argument: if a particular practical principle presupposes certain factual allegations, then the reason, as pure as it may be, cannot claim to have demonstrated the validity of this practical principle, if it did not prove the validity of the relevant factual allegations independently. - - -
IV 461
Freedom/determinism/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: other kinds of freedom are fully compatible with determinism (e.g. freedom of neurotic compulsion)!
IV 462
Will/Kant: (Metaphysics of Morals): "is a kind of causality of living beings, as long as they are reasonable, and freedom would be the property of this causality, since it can take effect independent of external determining causes." "external causes": reward, punishment, but also desires and inclinations!
Autonomy/Kant/Stegmüller: here, consistency with its own ideal of reason is an end in itself.
MackieVsKant: misapprehension: he probably even thought himself to have characterized the contra-causal free will, but in fact he distinguished between external causes and the autonomous efficacy of the will. And that is something completely different!
IV 463
autonomous activity: completely compatible with two assumptions: 1. that there are sufficient preliminary causes for the will to have a certain strength.
2. that, whatever such a will does, is dependent on the character of the person and his*her strength of will.
Will/capriciousness(Willkür)/Kant/Stegmüller: later he differentiates the two: the latter is the only one that posses contra-causal freedom; it is the free will in its usual sense.
Freedom/Kant: (late) he moves completely towards autonomy (autonomous legality of the will).
Vs: but that is not a solution to our problem.
Judgement/conviction/Kant/Stegmüller: (Metaphysics of Morals): it is not possible to render a judgement in the theoretical (speuculative) realm or to express a genuine conviction, while at the same time admitting to having been externally induced to do so.
IV 464
Judgement/conviction/MackieVsKant: whoever makes a rational judgement cannot interpret it in a way that it was reached incorrectly. However, there is no problem in seriously holding a rational conviction and at the same time acknowledging that it has been reached in an appropriate manner.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Kant, I. Schopenhauer Vs Kant, I.
 
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Berkeley I 236
SchopenhauerVsKant: die Stelle des Dings an sich ist bei Berkeley keineswegs leer. denn der produktive Geist in seiner Spontaneität, den wir in uns als Willen kennen, füllt diese Stelle aus. Berkeley hatte allerdings in Gottes Garantie der Wirklichkeit ein Mittel zur Verfügung, das Kant nicht akzeptieren konnte.
Kant, I. Stroud Vs Kant, I.
 
Books on Amazon
I 145
Def Realität/real/(Kant: "was immer mit einer Wahrnehmung nach empirischen Gesetzen verbunden ist, ist real". (A 376).
I 146
StroudVsKant: aber er geht nicht ins Detail, wie wir Realität von Erscheinung in Einzelfällen unterscheiden können, wo die Frage auftauchen könnte.
I 159
Skeptizismus/transzendental/StroudVsKant: wiederlegt er den Skeptizismus wirklich mit seiner Transzendentalphilosophie? Ist sie eine bessere Antwort als andere? 1. Wir können seine Antwort nur verstehen, wenn wir seinen transzendentalen Ansatz verstehen und akzeptieren. Wir müssen dann auch seinen Idealismus akzeptieren.
I 160
Verstehen/Stroud: sollten wir am besten, wenn wir Menschen und ihr Verhalten beobachten (>Behaviorismus). Das wäre aber eine empirische Untersuchung. Es ginge um Sprache, Sprachverhalten und Spracherwerb.
StroudVsKant: wir verstehen sein Argument nur, wenn wir seinen Begriff des a priori-Wissens verstehen. Und diese Untersuchung setzt voraus, dass wir den transzendentalen Idealismus akzeptieren. Das scheint zirkulär! (Zirkel):
um den Idealismus wiederum zu verstehen, müssen wir die besondere Natur der Untersuchung verstehen, die den Idealismus transzendental macht.
I 161
2. StroudVsKant: (das wären sogar Kantische Gründe VsKant): nach Kant sind Gedanken nur möglich, wenn sie auf das angewendet werden, worauf Kategorien angewendet werden können. Aber das ist nur im Rahmen möglicher Erfahrungen möglich. Die Begriffe müssen eine empirische Anwendung haben können. ((s) Sie müssen also in der Empirie gelernt werden). StroudVsKant: wie ist’s dann möglich, dass wir überhaupt (transzendentale) Gedanken haben können, die nicht durch empirische Bedingungen bestimmt sind?
a) empirisch:
Bsp wenn Ausdrücke wie "direkt wahrnehmen" und "unabhängig von uns" im alltäglichen empirischen Gebrauch gegeben sind, dann sehen wir ((s) nach Kant!), dass
der Satz "Wir nehmen unabhängige Dinge direkt wahr" wahr ist. Empirisch verstanden heißt das einfach: Bsp ohne Spiegel oder Bildschirme.
b) transzendental: anderer Sprachgebrauch:
hier drückt der Satz "wir nehmen unabhängige Dinge direkt wahr" keine Wahrheit aus.
((s) Vorsicht, Stroud sagt nicht, dass er nach Kant falsch sei).
StroudVsKant: mit der transzendentalen Bedeutung entfernen wir uns also von der Alltagssprache.
KantVsStroud: würde erwidern, dass dieser Gebrauch für uns verständlich sein muss, sonst wäre Wissen über die Welt nicht möglich.
I 162
StroudVsKant: das führt zu zwei Problemen: 1. Angenommen, wir akzeptierten Kants Transzendentalismus:
Frage: warum wäre die Ablehnung des Idealismus auf transzendentaler Ebene attraktiver als ihn auf dem empirischen Ebene zu akzeptieren?
Warum lehnt Kant den empirischen Idealismus ab?
((s) "Bedingung"/empirisch/(s): eine Bedingung kann man nicht empirisch auffassen. Wohl aber ihr Erfülltsein > Tatsache . Einer Tatsache kann man aber nicht ansehen, dass sie etwas erfüllen soll.)
Lösung: einen entsprechenden Satz wahr machen. Dieser Satz muss aber zuerst geäußert werden).
StroudVsKant: wenn das Argument lautet, dass unser Wissen sonst auf die Dinge beschränkt wäre, von denen wir wissen, dass sie von uns abhängig sind, warum sollten wir dann "Zuflucht" suchen in der Sicht, dass unser Wissen auf Dinge beschränkt ist, die wir als (transzendental gesprochen) abhängig von uns erkannt haben.
Skeptizismus/StroudVsKant: ist gerade deswegen so schmerzlich, weil er kein Wissen von unabhängigen Dingen erlaubt. Warum sollte Kants Lösung weniger schmerzlich sein, bloß weil sie transzendental daherkommt?
Empirischer Idealismus/KantVsStroud: kann nicht wahr sein.
2. Frage nach der Stärke der Garantie, de Kants Transzendentalismus gibt:
Das entspricht der Frage, warum Kant den transzendentalen Realismus ablehnt.
KantVsTranscendental Realism: wäre keine korrekte Erklärung unseres Wissens, weil - wenn er wahr wäre - wir niemals von uns unabhängige Dinge direkt wahrnehmen könnten und daher niemals in Bezug auf ihre Existenz sicher sein könnten.
Damit gibt der transzendentale Realismus den Weg frei für den empirischen Idealismus, indem er die äußeren Dinge als etwas von den Sinnen getrenntes auffasst.
Problem: wir können uns dann unserer Repräsentationen bewusst sein, aber wir wissen nicht, ob ihnen auch etwas Existierendes entspricht!
StroudVsKant: er weist diese Einstellungen aus dem einzigen Grund zurück, aus dem transzendentale Erklärungen überhaupt zurückgewiesen werden können: dass sie keine Erklärung liefern, wie ist’s möglich, dass wir etwas wissen?
StroudVsKant: warum denkt er, dass der empirische Idealismus dem transzendentalen Realismus den Weg bereitet?
Wahrscheinlich weil er glaubt, dass die einzigen Dinge die wir direkt wahrnehmen können die Dinge sind, die von uns abhängig sind. Und das nimmt er nicht als empirische These an, sondern nur als transzendental verstanden.
Der Satz "alles was wir wahrnehmen ist abhängig von uns" ist wahr, wenn transzendental verstanden.
Kant/Stroud: wahrscheinlich nimmt er das an, weil er nicht versteht, wie Wahrnehmung möglich ist, ohne die Wahrnehmung einer "Repräsentation" oder etwas "in uns".
StroudVsKant: so erscheint hier die Thesis von der "epistemischen Priorität"
wieder:
I 164
Uns zwar von der empirischen auf die transzendentale Ebene verschoben. Wahrnehmung/Kant/Stroud: er kann direkte Wahrnehmung unabhängiger Dinge empirisch gesprochen nur akzeptieren, weil er sie nicht transzendental gesprochen akzeptiert.
StroudVsKant: wichtig: dass dies der einzige Punkt ist, den er ablehnt.
Kant: wenn wir äußere Dinge als Dinge an sich behandeln, ist es unmöglich zu verstehen, wie wir zu einem Wissen gelangen können.
StroudVsKant: Angenommen, Kant hätte recht, dass transzendentaler Realismus unser Wissen von äußeren Dingen unerklärt lässt.
Frage: warum soll das alleine hinreichend sein, unsere Theorie falsch zu machen, transzendental gesprochen? Könnte es nicht einfach transzendental wahr sein, dass die Dinge unwißbar sind?
Kant/Stroud: würde sagen, nein, so wie er "transzendental" versteht: transzendentales Wissen ist Teil der Erklärung unseres Wissens.
direkte Wahrnehmung/Kant: ist nur von abhängigen Dingen (Repräsentationen usw.) möglich.
Transzendentaler Realismus/Kant/Stroud: würde dann sagen müssen, dass es außerdem noch unabhängige Dinge gibt. Nämlich solche, die diesen Repräsentationen entsprechen. Aber dann wären wir gezwungen zu schließen, dass alle unsere Repräsentationen (Sinneserfahrungen) inadäquat wären, um die Realität dieser Dinge zu etablieren. (A 369). Die äußeren Dinge wären dann getrennt von den Dingen, die uns bewusst sind.
StroudVsKant: das einzige Problem des transzendentalen Realismus ist dann, dass er unsere Erklärung "wie ist Wissen möglich", verhindert.
I 165
Problem: dann gibt es keine unabhängige Weise, seine Wahrheit oder Falschheit festzustellen. Der einzige Test seiner Akzeptabilität ist, ob er eine Erklärung möglich macht. Transzendentale Ästhetik/transzendentaler Idealismus/Kant/Stroud: der transzendentale Idealismus ist in die transzendentale Ästhetik eingebunden: (A 378), und zwar unabhängig von diesen Konsequenzen.
StroudVsKant: aber er ist nicht anders als transzendental oder a priori eingebunden als a priori Bedingung einer Untersuchung der Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Wissen. Und das ist die einzige Möglichkeit, wie eine transzendentale Theorie überhaupt begründet werden kann: dass sie die einzige mögliche Erklärung unseres synthetisch a priori möglichen Wissens in Geometrie und Arithmetik ist.
Skeptizismus/StroudVsKant: es gibt also keine unabhängige Möglichkeit, eine transzendentale Theorie zu begründen. ((s) als dass sie die einzige Erklärung für etwas anderes ist). Dann muss man fragen, ob der Skeptizismus damit überhaupt widerlegt ist.
I 166
Skeptizismus/StroudVsKant: es gibt mindestens zwei Weisen, in der eine Erklärung unseres Wissens von der äußeren Welt fehlschlagen kann: Wenn Skeptizismus wahr wäre; Kant beansprucht, das wenigstens empirisch gesprochen widerlegt zu haben, aber nur, indem er eine transzendentale Version derselben Beschreibung an die Stelle gesetzt hat.
Verstehen/StroudVsKant: wenn wir den Transzendentalismus (transzendentalen Gebrauch unserer Wörter) überhaupt verstehen, ist dieser Gebrauch nicht befriedigend. Er repräsentiert Wissen immer noch als beschränkt auf Dinge die ich als abhängig von mir verstehe.
Damit bin ich erneut ein Gefangener in meiner Subjektivität.
Transzendentaler Idealismus/StroudVsKant: ist dann letztlich schwer vom Skeptizismus zu unterscheiden.
D.h. nicht, dass er dasselbe wie empirischer Idealismus wäre, sondern er ist als Erklärung unbefriedigend, und zwar auf der empirischen Ebene!
I 167
Transzendentaler Idealismus/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant würde sagen: "ich verliere nichts, wenn ich ihn akzeptiere". Mein Wissen ist nicht beschränkt auf die Dinge, die empirisch von mit abhängig sind oder nur empirisch subjektiv sind. Ich bin theoretisch in der Lage, die beste Physik, Chemie und andere Wissenschaften zu liefern. Ich bin in einer besseren Position als Descartes.
StroudVsKant: aber dann ist all unser wissenschaftliches Wissen nach Kant immer noch subjektiv oder von unserer menschlichen Sensibilität abhängig.
I 168
Wissen/Erklärung/StroudVsKant: wir könnten aber auch auf eine andere Weise einer Erklärung entbehren: nicht weil der Skeptizismus wahr wäre (und damit nichts zu erklären wäre) , sondern weil die allgemeine philosophische Frage nicht schlüssig gestellt werden kann! (>Carnap, s.u.). Kant/Stroud: Pointe: plädiert in einer Weise für eine eingeschränkte ("deflationary") Sicht, die dieser Kritik entspricht. ((s) deflationär hier: nicht auf den umfassendsten Rahmen gerichtet, s.u.).
KantVsDescartes: wenn seine Frage kohärent gestellt werden könnte, wäre Skeptizismus die einzige Antwort. Daher ist die Frage illegitim.
StroudVsKant: dieser erklärt damit aber nicht, worüber Descartes besorgt war.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant, I. Hegel Vs Kant, I.
 
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Leibniz I 32
Hegel: we must not "let multiplicity disappear in unity". If deduction were only possible as reduction (as with Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought.
Kant: draws from this the consequence of founding the unity of the world in the priority of thought. Only then is unity transcendentally or subjective idealistically justified.
HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to explain the unity of being with the unity of the being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history.
---
Rorty II 153
HegelVsKant/Rorty: both God and the moral law must be temporalized and historized to remain credible.
Rorty VI 195
HegelVsKant/Rorty: "transcendental idealism" is just another name for skepticism.
VI 203
HegelVsKant/Rorty: he is too much geared towards scientific research. ---
Vollmer I 220
Knowledge/Criterion/Realization/Vollmer: we need a criterion for when realization is valid. Such a criterion would itself be a piece of knowledge and would also need a criterion recourse. On the other hand, the criterion could not be a simple convention, since a convention cannot justify any recognition. If at all, then by further conventions. Regress.
This is approximately:
SchellingVsKant: we need a recognition of recognition. And that is circular.
HegelVsKant: Examination of recognition: cannot be carried out without recognizing. As if you wanted to learn to swim before you go into the water.
Vollmer: the argument was developed by Leonard Nelson and is therefore called "Double Nelson".

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Kant, I. Chisholm Vs Kant, I.
 
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II 57
Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: closer to Kant than most. Also synthetically a priori: Chisholm pro.
II 58
But in terms of the form of the sentences in which s.A. may occur: VsKant: very different ontological framework.
Content:
I. distinction synth./anal.
II. Property theory
III. Involvement of properties (with anal. judgments) ChisholmVsLanguage-related view. IV. Property inclusion and property existence. Result:
SauerVsChisholm: Thesis: neither a conception of sA nor one of the analyticity seem to be fundable with Chisholm’s property theory.
II 60/61
Synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there exist non-analytical a-priori propositions of the form "All S is P". Synth a priori/VsKant: He gives the E.g.: "Space is three-dimensional", but this is contradicted by Riemann. Kant’s criterion of "strict generality" can therefore not imply the form "All S are P".
II 62
Synth a priori/ChishomVsKant: Much more phenomenological than Kant, who overlooked in fatal restrictedness the material (synthetic) a priori. Husserl: "contingent a priori" (e.g. color sets).
II 76
Analytic/Synthetic/Kant/Sauer: for Kant the distinction serves only to prepare the question: "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" That is the question of the "third party" on which reason is based and to recognize the predicate as belonging that is not in the concept of the subject. ChisholmVsKant: asks on the other hand, how truths of reason a priori propositions are possible.
I 77
SauerVsChisholm: it is difficult to see where the specific significance of a s.A. should lie, as he conceived it.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Kant, I. Cavell Vs Kant, I.
 
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II 196
Kategorischer Imperativ/CavellVsKant: sollte besser ein Kategorischer Deklarativ sein: eine Beschreibung dessen, was es heißt, moralisch zu sein.
II 197
Kategorischer Deklarativ: sagt, was man tatsächlich tut, wenn man moralisch ist. Er kann nicht gewährleisten, daß man nicht unmoralisch handeln wird.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002
Kant, I. Leeds Vs Kant, I.
 
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Horwich I 381f
Relevance/Unambiguity/Role/Explanation/Truth/Leeds: The ambiguity of T does not show, however, that T is not playing an important role, but that other truthlike relations are as important. Analogy to metric: Physics cannot be established in a non-standard spacetime, but it does not mean that explanations which use metric are not explanations. Explanation/LeedsVs: That is a bad analogy: Why physicists prefer a specific statement that there is a well-understood sense in which competing explanations can be equivalently regarded as essential - incorrect statement: "Most sentences of our theory are T".: that is completely empty: Suppose the theory is consistent and complete - then it would follow that it comes out as "true" under different incompatible W predicates - "success" would be to accept just any of the W predicates - if we already accept atomic physics, we do not need W theory that explains why the atomic physics work. Solution/Leeds: The right explanandum is not that some theories work, but that we (accidentally?) have some theories that work – Important Argument: T could still become important: But it would not be a coincidence according to T!
I 384
wrong: To define truth with terms of our method. LeedsVsKant: That would be like his Copernican revolution: We can arbitrary change our scheme. - Problem: 1. then we could no longer say that our induction could also harm us - 2. we could no longer say that our theories are successful because they are true.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Kant, I. Schlick Vs Kant, I.
 
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Wittgenstein I 204
synthetically a priori/Schlick:/SchlickVsKant: "What can you answer a philosopher who thinks that the statements of phenomenology are synthetic judgments a priori?"

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Kant, I. Kanitscheider Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 438
Kant: "kosmologisches Alter" ist ein sinnloser Begriff. (>Antinomien).
I 439
Antinomien/Raum/Zeit/Kosmologie/Kant: Asymmetrie zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft: in der Vergangenheit kein Durchlaufen einer unendlichen Reihe von Zeitpunkten möglich. Für die Annahme eines Weltbeginns müsste es eine Zeit davor gegeben haben. In einer solchen "Leeren Zeit" kann aber nichts entstehen, da es keine unterscheidenden Merkmale gibt, die der Existenz vor der Nichtexistenz den Vorzug gäben.
I 440
Kosmologie/Antinomien/KanitscheiderVsKant: übernimmt zu schnell den absolutistischen Standpunkt und bedenkt nicht den relationalen, wonach mit dem ersten Ereignis die Raumzeit selbst entstanden sein könnte. Mengen/Kanitscheider: aktual unendlich.
Folgen/Kanitscheider: potentiell unendlich.

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Kant, I. Cantor Vs Kant, I.
 
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Thiel I 165
CantorVsKant: "vager, instinktloser Gebrauch des Unendlichkeitsbegriffs".

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Kant, I. Vaihinger Vs Kant, I.
 
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Vaihinger I42 ff
Def praktische Fiktion/Freiheit/Vaihinger: ihr entspricht in der Wirklichkeit nichts, sie ist aber eine notwendige Fiktion. Auch falsche Begriffe haben den Wert eines Ideals. Ideal/Vaihinger: Bsp die Einheit von gut und wahr ist ein Ideal.
Kant/Vaihinger: Freiheit: "die Idee", d. h. als Fiktion.
VaihingerVsKant: der reaktionäre Zug, den man auch sonst bei Kant findet, bewog ihn, aus der Fiktion doch wieder eine Hypothese zu machen, welche von den Epigonen dann in ein Dogma verwandelt wurde.
I 77
Ding/Kant/Vaihinger: nahm an, die wahre Welt bestehe aus Dingen an sich, welche in gegenseitiger Einwirkungen begriffen seien. VaihingerVsKant: machte aus der Fiktion des Dings an sich eine Hypothese. (Falsch).
I 148
VaihingerVsKant: was Kant bei anderen einsah, sah er bei sich selbst nicht klar, dass auch sein Ding an sich eine Fiktion sei.
I 173
Kategorien/Tradition/Vaihinger: die ursprüngliche Psyche besaß vielmehr Kategorien als heutzutage. Deren Spuren lassen sich in allen Sprachen nachweisen, es sind einfach Analogien. Die Kategorien sind also keineswegs angeboren. Sie sind im Lauf der Zeit angewandt und ausgewählt worden. Ihnen kommen in verschiedenen Sprachen ganz verschiedene Analogien zu. (VsKant.)

V I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924
Kant, I. Vollmer Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 25
VollmerVsKant: heute glaubt man nicht mehr, dass seine Kategorien notwendig sind. Auch die Naturgesetze haben nicht die allgemeine und notwendige Geltung!
I 84
Theorie/Vollmer: reicht weiter als unser Mesokosmos: Das verstehen aber viele Philosophen nicht:
VsKant,
VsAnalytic Philosphy: Alltagssprache
VsPositivism
VsPhenomenalism: z.B. Mach: Sinnesempfindung ist alles. VsOperationalism: jeder Begriff müsse in mesokosmischen operationalen Termini definiert werden.
Vollmer: dennoch kommen wir nicht umhin, jedes Objekt, jede Struktur der empirischen Wissenschaft mit menschlichen (also mesokosmischen) Erfahrungen zu verbinden.
- - -
I 103
Kausalität/KantVsHume: Instinkte können versagen, das Kausalgesetz scheint nicht zu versagen. Kausalität/VollmerVsKant: was Kant beschreibt, ist bestenfalls ein normaler erwachsener Kulturmensch.
Evolutionary epistemology: Biologie statt synthetisches Apriori. Lediglich mesokosmisch angemessen.
I 173
Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: dieser sieht nicht, dass das Gebiet seiner traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie viel zu eng ist. Er bemerkt nicht den Unterschied zwischen mesokosmischer und theoretischer Erkenntnis
Er kann folgende Fragen nicht beantworten:
Wie entstehen unsere Kategorien?
Warum haben wir gerade diese Anschauungsformen und Kategorien?
Warum sind wir gerade an diese apriorischen Urteile gebunden und nicht an andere?
Kant gibt falsche Lösungen für folgende Probleme:
Sollten wir die Idee einer organismischen Evolution akzeptieren?
Warum können wir einander verstehen?
Wie ist intersubjektives Wissen möglich?
Können die Kategorien als vollständig erwiesen werden? (Vollmer: Nein!)
Können sie wissenschaftlich gerechtfertigt werden?
- - -
I 193
synthetische Urteile a priori/VollmerVsKant: bis heute hat noch niemand ein einziges Exemplar solcher Urteile geliefert. Obwohl sie logisch möglich erscheinen.
I 196
Deduktion/Kategorien/Kant/Vollmer: man muss sich klarmachen, dass Kant mit seiner "Deduktion" nicht einmal beabsichtigt, eine Rechtfertigung für spezielle Kategorien zu geben. Er zeigt lediglich, wie sie benutzt werden. Kategorien/Kant/Vollmer: als Begriffe können sie nicht wahr oder falsch sein (w/f).
Zu jeder Kategorie gibt es aber ein Prinzip des Verstandes, das aufgrund seines transzendentalen Charakters ein Naturgesetz liefert. Deshalb kann eine Diskussion (und mögliche Rechtfertigung) der Kategorien durch eine der zugehörigen Gesetze ersetzt werden.
I 197
Prinzipien des reinen Verstandes/Kant/Vollmer: vier Gruppen: 1. Axiome der Anschauung Anwendbarkeit der euklidischen Geometrie auf
a. Objekte, - b. Zustände, und - c. Prozesse.
2. Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung
a. Stetigkeit des Raums, - b. Stetigkeit der Zeit, - c. Stetigkeit physikalischer Prozesse
3. Analogien der Erfahrung
a. Beharrung der Substanz, b. universelle Kausalität, c. universelle Wechselwirkung der Substanzen.
4. Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt.(hier nicht Prinzipien, sondern Definitionen) .
I 199
VollmerVsKant: zeigt nirgends, dass seine Rekonstruktion die einzig mögliche ist. Seine Darstellung der Newtonschen Physik ist wohl nicht angemessen. Physik/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Materie: hält er für unendlich teilbar (NewtonVs).
Trägheitsprinzip: hat er nicht verstanden, denkt fälschlich, jede Zustandsänderung bedürfe einer äußeren Ursache. Gleichförmige Bewegung braucht jedoch keine Ursache!
Dachte fälschlich, Gewehrkugeln erreichten ihre höchste Geschwindigkeit erst einige Zeit nach Verlassen des Laufs. (TrägheitsprinzipVs).
Hat Infinitesimalrechnung nie beherrscht
Hat das Wesen der experimentellen Methode nie ganz verstanden. hat die Rolle der Erfahrung unterschätzt.
I 202
Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: mit Tieren sollte Intersubjektivität unmöglich sein. Es sollte unmöglich sein, mit Schimpansen zu kommunizieren. Schlimmer noch: eigentlich sollten wir uns gegenseitig nicht verstehen. Denn es gibt nach Kant keinen Grund, warum die kognitiven Strukturen der anderen Menschen mit meinen identisch sein sollten.
Grund: Erkennen und Wissen sind für Kant an die transzendentalen kognitiven Strukturen jedes einzelnen gebunden und darauf beschränkt. Daher könnte sie auch völlig idiosynkratisch sein.
Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: glücklicherweise gibt es sie auf der Erde. Der Transzendentalphilosoph kann das als Faktum registrieren. Erklären kann er sie nicht.
VollmerVsKant: der Ursprung der Intersubjektivität bleibt für Kant rätselhaft, unerklärlich, eine überraschende empirische Tatsache.
Vollmer: Intersubjektivität wird natürlich von der EE erklärt.
EE/Vollmer: unsere Raumanschauung ist dreidimensional, weil der Raum es ist. Sie ist zeitlich gerichtet, weil reale Prozesse es sind. (PutnamVs).
I 208
Erkenntnis/VollmerVsKant: offensichtlich müssen wir zwei Erkenntnisstufen unterscheiden: 1. Wahrnehmung und Erfahrung sind auf evolutionären Erfolg hin ausgerichtet und daher hinreichend korrekt.
2. Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis ist nicht auf evolutionären Erfolg ausgerichtet.
Kant trifft diese Unterscheidung nicht.
I 210
VollmerVsKant: aus der Tatsache, dass jede faktische Erkenntnis mit mesokosmischen Mitteln getestet wird, schließt er fälschlich, dass sie auch auf den Mesokosmos beschränkt sei. - - -
I 304
Ding an sich/Messen/Vollmer: wir messen zwar die Länge eines Körpers mit irgendeinem Maßstab, trotzdem sprechen wir von der Länge des Körpers. (sic: Referenz auf „Ding an sich“ durch Vollmer).
I 305
Wissen/VollmerVsKant: unser Wissen ist zwar nie absolut sicher, aber es unterscheidet sich doch ganz erheblich vom Wissen über Erscheinungen.
I 306
Zwar mag vieles unbekannt sein, aber es gibt kein Motiv, hinter der Welt noch eine unerkennbare Wirklichkeit an sich zu postulieren.
I 307
VollmerVsKant: die "nackte Wirklichkeit" kann von uns zwar nicht gesehen, wohl aber erkannt werden! - - -
II 48
Def Natur/Kant: das Dasein der Dinge, sofern es nach allgemeinen Gesetzen bestimmt ist. Natur/VollmerVsKant: unnötig eng und petitio principii: weil die Allgemeingültigkeit der Kategorien dadurch zu einer analytischen Konsequenz dieser Definition wird. (Zirkulär).

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Kripke, S. A. Brandom Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 805/806
The legitimacy of a chain of name tokenings depends on how the reference is passed on, just like in an anaphoric chain. Caution: According to Kripke, different beliefs of the users of proper names do not change the reference of those Tokenings as long as the user "specifies that it is used in the name of references common in the community." (> Kripke).
I 965
BrandomVsKripke: That sounds as if one would need to have the concept of reference in order to use an expression in an anaphorically tranferring way. Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! The "Cicero" E.g. shows that not all need to belong to the same chain, but that there is also no need for quasi-names which would play a role that corresponds to quasi-indexical expressions in de-dicto attributions of strong de-re attributions.
Any belief, be it strong or be it weak, can be attributed de-re or de-dicto.
I 807
The fact that the anaphoric analysis does not come into play at Kripke is due to his "Millian" theory of the semantics of proper names. BrandomVsKripke: his front position between Millian and Fregean principle makes it unclear whether (Millian): direct attribution, direct reference, i.e. that it is not permitted to refer back to anything other than the reference.
It also does not seem reasonable to treat other cases like this. "This" and other demonstratives are not really "directly referential" but require implicit sortals.
I 855
BrandomVsKripke: difference descriptive/causally historical is alright, but it gets dark when he is alleged to have shown that these are two ways of looking at the relation of language and consciousness to the world. Because that is not applicable to predicates. Never was a descriptive theory of meaning drawn up by predicates. At least the basal predicates get their reference through connection with the properties. (see BrandomVsKant).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Leibniz, G.W. Frege Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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III 31
Numbers / LeibnizVsKant: because the provability of the numerical formulas has claimed. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4 Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1 one can prove it, in a way.:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
Axiom: If one inserts the same, the equation remains true.
III 44
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4   So by Axiom: 2 + 2 = 4
FregeVsLeibniz: here is a gap that is covered by omitting parentheses. It should be called more precisely: each (1 + 1), (2 + 1), etc.
  Then we see that the set 2 + (1 + 1) = (2 + 1) + 1 is missing.
(see LeibnizVsKant, FregeVsKant)
FregeVsLeibniz: this tends falsely to regard all truths as provable.

- - -
Leibniz I 38f
Definition/Leibniz: always in the form of the identical sentence A = B, the predicate is identical to the subject. (FregeVsLeibniz) Substitutability/Leibniz: "Making obvious through the consequences".
Contrast: Prove by reason.
  I 46
  "Chain of definitions": reduction of complex concepts to simple ones.
  I 48
  "Chain of evidence": problem: where is the beginning?

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Stegmüller IV 388
Kontingenz/Leibniz: jedes Ding ist kontingent, weshalb es nicht so wäre, wenn ein anderes Ding anders wäre. Alle Dinge sind kausal verbunden. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit dieser Dinge, weshalb die Welt als Ganzes ebenfalls kontingent ist!
Welt/Leibniz: es mag durchaus sein, dass die Reihe der Ursachen unbegrenzt ist. Leibniz nimmt nicht notwendig einen zeitlichen Anfang an!
zureichender Grund/Leibniz: muss dann außerhalb der Welt liegen! Es muss etwas anderes sein als die Welt!
IV 389
Er muss ein notwendiges Wesen sein. VsLeibniz: 1. Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund braucht?
2. Kann es ein notwendiges Wesen geben, das einen zureichenden Grund in sich selbst hat?
Sollte die zweite Frage negativ beantwortet werden, hat die Gesamtheit keinen zureichenden Grund!
KantVsLeibniz: der kosmologische Beweis beruht implizit auf dem (widerlegten) ontologischen Beweis. (s.o. KantVsDescartes).
IV 390
Existenz/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: die Auffassung, der Begriff der Existenz gehe vollständig im Existenzquantor auf, ist umstritten! Existenz/Kontingenz/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: wir könnten notwendige Existenz als Negation von Kontingenz auffassen.
Problem: 1. Die Prämisse, die Welt als ganzes sei kontingent (es würde nicht existieren, wenn etwas anderes anders gewesen wäre), müsste fallengelassen werden: Selbst wenn jeder Teil der Welt kontingent ist, spricht nichts für die Annahme, dass die Welt als ganze nicht existieren würde, wenn nicht (sic?) etwas anderes anders wäre oder gewesen wäre.
Der Schluss von der Kontingenz jeden Teils auf die Kontingenz des Ganzen ist unzulässig.
2. Alternative: Kontingenz: etwas sei kontingent, wenn es auch nicht existieren könnte.
IV 392
Das muss man mit der obigen Bemerkung kombinieren, dass es nicht logisch unmöglich wäre, dass das behauptete notwendige Wesen auch nicht existieren könnte. Das aber ist unverständlich. zureichender Grund/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund haben muss? Bisher hat niemand eine Notwendigkeit a priori dafür zu zeigen vermocht. Das hätte auch keine Plausibilität:
1. Es ist richtig, dass wir immer nach Symmetrien suchen, aber es gibt keine Garantie, dass wir sie immer finden.
2. Wir halten uns immer innerhalb unserer Welt auf, Extrapolationen sind unzulässig!
Selbst wenn nun alles innerhalb der Welt einen zureichenden Grund hätte, hätten wir kein Recht, auf einen zureichend Grund außerhalb der Welt zu schließen.
Verbreitetes Argument: die Dinge müssen durch und durch verstehbar sein.
MackieVs: das stimmt überhaupt nicht!
IV 393
Wir haben keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass sich das Universum nach unseren intellektuellen Bedürfnissen richtet.

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Mackie, J. L. Verschiedene Vs Mackie, J. L. Stegmüller IV 435
Gott/Newman: nun gibt es keine irdische Person, die dieser Rolle voll gerecht würde! Glauben/MackieVsNewman: Argumente erzeugen selten den Glauben, wenn sie ihn auch bestärken.

NewmanVsMackie: tatsächlich ist es vielmehr die tatsächliche Erfahrung des Gewissens!
1. Es gebietet legitim (oder autoritativ)
2. Es weist über den Handelnden hinaus
3. Die Sanktionen müssen von einer Person, einem intelligenten Wesen herrühren.
MackieVsNewman: 1. das führt nicht zu Unendlichkeitsattributen Gottes.
2. Man kann nur entweder der ersten oder den beiden anderen Prämissen zustimmen.
Dilemma:
a) Wenn das Gewissen als gültig genommen wird, schreibt es bestimmte Handlungen als vernünftig vor. In der Handlung selbst ist das ein "Getanwerdensollen".
In diesem Fall braucht man nicht jenseits der Handlung nach einem höheren Wesen zu suchen.
IV 436
Dass hier Bedauern, Schuldgefühle usw. auftreten, ist natürlich: denn das Gewissen selbst sagt uns, dass wir so empfinden sollen. Außerdem treten die Schuldgefühle einer (menschlichen) Person gegenüber auf, die wir schlecht behandelt haben, und nicht gegenüber Gott. b) Wenn wir das Gewissen nicht einfach so hinnehmen, sondern versuchen es kritisch zu deuten, dann stoßen wir tatsächlich auf Personen, aber auf menschliche und nicht auf göttliche. Eltern, Lehrer, Institutionen usw.
IV 437
So gibt es hier entweder den ethischen Objektivismus und den Intuitionismus oder eine naturalistisch psychologische Deutung des Gewissens als bessere Hypothesen. MackieVs moralische Gottesbeweise: bessere Erklärungen für Handeln als für die Existenz einer göttlichen Person.
Praktische Entschlüsse müssen sich auf Tatsachenüberzeugungen gründen und nicht umgekehrt!
Wir können nicht das, was wir als vernünftiges Handeln anzusehen geneigt sind, als Beweis für das heranziehen, was der Fall ist.
IV 438
MackieVsKant: Schwierigkeit seines moralischen Arguments: wenn ein bestimmtes praktischen Prinzip ganz bestimmte Tatsachenbehauptungen voraussetzt, dann kann die Vernunft, so rein sie sein mag, nicht beanspruchen, die Gültigkeit dieses praktischen Prinzips aufgezeigt zu haben, wenn sie nicht unabhängig davon die Gültigkeit der fraglichen Tatsachenbehauptungen nachgewiesen hat.




Plato Aristotle Vs Plato
 
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Bubner I 23
AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king.
Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects.
Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it.
 I 119
Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul).
Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing.
In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge.
 I 120
Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé.
 I 164
Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology,
            2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology.
The relationship between the two is problematic.
AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development.
I 165
Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good.
Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities.
      "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which.
I 184
Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". ---
Kanitscheider II 35
Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe.
Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position).
"Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number".
II 36
Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement.
First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified.
World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time.
AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius:
Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help".
Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum.
II 37
Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Platonism Benacerraf Vs Platonism
 
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Paul Benacerraf
Field II 324
BenacerrafVsPlatonismus/Field: Standardargument: wenn es Objekte gibt so wie der Platonismus sie annimmt, wie sollten wir einen epistemischen Zugang zu ihnen haben? (Benacerraf 1973). Benacerraf/Field: gebrauchte damals ein Argument gegen die Kausaltheorie des Wissens.
PlatonismusVsBenacerraf: griff daher die Kausaltheorie an.
Field: aber Benacerrafs Einwand geht viel tiefer und ist von der Kausaltheorie unabhängig.
Benacerraf: These: eine Theorie kann zurückgewiesen werden, wenn sie von der Annahme eines massiven Zufalls abhängig ist. Bsp die zwei Aussagen:
II 325
(1) John und Judy haben sich jeden Sonntag nachmittag im letzten Jahr zufällig an verschiedenen Orten getroffen, (2) sie haben kein Interesse aneinander und würden nie planen sich zu treffen, auch gibt es keine andere Hypothese zur Erklärung.
ad (2): soll eine Erklärung durch irgendeine „Korrelation“ unmöglich machen.
Wenn (1) und (2) sich auch nicht direkt widersprechen, stehen sie doch in starker Spannung zueinander. Ein Glaubenssystem, das beide vertritt, wäre höchst verdächtig.
Pointe: dann ist aber auch der Platonismus höchst verdächtig! Denn er postuliert eine Erklärung für die Korrelation zwischen unseren mathematischen Glaubenseinstellungen und mathematischen Tatsachen. (>Zugang, > Zugänglichkeit) Bsp warum wir nur dann dazu tendieren zu glauben, dass p, wenn p (für ein mathematisches p). Und dafür müssen wir wiederum einen mysteriösen kausalen Zusammenhang postulieren, zwischen Glauben und mathematischen Objekten.
PlatonismusVsVs/Field: kann sich darauf berufen, dass es starke logische Verbindungen zwischen unseren mathematischen Überzeugungen gibt. Und in der Tat, in der modernen Zeit kann man sagen dass wir
a) dazu tendieren, verläßlich zu schließen, und dass die Existenz mathematischer Objekte dem dienen oder
b) dass wir p als Axiom nur akzeptieren, wenn p.
FieldVsPlatonismus: das erklärt aber die Verläßlichkeit wieder nur durch irgendwelche nicht- natürlichen geistigen Kräfte.
VsBenacerraf/Field: 1. er „beweist zu viel“: wenn sein Argument gültig wäre, würde es alles a priori Wissen unterminieren (VsKant). Und insbesondere logisches Wissen unterminieren. („Beweist zu viel“).
BenacerrafVsVs/FieldVsVs: Lösung: es gibt eine fundamentale Trennung zwischen logischen und mathematischen Fällen. Außerdem kann man „metaphysische Notwendigkeit“ der Mathematik nicht dazu gebrauchen, Benacerrafs Argument zu blockieren.
FieldVsBenacerraf: obwohl sein Argument überzeugen VsPlatonismus ist, scheint es nicht überzeugend VsBalaguer zu sein. II 326
BenacerrafVsPlatonismus/Field: (Benacerraf 1965): anderer Ansatz, (einflußreiches Argument):
1.
Bsp es gibt verschiedene Möglichkeiten, die natürlichen Zahlen auf Mengen zu reduzieren: Def natürliche Zahlen/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 ist die leere Menge und jede natürliche Zahl >0 ist die Menge, die als einziges Element die Menge die n-1 ist, enthält.
Def natürliche Zahlen/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: jede natürliche Zahl n ist die Menge, die als Elemente die Mengen hat, die die Vorgänger von n sind.
Tatsache/Nonfaktualismus/Field: es ist klar, dass es keine Tatsache darüber gibt, ob Zermelos oder von Neumanns Ansatz die Dinge „richtig darstellt“. Es gibt keine Tatsache die entscheidet, ob Zahlen Mengen sind.
Das nenne ich die
Def strukturalistische Einsicht/Terminologie/Field: These: es macht keinen Unterschied, was die Objekte einer gegebenen mathematischen Theorie sind, so lange sie in den richtigen Relationen zueinander stehen. D.h. es gibt keine sinnvolle Wahl zwischen isomorphen Modellen einer mathematischen Theorie. …+…

Bena I
P. Benacerraf
Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Quine, W.V.O. Stegmüller Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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Stegmüller IV 390
Existenz/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: die Auffassung, der Begriff der Existenz gehe vollständig im existential quantifier auf, ist umstritten!

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Redundancy Theory Kant Vs Redundancy Theory
 
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Metz II 486
KantVsReductionism: The self will never be explored, it can only be thought of in the most abstract concepts of "transcendental apperception". DamasioVsKant: We have a more secure foundation in our body with its skin, its bones, its muscles, the joints, the internal organs, etc.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Skepticism Kant Vs Skepticism
 
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Stroud I 129
Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable!
Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept.
"Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism.
Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all.
I 130
Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world.
Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors.
Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard.
Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition!
KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition.
KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it.
World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)).
immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371).
Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375).
DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable.
Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation.
KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge.
I 132
At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable.
Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives!
I 140
Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects.
I 141
Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible!
Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion.
Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes.
Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects).
I 142
We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge).
I 146
Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations).
I 147
Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases.
Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion).
KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions.
I 148
Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible:
no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us.
Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism.
KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge.
Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena.
KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false.
Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life.
I 159
Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things.
- - -
I 168
Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Carnap, S.U.). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework).
KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate.
StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Skepticism Quine Vs Skepticism
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
Stroud I 231
QuineVsSkepticism/Stroud: what is wrong with it in Quine's view? How can it be avoided? Naturalism/Quine: Solution: reflection on knowledge takes place within science, not beyond it.
QuineVsSkeptcism: Thesis: is an overreaction to the uncertainty of individual possibilities of deception. But skepticism is not inconsistent in itself.
"Overreaction"/Stroud: it would be an overreaction if I rejected the entire science because of certain insecurities. E.g. if my car did not start on a particularly cold day and I scrapped it because of that, it would be an overreaction. But from the simple fact that deceptions sometimes happen we cannot infer that deceptions always happen or that we know nothing about the world. ((s) This is Quine's position!).
I 232
Skepticism/Stroud: comes into play when all sensory experience is compatible with competing theories. And that would be no overreaction. E.g. If I cannot say on the basis of my sensory experience whether it's a goldfinch, it is not an overreaction to say I do not know that it's a goldfinch. Stroud: it looks as if the skepticism is not as well confirmed as other views.
ScepticismQuine/Stroud: what Quine calls like this is far from where Descartes gets at the end of his first meditation.
DescartesVsQuine: does not claim that we should base our predictions on dreams. And if he rejects science as a source of knowledge, it does not mean that we cannot make predictions any more if we adhered to the science.
Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: Quine speaks of future experience that could possibly support the skeptic, as if these doubts were not justified in this precise moment!
I 233
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not, is not something that will be decided by future experience or through experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine does - then we already know what future experience will be like! We will always be up against the question of the surplus of our rich output over the lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted with an experience today that undermines our belief, then skepticism is justified today. But: Important argument: it was just as justified in 1630!
I 234
Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with reductio ad absurdum. We'll have to rebuild the ship out at sea. The traditional epistemologist can saw out (identify!) the piece of the ship which represents the lean input.
I 248
QuineVsSkepticism/Stroud: Quine's idea is that if we deprive philosophy of its alleged "external position" that is sufficient to exclude that we arrive at a completely skeptical result in terms of our knowledge. That comes down to the naturalized as the only possible theory of knowledge. StroudVsQuine: I have shown, however, that this does not work as long as we understand our own knowledge as a projection.
This corresponds to Kant's objection:
Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general separation between
a) everything we learn through the senses on one side,
b) what is true or false about the world on the other side
would exclude us forever from knowledge (see above).
StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us with no independent reason to assume that any of our projections are true.
I 249
QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all information of external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from it? Do I not just contradict scientific facts?
StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment, and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else.
Important argument: we know - and he may also know - a lot of things that happen in the world, beyond those events. He himself will also know little about these events that take place on his sensory surfaces.
Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge).
Surely, without any sensory experience we would not come to any beliefs about the world at all.
I 250
Consciousness/Quine: we avoid the issue of consciousness by directly talking about the input.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Spinoza, B. Hegel Vs Spinoza, B.
 
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Leibniz I 31
Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: who starts from the thinking requirement of substantial unity of the world and the experience requirement of the qualitative diversity of beings (the manifold), can comprehend this manifold only as manifestations or aspects of a substance in which "all which was thought to be true, has gone down." However, with this the the actual condition of thinking, the distinctiveness of thought content, is exposed!Leibniz saw the danger.
---
I 32
Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in unity". If the deduction was only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), that would be the self-destruction of the world in thinking.
Kant: draws the consequence to establish the unity of the world in the priority of thought. The unit is then justified only transcendentally or subjectively idealistic.
HegelVsKant: attempts to renew the metaphysics of substance that would justify the unity of being in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute spirit in world history.
- - -
Rorty II 112
Truth/HegelVsSpinoza/Rorty: relinquishes the belief of Spinoza, that we recognize the truth when we see it. Truth/Spinoza: Thesis: W. we recognize when we see it.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Various Authors Goodman Vs Various Authors
 
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I 81
GoodmanVsIntrinsic/Extrinsic: this does apparently not work: because in every classification of properties in extrins./intrins. each image or each object has both internal and external poperties.
II Preamble Putnam IX
GoodmanVsFormalism for the Sake of Formalism. GoodmanVsIdea of ​​an ontological basement independent from our theorizing
II 10
It is not true that science could do without unreal conditional clauses. The tendency to dismiss the problems of unr. conditional clauses as a pseudo-problem or unsolvable is understandable considering the great difficulties (GoodmanVs.) If you drop all problems of disposition, possibility, scientific law, confirmation, etc., then you are in fact giving up the philosophy of science.
II 67
The argument that one should better dispense with the definition of an expression if it was not usually defined by scientists or laymen, is similar to the argument that philosophy need not be systematic, because the reality described by it is not systematic (VsAdorno). You might as well say that philosophy should not be in German, because the reality is not written in German.
II 70
(s) SalmonVsGoodman: Objects do not need to appear at all times, but places must be there at all times! ((s) GoodmanVs: Description dependence for him does not only refer to objects, but to the whole of reality. (VsKant)) Kant: space and time are not reality, but the condition for the possibility to experience reality. III 67 Presentation/Empathy/GoodmanVsEmpathy Theory: Gestures do not need to have features in common with music.
III 81
Metaphor: the general question: What does a metaphor say and what makes it true? GoodmanVsMetaphor as abridged comparison: sometimes we say a metaphor is elliptically designed and the metaphorical truth was simply understood as the literal truth of the extended statement. But the comparison cannot just result in the image of the person being similar in one respect or another. In this way, everything is similar to everything.
III 224
GoodmanVs"Special Aesthetic Emotion" - GoodmanVs Theory that it does not depend on the pleasure that one has, but on a certain "objectified pleasure": Goodman: Then the pleasure would be something that the object must have, and indeed rather without causing it; ultimately it would therefore probably have to feel this pleasure itself.
III 228
GoodmanVsDichotomy between the Cognitive and the Emotional. It blocks the insight that emotions work cognitively in the aesthetic experience.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989
Various Authors Mackie Vs Various Authors
 
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Stegmüller IV 399
"Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds!
MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy.
IV 400
Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason?
2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable!
God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems:
1. Has God simply emerged with the time?
2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced!
3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again.
Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume:
a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and
b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable.

IV 401
Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not.
a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses.
b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself!
- - -
Stegmüller
IV 447
Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole.
MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act.
- - -
IV 472
Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive.
Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent.
MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all.
- - -
IV 271
Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 502
Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition!
When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe.
Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life.
IV 503
Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct.
Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld.
The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing.
IV 504
According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume.
Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions.
Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense.
IV 504/505
Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes!
PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements. (> Wittgenstein).
MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood!
IV 506
MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism.
Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference!

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Various Authors Kanitscheider Vs Various Authors
 
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Kanitscheider I 433
Unendlichkeit/materielle Existenz/Physik: einige Modelle verlangen physikalische Unendlichkeit: die hyperbolische Welt der Allgemeine Relativitätstheorie (AR), die Steady Astate theory (SST). Unendlichkeit/Mathematik/Physik:
Gauß: skeptisch gegenüber aktual unendlichen Größen.
LucretiusVsArchimedes: Unendlichkeit bloße Möglichkeit eines Objektes, neue Raumzeitpunkte zu durchlaufen? (Bis heute Diskussion).
Bolzano: die objektive Existenz unendlicher Mengen kann nicht an der Unmöglichkeit scheitern, sich jedes einzelne Objekt vorzustellen.
I 434
NewtonVsDescartes: nicht "unbestimmter" sondern aktual unendlicher Raum! KantVsNewton: Unendliches unvorstellbar!
NewtonVsKant: nicht vorstellbar, aber begrifflich erfassbar!
Riemann: Unterscheidung unendlich/unbegrenzt (neu!). Lösung für das Problem des "Jenseits des Raums". Dreierkugel (S³) begrifflich analytisch problemlos handhabbar.
I 435
Mengen/unendlich: hier ist der Satz: "Das Ganze ist größer als die Teile" nicht mehr anwendbar. (Aber extensionale Bestimmung auch nicht nötig, intensionale reicht). Raum: Frage: kann ein offener unendlicher Raum mehr als Aleph0 Objekte endlicher Größe enthalten?
Lösung: "dichteste Packung" räumlich konvexer Zellen: diese Menge kann nicht größer als abzählbar sein. Damit kein a priori-Hindernis dafür, dass die Zahl der Galaxien in einem unbegrenzten Riemann Raum von nichtendlichem Volumen die kleinste transfinite Kardinalzahl ist.
- - -
II 102
Messung/Bewusstsein/Beobachter/Quantenmechanik/QM: psychologistische Interpretation: Fritz London und Edmund Bauer, 1939. >New Age Bewegung.
II 103
These: der Beobachter konstituiert durch sein Bewusstsein die neue physikalische Objektivität, nämlich die Drehung des Vektors im Hilbertraum. 1. KanitscheiderVsBauer: Problem: dann ist überhaupt kein definitiver Einzelzustand der Materie ohne den Eingriff einer Psyche vorhanden.
2. KanitscheiderVsBauer: einerseits wird das Bewusstsein in die quantenmechanischen Gesetze einbezogen andererseits soll es im Innern des Beobachters wieder Sondereigenschaften besitzen, nämlich jene, die das kombinierte System von Objekt, Apparat und Beobachter ohne äußeren Anstoß aus dem hybriden Überlagerungszustand in den Einzelzustand überführt, in dem die Teilelemente entkoppelt sind.
3. KanitscheiderVsBauer: merkwürdig, dass die Schrödinger-Gleichung, das grundlegendste Gesetz der QM damit nicht auf das Bewusstsein anwendbar sein soll.
4. KanitscheiderVsBauer: außerdem Zweifel, ob das Bewusstsein wirklich im Überlagerungszustand von verschiedenen völlig gleichwertigen Seelenlagen sein kann.
(Bauer hatte seine These von Erich Bechers interaktionalistischen Leib Seele Dualismus übernommen II 104).
- - -
I 423
Raumkrümmung/Empirische Messung/Schwarzschild/Kanitscheider: Schwarzschild: Verzerrung des Dreiecks, das durch die Erdbahnparallaxe gebildet wird. Obwohl die Krümmungsfaktoren nicht bekannt sind, kann man schließen, dass wenn der Raum hyperbolisch ist, (K < 0), die Parallaxe der sehr fernen Sterne positiv sein muss.
I 424
Beobachtet man nun Sterne mit verschwindender Parallaxe, dann liefert die Messgenauigkeit eine obere Grenze für den Wert negativer Krümmung. Wenn der Raum sphärisch ist - die Parallaxe negativ sein
Schwarzschild: beim hyperbolischen Fall müsste der Krümmungsradius mindestens 64 Lichtjahre,
im elliptischen mindestens 1600 Lichtjahre betragen.
KanitscheiderVsSchwarzschild: solche theorieunabhängigen Versuche gelten heute mit Recht als aussichtslos.
- - -
I 296
Zeitreisen/Kanitscheider: VsZeitmaschine/VsWells: H.G.Wells macht den Fehler, dass er den Reisenden auf dem gleichen irdischen Raumpunkt die Weltlinie der Erde auf- und absteigen lässt. Genau dies führt zur begrifflichen Unmöglichkeit von Vorwärts und Rückwärtsbewegung in der Zeit. Zeitreisen/AR/Kanitscheider: das ändert sich, wenn Materie ins Spiel kommt.

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Various Authors Vollmer Vs Various Authors
 
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II 169
Methode/Physik/Vollmer: es gibt überhaupt nicht die Methode der Experimentalphysik. Worin bestünde dann die "Einheit der Wissenschaft"?
II 170
Bondi: Methode ist das Wichtigste an der Wissenschaft. VollmerVsBondi: Ergebnisse sind wichtiger als die Methode, Einheit der Wissenschaft bedeutet mehr als Einheit der Methode.
II 97
DitfuthVsIdentity theory/Vollmer: (VsEvolutionistische Identitätstheorie): Leben sei zwar als Systemeigenschaft durchaus verstehbar. Ein materielles System sei jedoch entweder belebt oder nicht belebt. Es gibt nichts dazwischen. Lebendigkeit ist eine Alles oder Nichts Eigenschaft. Dagegen gebe es unterschiedliche, ja sogar unbegrenzt viele Grade von "Beseeltheit": Das Psychische sei nicht sprunghaft, sondern ganz allmählich entstanden!
Daher sei es unzulässig, der Materie das "Seelische" einfach als weitere, analoge Stufe anzuhängen.
Ditfurth Thesis: die Evolution hat allein deshalb zur Entstehung unseres Gehirns und damit des Bewusstseins führen können, weil das Geistige in dieser Entwicklung von allem Anfang an präsent und wirksam gewesen ist! ((s) >McGinn).
II 98
VollmerVsDitfurth: dieser konstruiert hier einen Gegensatz, der in dieser Schärfe gar nicht besteht. 1. Auch Leben ist in vielen kleinen Schritten entstanden. Allerdings sind die Zwischenstufen längst eliminiert. 2. Auch vom Bewusstsein kann man sagen, etwas sei entweder "beseelt oder nicht "beseelt".
Bewusstsein/Geist/Seele/Vollmer: man wird in Zukunft stärker zwischen den einzelnen Funktionen: Gedächtnis, Abstraktion, Sprachfähigkeit, Selbstbewusstsein unterscheiden müssen.
- - -
I 40
VollmerVsCopernicus/VollmerVsKant: erst die EE nimmt den Menschen wieder aus seiner zentralen Stellung als "Gesetzgeber der Natur" und macht ihn zum Beobachter kosmischen Geschehens, das ihn einschließt. - - -
I 293
VollmerVsVs: kein Kritiker definiert "Erkenntnis", allein Löw: dazu gehöre Subjektivität (die er aber auch nicht definiert). Information/Löw: Information gibt es immer nur für ein Subjekt". Vollmer pro, aber vielleicht zu dogmatisch.
Ähnlichkeit/Löw: Ähnlichkeit gibt es nur für ein Subjekt.
VollmerVsLöw: das ist sicher falsch.
- - -
VollmerVsProjection theory
II 90
VsIdentity theory/Vollmer: psychische und physische Prozesse erscheinen gänzlich unvergleichbar. Neuronale Vorgänge sind lokalisiert, das Bewusstsein nicht. Vollmer:(pro Identitätstheorie): Manche Identitätstheoretiker nehmen das gar nicht ernst, aber das Argument ist auch gar keine Bedrohung: wir können die Verschiedenheit projektiv deuten: als subjektive und objektive Aspekte ein und derselben Sache. Abb. Zylinder erscheint von verschiedenen Seiten als Kreis oder Quader. (s)Vs: Bsp nicht zwingend.
VollmerVsVs: Identität: nicht alle Eigenschaften müssen übereinstimmen: der optische und der haptische Eindruck eines Apfels sind auch nicht identisch. ((s) Das sind extrinsische Eigenschaften).
II 92
Projection/Vollmer: so erklärt das projektive Modell die scheinbare Unvereinbarkeit unterschiedlicher Eigenschaften wie Geist und Physis als verschiedene Aspekte derselben Sache.
II 93
VsProjection/Vollmer: könnte als Rückfall in die Postulierung einer unbekannten Substanz gedeutet werden. VollmerVsVs: Lösung: Systembegriff der Systemtheorie:
Systemtheorie/Vollmer: Bsp Diamant/Graphit: bestehen aus den gleichen Kohlenstoffatomen, sind aber in anderer Struktur aufgebaut.
Bsp Diamant/Silizium: gleiche Struktur, andere Bausteine: (hier Silizium).
II 94
Keine der Komponenten ist der anderen logisch oder ontologisch vorgeordnet! Kenntnis der einen ersetzt nicht die Kenntnis der anderen. Beide sind konstitutiv. Das zeigt, wie wenig mit der Kenntnis der Bausteine gewonnen ist.
- - -
I 282
VsEvolution theory: kann Erfolg Wahrheit garantieren? Wahrheit/Simmel: geht tatsächlich den Weg, Erfolg mit Bewährung und Bewährung mit Wahrheit gleichzusetzen. >Pragmatismus.
Evolutionary epistemologyVsSimmel: sie übernimmt diesen pragmatischen Ansatz nicht. Sie unterscheidet streng zwischen Wahrheitsdefinition und Wahrheitskriterium.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Vollmer, G. Kant Vs Vollmer, G.
 
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I 206
KantiansVsEvolutionary epistemology/EE/KantianismVsEvolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: if Kant is right, the limits of factual knowledge coincide with the limits of sensory experience.
Now, if the EE detects a match with the reality, how can it claim to know what the objective reality truly is?
I 207
VollmerVsKantians: This transcendental argument is wrong. The earth seems to be stationary, yet it moves. The space seems Euclidean, but it is not. Therefore, our knowledge goes beyond the perception via our senses.
According to Kant, quarks, elementary particles, atoms, molecules, electromagnetic fields, neutron stars, black holes, quasars, etc. should never be objects of empirical science since they cannot be seen.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
eliminat. Materialism Pro Frank I 578
Rorty per eliminative materialism: is linked to Feyerabend - RortyVsKant, RortyVsDescartes
Fra I 584
Foucault: man disappears, Rorty: the mental disappears).

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Mathematics Kant, I.
 
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Field I 79
Def Logicism / Field: is the thesis that mathematics is part of logic. This is   VsKant: who denies that mathematics is analytic, because the calculations are synthetic. And for the calculations we need the numbers as entities.
LogicismVsKant - KantVsLogicism.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Moore s Hands Stroud, B.
 
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I 83
Existence proof/Skepticism/E.g. Moores hands/Problem of the external world/Moore/Stroud: (Moore Proof of the external world, 1959, 127ff "PP"). MooreVsKant: Moore thinks that he can deliver the proof of existence.
I 108
Stroud: it is not always possible to reject a denial of knowledge by referring to a particular known thing.
Realism Stroud, B.
 
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I 151
metaphysischer Realismus/Kant/Stroud: These daß es Dinge gibt, die von uns unabhängig sind) erweist sich daher empirisch als wahr. Wegen der empirischen Unterscheidung zwischen unabhängigen Dingen (Steinen) und von uns abhängigen Dingen (Traum). B. (empirischer epistemischer Realismus).
"unabhängig"/epistemisch/Kant/Stroud: dasselbe kann man über den epistemischen Aspekt sagen: Bsp wir unterscheiden in der Erfahrung zwischen Dingen die wir direkt (Bsp im Tageslicht in mittlerer Entfernung) und solche, die wir indirekt (Bsp über Spiegel oder Bildschirm) wahrnehmen.
I 152
Lösung (s.u.): selbst hier gibt es eine einzelne Unterscheidung: der Begriff der -ždirekten-œ Wahrnehmung sollte dann nicht selbst als -žempirisch-œ verstanden werden. Die These des empirischen Realismus ist dann selbst eine -žtranszendentale-œ These. Lösung/Kant/Stroud: wenn er die Wörter -žabhängig-œ, -žunabhängig-œ und transzendental-œ gebraucht, ist er Idealist.
transzendental/Stroud: eine transzendentale These kann nicht empirisch bestätigt oder widerlegt werden.
...I 163
StroudVsKant: so scheint hier die These von der -žepistemischen Priorität-œ wieder:

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Morality Oakeschott, M.
 
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Rorty III 106
Moral/Oakeshott/Rorty: These »eine Moral ist wieder ein System allgemeiner Prinzipien noch Regeln, sondern eine Volkssprache. (VsKant).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Supernature Santayana, G.
 
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Rorty VI 263
Def "Supernaturalismus"/Santayana: die Verwechslung von Idealen und Macht. RortyVsKant: das ist der einzige Grund hinter Kants These, es sei nicht nur freundlicher, sondern auch vernünftiger, Fremde nicht auszuschließen.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997